Protection of Freedoms Bill

Robert Buckland Excerpts

Monday 19th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

The hon. Lady is making a powerful point about Scotland. Scotland moved straight from “breach of the peace” legislation to legislation on stalking, so the comparison is quite dramatic. We in England and Wales are in a slightly better position, but the comparison is nevertheless invidious, which is why the proposed change in the law is so essential and welcome.

[Stella Creasy]

In order to establish whether the present proposals will deal with our concerns adequately, it is worth considering what has happened in Scotland as a result of the legislation providing for a specific offence, and also making comparisons with what is offered by the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

On behalf of the House, let me thank those who have been campaigning on these issues, and who have led action both in the House and outside. Working with Protection against Stalking and the National Association of Probation Officers, the all-party inquiry into stalking— in which I know the hon. Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) participated—has tirelessly and persistently made the case for new legislation. I pay tribute to both those organisations, and to the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd), who is present, for all their work on the inquiry.

Although she was not able to be here today, I think that the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), deserves credit for putting the case for the legislation in September last year. She also stressed the need for stronger sentencing and police training to improve responses.

Finally, I think that we must all pay particular tribute to Baroness Royall, who, back in November, began tabling amendments to the Bill in the other place to introduce this law in some form and thus to force action on the issue. We can see that that tactic has worked. Ministers initially refused to accept the case, saying that the current legislation covered criminal behaviour of this kind, but their view has now changed, and that change is welcome. I note that Lord Henley himself acknowledged the work of Lady Royall in raising the issue.

[Stella Creasy]

When I discussed the proposals with the police, they were anxious to ensure that we used this opportunity to get the proposals right. I welcomed their acknowledgment of concern about the way in which the legislation had been used to deal with the problems, and about the lack of training in what stalking might involve.

As a result of this pressure, we stand here today to debate not whether proposals are needed, but the strength of the proposals that are on the table. We can see how the proposals are evolving as the Government respond to people who have been campaigning. The new amendments—as opposed to the proposals that were put to the other place last week—reflect further movement in the right direction, given the Government’s initial response to Baroness Royall’s proposals.

It is in the spirit of ensuring that the Bill is meaningful and effective that Labour Members have tabled further amendments today. Having championed the need for legislation, we wish to ensure that this opportunity is not wasted. When we test the Lords amendment against the realities of the crime that we are discussing, and indeed the issues raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), we still see difficulties. In particular, we fear that the amendment presents the appearance of progress while failing to deliver through its confusing demarcation between section 2A and section 4A offences. We also believe that it does not give the criminal justice system the full confidence that it needs to be able to address this crime in its many manifestations, whether through investigation, prosecution or conviction.

Our amendments (a) and (b) would ensure that the Bill would be what I call future-proof. When the Protection from Harassment legislation was enacted in 1997, Google did not exist. One of the compelling examples of the behaviour of the persecutor of Claire Waxman was the fact that he had searched for her name 40,000 times in a single year. The amendment reflects the need not only to train all who work in the criminal justice system to recognise that stalking can manifest itself in many ways, but to ensure that the legislation can keep pace with the innovation. As we have heard, many victims experience multiple forms of harassment, and do so many times before it is reported. These amendments would enable the Secretary of State to respond to the creativity of perpetrators and ensure that all those charged with protecting the public from these crimes are able to act. The inclusion of “inter alia” and the ability to include additional clarification will give confidence to the Crown Prosecution Service, the police and the magistrates courts that these kinds of conduct could in future be relevant to this offence.

If the Government will not accept the amendments, they must set out now, on the record, how they propose to ensure that the criminal justice system is able fully to comprehend and respond to the way in which fixations occur, both online and offline.

[Mr Buckland]

I am listening with great care to the hon. Lady’s argument about the use of the phrase “inter alia”. There may be a bit of an irony in using legal Latin to anticipate developments in respect of Google and Twitter, but I do not criticise her for that. The Lords amendment lists

“examples of acts or omissions”.

That is therefore a non-exhaustive list, so the problem the hon. Lady rightly identifies as possibly occurring cannot occur on the basis of any reasonable interpretation of the Lords amendment as it currently stands.

[Stella Creasy]

This is a point of genuine disagreement, because there is concern that what should be seen as a non-exhaustive list of behaviours and conducts for the offence of stalking will instead be seen as a list of the only such behaviours and conducts. We are trying to ensure both that training is given to all sectors of the criminal justice system and that there is clarification about the wide range of perpetrator behaviours that can be included. I gave the example of Google in order to argue that if the idea of cyber-stalking had been considered when the protection from harassment law was introduced in 1997, legislators might have recognised the need to address it. Given that we so rarely get an opportunity to draft legislation, it is important that we make any new laws as robust as possible, such as by ensuring that the Secretary of State can intervene. We believe that our proposal would offer an opportunity to address any concerns that might arise. Law makers might say, “This is a list of stalking behaviours and anything else isn’t stalking.” If the Government are not prepared to accept the amendment, they must explicitly state how they will ensure that this list does not become the only list of examples, rather than a starting point for our law makers.

Our amendments to Lords Amendment 51 go to the heart of the inconsistencies in the proposals. We challenge the retention of a section 2A offence of stalking and the creation of a section 4A offence of stalking, differentiated by the concept of seriousness. We welcome the fact that, in response to Baroness Royall, the Government’s position has moved from that of the amendments tabled in the Lords, which set out stalking as purely involving a fear of violence. The new provisions go much further towards recognising the need to be able to act against perpetrators without waiting for physical harm as well as the different ways in which this crime impacts upon victims, and that is certainly welcome. However, the strengthening of section 4A does not undermine the inconsistency created by the retention of a section 2A offence for stalking.

Under Government amendments (i), (j) and (k), section 4A will apply when someone has suffered

“serious alarm or distress which has a substantial adverse effect on”

their

“usual day-to-day activities”.

Yet section 2A sets out a less well-defined offence of stalking that would secure a lower level tariff. That offence would be triable only in a magistrates court, with a fine or maximum penalty of just six months’ imprisonment. We believe that such a distinction between different offences and courses of action does not stand scrutiny. Specifically, it is unclear from the evidence of this crime what kinds of cases would fall under section 2A rather than section 4A. In respect of the wording of the new amendments, it appears that a distinction would be based on proving that someone has suffered a “serious” form of distress. Therefore, the Government must set out how that could be proved—for example, whether it would be similar to psychiatric injury, where we need a psychiatrist to say there has been a serious impact on the central nervous system. This also raises the prospect of medical records having to be disclosed, potentially giving more information to the stalker at court and also creating a higher burden to prove, so the CPS would again be less likely to charge under Section 4 and default to Section 2A, with the resulting lesser options for punishment.

We as parliamentarians should reflect upon whether we would ask the victims to have their lives altered as a marker of such seriousness. The survey commissioned by the university of Leicester for the Network for Surviving Stalking found that one third of victims of stalking said that they had lost their job or relationship or had been forced to move because of the stalking. Some 92% reported physical effects and 98% reported emotional effects, ranging from anxiety, sleep disturbances, anger and distrust to depression, self-harm and post-traumatic stress disorder. Half of all the victims had changed their telephone number; half of them had given up social activities; half of them had seen their performance at work affected; and a third of them had relocated. If the Home Secretary wishes to retain these divisions, she must tell us whether it is justifiable to ask victims to prove that their lives have been changed in such a serious way before we can offer them real protection. Does she not see the risk that the police could apply this “seriousness” test in choosing whether to investigate and secure a section 2A or section 4A offence, leaving victims in the horrific position of having to prove that their lives have been damaged in these ways in order to secure effective action against the perpetrators?

As many experts have pointed out, this distinction risks retaining one of the problems with the existing legislation: it is extremely unusual for someone to be found guilty under section 4 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, with just 170 of the 786 people found guilty being given a custodial sentence. Some 53,000 harassment cases were recorded by the police in 2009-10, but in only 23 was a custodial sentence of more than 12 months given for breaching a restraining order and in just 27 was such a sentence given for putting someone in fear of violence. Under the current legislation, most perpetrators receive restraining orders on multiple occasions and yet still receive fines and non-custodial sentences. Both the National Association of Probation Officers and Protection Against Stalking state that they believe that

“similar outcomes will come from an analysis of court proceedings under 2A.”

Even if a case can be made for the retention of a “lesser” offence of stalking, the division also limits the ability of the Crown Prosecution Service to respond to cases effectively by setting out two separate paths for the same crime. As NAPO and PAS have pointed out, allowing the offence to be triable either way would have two advantages. First, if evidence came out during a magistrates court trial indicating that the matter was more serious than first thought and may warrant a sentence of more than six months, the case could be sent to the Crown court for sentence. Secondly, many stalkers who do not threaten violence and who may be tried under section 2A for less serious matters are, nevertheless, highly persistent. Without the power to refer to a Crown court, such people could appear persistently in magistrates courts, being liable only for six months’ imprisonment and automatically released at three months —if they were tagged, they would come out after one month and continue their behaviour.

The amendments tabled by the Government maintain the risk that offences will not be adequately addressed, as at present, because they ask the CPS to choose between “lower-level” offences of stalking, as yet undefined, and those considered “more serious”. The challenge for all involved in addressing this offence will be to make such a distinction in any meaningful way as to merit it.

In contrast, our proposed amendments to Lords amendment 51 offer the opportunity to correct this situation so that confusion is no bar to ensuring that those who commit these crimes are given appropriate sentences. Our amendment (d) to Lords amendment 51 proposes a simple definition of stalking that could clarify the difference between “harassment” and “stalking” between neighbours who behave in unacceptable ways towards each other and the person who fixates on a former partner or someone they have never met but serves to cause them distress.

Our amendment (c ) to Lords amendment 51 would help to ensure that it is open to the criminal justice system to respond to these crimes by making them triable either way, thus introducing the possibility, alongside the lesser sentences the Government are offering under section 2A, of a sentence of up to five years. If the Government will not accept the amendments, they need to set out precisely what constitutes a “lesser” crime of stalking and how it would be distinctive from the crimes they expect to be prosecuted under section 4A. In particular, I ask the Home Secretary to put on the record clear examples of the different criteria they expect to be applied to justify this division and to ensure that criminal justice agencies are able to understand the intent in their proposals.

Finally, our amendment (a) to Lords amendment 52 deals with how these crimes are investigated and with the importance of ensuring that the police are able to act. It would restore a power of entry to the properties of those arrested for stalking without a warrant to ensure that evidence cannot be destroyed. The power previously existed for cases of harassment, but was removed as an unintended consequence of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, and many of us believe that this omission requires attention. Again, I highlight to Ministers the risks they are taking by creating two stalking offences, where one is indictable and the other is only a summary offence. Under their proposals, the police can enter a property to search only if the offence is indictable. The confusion between sections 2A and 4A could mean that officers hesitate in using this power to investigate matters relating to these crimes for fear of not finding enough evidence to meet the “seriousness” test. Seeking this power, and thus the possibility of investigation, would help to ensure that the police would not flinch out of confusion; those committing offences that the Government believe would fall into section 4A could be investigated without the police thinking twice.

Without this power, there is a very real danger of evidence being destroyed as others act to protect those arrested for this offence. The fact that it could take hours to secure a warrant allows that possibility—that time is valuable. Indeed, as we have seen with recent attempts to destroy evidence relevant to the prosecution of those involved in phone hacking, such behaviour is not theoretical. The fact that the police are currently able to search the property of a shoplifter but not to access the property of someone who has been arrested for stalking to seek further evidence—perhaps to see the shrine they have created or computer information on social networks—further reflects the difficulties our police will have with the measures as they stand in ensuring that they effectively protect victims.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs May]

It is normal practice when introducing offences to have a lower level and a higher level offence, and training for the criminal justice system agencies will look at identifying the sort of behaviour that might come under one or the other. Again, in these circumstances it is always difficult, and I think inappropriate, to try to state absolutely what behaviour would come under one offence and what behaviour would come under another, because the context of behaviour might be significant; behaviour that might be considered lower level in one context might be considered higher level in another. It is important that we do not try to set out absolute definitions and that discretion is available to the police in interpreting the offences and looking at the context in which they are committed. I know that the hon. Lady’s view is different from mine, but the point is similar to the previous one: the more we try to define the offence in legislation or on the Floor of the House, the less we can offer the discretion and flexibility that might be necessary to an individual officer or the Crown Prosecution Service to deal with such cases. I fear that we might end up in a situation that is not so good if the terminology we use is too rigid.

The hon. Member for Walthamstow also tabled amendment (c) to Lords amendment 51, which would make the lower-level section 2A offence triable either way. It is currently a summary-only offence, reflecting the fact that it is a lower level offence and should be properly tried in the magistrates court. More serious behaviour should be captured by the higher level section 4A offence of stalking involving fear of violence. Amendments (d) to (f) seek to capture the emotional distress suffered by victims of stalking. I have already set out how we intend to address this point, and our approach is supported by NAPO and Protection Against Stalking. She referred to the need for clarity in the criminal justice system, yet her proposals attempt to blur the distinction between the two offences and, I think, would lead to less clarity rather than more.

The Opposition’s other amendment in this group, amendment (a) to Lords amendment 52, would remove the requirement to obtain a warrant before searching a potential stalker’s property or possessions under the new section 2A offence. As the offence is a summary-only offence, which is by definition a lower level offence, I think that requiring a warrant for a search represents an appropriate balance between protecting the vulnerable in society from stalkers and respecting the rights of those who are innocent until proven guilty. The higher level offence, as I said earlier, automatically allows the power of entry, which is appropriate, given that it is a more serious offence. For those reasons, I cannot accept the Opposition’s amendments.

[Mr Buckland]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for her clear exposition of the position. May I seek some clarification on the position regarding persistent offenders, who quite properly should be dealt with in the Crown court? Will guidelines be issued to prosecutors to deal with the particular issue of persistent offenders—in essence to ensure that they are dealt with by the either-way mechanism and can then be sent to the Crown court either for trial or for sentencing?

[Mrs May]

I thank my hon. Friend for raising that issue. The persistency of an offence is a factor that should be taken into account when looking at the seriousness of it. Perhaps I can attempt to give the hon. Member for Walthamstow some indication on these matters. My hon. Friend raises the issue of someone persistently undertaking the offence of stalking, and we hope to reach a situation in which early examples, or early behaviour, of stalking can be identified, captured and therefore dealt with through the lower level offence before it moves on to stalking behaviour—the more serious offence that is set out in proposed section 4A.

We do take stalking very seriously, however, and we are determined to do all we can to stamp it out. We have created the two new offences, explicitly putting stalking on the statute book for the first time; we are giving the police the powers of entry that they need to disrupt stalkers at an early stage; and we have responded to the concerns of victims and of victims’ organisations by making it clear that behaviour which ruins lives will be properly punished. I think that those changes will make a real difference to the lives of victims, and I commend the Lords amendments and the Government’s amendments to those amendments to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Llwyd]

I am grateful to the right hon. Lady for that assurance, which I take to be an invitation to write to her. I had another seven or eight questions, but I shall not labour the House with them this evening.

Before I sit down and allow others to take the matter further, may I once more express my sincere gratitude to all the parliamentarians who took part in the research work? I think this may be the only time when a cross-party group that is not a Committee of the House has succeeded in bringing forward a change in the law. I do not know how often that will happen, but it is certainly a precedent that I favour—I would say that, wouldn’t I?

I wish again to say how grateful we are to Laura Richards of PAS and Harry Fletcher of NAPO, and to all the victims who assisted us by giving evidence. I am also very grateful to the Home Secretary, because I know she has been on the side of the angels on this issue for some time. I am sure she shares my pleasure in the fact that something positive is now being done.

The Bill’s provisions on stalking show that the Government have carried out a listening exercise, and we will now have firm laws. They will prevent lives from being ruined and, crucially, from being lost. They represent an important change in the law, and I have been privileged to play a part in achieving it. The inquiry has been the most enriching and worthwhile experience of my political life, and I am delighted to see the result.

[Mr Buckland]

I will not repeat the constructive comments of the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd) and others on the provisions that all parties have accepted. I am delighted to have been part of the process, but hope that does not give me, as a relatively new Member, a false sense of what can be achieved so quickly by consensus. The Government have moved with speed and with willingness to listen, and I commend their fleetness of foot. I am grateful to them for acting and amending their own amendments. That shows their willingness to listen to the debate and to engage with NAPO and Protection Against Stalking, to which I pay tribute.

The journey does not end here. Once the Bill is passed, it is essential that we get training for police officers and guidance for prosecutors absolutely right and monitor the progress of the new laws. Stalking is emotional terrorism; it is a crime of control, a crime of manipulation and, yes, a crime of violence. It was quite clear from the evidence heard by the all-party inquiry heard these changes to the law were necessary. I started as somebody who was not convinced that the law should be changed, but I ended as somebody who was entirely persuaded. I commend the Government’s amendments to the House.

[Stella Creasy]

We have listened to the debate, but we are still not satisfied on the question of lesser and more serious charges of stalking. We therefore wish to press amendment (b) to a vote.

Question put, That amendment (b) to Lords amendment 51 be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hanson]

I hesitate to agree with the hon. Gentleman yet again, but I do agree with him. As far as I am aware, the fact that someone’s DNA is on the database under the 2010 Act is known only by the police—if they wish to examine it—and by the person concerned, and they can tell whoever they wish to tell, or alternatively tell no one. It is not a matter of public knowledge.

This is the nub of my amendment, flawed though it is. Of the 23,000 people I mentioned earlier, about 6,000 a year will go on to commit serious crimes, including rape and other sexual offences, murder and manslaughter. I simply ask—as I have on every occasion when I have had an opportunity to discuss the issue—why we should allow that to happen when we have the ability, potentially, to prevent it from happening.

[Mr Buckland]

Nonsense.

[Mr Hanson]

We have had a debate about this and there is an honest disagreement between the Minister and me, but the hon. Gentleman needs to recognise that the DNA database, as constituted under the 2010 Act, would prevent those 6,000 serious crimes from taking place. He may shake his head, but that is what he needs to recognise.

Let me give an example involving an event that took place after our debate on 10 October. A newspaper report, headed “Warning as bogus cab driver is jailed for rape”, stated:

“Marcos De Souza, 32, was trapped because his DNA was held on file even though he had no criminal record. The Brazilian had lured the drunken 19-year-old into his car as she left a house party in Camden in February.

The victim was so drunk the sex predator believed she would never remember what was about to happen to her…But when she arrived home dishevelled, her boyfriend encouraged her to call police and De Souza’s DNA was found after tests. The sex predator was traced because police had taken his DNA when he was arrested after a previous girlfriend claimed he had assaulted her. The case was discontinued but his profile was retained on the national database.”

That DNA would not have been retained under the Government’s current proposals.

I accept that my amendment is not perfect. I may not have advanced the same argument in the past, and it is possible that I shall not do so in the future. The purpose of the amendment is to persuade the Minister to reflect again on the views of the hon. Member for Shipley and other Members.