(9 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis may be my last contribution in the House, after 18 years here. I have always believed that we are, to coin a phrase, in Europe but not run by Europe. I have always believed that one can be a good European but a pragmatic European who believes that this debate goes beyond red, yellow and green cards, and so on, as the hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) said. I discovered in 12 years serving on delegations to the Council of Europe and the Western European Union that many of the opinions expressed in this House are expressed by our colleagues right across Europe in other national Parliaments.
I spent the years running up to the dissolution of the WEU arguing with the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council about what the right form of parliamentary scrutiny over European common security and defence policy is. Europe does not, whatever Mr Juncker might have said in the past 24 hours, have an army or a defence budget. It has a foreign policy courtesy of its 28 member Governments, not one of its own. There was a rightful role for national Parliaments to play there, but, sadly, we have lost that kind of effective parliamentary scrutiny over even that collective action. Today, we are asked to take note of two documents. That is all we can do.
We should remind ourselves how we got to this situation. The Laeken declaration brought about the current treaties—the so-called Lisbon treaty—and it was a document signed by the leaders of all the European Union member states in 2001, explaining what they considered to be good about the EU and what problems it faced. It recognised at that time the disillusion and wish for reform that was widespread across Europe. Those were the terms, in that declaration, that were given to Giscard d’Estaing’s Convention on the Future of Europe and it set out how he should work to respond. Unfortunately, he did not comply with the instructions he was given and he produced a European constitution. That was discussed, modified and eventually signed in October 2004 as what we now know as the Lisbon treaty.
Let me just read out what the Laeken declaration said about the democratic challenge facing Europe:
“Within the Union, the European institutions must be brought closer to its citizens. Citizens undoubtedly support the Union’s broad aims, but they do not always see a connection between those goals and the Union’s everyday action. They want the European institutions to be less unwieldy and rigid and, above all, more efficient and open. Many also feel that the Union should involve itself more with their particular concerns, instead of intervening, in every detail, in matters by their nature better left to Member States’ and regions’ elected representatives. This is even perceived by some as a threat to their identity. More importantly, however, they feel that deals are all too often cut out of their sight and they want better democratic scrutiny.”
That was in 2001, and we are here today debating those very questions about the division of competences between the Union and the member states.
As we take note of these documents, we should look at how we can improve relations between the Commission and national Parliaments and how we can make subsidiarity and proportionality mean what they say. These will be matters for the next Parliament; but as a first step, we can improve our own relations. Scrutiny of legislation, which is done marvellously by our European Scrutiny Committee, is all very well, but it is generally too late. The laws have already been made. They are already set in stone. We can huff and puff and have debates and discussions in this Chamber or in the various European committees, but what we really need to do is to be involved in the formation of policy at a very early stage.
We need to engage with our colleagues in the European Parliament. They are elected by the same British electorate as we are. To start with, we need to give them back their passes for this building, so that they can come and meet us. It is clearly ridiculous that their passes allow them to move around the House of Lords but that they are not allowed to move around the House of Commons. They have to stop where the red carpet ends.
When we have the next Conservative Government after the election, we need to make sure that we engage with the leaders across Europe in seeking to redress the balance of power between Brussels and the member states. We will call for engagement not just with the Commission and with the European Parliament—with the Brussels elite—but in the national capitals of Europe. Members of this House may need to brush up on their French, German or Italian and engage in dialogue with our colleagues across Europe. They may be surprised that the frustrations expressed here about the lack of subsidiarity, the lack of proportionality, the lack of any real dialogue with national Parliaments are shared across Europe.
I know that my right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe will lead that charge, and I believe that that will end in a decisive referendum that will result in our future inside the European Union, but inside a reformed European Union with a balance of competences between the Brussels elite and the member states that all the people of Britain and of Europe will respect.
(10 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI agree. We have taken this graduated approach but we have never hesitated to add further at each stage, and we demonstrated that again yesterday. I say again that Russia not should underestimate our determination to go further if necessary. The hon. Gentleman is right about the importance of financial measures. Some of the measures taken by the United States have already had some financial effect, but it would be possible to go much further than that, including through what the United Kingdom could do.
The Kremlin, the leading members of the Duma and the Russian media have consistently sought to undermine both the authority and the credibility of the interim President of Ukraine and the Government in Kiev. Given that Russia is a member of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe, both of which will be observing the elections next week, what assurances has the Foreign Secretary been given by his Russian counterpart that the Russians will recognise those elections, endorse the result and recognise the authority of the elected President to speak for all the people of Ukraine?
As I am sure my hon. Friend anticipates in his question, we do not have any such assurance from Russia, but of course we do have the one change in Russian policy and attitude to the legitimacy of the elections, which was President Putin’s statement last week that the presidential elections are a step forward in terms of national unity in Ukraine. This demonstrates the importance of the election observation missions, of the elections being demonstrably free and fair, and of the maximum number of people in Ukraine being able to participate in them, because all those things will contribute to the legitimacy of the outcome. I suspect that Russia will be faced with a very legitimate electoral process in Ukraine and will then have to decide its attitude to it.
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberThat is an important point and a difficult one for the Ukrainian authorities, because Russian state television is broadcast in many regions of Ukraine, where people therefore hear only one partial side of the argument. From what I could see, the Ukrainian authorities are taking every step to correct misinformation whenever they can and are giving maximum information to the world’s media. However, this is one of those occasions when it is important for people to use social media and listen to different sources of information, because they will not receive the truth from just one source.
My right hon. Friend has alluded to the danger of Crimea becoming yet another frozen conflict. When Russia occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thousands of ethnic Georgians had to flee their homes and cross the border. What steps does he believe the international community should take to protect the rights of ethnic Ukrainians and Tatars in Crimea?
That too is important. It is one of the reasons we want Ukraine and Russia to be able to talk to each other about the diplomatic settlement of these issues. The position is very complex, given the range of minorities in Crimea. It is currently impossible for people to leave, because road and air access to and from Crimea is now extremely difficult. There could also be very serious medium-term implications. This is another strong argument for Russia to engage with a contact group, or in consultations under the Budapest memorandum, rather than allowing the problem to build up over the coming weeks.
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am sure the hon. Gentleman is aware that considerable legal and other measures already exist on both sides of the Atlantic to secure proper protection for workers, and those matters are indeed in the minds of negotiators. However, I do not think that we should take our eyes off the enormous prize that a trade deal of this kind would represent in increasing economic growth and mutual trade on both sides of the Atlantic.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that those who campaign for us to leave the European Union would be turning their backs on a free trade area constituting some 40% of the productive wealth of the world, and that we would be unlikely to negotiate similar terms outside the Union?
I think it is true that the opportunity for a trade deal with a market of more than 500 million people in Europe as a whole is more attractive to United States negotiators than a trade deal with any single European country. Moreover, as my hon. Friend says, any member state that left the European Union would, unless alternative arrangements were negotiated, be abandoning the free trade agreements that the Union had negotiated with other countries around the world.
(11 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI echo many of the sentiments expressed today; any decision on arming rebel forces must rest ultimately with Parliament.
I want to stress that this type of decision cannot be taken lightly. I have visited refugee camps in Turkey and talked to those who have fled for their lives, and I believe we need a chance to scrutinise the situation carefully and to consider the consequences of our actions, for which we would all be responsible. We all want to see the balance of power altered so that the Syrian people have a chance at rebuilding their country, but my concern is that the Government’s suggested proposal—that to strengthen certain rebel groups would bring Assad to the conference table—is like a very high-risk chess move or a game of bluff that could go badly wrong. One has only to consider the reaction of Russia and Iran to the easing of the EU arms embargo. They immediately bolstered the Assad regime militarily.
I want to consider another question that underscores the complexity of the challenge. Why, after more than two years of fighting, is Assad still in power? We can point to the material support provided by Iran and Russia, which is significant; another factor might be the international community’s reluctance to intervene militarily; but what is often underestimated is Assad’s domestic backing from key communities beyond his core Alawite constituency. The Ba’athist regime has promoted a secular society in which the Christian community, which constitutes 10% of the 22 million population, as well as Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians, Turks, Druze and other Shi’ites and secular Sunnis have coalesced to shore up Assad’s base.
What motivates and unites these communities is not so much any inherent love of the Assad regime, but fear—fear of the chaos that would ensue if Assad was overthrown; fear that the rebels will bring about not the peaceful, multi-sectarian society to which we all aspire, but violent retribution against them. This is where my concerns lie.
Rebel groups have been accused of the indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas such as Aleppo, and there are reports of extrajudicial killings of pro-Government civilians. Human Rights Watch found that Syrian rebels have kidnapped, detained and tortured Government fighters and supporters, and we all know that when the heavy lid of authoritarian rule is lifted, sectarian and tribal aspirations are often violently unleashed.
If the Government’s plan A is to force Assad to the conference table and it fails, and if plan B is for the various opposition groups to succeed militarily, we may face a humanitarian catastrophe. Those groups already show no mercy and will, I fear, set out to massacre any group seen or perceived to have supported the Assad regime. We will then not be dealing with 1.5 million refugees, but with perhaps 4 million, 5 million or 6 million people fleeing across the borders to Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan. I believe the priority is to bring Assad, Iran and Russia to the conference table.
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberIran and Russia have consistently supported the Assad regime. Given the recent reports that 4,000 republican guards are to be deployed to Syria, is it not even more important that Iran’s presence at the conference is taken seriously? They are part of the problem and therefore part of the solution.
My hon. Friend makes a valid point, but it is possible to argue that in both directions. As I said a moment ago, it is important to have at Geneva sufficient groups and sufficient powers to be able to make a workable and sustainable settlement of the conflict in Syria, but there is a balance between that and including those powers or groups that would make a settlement to the conflict impossible. None of Iran’s actions to date on Syria has been in the interests of promoting a solution or political settlement.
(11 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI welcome this evening’s debate on the Council’s decision and commend the Government on securing the flexibility that we and other countries need to step up the pressure on the Assad regime. I am especially pleased that the Council document explicitly sets out the humanitarian context that underlies our rationale for action. The urgency for a political or, reluctantly, a military solution is the humanitarian imperative on which I want to focus for a few moments. We cannot talk of aiding the Syrian opposition without stressing the urgent need and plight of the Syrian people, who live in constant fear for their lives and who in their hundreds and thousands are fleeing every day.
The Syrian crisis is entering its third year, and while we hope for a political solution, a humanitarian tragedy continues to unfold before our eyes. The situation for Syrians is desperate. Life for those caught up in the spiralling violence is unbearable. As ordinary civilians fall into ever deeper despair, the humanitarian need is growing more urgent by the day. According to the United Nations’ estimates, the death toll is now 80,000; 8 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance; and more than 4.25 million people have been driven from their homes by the fighting to other areas of Syria, with now well over 1.3 million refugees in neighbouring countries. The majority of these refugees are women, children and the elderly, more than half of whom are children below the age of 11, suffering first and foremost from psychological trauma. These figures are alarming, but from my own experience having visited two camps in Turkey, I can say that they do not capture or convey the full extent of the crisis.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees conceded that the total numbers are far higher than have officially been accounted for. Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate rapidly as increased fighting and changing of control of towns and villages, in particular in the conflict areas, is driving more and more people out of the country.
Beyond Syria’s borders, the problems continue. For the countries that have taken in those refugees—Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Turkey—the burden that they face in economic, security and social terms, on their energy, water, health and educational facilities, is huge and proving a serious challenge that far exceeds their capabilities to cope with.
I agree entirely with what my hon. Friend says about the burdens put on Jordan in particular. Does he agree that more pressure should be put on the United Arab Emirates to contribute more to humanitarian relief?
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. I want to make a point about the international community’s responsibility, and that includes the Gulf states.
If the scale of the humanitarian needs continues to outstrip the support available, the risks will only soar. The pressure on Jordan’s already scarce water, energy and education resources is enormous. Approximately 40,000 Syrian students have started attending classes in Jordanian schools, and health services are strained by the average daily influx of 3,000 refugees into Jordan alone. If that influx continues at that pace, we will be looking at 1 million refugees in Jordan by the end of the year.
Where is the European Union and the rest of the international community in this devastating and desperate hour? Many promises have been made, but not enough have been delivered. I find it dispiriting that we have collectively fallen so far short of our obligations to help the Syrian people caught up in the turmoil and to alleviate the burdens borne by the neighbouring host countries. Appeals for funding to provide food, water and other humanitarian aid inside Syria have received only meagre support, while the UN Refugee Agency says that its appeal for half a billion dollars was only one-third funded. As a result of the woeful state of funding, the UN and other aid organisations can reach only 1.5 million of the people in desperate need, of whom there are probably around 3 million.
Will my hon. Friend give way?
I am very conscious of the time limit that you, Madam Deputy Speaker, have placed upon me and so will take no more interventions.
There was a conference in January at which $1.5 billion was pledged. The Foreign Secretary reported yesterday that payments have now reached 71% of the amount pledged, but that is still nearly half a billion dollars short. I think that we can be proud of honouring our financial commitments, but we know that there are still countries that have not done so. That is not good enough. When the Foreign Secretary goes to Brussels on Monday, there must be progress on dialogue. In the long term, the whole international community will have to pull together to find a solution to the conflict.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberYes. My right hon. Friend again makes an excellent point. We will find that someone who is concerned about a particular right in this country is faced with a plethora of bodies, and those involved in this field in this country have an extra body to liaise with on the European front. Whereas in the past they would just have looked to the contents of the European convention on human rights and the findings of the European Court of Human Rights, they now have to think, “I wonder what the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights will think about all this. I wonder what it has said about it.”
I will not go down that road, as we have other amendments to consider and there is a further debate afterwards. I doubt whether we need that body at all. That is why I will support my hon. Friend’s amendments tonight. The body is unnecessary and it adds confusion to what is already a very crowded playing field in the area of human rights. I simply ask the Minister how the agency will benefit my constituents in Bury, North. How would they notice if it were simply abolished? That is what I think should happen.
My hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Mr Chope) and I do not always agree on matters relating to the European Union, but we generally agree on matters relating to human rights. He does sterling service in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of the Europe as chairman of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights.
Does my hon. Friend agree that it is a simple matter of fact that for many of the issues that he is delineating we in this country have been practising a proper discourse and addressing them coherently in UK jurisdictions, in many cases before the European Union even existed?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is partly why we were one of the founder members of the Council of Europe and one of the original signatories to the European convention on human rights.
Article 3 of the document gives one a little hope, because it talks about
“Complementarity and cooperation with other bodies”,
but one has to read all the way through it to find that it does not even mention the Council of Europe until the final sentence, in paragraph 5, which refers to the
“Agreement between the European Community and the Council of Europe on cooperation between the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and the Council of Europe”.
That is all well and good. However, I hope that the Minister will deal with the question of resources. The Council of Europe has been constantly under pressure from all 27 member Governments, including our own, on how it disburses its budget. The ever-increasing work load in the European Court of Human Rights means that the majority of the budget goes towards its operation. Now we have another body, funded by exactly the same taxpayers in the 27 member states of the European Union, that apparently might not have the same financial constraints placed on it. Would it not make absolute sense if we, as the 27 members of the European Union, agreed to chuck the little packet of money that we are going to give to the Fundamental Rights Agency into the budget of the Council of Europe to make it the much more effective body in promoting human rights and respect for all the rights outlined in article 2 of the document? We could then ensure that we in the European Union can promote human rights much more effectively, particularly in the new states of Europe and the states to the east, as partners through our membership of the Council of Europe.
My hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Mr Chope) provoked a very wide-ranging debate covering a large number of issues, some of which are to do with the Bill and a few of which are even to do with the amendments. They include the question of whether the Fundamental Rights Agency represents value for money and concern about the potential for duplication with the work of the Council of Europe, about which my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Mr Walter) spoke so eloquently.
The Bill is limited to seeking parliamentary approval for an EU decision to agree the agency’s new five-year work programme. The programme simply identifies the thematic areas under which the agency will undertake its tasks. The amendments—my main contribution to the debate, Mr Evans, will be to talk about the amendments—have as their common purpose a desire to remove clause 1(2)(b) from the Bill, the effect of which would be to withhold parliamentary approval of the draft decision that seeks to establish the next five-year work programme for the agency. Without that parliamentary approval, the UK cannot vote in favour of this measure at EU level. I do not believe that withholding such approval is the right course of action. I urge my hon. Friend to withdraw the amendment, or the Committee to vote against it, for the following reasons.
The work programme is agreed by the Council. Agreeing the work programme provides member states—including, of course, us—with the opportunity to define the focus for the agency’s work for the next five years, encouraging it to concentrate its resources on a limited number of areas and to undertake targeted, in-depth research within the boundaries defined by the framework. The UK has participated actively in the negotiations that have led to the new draft programme being drawn up and is satisfied with the results. It is important for the Committee to be clear that the agreement of a new work programme does not alter the core tasks of the agency, nor does it change the agency’s role. The work programme does not set out or define these elements. They are set out in a completely different instrument—the agency’s establishing regulation, which is not under review in the Bill or in the amendments. I hear the views of many of my hon. Friends about the merits of the agency’s work, but neither this Bill nor the draft decision that it approves can do anything to bring about changes in those areas.
The hon. Gentleman has cited examples of where the Fundamental Rights Agency is investigating areas into which the European Commissioner for Human Rights—a Council of Europe appointment—has not delved. Surely it would be more logical if we were to use those resources for the benefit of all 47 member states of the Council of Europe. It is in the 20 member states that are not members of the European Union that those rights are inevitably most at risk.
The hon. Gentleman makes the point: there is a mismatch between the Council of Europe and the European Union, not least in terms of the membership of those two constituent organisations. It can become awkward and cumbersome, but that obvious overlap should be recognised and efforts are being made by both parties to minimise the duplication of work. It is significant, for example, that the Council of Europe has an independent expert who sits on the board of the Fundamental Rights Agency. A physical interrelationship takes place, which is to be warmly welcomed.
One conclusion of the important report from the other place was that:
“EU legislation brings a considerable added value over the ECHR in that it can be effectively enforced…It can also cover matters not adequately covered by the ECHR and is more flexible”.
Those are important considerations. We are talking about two different beasts. The work is complementary but it is also different and it is important to recognise that.
In conclusion, it is not my intention to trespass into the debate about whether or not the UK should exercise next year its block opt-out of so-called third pillar issues. That is a debate for another time, but I say simply that these issues need careful and rational consideration. Given the interest in related issues, I hope that this House will have umpteen opportunities to consider the profound decision that will have to be made next year. This clause has the support of the Labour party and we are pleased that time has been allocated for the discussion of the Bill on the Floor of the House. We hope Members from all sides will feel able to support the clause.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberAs I carry on, the hon. Gentleman will find out exactly what my position is; I will answer his question in due course.
With the Prime Minister being the arch-negotiator he is, he has decided to put in the next Conservative manifesto the terms he will be seeking, thus revealing to the entire world his negotiating position before the negotiations actually start. The Prime Minister has said that he will put his heart and soul into achieving a yes vote to stay in the EU, but will he still do that if he does not achieve what he has laid out in that Conservative manifesto at the next election? Will he then push for a no vote, or will there be an arbitrary threshold that says the Prime Minister will push for a yes vote only if he achieves 80% of what he wants, or 60% or 20% or whatever? All this because the Prime Minister faces the uncertainty of what his Back Benchers will do on the EU. It has become a kind of fetish that skews reality and it will not be sated until we leave the EU—without any regard to the consequences for the UK.
The Prime Minister believes his speech will soothe his truculent Back Benchers, but I’ve got news for him: his Back Benchers can see the EU exit door ajar, and they will push and push at that door until it is fully open and they can march through.
I do not have much more to say, but I need to cover the earlier point and I know this debate is oversubscribed.
We are left with a Prime Minister whose renegotiating position is “If I can’t get what I want; I’ll stop playing and take my ball home”. If he does that, he will be isolated in his negotiations. While this is being played out, the economic uncertainty faced by millions of families up and down the country continues. About 3.5 million jobs rely on the EU, 6,500 of them in Sedgefield, 28,000 in County Durham and 141,000 in the north-east. Companies such as Nissan are big exporters to Europe.
A number of Opposition Members have criticised the Prime Minister for announcing that he will campaign in the next general election to renegotiate, hold a referendum and, on the basis of that renegotiation, campaign for a yes vote. It is probably worth reminding them that it was a Labour leader and a Labour Prime Minister who did just that in the general election of 1974. Despite having a number of irreconcilable people on his Benches, including Barbara Castle, Michael Foot and Tony Benn, he succeeded in gaining a two-to-one victory in the subsequent referendum.
The hon. Gentleman reminds us of the 1970s. Of course, the clamour of the two camps to win out against each other took our eye off the economy at the time, and we went into a very difficult period. Are we in danger of doing exactly the same, and is not the Prime Minister in danger of being not the son of Blair, but the grandson of Harold Wilson?
I think the hon. Member for Ynys Môn (Albert Owen) made a good comparison with Harold Wilson and the 1970s. Like our Prime Minister now, Harold Wilson wanted modest reforms, but was unable to satisfy the Europhobes in his own party. Within five years, that party was voting for exit from the European Union—despite the referendum. Is that not a little bit of a warning from history?
It is a warning from history, but if the hon. Gentleman listens to what else I have to say, I hope that he will accept that I will be campaigning to make sure that that does not happen. I had rather hoped that the question of Britain’s membership had been settled decisively back then—my view has not changed—but I believe that the prospect of a national vote would give our country an opportunity to have a serious national conversation about Britain’s relations with the European Union. I welcome that, because I think that for too long the debate has been dominated and, to an extent, distorted by mistrust and by a suspicion that more EU integration means less sovereignty for the United Kingdom.
We need to set the record straight. For those of us who support the European project, this will serve as an opportunity to explain what Parliament and politicians have done in the people’s name over the last 40 years. It will also give us a chance to expose the myths purveyed by those who would have us turn our backs on both our European history and our European future.
It is true that the Europe we joined in 1973 was created on the basis of a vision of a post-war Franco-German elite. It is also true that Schuman, Monnet and de Gaulle himself saw ever-closer union as meaning an eventual federal Europe. But that was another time, and another Europe. The EU of today is markedly different, and the EU of tomorrow will, I believe, be even more so. In the Commission and, to some extent, in the European Parliament, there are those who still see the EU as a centralising project, but in national Parliaments—including this one—and among the peoples of Europe there is no craving for that original centralised model.
Brussels is not Europe, and the people who work there have no monopoly on the European vision. Schuman’s plan was fundamentally about eliminating trouble, anxiety and distrust from a continent ravaged by centuries of conflict. Today, our focus is not on keeping the peace, but on consolidating prosperity. The treaty of Rome was signed in 1957 by just six countries with a combined population of 173 million. By the time the Lisbon treaty came into force, more than half a century later, the Union comprised 27 member states with a combined population of more than half a billion. With Croatia, we are soon to number 28. Enlargement, one of the EU’s greatest success stories, is set to continue, bringing more change to the character and direction of the European project.
As its membership has changed, the EU has embarked on a different path. If we reflect on the way in which European institutions have evolved since that original blueprint, if we look at the aspirations and stated aims of EU member states—all of which want to protect their identities and interests—and if we consider the actions that member states have taken independently, across a wide spectrum of policies, it is clear to us that there is no great craving for the centralising project envisaged by the founding fathers. The proof is all around us.
After 40 years of British membership, there is really no overarching bureaucracy or executive. The Commission and the Council are small in comparison with many national Government administrations. The Commission’s budget is barely 1% of Europe’s GDP. Countries retain sovereignty over many areas that might have been expected to be transferred in a federal system. Member states have their own foreign policies and their own armies, which they can deploy at will, and they do. Member states can choose to opt out of a raft of agreements that they oppose, and they have: that has been proved.
We should not forget, of course, that treaties require the consent of every member state, even if they are supported by the vast majority of the population of the EU. That is an important point. When consent is not given, Europe must go back to the drawing board, and that has been done. In 2005, France and the Netherlands rejected, by referendum, what was then the constitution. In 2008, Ireland rejected the Lisbon treaty in the same way. Did those countries threaten to leave the European Union? No. Did the EU respond by trying to coerce those countries into accepting a treaty that was judged unacceptable by the people? No. What happened was that the countries returned to the negotiating table, and their Governments renegotiated the aspects of the treaties that conflicted with their national interest. They made the case for their concerns to be addressed, and they were.
I think that there is a lesson here. We in the UK have our concerns and suspicions, and the EU has many shortcomings. We are therefore right to push for reform, but these examples show us that the EU is not heading inevitably and inexorably towards some sort of federal superstate, even if some people within the Commission and the European Parliament still harbour that goal. Every country has its own corner to fight, and it has the power to do so. We are far too reluctant to admit this, but the UK has time and again proven itself to be an influential leader in the EU.
No, you cannot.
Thanks to our positive engagement across a swathe of policy areas, from economic reform and deregulation to environment and trade, we have consistently set the agenda. In the debates ahead, we need to strip away the rhetoric and clarify what Europe represents. Europe is the solution, not the problem. Our history is in Europe, and I believe that our future is, too.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I share his assessment of the situation; I do not think that the process is dead. There was optimism that the question might have been resolved by the end of June, but given the need to work to such a tight deadline, that has proved impossible.
Does my hon. Friend agree that, before we talk about blockages by Turkey on issues such as energy or the recognition of Cyprus, it is important to acknowledge that a blockage to better relations between NATO and the EU is being created when, every time the subject crops up in the EU, it is blocked by Cyprus, which is not prepared to welcome Turkey into EU operations?
I note what my hon. Friend has said. The report is careful not to take sides in the dispute between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, but I am sure that the House will have heard his point.
I was talking about how the situation with regard to gas reserves off the coast of Cyprus was deteriorating, rather than improving. Turkey is a rising regional economic power within reach of about 70% of the world’s gas and oil reserves. It forms part of the southern gas corridor, which is critical to reducing the EU’s dependence on Russia as a supplier of gas. Frustratingly, the stalling of Turkey’s EU accession process seems to be losing the EU influence over Turkey’s energy policy decisions. I would be grateful if the Minister addressed that point.
Cyprus is not the only major obstacle to Turkey’s EU accession. Let us turn to the sensitive matter of human rights. Shortcomings in the Turkish justice system are damaging the country’s international reputation. During our visit, we were struck by the country’s economic dynamism and international ambition, but we were taken aback by Turkish legal procedures and by the detention of large numbers of military figures, officials, elected politicians, journalists and activists. Such practices do not accord with the human rights standards that we fight for in the west. We were astonished to hear that, at the time of our inquiry, more journalists were in detention in Turkey than in China. The opaque nature of the system seemed to be part of the problem. Information about legal cases is hard to obtain, and we formed the view that the climate in Turkey was limiting freedom of expression and the media.
Improvements are in progress, however, and we are grateful to the Turkish ambassador for keeping us up to date. Only on Monday, the Turkish Parliament passed an important judicial reform package, which should reduce pre-trial detention and lead to some actions against journalists being dropped. It is clear that the situation is fast moving, and the Foreign Office should help in practical ways to achieve further improvements. That should be done gently and sensitively, however, with quiet reminders that we could support Turkey’s inspirational role in its region more strongly if it improved its democratic and human rights practices.
I congratulate Ministers on the Treasury Bench on singling out the topic of UK-Turkey relations and Turkey’s foreign policy when considering the estimates for the Foreign Office.
Turkey is a delightful country. I think you know that, Mr Deputy Speaker, as I think you have been there on a number of occasions. I was reminded of it only yesterday when I got into a taxi in Belfast with a number of colleagues. The taxi driver asked where we were going for our holidays and then told us that he was going back to the same hotel, in the same town in Turkey, as he had for the past 19 years. He and the hotel owner were on such good terms that he no longer had to pay for the hotel room, and just for his flights; I do not know how much Guinness he drank when he got there. I, too, shall spend time in Turkey over the summer recess. As many colleagues know, my wife is Turkish, but my interest in and commitment to supporting Turkey’s role in European institutions long predates my marriage.
Turkey is a fascinating country, and there are similarities with our own history. We lost an empire; Turkey lost its empire about 50 years before we lost ours. Turkey’s greatest area of influence, political, economic and cultural, is in the former Ottoman empire, and we ignore that at our peril. Conservative estimates suggest that the EU neighbourhood policy costs in the order of €1.4 billion a year. When we add the cost of the new EU External Action Service, we can see that the EU spends an awful lot of money on our neighbourhood. Our political and economic effectiveness, however, is dwarfed by Turkish foreign policy in that very same neighbourhood.
A key argument to embrace Turkey and its foreign policy is our joint approach to our common neighbourhood; most of Europe’s neighbourhood was, in fact, part of the Ottoman empire. In areas of conflict and of post-conflict reconstruction, Europe has benefited from Turkey’s influence. In the Balkans, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, Turkish influence is not to be underestimated, and we should recognise that. In the Maghreb—the countries of the Arab spring—Turkey was the first back in, in terms of influence, and it had influence that predated us in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. In the middle east, Turkey’s influence on its near neighbours—Iraq, Iran, Palestine and Syria—is something on which we should capitalise, and which we should not ignore.
It is not just in areas of conflict or post-conflict that Turkey has influence; it has economic influence in the Balkans, the Maghreb and the middle east, as well as the Caucasus and central Asia, particularly the Turkic-speaking nations of central Asia. Europe’s neighbourhood is Turkey’s neighbourhood. The Ottoman empire, to which I referred, significantly predated the British empire. In the middle ages, it dislodged Byzantium. By the mid-19th century, it was in serious decline. It was Tsar Nicholas I of Russia who coined the phrase that Turkey was the “sick man of Europe”. He thought that Britain and France would stand by while he took control of the Crimea, but he was mistaken. We reacted, not because we wanted to prolong the rule of the Ottoman empire but because we wanted to limit Russian influence, which has very much been part of our foreign policy ever since.
The final demise came in world war one, when Turkey backed the wrong side. The treaty of Sèvres in 1920 effectively destroyed the unity of the Turkish state and partitioned the Ottoman empire between the allied powers. Many educated Turks—and this is key to modern Turkey—were totally dissatisfied with that. The war of independence, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who we now know as Ataturk, the name given to him by the Turkish Parliament, resulted in the 1923 treaty of Lausanne and the modern Turkish state.
Ataturk is somebody we should focus on. He was the man who wanted to create Turkey and reinforce it as a modern European state, a secular state. In the early years he set about banning the fez and the turban, and later the veil and the headscarf, all the paraphernalia of a religious state. Arabic script was banned and replaced by a Latin alphabet. Religious schools were outlawed. Women were given equal rights and universal suffrage. Islamic law was replaced by a civil code based on the Swiss model and a penal code based on the Italian model. This is the basis of modern Turkey.
The question which I know some of our colleagues in Germany and France still ask is, “Is Turkey a European country? Should it be a member of the EU?” We have already heard that it is a member of NATO, a founder member of the OECD, a member of the Council of Europe and a member of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. It was an associate member of the Western European Union, and it participates in European Union battle groups, EU military operations and is also a participant in the European Court.
Turkey applied to join the European Union in 1963. That was also the year of the first French veto against our membership, but we joined eventually in 1973 and Turkey is still trying to join. In 1995 the customs union was concluded with the European Union, and 59% of Turkey’s exports go to the European Union—some 10% to Germany and 6% each to France, Italy and the United Kingdom. It is the fastest growing economy in Europe. It grew by 9% in 2010 and by 8.5% in 2011. Growth is slowing this year, but Turkey is still the fastest growing economy in Europe.
Politically and economically, Turkey brings so much to the table that we delay her membership at our peril. There are those who say that Europe is a Christian club and Turkey is a Muslim country. I suspect that Turkey would not have succeeded in joining the Holy Roman empire, but this is the modern Europe. It is a place for all cultures and we should not be discriminating on the basis of the predominant religion in that country. Our own nation is a good example of that, as are many others. European Union membership for Turkey is not without its problems, but Turkish membership is in our interest economically, politically and strategically. Turkey has always been a strong ally of Europe and should be recognised as such today. Europe should recognise her contribution and grant her membership as soon as possible.
No, I will not, if the hon. Gentleman does not mind, as he has not been present for the whole debate.
I have concerns about justice and home affairs. I find it quite astonishing that the Home Office—or any Government Department—has not looked in any systematic way at how many people would be likely to move from Turkey to other European countries if the freedom of movement directive applied and after any transition period that was put in place. Figures ranging between 500,000 and 4.4 million are often cited.
Europol, the EU’s law enforcement agency, has stated that Turkish criminal groups are significantly involved in various forms of organised criminality, including the trafficking of heroin and synthetic drugs and the trafficking of cocaine to Europe from South America via Turkey and the Balkans. It has described “very high” levels of human trafficking to Turkey and high levels of trafficking through the country, as well as people smuggling and other criminal activities including fraud, firearms trafficking, money laundering and copyright offences.
Turkey has become a prominent stepping stone in irregular flows of migrants coming from further afield who aim to enter the European Union. The Turkish ambassador to the United Kingdom recently told the Home Affairs Committee that nearly 800,000 illegal immigrants have been apprehended while attempting to cross Turkish territory over the past 15 years. By October 2010, 46% of all irregular immigration detected at the EU external border took place at the land border between Greece and Turkey and the authorities estimated that up to 350 migrants were attempting to cross the 12.5 km land border near the Greek city of Orestiada every day.
EU accession would have implications. The length of the external land border with Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Iran and Syria would put great stresses and strains on the EU’s external border, given that the EU has already been critical of the Turkish border security capacity. The Minister may wish to comment on the fact that there has been no impact analysis of Turkish accession on future migration trends. We need to take a serious look at that, even though accession may be many years away.
It is appropriate to mention the Armenian genocide, which is an issue of great hurt and offence to Armenian people across the world. It began on 24 April 1915 and, with the systematic deportation and murder of up to 1.5 million people, it is the first modern example of genocide. Armenians perished as a result of execution, starvation, disease, the harsh environment and physical abuse. A people who had lived in Turkey for nearly 3,000 years lost their homeland and were decimated in the first large-scale genocide of the 20th century. I concede that that was 97 years ago, but it is difficult to accept the fact that the Turkish Government refuse to countenance the idea that it is an incontestable historical fact.
I hear what my hon. Friend says. For many years, historians have tried to define genocide. He is trying to condemn the Government of the modern Turkish state post-1923 for a crime that was, or was not, committed by the Ottoman empire, of which both Armenia and the Turkic peoples were part.
I yield to no one in my enormous respect for my colleague in the Inter-Parliamentary Union and his great love for Turkey and affinity for the country. I bear no malice as a candid friend to the wonderful, decent people of Turkey but I quote Leo Kuper, who was an eminent academic at the University of California, Los Angeles and said:
“The Armenian genocide is a contemporary current issue, given the persistent aggressive denial of the crime by the Turkish government—notwithstanding its own judgment in courts martial after the first World War, that its leading ministers had deliberately planned and carried out the annihilation of Armenians, with the participation of many regional administrators.”
My point is not that that series of events did not happen at the end of the Ottoman empire in Anatolia, which is now part of modern Turkey, but that a key issue in assessing the suitability and fitness of a country seeking to be part of a club founded on the bedrock of legality, fairness and equality is the fact that it should acknowledge past mistakes and crimes that took place almost 100 years ago. In that respect, just as the Turkish Government have to move on the issue of Cyprus and countenance the right of the Cypriot people to self-determination, democracy and freedom, they must accept that the Armenian genocide happened. They have to apologise and move forward, as happened in Northern Ireland, South Africa and elsewhere, with a truth and reconciliation process to put to rest that disastrous, despicable, appalling series of events almost 100 years ago.
We have had an interesting debate. I do not agree with everyone who has spoken, but these issues are of such great importance and clarity historically that they must be raised.