United Kingdom’s Withdrawal from the European Union

Richard Bacon Excerpts

Friday 29th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir William Cash]

Thank you, Mr Speaker. We have heard a great deal about the process and the underlying reasons for this motion this morning, but we are really dealing with whether the withdrawal agreement should be passed and approved today, and if not, why not. The first point I make in that respect is quite simple and straightforward: under article 4 of the withdrawal agreement, we will, for a significant period, lose control over the lawmaking conferred on the House by virtue of our election as Members of Parliament according to the wishes of voters in general elections. It is unconscionable that, for whatever reason, the House should be politically castrated by the arrangements set out in article 4. For that reason alone, it is therefore unthinkable that the withdrawal agreement should be passed.

I just refer to the state of affairs within the German constitutional court, which takes precedence over all EU laws. That court often expresses rulings insisting that the EU can only operate or legislate in accordance with what the Bundestag has given it, and that EU actions are illegal if they depart from the terms in which the Bundestag gave that power. If that is good enough for Germany, it is good enough for this country, is it not?

I asked the Attorney General whether there will be a withdrawal and implementation Bill even if the withdrawal agreement goes down this evening. I got no answer, just as I received no answer from the Prime Minister to several questions I put to her about whether the Attorney General had given legal advice in accordance with the ministerial code. One characteristic of this debate is that, when we ask difficult questions, we tend to get no answer. That is not good enough, in terms of the accountability of the Government to the House. That is point No. 1, regarding control over laws. It is unconscionable.

[Mr Richard Bacon (South Norfolk) (Con)]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, with whom I have regular discussions. He makes an interesting point about Germany, and the fact that the Bundesverfassungsgericht has often made that point. However, is it not true that that actually amounts to no more than, to coin a phrase, a political declaration by a court? Were it tested in front of the European Court of Justice, it would be shown that German law is inferior to European law in the same way as for every other member state. That is why we in the United Kingdom have to have legal exit and stop being a member state, however painful the route to get there.

[Sir William Cash]

I understand my hon. Friend’s point, but I have to point out to him that, under EU law, it has been made abundantly clear in several cases regarding the constitutional orders of member states—van Gend en Loos, Costa and similar cases—that the European Court asserts superiority over the internal constitutional orders of the country in question. The reality is that the question he and I raise demonstrates a conflict over competence, because, as I have stated, the German constitutional court will not countenance direct contradiction of its own lawmaking.

The next point I wish to make regards the Northern Ireland backstop. I know that many Members are more than familiar with this; we have justifiably spent an enormous amount of time on this question. However, it really boils down to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. The European Communities Act 1972—[Interruption.]