Afghanistan

Robert Smith Excerpts

Wednesday 19th December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Smith (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (LD)]

One of the legacies we can give to those who have paid so much in sacrifice for our mission in Afghanistan is the long-term stability of the nation. In its economic stability, are we doing everything we can to make sure that the wealth of natural resources that my right hon. Friend mentioned is exploited to the best benefit of the people of Afghanistan, not those from outside?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right that the long-term stability of Afghanistan depends on its economic development and a key part of its economic development will be the successful exploitation of its mineral wealth. Mineral wealth cannot be taken offshore to Dubai; it sits in the ground, and as long as the wealth of Afghanistan is in Afghanistan, local people will invest in Afghanistan and the future of the country. There are all sorts of international efforts, including many supported by the UK’s DFID funding, to ensure the development and exploitation of that mineral wealth for the benefit of the people of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan (Troop Levels)

Robert Smith Excerpts

Thursday 26th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. We owe it to those who have made the ultimate sacrifice to conclude this operation in good order and to secure our legacy—their legacy—for the future.

[Sir Robert Smith (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (LD)]

In paying tribute to our troops and recognising their hard work, I seek a reassurance from the Secretary of State. Although we recognise the development of the ANSF, is he getting reassurances from our ISAF partners that they understand the need to maintain resources on the ground during transition so that there can be a flexible response to the assistance role?

UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan

Robert Smith Excerpts

Thursday 9th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)]

Can we make something clear? The last speaker seemed to equate al-Qaeda with the Taliban. The Taliban have never threatened us, but al-Qaeda certainly has. If we want to understand Taliban thinking, we should note what was expressed recently by a commander. He said that war is dreadful and horrid:

“It creates nothing but widows and disruption. But jihad is different. It is our moral obligation to resist you foreigners. One year, a hundred years, a million years, ten million years—it is not important. We will never stop fighting. At Judgement Day, Allah will not ask, ‘What did you do for your country?’ He will ask, ‘Did you fight for your religion?’”

That shows the precise nature of the conflict, and it is not a conflict that can be won.

[Sir Robert Smith (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (LD)]

The hon. Gentleman should reflect on the Taliban’s relationship with the events of 9/11. While they did not directly threaten us, they provided the wherewithal and the facilities for al-Qaeda to threaten us, and they did not do anything to try to rectify the situation when they had the opportunity to do so.

[Paul Flynn]

The situation now is that the Taliban are not in power because of al-Qaeda, as the Taliban well know. The Taliban already control at least half the country, and al-Qaeda has not been allowed in. There is no problem here; this is a false argument. We have created this myth that, somehow, if we pull out, al-Qaeda will have an area in which to operate. It already has Pakistan in which to operate, and Somalia and Yemen.

I take the point about how our soldiers will perceive what is said in the House, however. I, like most Members, have had the torment of trying to say to constituents who have lost loved ones that they died in a cause that was just and honourable. It is no reflection on the quality and bravery of our troops to say that this war has been, certainly since 2006, a grave error. There were people in this House and in the military—one military person resigned over this—who said in 2006 that our going into Helmand then was stirring up a hornet’s nest. At that point only two British soldiers had died in combat, but now the figure is 334 and the rate is accelerating; the 200th soldier to die, who came from Gwent, died last August. The bloodiest year so far for British troops in Afghanistan was 2009, but if things continue as they are, 2010 will be far worse. The rate at which British soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan is now four times that of our United States counterparts.

The whole operation is continuing and there is no possible outcome that will be just and honourable. Both Governments have been in denial. We have heard optimism, and nothing but, year after year and in debate after debate, when they have told us that we have turned the corner. The Deputy Prime Minister used the same expression the other day, saying that things are going well now and we just have to hang on. We have turned so many corners that we have been around the block half a dozen times in Afghanistan, but we are still in hell and the situation is still getting worse. We believe in the possibility that the Afghan national army can take over, but it is mainly drug addicted and it routinely oppresses its own people. In one incident, 300 members of the Afghan army were guarding a convoy when they were attacked by seven members of the Taliban and they fled, with their commander saying, “Why should they sacrifice their lives and kill fellow Afghans in order to defend a corrupt leader from a different clan and to promote the policies of a foreign country?” Indeed, one is entitled to ask that.

The Afghan police service routinely extorts money from its own citizens. When the police went into the village of Penkala, the local elders came forward and said, “Last time they came here, they practised bacha bazi on our young boys.” That refers to the routine ritual sexual exploitation of young boys. They also said, “The Taliban were here before. They were wicked people, but they were people of principle.” The Afghan police are a criminal police service. Many of them are not paid, so they are expected to get their money in this way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment (a), at end add—

‘provided that a more realistic military strategy is adopted designed to fulfil the United Kingdom’s long-term interests in the region at lesser cost in life, limb and financial resources.’.

It is a privilege to have the opportunity to move the first Back-Bench amendment to a motion selected for debate in this House by Back Benchers themselves. I have a friend who is engaged to a corporal in the Army. He is a medic who has been on two tours of Afghanistan, the second of which he volunteered for before he had to go. As a medic, he is one of a small number of people who go out on every patrol because something horrible may happen to one of their comrades. He understands the importance of that vital role and so decided to stay on for two weeks longer than necessary at the end of his second tour, to avoid there being no proper handover to the medics who would succeed him.

In the second of those two extra weeks that he voluntarily undertook, on the second tour for which he also volunteered, he was blown up. He was in a new Husky armoured vehicle, so he and his entire crew survived. It is typical of his spirit that the picture of him grinning in front of the absolutely devastated vehicle now adorns the laptop of his fiancée, my friend. Had he been blown up a week earlier, he would have been in a Vector armoured vehicle and he and all his comrades would be dead. So, in this case, it is one up for the former Government and for the armed forces, but it is not one up for the strategy that we have been pursuing.

Over past months, I have made various inquiries about where casualties are primarily incurred, because the question of deadlines is related to casualties more than to anything else. The previous and present Governments have made no secret of the fact that the overwhelming majority of casualties are incurred on predictable patrols by uniformed military targets, which is what our armed forces have become under the current strategy.

For the sake of clarity—it is important that people following this debate should understand this, given what we are told about the audiences who will listen to, see and read what we say today—may I spell out the difference between my amendment and the original motion? The motion is very simple and it states:

“That this House supports the continued deployment of UK armed forces in Afghanistan.”

Those who think that the mission should be open-ended should therefore vote for the motion. If they think that the troops should come home straight away and that the whole thing is a lost cause, misguided and counter-productive, as some have argued today, they should vote against the motion. However, if Members think, as I do, that the mission is justified and important, but that it is not being pursued in the right way, they should consider voting for my amendment.

The reason for that was made clear when my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), the Chairman of the Select Committee on Defence, so typically put his finger on the heart of the matter. As he said, it is true that if the public believe we have a strategy that will succeed, they will support the mission. Why is public support for the mission draining away? It is because the public are not satisfied with the strategy. That is why I propose adding the words of the amendment to the end of the motion.

[Sir Robert Smith]

Does the hon. Gentleman think that the coalition’s move to much more of a political engagement to try to move things forward is the right way to proceed in order to bring the troops home in the long run? Does he think that we need to find a political solution on the ground, and that it is not so much the military strategy that has had to be refocused but the political context of that strategy?

[Dr Lewis]

The answer to that is yes and no: yes in the sense that all counter-insurgencies end, eventually, with a negotiated political outcome, which is what the hon. Gentleman is saying; and no in the sense that now is not the time to negotiate. There has been a lack of strategic consistency in the advice given to Governments. The hon. Member for Walsall North (Mr Winnick) referred approvingly to General Richards’ recent statement that we ought to negotiate with the Taliban. What he did not state was the Taliban’s response to that, as relayed through the BBC, which has some quite good contacts with the Taliban in a purely professional way. It was that they saw no reason to negotiate because they were winning anyway and deadlines had been set for withdrawal.

The strange thing is that this is the same general—he is a talented and charming man and I have had a number of conversations with him over the years—who said a few months ago when appointed head of the Army that we would need to be in Afghanistan for 30 to 40 years and that there was no question of our withdrawing. Now, because we are getting political messages from the White House and from Downing street that the Governments—or at least the leaders of the Governments—of the United States and the United Kingdom are not prepared to go on indefinitely, we are being told, “Oh yes, well perhaps we could get out in four years after all,” and, “Oh yes, let’s talk to the Taliban.”

Afghanistan

Robert Smith Excerpts

Wednesday 7th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I do not intend to give any comfort to the Taliban by talking about what might happen if we are not successful. We intend to see this mission through, to do what is required to put in the numbers needed to make the mission a success, to ensure that the equipment is there and to play our full part in the international coalition. We intend that the strategy as set out by General McChrystal will be met within the time scale he set out.

[Sir Robert Smith (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (LD)]

I join the rest of the House in paying tribute to the courage and commitment of our forces, the burden of which is reinforced by this redeployment, which shows what they have undertaken on their own so far. Will the Secretary of State outline what effect the new military reconfiguration will have on the provincial reconstruction team and on engagement with civilian communities in those areas?

[Dr Fox]

The provincial reconstruction team will continue as it is. I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for giving me this opportunity, which I should perhaps have taken earlier, to praise the work of the PRT. Its success will be central to the long-term stability of, and thereby the governance support for, the security situation. It is a leading example of what is possible and is internationally admired.