Army Reserve
Debate between Richard Bacon and Mark Francois(2 years, 10 months ago)
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Mr Bacon
I very much agree. The hon. Gentleman made the point that Northern Ireland has contributed disproportionately to the reserves. I should declare that when I did my final passing out camp in the intelligence corps, we shared our barracks with the Royal Irish Rangers; indeed, I passed out with a Royal Irish Rangers pipe band. I must say to anyone who has not experienced it that they should not knock it until they have tried it. There is nothing quite like marching in Army formation with an Irish pipe band. As he said, the Northern Irish have contributed hugely to the reserves and we are all in this House grateful to them for what they do.
Much worse than the actual cut in numbers is the way in which the cut is proposed, including the erosion of the already fragile structure of all our combat units, instead of simply closing a few. The essence of effective reserves, both for use in small operations and to form a basis for regenerating a larger army, is putting together a body of officers and soldiers who train, study and socialise together, building links of comradeship that can stand the test of combat.
Britain did that successfully in the two world wars and more recently in Iraq and in the early part of Operation Herrick in Afghanistan, where formed companies of infantry, and sub-units from other elements, were successfully deployed. Unfortunately, in the latter stages of Operation Herrick, that approach was torn up and reserve units were exclusively used to backfill regular ones—“augmentation”, as the Army calls it. That offered no command roles for junior reserve officers, just supporting posts.
The consequences were dire. The “Reserves in the Future Force 2020” report uncovered that the junior officer base of the Army had disintegrated, and applications for reserve Sandhurst courses collapsed. Putting that right and moving back towards formed bodies was at the heart of the rebuilding programme of the past decade. Indeed, in the past two years, we have seen a yeomanry squadron rotate successfully into Operation Cabrit in eastern Europe and two reserve infantry battalions, 6 and 7 Rifles, provide the framework for Operation Tosca in Cyprus.
That is why the widely discussed proposals for the cuts in the Army Reserve are so devastating. Instead of simply disbanding a few reserve units—perhaps from an area such as logistics where there is a successful record of using armed civilian contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan—I understand that the plan is to devastate every infantry battalion by reducing the manning in three company battalions to just 340 and in four company battalions to 430. Each company will consist of just two rifle platoons and a single section of support weapons, instead of a support platoon.
Besides the obvious point that this seems a very odd time to reduce our reserves of anti-tank weapons and mortars, that will leave each company much smaller and with no in-house staff for the residual support element. Given that nobody gets a full turnout, even when manning recovers from the devastation of covid, that would leave a sub-unit structure without the critical mass for company-level training. At battalion level, it will become impossible to generate a formed company for an extended deployment, as the proportion of even a well-recruited unit who can take many months off work in peacetime is inevitably limited.
That brings me to the state of the reserves recruiting programme. During covid, the collapse in activity was damaging to units, much of it, I suspect, concealed in the statistics by a failure to discharge non-attenders. So the decision largely to turn off the reserve pipeline for many months was ill judged, but, since it restarted last year, astonishingly, the marketing has been done without consultation or even co-ordination with reserve units, or with the reserve forces cadets associations with their local footprint and knowledge. The Minister will know that that has not produced the surge that the Army Reserve hoped for, and badly needs, after the setbacks of covid. I await the figures for the most recent quarter with some trepidation.
There is now a threat to the progress that has been made on reserve officer courses at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Three years ago, the post of deputy commandant reserves, which had played such a big part in the recovery of reserve officers, was abolished. Now, the decision has just been taken to sideline the reserve colonel at Sandhurst, to whom the various university officer training corps reported. The reserves depend on the OTCs for the bulk of their officer supply and much of their training, and almost all OTCs are commanded by regular officers. Now they will answer to a regular officer, too. So the senior reserve voice has been frozen out of that critical area for the health and regeneration of the Army Reserve. OTCs may become little more than recruiting organisations for the Regular Army.
Those concerns about manning are reinforced by a number of other emerging trends. At a time when covid and the recruiting pause have left such gaps, is it really a good time to suggest that, where units can recruit above strength and their neighbours cannot, they will be forbidden to do so? That would punish those who are successful, and make it a certainty that we will never recruit up to our new, further reduced target.
In a separate “Future Soldier” document, the reserve component narrative states at paragraph 3, line 4:
“An assured and capable Reserve will require a new approach to training, basing and force generation that sets the Army Reserve up for success. Reservists may not need to give more of their time; but making much better use of their time will be essential.”
That is exactly right, but let us look at the detail.
To take training first, many experienced reservists would say that the biggest waste of their time is the approach of many of the arms schools, which insist that reservists are trained at the same slow speed as regulars, despite reservists having a higher educational minimum standard and, crucially, needing to make progress in the short periods they can spare from civilian jobs. Some forward-leaning institutions, such as Chatham and Larkhill, have modularised, pushing out much of their courses to units and making use of distance learning. Others, such as Bovington and Leconfield, continue to insist on courses being almost all delivered on site and frequently at a very slow pace—a considerable problem for reservists whose day jobs and homes are far away.
What is being done to tackle those institutions that simply do not understand that reserves need to be prepared in a way that fits around their civilian work patterns?
Turning to basing, there are plans that elements of the reserve estate will be closed and that units will be grouped in larger, better centres. Although, in principle, this should improve some dire accommodation, we need to be cautious. Most journeys to training take place in the rush hour, so peak traffic journey times are critical in assessing the expectation that recruits with demanding day jobs will be willing to travel after a hard day’s work. This is particularly seen in threats to delete successful sub-units. Unless the alternative location is close, it will simply drive people away, further reducing manning.
Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)
I declare an interest of sorts, as a former TA infantry officer during the cold war. On a positive note, I am delighted to report that my godson Alexander Blackwell, who I saw today, recently graduated from Sandhurst as a second lieutenant in the Army Reserve.
The Territorial Army did great service in both the first and second world wars. Given that we now have 125,000 Russian troops ringing Ukraine, does my hon. Friend agree that we should never, under any circumstances, take our reserves for granted? Time and again, they have been literally the last line of defence.
Mr Bacon
My right hon. Friend is exactly right, and I fear that, at times, we have acted as if we seem to be taking them for granted, which we absolutely must not do.
One of the best ways of making the slender resources available to the reserve estate go further would be reducing bureaucracy in the Defence Infrastructure Organisation so that the reserve forces and cadets associations can crack on with using their local knowledge and the business acumen of their volunteers, as they used to do so successfully. On that subject, when will the Ministry of Defence publish the 2021 report of the RFCA external scrutiny team?
I am sure the Minister will be familiar with section 47 of the Defence Reform Act 2014:
“On receiving a report…the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before Parliament.”
Heaven forfend that the Secretary of State would inadvertently break the law, but I understand he has had a copy of this report since last July.
On the question of force generation, right across the English-speaking world, from the National Guard with its presence in every American population centre to the Australian army reserve, reserve forces are proud of their local ties and footprint. Earlier this decade, changes that paired reserve battalions with regular battalions wisely built on that here.
Earlier I stressed the importance of keeping the emphasis on formed bodies, which train, socialise and build comradeship to fight together. It is a shame that the Army’s reserve narrative lists, for conditions short of war, supply individuals to regular units ahead of using formed bodies. That points towards the slippery slope that we went down in the dying days of Operation Herrick, with the destruction of the reserve officer corps.
Returning once more to the reserve component narrative of “Future Soldier”:
“While Army Reserve will play an increased role, the management of the Army Reserve will change to ensure that employers are not adversely affected.”
The greatest barrier to employer support is last-minute changes in call-out plans and arrangements that wreck the plans that employers have generously made to allow their employees to engage in military service. That happened frequently in Operation Rescript at the peak of the covid crisis and continues to happen on other operations. When will steps be taken to ensure that such last-minute changes are identified and recorded, and to ensure that the officers concerned are called to account?
To summarise, I welcome much of the Army’s vision for the reserve, but I believe there is a real danger that the cuts to numbers and resources, and the structures emerging, will undermine them.
Mr Francois
As I now have the privilege of serving on the current Public Accounts Committee, I entirely endorse the sensible suggestion of my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesham (Adam Holloway).
Mr Bacon
I hope the Minister is listening, because my right hon. Friend is a man not lightly to be trifled with. Indeed, the hon. Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Dame Meg Hillier), the Chair of that Committee—with whom I co-operate extensively, as I chair the Public Accounts Commission, which provides the budget for the National Audit Office—is a lady not to be trifled with. I hope that the Minister and the Ministry of Defence will take that seriously, otherwise I think they may find that there are questions on it at future PAC hearings.
At a time when regular manpower is being cut, the Army Reserve is rightly being asked to do a great deal more, and it needs the structures, systems and resources that will allow it to deliver.
Oral Answers to Questions
Debate between Richard Bacon and Mark Francois(10 years, 5 months ago)
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Mr Francois
When I served in the Territorial Army in the 1980s, I served on something called Exercise Lionheart in 1984. In those days, what was the Territorial Army had 75,000 trained men and women under arms, drawn from a smaller population. I have to believe that if we could achieve 75,000 then, we can get 30,000 trained men and women by 2018-19. We can do this, and I believe that we will.
Mr Richard Bacon (South Norfolk) (Con)
The Defence Reform Act 2014 requires the reserve forces and cadets associations to prepare an annual report on the state of the reserves, and the Secretary of State to publish it. Will my right hon. Friend confirm that that report was filed on time? When will he publish it?