Afghanistan Debate

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Department: Cabinet Office
Wednesday 6th July 2011

(13 years, 4 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton Portrait The Prime Minister
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The right hon. Gentleman asks a totally appropriate and legitimate question. What I have said is that the numbers are going down to 9,000 by the end of 2012. We must then work out the right number for 2013 and into 2014. I have said that after that, we will not be in Afghanistan in anything like the same number, nor in a combat role. I am not in a position now to give a figure for, as it were, the enduring commitment, through 2015 and beyond and the training role, which involves the officer training academy and other training work. We are not in a position yet to put a figure on that, but it will obviously be way down from the figures that we talk about today.

Richard Ottaway Portrait Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)
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The Prime Minister reaffirmed today that the stated policy objective in Afghanistan is to deny al-Qaeda a base from which it can attack the UK and other British interests. From that, it is fair to assume that he continues to receive intelligence that al-Qaeda remains a threat in Afghanistan. I know that this is difficult, but will he consider how that information and intelligence can be shared with the House?

Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton Portrait The Prime Minister
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Obviously, the whole process of sharing intelligence is a difficult vexed issue, and there are some difficult recent historical connotations. What I said in my statement is that there was a time when the lion’s share of plots that threatened people in UK came from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The number of such plots has come down significantly since then. Clearly, al-Qaeda has been absolutely hammered in Pakistan—it has lost a huge number of its senior leaders—and it has nothing like the presence in Afghanistan that it had when it was hosted by the Taliban in 2001. Our aim should be not just to exclude al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, but to ensure that the Afghans can go on ensuring that exclusion without the support of foreign troops. That is our real enduring aim.