(8 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberOkay, the hon. Gentleman wants to hear more. In the July 2015 Budget we confirmed an extra £800 million investment to fund additional work to tackle evasion and non-compliance. HMRC’s specialist offshore unit is currently investigating more than 1,100 cases of offshore evasion around the world, with more than 90 individuals subject to current criminal investigation. Even before last week, HMRC had already received a great deal of information on offshore companies, including in Panama, and including Mossack Fonseca. This information comes from a wide range of sources and is currently the subject of intense investigation.
We are going further by providing new funding of up to £10 million for an operationally independent cross-agency taskforce. It will include analysts, compliance specialists and investigators from across HMRC, the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office and the Financial Conduct Authority. It will have full operational independence and will report to my right hon. Friends the Chancellor and the Home Secretary.
Of course the FCA has a role to play. Its 2016-17 business plan states that the fight against financial crime and money laundering is one of its priorities. Its rules require firms to have effective systems and controls to prevent the risk that they might be used to further financial crimes. That is why the FCA has written to financial firms asking them to declare their links to Mossack Fonseca. If it finds any evidence that firms have been breaking the rules, it already has strong powers to take action. However, it is HMRC that is ultimately responsible for investigating and prosecuting offences associated with tax evasion.
Finally, with regard to trusts, we believe that we have secured a sensible way forward by ensuring that trusts that generate a tax consequence in the UK will be required to report their beneficial ownership information to HMRC. By focusing on such trusts, we are focusing on those where there is a higher risk of money laundering or tax evasion, which arise when trusts migrate or generate income or gains, and minimising burdens on the vast majority of perfectly ordinary and legitimate trusts.
Although I appreciate the spirit with which the new clause has been tabled, I do not believe that it would be appropriate to change the role of the FCA or the PRA, so I urge the hon. Member for Leeds East not to press the new clause.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 9 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 14
Combating abusive tax avoidance arrangements
“(1) Section 3B of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulatory principles to be applied by both regulators) is amended as follows.
(2) At the end of subsection (1) insert—
(i) combating abusive tax avoidance arrangements.
(a) in observing principle (i), the regulators must undertake, in consultation with the Treasury, an annual review for presentation to the Treasury into abusive tax avoidance, including measures to ascertain and record beneficial ownership of trusts using facilities provided by banks with UK holding companies or entities regulated by the Bank of England or the FCA, control of shareholders and ownership of shares, and investment arrangements in an overseas territory outside the UK involving UK financial institutions.
(b) in this section “beneficial ownership of trusts” includes ownership of any equitable interest in a trust including being an object of a discretionary trust, power of appointment or similar arrangement as well as any vested interest under a trust;
(c) “control of shareholders and ownership of shares in companies using facilities provided by banks with UK holding companies or entities regulated by the Bank of England or the FCA” shall include control by any person with control over a voteholder in a company as defined in Part VI Official Listing s.89F of the FSMA (2000) as applied mutatis mutandis to this context, whether directly or indirectly, and whether alone or in concert with some other person.””—(Richard Burgon.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
(8 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a delight to be back here, again on a sunny Tuesday, to continue our scrutiny of the Bill under your chairmanship, Mr Brady.
The Government have fundamentally reformed consumer credit regulation, transferring responsibility from the Office of Fair Trading to the Financial Conduct Authority with effect from 1 April 2014. Clause 26 supports the effective operation of the FCA’s regime through minor amendments to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 in relation to the regulation of consumer credit. It is a technical clause and concerns the application of provisions relating to the enforceability of credit agreements. It makes it clear that when a person acting on behalf of a lender can lawfully undertake the relevant credit-related regulated activity in relation to the agreement, either by administering the agreement in relation to section 26A(4), or by taking steps to procure the payment of debts under it in relation to section 26A(5), they are also able to enforce the agreement.
It is a pleasure to be here with you again, Mr Brady. I thank the Minister for her explanation—that is great.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
I will try to keep my response in order, Mr Brady, but forgive me if I occasionally slip out of order. The hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West started by asking about clause 27, which he described as “see no evil”. I want to reassure him that the change addresses an issue that arises as a result of the transfer of the regulation of consumer credit from the Office of Fair Trading to the Financial Conduct Authority and the consequent application of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to the consumer credit market. The issue addressed by the clause, whether relating to a chain or third party, arises particularly in the context of consumer credit and the activity of credit broking.
We are confident that the change to section 27 of the Financial Services and Markets Act addresses the issue with regard to consumer credit, ensuring that the section is more proportionate on consumer credit firms, without unduly affecting the protections available to consumers in the market. That is in line with our broader policy intent for the consumer credit market, where the reforms that the Government have made balance the need to provide strong consumer protections with ensuring that the burdens placed on a diverse market that includes thousands of small businesses is proportionate. I reassure the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West that firms remain under a regulatory duty, imposed by the FCA, to take reasonable steps to satisfy themselves that the firms that they deal with are authorised, where that is appropriate. The clause strikes the right balance between protecting consumers and placing a proportionate burden on firms that are lending to consumers.
We share with the hon. Gentleman an aspiration to simplify some of the legislation. I very much welcome his words of support for my dream goal in this post, which is to simplify and reduce some of the complexity not only of this regulation but of the FCA’s own rulebook, which has become quite a significant barrier to entry to sensible organisations that may want to move into, for example, the debt advice space. I welcome his support for any progress I am able to make to simplify some of that.
Clause 27 simply narrows the circumstances in which a credit agreement or a consumer hire agreement is unenforceable. I think that the hon. Gentleman will welcome that. Both he and the hon. Member for East Lothian mentioned transformer vehicles, which are not those fun toys that appeal to consumers but something completely different that, I assure Members, are not for the consumer market. Only sophisticated or institutional investors will be permitted to invest in insurance-linked vehicles.
From a policy perspective, it is important that London have the ability to establish insurance special purpose vehicles. London is the largest insurance market in Europe and is a centre for specialist insurance activity. Whether we like it or not, all Members face risks in their lives—indeed, all businesses face a range of risks. Insurance is a way to bring that risk down to a manageable level. London should be able to compete and innovate in new forms of risk mitigation. If London is able to offer a full range of innovative solutions, insurance entities will continue to come to London to meet their risk mitigation needs. I heartily hope that all Committee members support that.
Insurance-linked securities use a range of specialist skills and services to arrange the deals, including underwriting, risk modelling, brokerage, legal and capital market expertise. Nevertheless, Members are right to express concerns about the transparency and manageability of the risks, as well as about the importance of their being arranged by regulated entities, so it is important that I set out that insurance-linked securities business will be prudently regulated in the UK.
All special purpose vehicles will require Prudential Regulation Authority authorisation. All the wording in terms of the contracts must be clear and robust, and importantly risks cannot be bundled together in the way that the hon. Member for East Lothian feared. We require all special purpose vehicles to be fully funded to cover the full extent of the risk they take on, so we are not talking about the kind of very leveraged structures that he rightly said were so instrumental in the last financial crash.
I have said that only sophisticated or institutional investors will be permitted to invest in the vehicles. Of course, if they are arranged prudently—when someone is able to manage their risks prudently—those transactions will contribute to financial stability. They increase the capacity of the reinsurance markets. They provide investments that are not correlated with the economic cycle, and therefore they provide investors with good diversification characteristics. I hope that I have reassured hon. Members of the importance of clarifying the rules on transformer vehicles, but I sense that the hon. Gentleman has a further question on the issue.
I am somewhat reassured by what the Minister has said. However, I would caution her about her remarks about innovation and the attractiveness of London, because I sat—either in this room or Committee Room 10—on the Finance Bill Committee when her predecessor, Ed Balls, was saying the same thing in 2006 and saying, “We are grateful that London is now the financial capital of the world, over New York, because we don’t have the millstone of Sarbanes-Oxley.” Look where that ended. Therefore, yes to innovation, and yes to London being the major financial centre in Europe, if not the world, but I urge the Government to be careful that we do not go round the same crazy merry-go-round that my Government let us go round in the past.
The hon. Gentleman and I agree on the importance of making sure that we try to strike the right balance. We must ensure that the UK retains the ability to innovate. I am sure that none of us would want to see that ability being reduced, but it should do that within the boundaries of sensible and prudent regulation, so that we do not commit the alternative policy error, which would be to throw up our hands in horror at the kinds of innovations that have happened and so harm consumers by not allowing that kind of innovation. It would harm jobs in the UK if such innovation were not allowed to happen here. I welcome hiss questions—he is absolutely right to ask them—but I hope that I have convinced him that, in this instance, we have got the balance right and that these are simply useful instruments that will be well regulated and certainly available only to sophisticated institutional investors.
Although there are no Government proposals to consolidate the Financial Services and Markets Act at the moment, consolidated versions—for the ease of reference of members of the Committee and members of the public who are following our discussions with such avid interest—are available on commercial databases, such as LEXIS, and the Government statute law database—legislation.gov.uk—is working to make up-to-date Acts of Parliament available free of charge on a consolidated basis to everybody.
I will move on to the questions that were asked about Pension Wise and pension guidance, and the important steps that we are taking to bring pension freedoms to those who are no longer required to buy an annuity but to extend them to people who have bought an annuity and who may decide in retrospect that it was not the right thing for them. We are promoting a secondary market in those pension freedoms.
To be clear, regarding the rules on beneficiaries—I am thinking of a situation where a spouse remains a beneficiary and there is a remaining annuity after the death of the primary annuitant—there might need to be the ability to provide Pension Wise guidance and other support to people in that circumstance. The exact characteristics of who is entitled to use the service will be set out in regulation in due course, as will the definition of a “relevant interest” and what a relevant annuity is.
I am grateful. The statistics might be available on the website, but although I am an averagely competent user of websites I could not find them. They are therefore not readily available.
We have made huge strides with the gov.uk website, which is a lot clearer and simpler than it used to be, but let me be the first to agree with the hon. Gentleman that such things can always be made clearer. I have put on the record the most recent example of management information available, which is that 2.2 million people have clicked on the website, with more than 50,000 people having some sort of face-to-face interaction. Also, in the summer Budget last year we extended the ability of people from 50 onwards to use the face-to-face service.
The website is well used. The feedback on face-to-face interactions has also been positive.
Clearly, it is regrettable that although we often pass regulations in this House—this is a very regulated area—people still choose to prey on the vulnerable, particularly older people, and do things that are illegal and completely against the regulations. We ought to combine regulation with informing people about the regulations and when they should have their antennae twigged to the fact that something might not be a good idea.
The hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West raised a range of important points about auto-enrolment, the reports in The Times today and master trusts. I can let him into a little secret on that: the Government will bring in legislation on master trusts and on the points he raised as soon as practically possible. We had considered bringing it in as part of this piece of legislation, but we felt that since the Bill had gone through the House of Lords it would be very late on in the legislative process to introduce something as extensive as that. That was my judgment, and I hope that he will support me on that. However, we aspire to find very soon the first appropriate vehicle that could be scrutinised by both Chambers to bring in the regulations relating to master trusts and auto-enrolment.
I thank the Minister very much for that swift response to my plea. It is perhaps one of my first successes, and now she has indeed set my pulse racing.
No comment, Mr Brady, on that. I am making sure that I cover all the points that were raised by members of the Committee. I am shocked—deeply shocked—that the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West is not aware that the Royal Mint is in Cardiff and that it continues to produce all our coins. Indeed, Wales plays a very important role in the issuance of our currency. It does not play a role at the moment in the production of bank notes. Obviously, that lapsed when the last issuing bank in Wales was taken over by either HSBC or Lloyds—I cannot remember which—and got subsumed into that bank, and the bank lost this ability at that point.
To answer the hon. Gentleman’s other questions about clause 31 and the reason for subsection (7), this provision is included in order to confirm that the amendments to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Appointed Representatives) Regulations 2001—a very catchy title—can be subject to further amendment by the Treasury if it comes to revise those regulations. That is to say that the fact that this secondary legislation is amended in the Bill does not narrow the scope of the Treasury’s powers in the Financial Services and Markets Act. I hope that that is as clear as day for the hon. Gentleman. I would also like to clarify that the amendments set out in clause 31 are intended to remove any doubt on this question by making it clear that financial advisers who are appointed representatives of authorised firms are eligible to advise on the conversion or transfer of safeguarded benefits.
The hon. Gentleman also asked some extensive questions about what the definition of a bank in insolvency should be. The wider fact is that here we are establishing a gateway for the transfer of what might be extremely sensitive material—non-public information about the financial health of a particular bank—into the Treasury to ensure that the Treasury can fulfil its important public role of understanding where or when there might be a risk to public funds. That is what we are trying to establish here. It is right to probe the word “insolvency”, because what we are really talking about is a bank in trouble. “In trouble” is a rather difficult phrase to define in legislation, but I think we both know it when we see it.
I was also asked whether the Treasury can request information in advance of a bank failing. The answer to that is clearly yes. The only condition would be that the Treasury considers the information to be material to the Bank’s assessment of the likelihood of a bank, building society, credit union or investment firm failing. This assessment would be done in advance. It influences the resolution plan that the Bank adopts in preparation for a possible failure of the institution in future.
I think that I have now touched on all the points that were raised about this section. I hope that I have satisfied hon. Members of the wisdom of these clauses and that they will join me in supporting their inclusion in the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Government new clause 7 places a duty on the Financial Conduct Authority to limit early exit charges, which act as a deterrent to people accessing their pensions early under the new pension freedoms, thus fulfilling a commitment that the Chancellor of the Exchequer made recently.
The Government introduced the pension freedoms in April 2015 because we believe that people who have worked hard and saved their entire life should be free to spend their retirement savings as they want. At that time, the Government wanted to ensure that everyone who was eligible could access their pension flexibly under the new freedoms, and they therefore strengthened the statutory right of members in defined contribution schemes so that people could, in all cases, transfer their pension savings from one scheme to another.
Following the introduction of the freedoms, it became increasingly clear that other barriers, including early exit charges and long transfer times, were preventing some people from using them. Evidence gathered for the Government by the FCA has shown a small but nevertheless significant cohort in contract-based schemes for whom early exit charges pose a barrier to their use of the freedoms. Some 670,000 people in FCA-regulated schemes face an exit charge, and for 66,000 of them—one in 10—the charge would exceed 10% of the value of their pension pot. In some cases, the charges could be high enough to make it uneconomical for an individual to access their pension flexibly, while in others the presence of an early exit charge could act to discourage individuals from accessing their pension, when that might be the best thing to do in their circumstances. It is therefore clear that the Government’s objective of ensuring that everyone who is eligible is able to access their pension savings flexibly is not being met, and that action is needed to ensure that all consumers are able to make use of the freedoms.
To ensure that the cap benefits current consumers who are eligible to use the freedoms now, the Government will ensure that any cap applies equally to existing arrangements and to those entered into in the future. The Government have not taken the decision to pursue legislation with retrospective effect lightly, and we recognise industry concerns about interference with existing contractual agreements. We have already made it clear that market value reductions should not be subject to the cap on early exit charges. However, in the Government’s view it is unfair that a significant minority of individuals have been deterred from accessing their pensions flexibly because of contractual terms they entered into long before the freedoms were introduced. Indeed, some providers have conceded that industry practices have moved on, and that the introduction of the pension freedoms means that the charges pose a much more significant barrier now than when they were first agreed. Fairness is not determined solely by reference to whether it was acceptable to include a term in a pension contract many decades ago; it should also be assessed in light of the reforms and changes in market practice over time.
In the context of the new pension freedoms, it is unfair that some individuals are being deterred from accessing their pensions flexibly because of terms in contracts from before the pension freedoms were introduced. Those people would not have been in a position to make an informed decision about potential early exit charges when they signed up, and that is why we have introduced the clause, to limit the charges and remove the deterrent.
In giving the FCA, as the relevant regulator, the flexibility to determine the precise level of the cap, we are ensuring that fairness is built into the setting of any cap. The FCA is best placed to determine how best to apply any cap, to ensure that early exit charges are not a deterrent to individuals using the freedoms. The new clause will provide consumers in contract-based pension schemes with genuine protection when exercising the pension freedoms, by ensuring that they are not deterred by early exit charges. Alongside that measure, which will apply to FCA-regulated pension schemes, the Department for Work and Pensions and the Pensions Regulator will work to ensure that any relevant concerns are appropriately addressed for trust-based schemes. We will ensure that all pension scheme members are protected against excessive early exit fees, regardless of the type of pension scheme they are in. I commend the new clause to the Committee.
I am glad that the Chancellor has come on board fully. The Prime Minister did so yesterday; he came on board with Labour’s manifesto commitments on the European Union—good for him. The 2015 Labour manifesto said:
“We will reform the pensions market so that pension providers put savers first, and protect consumers from retirement rip-offs. We support greater flexibility for those drawing down their pension pots, but there must be proper guidance for people to avoid mis-selling.”
We have already discussed pension guidance and the welcome amendments on Pension Wise.
I have several issues to raise with the Minister. Paragraph 2.16 of the Government’s response to the consultation document on pension transfers and early exit charges referred to “further cost-benefit analysis” from the FCA
“in relation to the appropriate level of any cap.”
Can the Minister tell me—my research has not extended this far—whether the FCA has done that research? I gather from her remarks that it has not yet done so, but I may have misunderstood her. If it has done it, when was it done and published? If it has not, when does she anticipate that it will be done?
Can the Minister say something—again, I may have missed this in her remarks—about what she anticipates the level of the cap will be? She referred to the shocking 10% charges that some people have unfortunately been asked for on requesting a transfer. A press release from a couple of weeks ago referred to speeding up the process and to things being done “quickly and accurately”. I do not see any reference in new clause 7 to the timescale, although there is a reference to the cap, so I hope the Minister can elucidate that.
The bigger issue—again, this may be my reading of new clause 7—is that the Government seem to be conflating two things in the wording of the new clause. The Minister’s remarks did not reassure me about that. The first is the penalty for moving. One of the reasons why I signed up to Equitable Life years ago—what a great deal that was—is that it had what was then called an open-market option, which was unusual in defined purchase schemes at that time. It was attractive because it meant that decades down the road I would have the option of buying an annuity from a provider other than Equitable Life. It was not the only provider to offer such a scheme, but it was unusual; it was in the minority. That was back in the ’80s, when I was a very young man. Some schemes had a ban on moving—that has effectively been statutorily overridden—and others had penalties.
The other thing, which I fear that the Government have conflated with the first in their wording—perhaps the Minister can reassure me about this—is what in the trade used to be called an actuarial reduction. In other words, if the normal retirement age for the pension scheme is 65, as it is in the House of Commons scheme, to which many hon. Members have signed up, but someone takes it at 60—above the statutory age of 55; it used to be 50—in round terms they take a 50% reduction in the annual pension. Keeping it simple, instead of getting £10,000 a year from the age of 65, they get £5,000 a year from the age of 60 because they are getting it for an extra five years. It is not exactly 50%, but as a rule of thumb it is about 5% a year for taking it early, so if someone takes it at 55 they lose 50% of their pension. That is not, to most people’s minds, a penalty. Because people get the dosh for longer, they get a smaller annual amount. We could have a debate about whether 5% a year is mathematically accurate, with life expectancy and so on, but in terms of the principle and the concept that people lose pension because they have started to take it below the normal retirement age there is that actuarial reduction.
(8 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI was not aware of that statistic, but it does not entirely surprise me. I thank the hon. Gentleman for that.
We have the chair of the FCA’s foreword to its business plan for 2015-16—as I said, the current year. That is John Griffith-Jones, who by the way worked at KPMG from 1975 to 2012; we all know that KPMG has questions to answer about what it was doing in relation to the financial institutions in the lead-up to the meltdown in 2008. I was talking about cosiness; he comes from KPMG, and he said in that foreword:
“In our last Risk Outlook we identified the seven most important forward-looking areas of focus in our view. We do the same again this year. Unsurprisingly, given the long-term nature of these risks and the underlying drivers, the list is largely unchanged. Poor culture and controls continue to concern us, notwithstanding the efforts being made by firms to improve both.”
So there he is, in his foreword to the business plan, less than 12 months ago, stressing again the concerns about “poor culture and controls”. The FCA said in the business plan that would investigate the culture of banking and financial institutions and then, in a whiff of smoke, it was gone—no investigation whatsoever. The Minister says that is nothing to do with the Treasury, but I hope she will recognise that the Opposition are a little concerned about the relationship between the Treasury and the FCA. We are concerned about how much control and direction the Treasury can give the FCA.
The FCA is constitutionally a creature of statute, hence the Bill and previous legislation, but in everyday terms it is somewhat a creature of the Treasury. It would be helpful if, when addressing clause 18 and the minor amendments 37 and 38, the Minister said a little more about the current relationship between Her Majesty’s Government, refracted through the Treasury, and the FCA, and what she foresees that future relationship being in the changed landscape that the Bill introduces.
Clause 18 is effectively about remit letters, which I think is why the hon. Gentleman took the opportunity to bring a lot of fairly extraneous issues into discussion. I will respond to some of them in the course of my remarks.
It is important that regulation takes account of both the implications of the economic environment for the regulators and of the regulators’ own impact on that economic environment. I am sure all members of the Committee agree with that. That is reflected in the statutory remits of the regulators. For example, both regulators have a duty to have regard to the desirability of sustainable economic growth in the medium or long term. The objectives of both regulators recognise the importance of effective competition, and I trust that members of the Committee do not wish to raise any controversy or have any criticism about that.
Clearly, therefore, both regulators need to understand how the Government’s economic policy may affect their work. I want to be absolutely clear that the recommendations in the letters that the Government will be able to send to the regulators will indicate the Government’s economic policy. They will be recommendations and will not be binding. They will certainly not be what the hon. Gentleman termed “direction”. They will not compromise, modify or override the regulators’ statutory objectives in any way, nor, importantly, will they relate to individual firms or cases.
The hon. Gentleman raised one of his favourite topics: the fact that the FCA had a bank culture review in its business plan for the year ahead. Despite my assurances to him in the Chamber that the first the Treasury heard of that was when it was covered in the media over the new year, he does not seem convinced by what we have said. We have replied to numerous written questions with the same response, and I repeat it for his benefit today.
The FCA is clearly operationally independent. It took an operationally independent decision to change what it is going to focus on over the coming year, and that decision was made completely separately from the Government.
I take what the hon. Lady says. Is she comfortable that that was the right decision for the FCA to take? It was made by a body that is so incompetent that it could not even monitor the share dealings of its own staff.
The hon. Gentleman cannot have it both ways. If he thinks that I should have no operational interference in whether the FCA does a cultural review study, obviously I should not have any operational interference in whether it reinstates the study. That is the situation in which operational independence results. Where the Government have a role is through sending these non-binding remit letters and through the power to appoint the chief executive and the board. The hon. Gentleman has described the history of the predecessor organisation, the FSA, and obviously we had to abolish that organisation—that is the power of the Government of the day. His party’s Front Benchers have a range of different and fairly eccentric ideas about the independence of the Bank of England, which are on the public record. I will not entertain the Committee by talking about them.
The hon. Gentleman is serving in the team of a shadow Chancellor who wants to end the independence of the Bank of England.
I think we can all agree that that would be a fascinating study to read, but I will not get involved in directing the FCA to change its business plan. That would be interfering with the operational independence of the FCA, which I am sure Opposition Members do not want me to do.
I thank the hon. Lady for being so generous in giving way. Actually, I never said anything about not interfering in operational matters. She rightly says that, in theory, the Government could abolish the FCA. This clause does not cover a directive to the FCA; it talks about a recommendation. A recommendation from the Treasury, a body that could abolish the FCA, is something akin, in everyday parlance, to a directive. Pursuant to proposed new section 1JA(1)(b) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, such recommendations could be on “how to advance” one or more of its operational directives.
I have outlined some of the things that the Government put in their remit letter, which is not binding on the organisation but provides important context for what the Government, elected by the British people, want to focus on.
Let me now turn to the amendments. Amendment 37 would require the Treasury to publish the recommendations it makes to the FCA within one month, and amendment 38 would require the notice laid before Parliament to be accompanied by a statement to each House. The amendments raise the important issue of transparency, which is at the heart of the Government’s proposals for these remit letters. The remit letters themselves form an important element of transparency, and they provide a transparent and formal means of conveying Government economic policy to the regulators, so it is an important part of the provision that the Treasury must publish its recommendations and lay a copy before both Houses of Parliament.
These probing amendments have been useful to confirm how the process will work. I assure members of the Committee that I cannot foresee any circumstances in which the notification for either regulator would not be published and laid before Parliament within a month. I am happy to commit the Government to that practice. I am not going quite as far as accepting the hon. Gentleman’s amendment, but I am happy to commit the Government on the record to that practice. I hope my assurance will be sufficient.
We need to retain flexibility about the best way of informing the House. For example, the updated recommendations might be issued as part of the Budget statement. In that case, it would be more appropriate and efficient for the House to be informed of the new recommendations in the Budget speech, as has happened when the FPC remit letter is updated at that time.
The hon. Gentleman raised a few other points, and it might be helpful if I respond to them. Without criticising Mr Andrew Bailey in any way, the hon. Gentleman did imply that he thought he was doing too much. However, I can assure the hon. Gentleman that Mr Bailey will stop being the chief executive of the PRA on the day he moves over to be chief executive of the FCA. The hon. Gentleman referred to conflicts. I hope that he is not alluding to any specific conflict of interest, because that would be inappropriate in terms of impugning Mr Bailey’s integrity.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned a “cosy” relationship. There were a lot of allegations relating to the fact that many individuals involved have worked with, and have experience of, other organisations. However, that is where the operational independence, structure and framework of statutory duties and responsibilities, as set out by Parliament, is so important. FSMA, for example, made it clear that the terms of all appointments have to ensure that the appointee cannot be directed by the Treasury or any other person, including the Bank.
When we make appointments, we consider the appointee’s current and previous background—of course we do —including any material conflicts. In our view, it would be entirely appropriate for people who are appointed to these important functions to have extensive experience of a relevant institution. Therefore, I do not think that the hon. Gentleman is right to talk about “cosiness”; he ought to be saying how important it is to have experience and wisdom in the statutory framework that we are discussing.
Without more ado, I hope that my points on the amendment and the clause have been sufficient to satisfy the hon. Gentleman. I am very grateful for his probing amendments. I hope I have been able to address the concerns and that the clause may stand part of the Bill.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19
Diversity
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The clause shows how valuable it can be for Ministers to have their Bill start in the House of Lords, given that we often find that we benefit from their insights as the Bill proceeds through the other place, particularly on subjects on which their lordships have so much wisdom.
The clause amends the general regulatory principles that apply to both the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. That is a direct way of ensuring that the regulators fully consider the differences between types of business, including—importantly—mutual institutions, across the breadth of work that they undertake, when it is appropriate to do so. The clause makes it clear that both regulators must take into account the differences between the varying forms of business organisation adopted by firms, including —importantly—mutual societies, where appropriate whenever they are discharging their general functions.
I hope that introducing the clause, which puts consideration of mutuality and other types of business organisation into the regulators’ guiding principles, provides reassurance that the Government strongly support a diverse financial services sector and the part that mutuals play in achieving that. We are building on previous action that the Government have taken to support the sector, including: carving out the building societies from the Independent Commission on Banking ring-fencing regulations; increasing the maximum interest rates that credit unions may charge on loans from 2% to 3% a month; spending £38 million in the credit union sector through the Department for Work and Pensions credit union expansion project; and ensuring that universal credit and pensions payments may be paid into a credit union account.
Moreover, Government support for the Mutuals’ Deferred Shares Act 2015, which received Royal Assent in March 2015, underlined our commitment to fostering growth and competition in the sector by seeking to address mutual insurers’ inability to access external capital without the need to demutualise.
Clause 19 provides a further step to ensure that regulators fully consider the particular issues that relate to mutual institutions and other forms of business across all their work. It highlights the role of mutual financial institutions in the UK’s evolving financial services marketplace and ensures that, where appropriate, the specific challenges that the mutuals sector faces are taken into consideration when the regulators are discharging their general objectives.
We on the Labour Benches—I do not know about colleagues in the Scottish National party—welcome clause 19. I say that as someone who first joined a credit union more than 40 years ago. Diversity is important in the financial sector, as in many sectors. The parallel that some of us may remember from our schooldays is crop rotation, for which we need ecological diversity. If we go for monoculture with crops, it is seriously bad news if a pest comes, because our one and only crop is gone.
There is a parallel with financial institutions. By and large, the mutuals sector, including building societies, fared better than mainstream, privately owned banks in the crisis. Where there were problems, in particular, was with some former building societies that had demutualised. I say that as someone who voted against demutualisation for at least three building societies. Two of those were the Staffordshire and the Cheltenham & Gloucester. We lost both of those, but we won with the Nationwide building society—it is still a mutual, and I still have an account there. It is a very big mutual—a very big financial institution. At the other end of the spectrum are institutions such as the Wolverhampton credit union—I am not sure what it is called now, because it keeps changing its name—of which I have been a member for many years. Compared with the Nationwide building society, it is a very small institution, but that is part of diversity.
I am pleased that this Government and their predecessor, the coalition Government, have embraced diversity. The Minister mentioned some of the things that have been done: the £38 million for credit unions and the £2 million. I salute the work that the coalition Government did, and that I hope this Government will continue to do, in relation to the mutuals sector. For example, the previous Government supported disclosure of lending data by the main high street banks to understand patterns of lending across the UK. There has been the lowering of barriers to entry to the financial services market to help to increase competition—challenger banks and so on. I do not think that the Minister mentioned the good work on schools-based financial literacy programmes, which were brought in. That is not directly about mutuals, but it has to do with that concept of a broader view to financial services than simply the high street banks.
A few more things need to be done, and if you will indulge me briefly, Mr Brady, I will mention one or two of them. I am indebted to the Community Investment Coalition for some of these suggestions. A review of existing affordable financial tools would assist, as would supporting and encouraging FinTech innovation, which the Government are starting to do—it is likely to be a growing sector—but it needs to be done in a way that will also benefit people on lower incomes. Also needed is a clear direction to economic regulators—something we discussed in our debate on the previous clause—to ensure that the financial services market provides easily understandable and appropriate products. There is a constant battle there, because products keep mutating and so on. Broadening and strengthening the existing voluntary framework for disclosure of lending data would take further what the Government have already done.
It would be useful to have stressed by the Government—practising some of their recommendations to the FCA, not directions—the value and importance of community finance. They need to ensure some competition and diversity in the financial services sector, which should benefit all communities if it works properly. A review of community finance provision across the UK would be very helpful to identify where there are strong and sustainable community finance providers, but also where there are gaps in provision. Again, that would be carrying on the work of the previous Government, which this Government, in their nine months, have carried on with clause 19 on diversity.
The final suggestion is about trying, inasmuch as Government can, and they have a role to play—the Minister mentioned the £38 million for the credit union sector given by the previous Government—to scale up the community finance sector. For example, there could be assistance with investment in IT infrastructure—not the FinTech stuff, just IT infrastructure for the community finance sector. Computers are still quite expensive, let alone programming and so on. If the Government could assist with that, with their push towards diversity, as exemplified in the clause, that would be very helpful.
I fear that the harmony in the Committee might diminish with clause 20, which introduces schedule 4, making provisions to extend the senior managers and certification regime across the financial services industry to all authorised firms, replacing the discredited approved persons regime.
Before setting out the reasoning for that, it is worth outlining the history and development of the senior managers and certification regime. Currently, individuals who work in the financial services industry are regulated through the approved persons regime. Under that regime, authorised financial services firms may not employ a person to perform “controlled functions”, by which is meant functions specified by the Prudential Regulation Authority or the Financial Conduct Authority in their rules, unless that person has been approved by the appropriate regulator following an application by the firm concerned.
The financial crisis in 2007-08 and more recent events have highlighted concerns about the performance and behaviour of many of the individuals working in the financial services industry. It is clear that the approved persons regime has not been a successful way of regulating individuals working in the industry.
As the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards argued, the regime is too broad and insufficiently focused on senior management. In fact, it called it a “complex and confused mess”. Specifically, the commission criticised the approved persons regime for being mostly
“an initial gateway to taking up a post, rather than serving as a system through which the regulators can ensure the continuing exercise of individual responsibility at the most senior levels within banks”.
In addition, the commission noted that there was a lack of clarity around the responsibilities of individuals at the senior level, and that institutions did not take enough responsibility for the fitness and propriety of their own staff at more junior levels. It is clear, therefore, that the approved persons regime is not fit for purpose. It is being replaced from March by the senior manager and certification regime for firms in the banking sector.
This regime requires the regulatory pre-approval of individuals at the top of the firm, along with statements of responsibility setting out the areas of the firm’s business for which they are responsible. It also requires certification for other key individuals upon hiring, and thereafter annually.
This new regime represents a significant strengthening of personal accountability among the top senior management in firms. It will improve corporate governance, thereby advancing the safety and soundness of regulated firms. It also provides a more effective and proportionate means to raise the standards of conduct of key staff more broadly, supported by robust enforcement powers for the regulators.
It is important to recognise, however, that the activities of firms outside the banking sector can pose significant risks to market integrity or to good outcomes for consumers, and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards expected that the deficiencies of the approved persons regime would not be confined to the banking sector.
Consequently, the Government have decided to extend the senior managers and certification regime to all authorised financial services firms in all sectors of the financial services industry. This action is also supported by the recommendations of the fair and effective markets review, which argued that misconduct in fixed-income currency and commodity markets had not been limited to banks. Indeed, the review noted that extending the senior managers and certification regime would emphasise the personal responsibility of individuals working in all firms to observe proper standards of market conduct.
The application of the senior managers and certification regime to all authorised financial services firms will bring in a stronger, more comprehensive regime across the financial services industry. It will enable the effective and efficient regulation of groups with a variety of financial services firms within them, and it will support a level playing field for competition. Therefore, extending the senior managers and certification regime to all authorised firms is covered by clause 20.
Mr Brady, I seek your guidance. We on the Labour Benches have no problem with a schedule 4 being added to the Bill, which is what clause 20 would do—we are therefore content with clause 20. However, regarding the exact content of schedule 4 and the attendant linked debates, we wish to have an opportunity —in a moment—to put our views, after the stand part debate on clause 20, I would suggest.
I wonder whether the Minister has a chance now or in a moment to deal with a concern I expressed about clause 23(3)(c), which is to omit section 64B(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, about the duty to report wrongdoing and so on.
I fully intend to address that. The hon. Gentleman will have to bear with me, I am afraid. I am getting a little confused with all my different subsections, as he did in his remarks. I will, however, be addressing that.
On the hon. Gentleman’s earlier question about why we did not simply implement the reverse burden of proof, allow time for it to bed down and see how it worked, my colleague in the other place, Lord Bridges, has pointed out that evidence had already started to emerge that unhelpful effects were becoming apparent as firms prepared for its introduction. We were losing the essence of the purpose of the regime, which is to ensure that everyone knows and understands their responsibilities and what they are for. We therefore felt that there was no need to wait before making the changes.
Clause 23 also removes a provision that requires firms to report all known or suspected breaches of rules of conduct to the regulators. That requirement is unnecessary, because the regulators can use their existing powers to require firms to notify them of matters that they want to know about. The provision, which requires notification of all suspected, as well as confirmed, breaches of rules of conducts, is unnecessary because it goes much further than the principles we want to operate. It would be unnecessarily onerous for firms and regulators.
As the hon. Gentleman can imagine, such a provision could effectively force firms to work out a point at which the possible indications of a breach of rules of conduct might amount to a genuine suspicion. Firms would need systems to ensure that the information is captured and transmitted to the regulators, and having been notified of a suspicion, the regulators would have to decide whether to investigate and, if appropriate, consider what action to take. In many cases there would be nothing more than suspicion, so no action would be taken, but meanwhile the regulators would have to consider and prioritise all notifications received. That would be bound to limit their ability to respond appropriately in real cases, thereby imposing costs and burdens on the regulators and using up their time. Similarly, it can be argued that the suspicious activity reports used in the money laundering regime generate many false positives.
The Government thought hard about the provision and decided that removing the requirement would help to ensure that the regulatory system can work proportionately, without putting potentially costly burdens on firms that are disproportionate to any regulatory gain. Regulators will continue to be able to require firms to notify them of matters that they want to know about. The provisions introduced by the 2013 Act as section 64C of the 2000 Act remain. The requirement that firms must report disciplinary action that they take against employees will therefore remain in force. I hope that reassures the hon. Gentleman.
Amendments 31 and 32 would reinstate the reverse burden of proof for banking sector firms—the banks, building societies, credit unions and systemically important investment firms regulated by the PRA. Amendment 33 would allow the definition of the “relevant authorised persons” to remain in the Financial Services and Markets Act, which would be needed for amendments 31 and 32 to work as intended. Amendments 34 and 35 would apply the reverse burden of proof to all authorised persons across the entire industry. I will address the specific problems that each amendment would cause.
It is important that the Committee understands that the reverse burden of proof is simply not necessary to embed senior manager accountability in the senior managers and certification regime. The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards clearly established that the approved persons regime was wholly inadequate. We believe that the senior managers and certification regime clarifies the responsibilities of individual senior managers, which is something that any effective regulatory regime must deliver. Moreover, it will deter senior managers from taking a reckless or negligent approach to managing their responsibilities in the first place. I know that the whole Committee will agree with that. The duty of responsibility is a powerful incentive that encourages senior managers to take effective action to prevent such failings.
I have already set out how the new regime will deliver a step change in senior manager accountability. Regulators and firms will have the necessary clarity about who is responsible for what, and there will be no wriggling off the hook. Senior managers will need to take full ownership of their respective areas of responsibility. Each bank will have to submit to the regulators a responsibilities map, which will set out how responsibility for the business of the firm as a whole is allocated and minimise the risk of any responsibilities falling through the cracks between different senior managers.
The new regime places tough obligations on senior managers to act responsibly, and imposes stringent penalties if they fail to do so. For example, under the duty, a senior manager can be found guilty of misconduct by the regulator if a breach of regulation occurs in the area of the firm’s business for which they are responsible and they did not take reasonable steps to avoid the contravention. It does not matter whether they were aware of the regulatory breach. As in the example that the hon. Gentleman raised earlier, ignorance is not a defence. What matters is whether they took reasonable steps to prevent the breach. If they did not, they are guilty of misconduct. They will not be able to avoid liability simply because the email trail has gone cold.
Removing the reverse burden of proof does not change the penalties that can be applied. If found guilty of misconduct under the statutory duty of responsibility, a senior manager will face an unlimited fine or prohibition from working in the industry. As the chief executive officer of the Prudential Regulation Authority, Andrew Bailey, said, introducing the statutory duty of responsibility instead of the reverse burden of proof
“makes little difference to the substance to the new regime…This change is one of process”.
The Government are rolling out the senior managers regime to all authorised firms, including the fixed-income currency and commodities market. In the light of that extension of the regime, we must consider whether it is appropriate to apply the reverse burden of proof to every single firm in the financial services regulated sector, given how rigorous the regime is.
I sense you are getting slightly restless, Mr Brady, but I am nearing the end of my remarks. Amendments 34 and 35 would apply the reverse burden of proof to all authorised persons, the vast majority of which are small firms. It would be simply disproportionate to apply it to senior managers in all of those firms. I have spoken about the overly legalistic approach. We think it could lead to a perverse outcome, leaving senior managers in the largest firms less exposed to legal risk under the reverse burden of proof than those in small firms.
I have spoken at length about the clauses and set out why I strongly disagree with the Opposition’s amendments. I hope I have convinced everyone of the merits of my argument. I ask the Committee to oppose the amendments and accept the clauses.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Sarah Newton.)
(8 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesMr Wilson, it is good of you to come along this afternoon to hear the conclusion of my speech. I reassure the Committee that, having had lunch, I have been able to recollect a couple of other small points that I wanted to mention to the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West. Earlier, he raised the question of the powers in clause 21, and I said that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee expressed no concerns about those powers. In fact, I can go further and reassure him that the Committee actually thought that the original provision tabled by the Government, which provided for use of the negative resolution procedure, was not ideal, and it recommended the affirmative resolution procedure—that is in the Bill today. The amendment was made after discussion with the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which I hope reassures him. The Committee was not concerned about the powers.
Before lunch, we were talking about how important it is that this country has a strong and effective regulatory framework. With these clauses we are talking about the importance of conduct and the signals that we, as regulators and parliamentarians, send out about the importance of conduct and responsibility. We have achieved that with the introduction of the senior managers and certification regime across the financial services industry, together with the duty of responsibility. Opposition Members should bear in mind the wise words of Lord Turnbull in the other place, He was a member of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, and he said of the burden of proof in the original proposal:
“I signed up to its proposal, but I believe that the proposal now in the Bill is superior. Many philosophers have said, ‘Second thoughts are often best’… This is a time to follow that dictum. In this case, second thoughts are best. I hope that the House will reach the same conclusion as I have put forward and not support the amendment.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 15 December 2015; Vol. 767, c. 2028.]
I agree with those wise words, and I therefore commend these clauses and request that they stand part of the Bill.
It is a pleasure to be here with you, Mr Wilson.
I have listened to the Minister’s patient explanation, which has not convinced me. I therefore seek a Division on amendment 33. I appreciate that, to state the obvious, were the amendment for some strange reason not to pass, my other amendments would not proceed because they are consequential upon it—it is up to the SNP to decide on the other amendments.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(8 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI do worry about the hon. Lady sometimes, because she is again criticising the decisions of the independent Bank of England.
That is before we get to the Opposition’s other policies, such as bringing back secondary picketing, banning dividends, and nationalising businesses without compensation. Even Danny Blanchflower, the head of the independent review that the shadow Chancellor has set up to look at the remit of the Bank of England—
Danny is what he seems to like to go by. He said in a recent article for the New Statesman:
“We are in search of good ideas…the new Labour Party still doesn’t have many economic policies to speak of...The new Labour leaders are not economists and are going to have to learn fast.”
This debate shows that they have not learned anything.
While the SNP’s reasons for opposing the Bill’s Second Reading show some common ground with Labour’s, the SNP is at the other end of the spectrum in thinking that the Bill fails to provide sufficient independence from direct political interference for the Bank of England. They cannot both be right; indeed, they are both wrong. The Bill strikes the right balance on operational independence at the Bank of England and the FCA, and scrutiny by the people in the form of the Treasury Committee and the elected Government.
I will now address some of the points raised in the debate. I noticed that the hon. Member for Leeds East (Richard Burgon) did not point out that we now have the toughest rules on bankers’ pay of any major financial centre and that we have brought in new criminal offences in terms of financial crime, and that he did not welcome the fact that we are widening the duty of responsibility to the whole of the financial services sector. He asked one reasonable question, which was about the memorandum of understanding between the BOE and the NAO. He knows that I have written to the Governor and to the Comptroller and Auditor General, Sir Amyas Morse, and they will endeavour to try to publish the memorandum during the course of the Bill’s passage through the House.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Chichester, who made a superb, sweeping masterclass of a speech on the history of financial regulation, came up with some interesting suggestions about making PRA rulings public. Obviously that would involve some issues of commercial sensitivity in some of the things that it deals with. He said that he wanted to rename the court “the board of the Bank of England”. He pointed out, quite rightly, that the concept of “too big to fail” is still in the banking system, not least in that the Government continue to own large chunks of it. He mentioned the timetable, and emphasised competition, which is very important.
The hon. Member for East Lothian, in an erudite speech, pointed out that responsibility is what we need, and we believe that we are delivering it through the duty of responsibility. He rightly highlighted the importance of changing the culture. I like his analogy with the captain of the ship, and we believe that setting out the responsibilities of senior managers achieves that balance.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster spoke up for his constituency. He mentioned a problem with interest rate swap claims running out of time, which I would like to take up with him on a separate occasion, if I may. I want to clarify that the power to appoint deputy governors is not the Governor’s alone; it is actually an appointment of the Queen, with the consent of the Chancellor.[Official Report, 4 February 2016, Vol. 605, c. 7MC.]
The hon. Member for Bassetlaw, who is not in his place, wants more transparency and competition. I gently point out to him—perhaps he will read this in Hansard—that the building society sector has welcomed the fact that the reverse burden of proof is no longer in the Bill.
My hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon made an excellent point about debt management, and I share his enthusiasm for free debt advice and organisations such as PayPlan, Christians Against Poverty, StepChange and, of course, Citizens Advice. I am keen to hear more detail from him about what more we can do to make sure that, as the FCA takes on responsibility for debt management, the fee structure works well for consumers.
The hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr mentioned Welsh bank notes, which is an interesting idea, and proposed a sterling central bank. He will, of course, be aware that the North and South Wales Bank was bought by Midland Bank in 1908 and lost the ability to issue Welsh bank notes.
My hon. Friend the Member for Havant made a wide-ranging and supportive speech, but the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland and I are never going to see eye to eye on this Bill. On the sale of the Royal Bank of Scotland, how can she think that it is not in the wider interests of the economy for the Government not to own it? She is the one complaining about socialising losses, so she should be congratulating the Government on having started on the sale of RBS last August.
My hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil made a very good speech about competition and systemic risks. He is right that the investment firms and their systemic risk must be addressed by the regime. So far, eight investment firms have been identified as important in that regard.
The hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath made a very good speech about the importance of culture. We agree with him on that.
My hon. Friend the Member for Newark made a Nottinghamshire-based speech about the bellwether for the British economy. He made some excellent points. I reassure him that supervision and resolution will continue to be operationally separate under different deputy governors at the Bank of England. I also endorse his point about the regions. He will be pleased to know that Mr Andrew Bailey is, in fact, from Leicester, which is another important bellwether for the British economy. I was also glad to hear my hon. Friend make supportive comments about Pension Wise.
My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley South said how popular Pension Wise is in his area, and the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West has clearly done his legal research.
In conclusion, the Bill brings National Audit Office scrutiny into the Bank of England for the first time. It protects its independence on decisions and extends a duty of responsibility, via the senior managers and certification regime, to change the culture of financial services firms. It brings extra help for consumers in the secondary annuity market and in capping exit charges, and ensures that the most vulnerable in society are protected from illegal loan sharks.
All those excellent measures will be lost if the Opposition have their way and tonight’s Second Reading is opposed. We cannot take irresponsible risks with financial regulation, which is what the Labour party wants to do. This is a good and sensible Bill, and I urge right hon. and hon. Members to back its Second Reading.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(8 years, 10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesWhat a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Sir Roger, after our short break. I welcome the hon. Members for Wolverhampton South West and for Leeds East to the Opposition Front Bench. I hope that they remain there for a long time. I also pay tribute to the work of the hon. Members for Worsley and Eccles South (Barbara Keeley) and for Wirral South (Alison McGovern), who worked so hard in that role before the break.
The changes made by the clause mean that banks will no longer be entitled to tax relief for compensation payments made in relation to their misconduct and mis-selling. That will protect the Exchequer from banks’ past management failures and ensure that the sector makes an appropriate contribution to restoring the public finances.
Let me start by providing some background to the tax rules in this area. Fines are generally treated as non-deductible expenses in calculating companies’ profits liable to corporation tax. That means that the fines imposed on banks as a result of their conduct have had no direct impact on UK tax receipts; in fact, they have actually benefited the Exchequer due to a change in rules enacted by the Government. That is not the case, however, for banks’ customer compensation payments. Such payments are generally treated as deductible expenses for corporation tax purposes, reflecting the fact that they are non-punitive and often the straightforward reimbursement of income on which businesses have already been taxed. As a result, compensation payments made by banks in relation to the mis-selling of financial products have, until this point, impacted directly on corporation tax receipts.
The scale of banks’ compensation payments in recent years has been unprecedented. More than £25 billion has already been paid out or provided for in relation to the mis-selling of payment protection insurance, with a further £1.8 billion paid or provided for in relation to the mis-selling of interest rate products. Crucially, the exceptional levels of banking sector compensation are persisting. New PPI provisions exceeded £2 billion in the first half of 2015 alone, with cumulative provisions now well in excess of initial market expectations and continuing to grow. In that context, the Government believe that the existing tax rules have become unsustainable. It is not acceptable that post-crisis corporation tax receipts continue to be depressed by conduct failures that in some instances took place more than 10 years ago. The clause therefore makes a change to address that.
The clause makes banks’ compensation payments in relation to misconduct and mis-selling non-deductible for tax purposes from 8 July 2015. That will apply to compensation material enough to have been disclosed in banks’ accounts, albeit with an exclusion for compensation relating to administrative errors, system failures and the actions of unconnected third parties. The changes will also capture administrative expenses associated with that compensation, but will achieve that indirectly by requiring banks to apply a 10% uplift in calculating their non-deductible compensation expenditure. That will help to ensure that the changes are proportionate. It will also ensure that the Exchequer is protected from the large-scale compensation seen in recent years, but in a way that is administrable and recognises that banks, like other industries, will inevitably make compensation payments as part of their ordinary course of business. Overall, this is a fair and workable set of rules, which is forecast by the independent Office for Budget Responsibility to increase banks’ corporation tax payments by £1 billion over the next five years.
We have already taken action to reduce the sensitivity of corporation tax receipts to losses incurred by banks during the crisis. The changes made by clause 18 now do the same in respect of banks’ past misconduct and the exceptional levels of compensation it has given rise to. This is crucial in ensuring that taxpayers get a fair deal from the banking sector, which they stood behind during the crisis. I therefore commend clause 18 to the Committee.
What a pleasure it is to appear in Committee before you, Sir Roger. It has been a good many years. I thank the Minister for her kind words and pay tribute to my predecessors in this role, who worked hard, including on this Finance Bill. It is a particular pleasure to be shadowing the hon. Member for South West Hertfordshire. He and I have crossed swords in previous Committees—it is getting on for 10 years ago. I always think it is a bit like that Texas festival, South by Southwest—we are South West Hertfordshire and Wolverhampton South West. I look forward to our debate.
It will not surprise the Committee, and in particular my hon. Friends, that the Labour party thinks that clause 18 is rather a good idea. I will not detain the Committee for long, but I want to make one point and raise one issue. It was on this very day in 2008 that one of the major banks in this country was nationalised—I believe it was Lloyds bank. I remember, because I remarked in the Commons, as a then Government Back Bencher, that happy days were here again, because we were nationalising a bank on Margaret Thatcher’s birthday. It seems to go with the zeitgeist of the current Labour party leadership.
On that point, I am keen to explore whether the hon. Gentleman supports that leadership.
Thank you, Sir Roger. As a shadow Minister, I think the Minister knows my response.
I have a question for the Minister—one that has just occurred to me, so I hope she will indulge me, as I have not had a chance to research it. The explanatory notes seem to suggest that this clause refer to banking, but the wording seems to suggest that it refers to corporation tax and deductions for compensation. All hon. Members will be aware that the largest car company in Europe—the second largest in the world—has been doing precisely what banks were doing leading up to the crash in 2008. Starting in 2009—which shows that the capitalists never learn and need regulating—the Volkswagen Audi group has been using computer algorithms and deception to con consumers. My personal view is that the Government, with the prosecuting authorities, should look at prosecuting Volkswagen executives if there is a case to answer that they obtained pecuniary advantage by deception—a breach of section 15 of the Theft Act 1968. However, my question for the Minister is this. Would clause 18, on the deductibility or non-deductibility from corporation tax of payments made by cheating companies, cover a company such as Volkswagen if it were adjudicated formally to have cheated?
Let me answer the hon. Gentleman’s question by agreeing that clause 18, given the way it is worded, applies only to banks. Clearly, it was introduced in response to the fact that the scale of bank compensation, to which I referred in my opening remarks, has been so significant. More than £25 billion has already been paid out, which has had a material and meaningful impact on the corporation tax receipts of Her Majesty’s Treasury. We have always been clear that we want banks to make a fair contribution to their historic costs and their potential impact on future risks to the economy.
The hon. Gentleman asked about compensation relating to the Volkswagen emissions scandal, which, as he is right to highlight, is a complete scandal. There is currently no intention to extend this measure. It is obviously early days in terms of the full scale of potential actions regarding Volkswagen, in particular Volkswagen in the UK and where the company pays corporation tax. However, I can assure the hon. Gentleman that the Government reserve the right to act decisively through legislation such as Finance Bills when they need to take steps to protect the public finances.
The changes made by clauses 19 and 20 ensure that special provisions for building societies in the loss-relief restriction legislation extend to savings banks, which share many of the same characteristics. This is a very narrowly targeted change to the legislation to ensure that it applies fairly across the sector and delivers on its stated policy objectives. Clause 20 makes a change to the definition of a bank for the purposes of bank-specific tax legislation, helping to ensure that it is aligned with regulation and delivers the intended policy outcome.
Let me start by explaining the background to clause 19. When a company makes a loss for corporation tax purposes, it is entitled to carry forward that loss and offset it against taxable profit arising in future periods. Legislation was included in the Finance Act 2015 to restrict the amount of profit that banks and building societies can offset with historical losses to 50% from 1 April 2015. This is designed to reduce the sensitivity of corporation tax receipts to losses incurred by banks during the financial crisis and subsequent misconduct and mis-selling scandals. The loss-restriction legislation includes a special provision for building societies, meaning that the restriction applies only to profits they make in excess of £25 million. That reflected a concern that the smallest building societies could otherwise be disproportionately impacted by the restriction, due to the fact that they are non-profit maximisers and reliant on retained earnings to build regulatory capital.
It has been brought to the Government’s attention that this provision does not accommodate banks incorporated under the Savings Bank (Scotland) Act 1819, which share many of the same characteristics as building societies and thus have the potential to be affected in the same way. The changes made by clause 19 therefore address that by ensuring that, from its inception, the legislation applies fairly and consistently across the sector. The changes will have a negligible impact on tax receipts. The independent OBR still forecasts that the loss restriction will increase banks’ tax payments by around £4 billion across the next five years, helping to ensure a fair deal for the taxpayer.
I will now turn briefly to clause 20. The Government have taken a number of steps to ensure that banks make a fair contribution to the public finances. That includes the bank levy, a tax on banks’ balance sheet equity and liabilities. The measures also include a restriction on the amount of profit that banks can offset by carried-forward corporation tax losses.
These policies, which will have raised over £30 billion in total by 2020-21, rely on there being a suitable definition of a bank within tax legislation. That definition needs to be able to take account of the differences between retail banks, investment banks and building societies. The current definition, which is based on regulatory concepts and supervision responsibilities, has been successful at targeting tax measures in accordance with the Government’s policy objective. However, as part of the modernisation of financial regulation, there have been recent changes to the regulatory terms used. Clause 20 aligns the definition used within tax legislation with those changes, and so ensures that investment banks supervised by the FCA remain within the definition, in line with the stated policy objective. The amended legislation will continue to apply to the same population and will continue to operate in the same manner.
Clause 19 represents a narrowly targeted change to the loss restriction legislation to ensure that it applies consistently across similar institutions. It is consistent with existing policy and immaterial in terms of sector-wide tax receipts. Clause 20 is a technical change to the bank tax legislation to ensure that it remains appropriately targeted and appropriately aligned with regulation.
We seem to be dealing with the progressive clauses early on in our proceedings. That suits me and my party rather well: we like building societies, and I suspect that, were we to know more about savings banks in Scotland, we would like them as well, because they are not driven solely by profit, but do wish to make a surplus. I therefore encourage my hon. Friends to support clause 19.
As for clause 20, I have to confess—and this will not be the last time—that some of the technical matters are beyond me, although I appreciate that there is considerable expertise on the Committee and I thank the Minister for her explanation of this technical change. I have one question for her about the clause. It is a troubling one, but she may be able to allay my fears; if she cannot, I will be encouraging my hon. Friends to abstain.
As I understand it, the effect of clause 20, if enacted, would be retrospective to 1 January 2014—that is, a year and a half before the Budget on 8 July 2015. As a lawyer and as a Member of Parliament, I am always acutely concerned about retrospective legislation. I know it happens in Finance Acts in particular; it is common to backdate things to the date of the Budget, for example, and, on occasion, to the beginning of the tax year of that Budget. However, this is the second Finance Bill this year—one hopes it will be the last—and it is concerning to have retrospectivity, even if the measure is a very technical one.
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that, where possible, we always try to ensure that this type of legislation has no retrospective effect. He is also right that that is an important principle that we apply in dealing with such Bills. However, I can reassure him that, as he will see from the impact assessment, there will be no change to the effect of the legislation in terms of its financial impact. The legislation will continue to apply to the same population as before and will continue to operate in the same manner. He is right to raise a general principle that we would seek to observe with regard to the Bill, but in this example, because the institutions in question are already being treated in this manner for tax purposes and for regulatory purposes, it is simply a case of the legislation catching up with the real world.
Is the Minister suggesting, by talking about catch-up, that the regime has been acting outside the law for the best part of two years?
The wording in the legislation is being changed to reflect the way in which the system has been operating, and so the change will have no material or measurable impact. Given the regulatory changes that came into effect with the Finance Act 2012, the legislation was ambiguous, so I would describe the change as a clarification of the wording to provide certainty in the legislation to match what has been happening in the real world.