Investigatory Powers Bill (Twelfth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateRobert Buckland
Main Page: Robert Buckland (Conservative - South Swindon)Department Debates - View all Robert Buckland's debates with the Home Office
(8 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesHaving tested the patience of the Committee on the point I was labouring on the last amendment—which I think is important, even if I am alone in that—I can indicate that these and the other amendments following in this chapter are all similar to previous amendments. I will deal with them quickly.
Amendments 698 and 699 deal with the test for the judicial commissioner. If it is helpful, I can indicate to the Solicitor General in advance that, having been round the track on this issue, I am not going to repeat the arguments or press them to a vote, because of the discussions we have been having.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I beg to move amendment 620, in clause 163, page 126, line 6, at end insert—
This drafting amendment is for consistency with clauses 127 and 143.
Briefly, these are minor drafting amendments that mirror drafting in an equivalent interception provision in clause 127. The amendment makes no changes to the bulk equipment interference regime itself. It is a minor discrepancy and we want to try to ensure drafting consistency as much as possible. We are mindful that the Committee has attached particular importance to that issue. Here is an instance of the Government making sure that in this example we are doing just as encouraged.
Amendment 620 agreed to.
Amendment made: 621, in clause 163, page 126, line 31, at end insert—
“This is subject to subsection (5).”—(The Solicitor General.)
This drafting amendment is for consistency with clauses 127 and 143
Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
From memory, the services could not at the moment envisage a circumstance in which they would need it, but they would not want to rule out the possibility that it might arise at a future date.
An example could be a group of terrorists who are involved in an explosion and sustain burns. Medical evidence about where they attended—the fact that they had attended a local A&E—could be relevant to that particular operation. That is the sort of category that we are thinking of.
That may well be. I listened carefully to the answer that was given—
It may well be that it could be dealt with in a more targeted way. As a general proposition, where targeted powers can be used they should be used. That is a theme that goes through the Bill and the code.
I can clarify: let us imagine a scenario where there is an unidentified individual or we do not know the identities of the people. We know that an atrocity has taken place, but we do not have names, so targeting is more difficult. It is an exceptional case, but there is that possibility.
These are all hypotheticals. I think the services themselves have said that they have not needed such powers yet, and we can speculate as to what the situation might be. However, I accept as a general proposition that the focus ought to be on the threshold test for accessing information. For the record, in relation to adult and child social care, there would be a concern not only for the vulnerable adult and child but among those providing the care, because they will be expressing their opinions in these reports and they would be concerned that that remained confidential. That highlights why we need to work on this position. However, for the time being, I look forward to that work and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I beg to move amendment 629, in clause 186, page 143, line 9, leave out “(urgent cases)”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 630.
The amendments will make it possible for an instrument that makes a major modification to a bulk personal dataset warrant, to add or vary an operational purpose, to be signed by a senior official as a provision for situations in which it is not reasonably practicable for the Secretary of State to sign it. The amendments are very similar to others we have made. Obviously the Secretary of State will make the decision, but in his or her absence an official will be authorised to sign the instrument. I therefore commend the amendment to the Committee.
Amendment 629 agreed to.
Amendment made: 630, in clause 186, page 143, line 10, leave out from beginning to “the” in line 15 and insert—
“( ) If it is not reasonably practicable for an instrument making a major modification to be signed by the Secretary of State, the instrument may be signed by a senior official designated by the Secretary of State for that purpose.
( ) In such a case, the instrument making the modification must contain a statement that—
(a) it is not reasonably practicable for the instrument to be signed by the Secretary of State, and
(b) ”.—(The Solicitor General.)
This amendment enables an instrument making a major modification of a warrant under Part 7 to be signed by a senior official in any case where it is not reasonably practicable for the Secretary of State to sign it.
Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
I beg to move amendment 631, in clause 192, page 147, line 37, after “that”, insert “—
(a) ”
This amendment is consequential on amendment 632.
I will deal as succinctly as possible with the amendments, which I think will gain Members’ support. They will ensure that a direction by the Secretary of State that is approved by a judicial commissioner cannot disapply the prohibition on the disclosure of an intercept warrant or any intercepted material. The clause relates to bulk personal datasets obtained by a security and intelligence agency using a capability for which a warrant or other authorisation was issued or given up under another part of the Bill: for example, via the intercept provisions.
The clause provides that, in such cases, the intelligence agency can apply to the Secretary of State for a direction, which has the effect of applying this part—part 7—to the bulk personal dataset. For example, if an agency intercepts an email that has a bulk personal dataset attached and the agency wants to retain and examine that information as a bulk personal dataset, it can apply for a direction to that effect to the Secretary of State. The judicial commissioner must then approve that before it takes effect.
Subsection (6) as drafted states that it is not possible to disapply clause 48, which excludes material identifiable as intercept, from legal proceedings, unlike schedule 3, which provides exceptions to that exclusion. Therefore, a bulk personal dataset that is acquired by interception will always be subject to those provisions, even if a direction is given to apply the safeguards in part 7. The amendments make it explicit that it is not possible to disapply clauses 49 to 51 in such circumstances, either. The clauses together mean that it is an offence to make unauthorised disclosure of the existence of an intercept warrant or any intercepted material.
The clauses relating to the restrictions around the disclosure of material obtained under interception warrants have already been considered by the Committee. The amendments ensure that the restrictions continue to be mandatory, where applicable, to a bulk personal dataset that is subject to a clause 192 direction. Although without the amendments the Secretary of State could choose not to disapply the restrictions on a case-by-case basis, we believe that it is appropriate that that is mandatory, given that they relate to authorised disclosures and criminal liability for such a disclosure.
The clause also allows the Secretary of State the power to vary directions given under the clause, but as drafted it does not explicitly require judicial commissioner approval of such a variation. We are therefore tidying that up and making it explicit that a double lock of judicial commissioner approval will apply to the varying of a direction as well as the original direction. Therefore, once again we are paying close attention and ensuring that the safeguards on the Bill are robust in every possible respect.
Amendment 631 agreed to.
Amendments made: 632, in clause 192, page 147, line 40, at end insert—
“(b) where sections49 to51 applied in relation to the bulk personal dataset immediately before the giving of the direction, they continue to apply in relation to it with the modification that the reference in section50(6)(a) to the provisions of Part 2 is to be read as including a reference to the provisions of this Part.”
This amendment provides that, where the Secretary of State gives a direction under Clause 192(3) with the effect that Part 7 applies to a bulk personal dataset obtained under a warrant issued under Part 2 of the Bill, the direction must ensure that clauses 49 to 51 of that Part continue to apply in relation to the disclosure of the bulk personal dataset (with a modification to ensure that certain disclosures made in connection with the giving of legal advice about Part 7 are excepted disclosures for the purposes of Clause 49).
Amendment 633, in clause 192, page 148, line 8, at end insert—
‘(10A) Subsections (7) to (9) apply in relation to the variation of a direction under subsection (3) as they apply in relation to the giving of a direction under that subsection.” —(The Solicitor General.)
This amendment provides that a direction under Clause 192(3) may be varied by the Secretary of State only with the approval of a Judicial Commissioner.
Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.