GKN: Proposed Takeover by Melrose Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateRebecca Long Bailey
Main Page: Rebecca Long Bailey (Independent - Salford)Department Debates - View all Rebecca Long Bailey's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the Secretary of State for today’s update. Sadly, however, the letter sent by the Government yesterday and the response by Melrose offer very little certainty and raise even more questions.
First, it was on 8 January 2018 that the board of GKN received a preliminary and unsolicited proposal from Melrose to acquire the entire share capital of GKN. Melrose put in its formal offer on 1 February. Concerns about Melrose’s plans had been raised by trade unions, Members of this House and the media for months, yet it took until 26 March for the Government to write to get some assurances from Melrose. So why did the Secretary of State wait until the last minute?
My second question concerns the enforceability of the assurances themselves. Which of the assurances and commitments given by Melrose in its letter of 27 March are actually legally enforceable and binding, because on my reading of the letter, it seems that very few are? Specifically, can the Government confirm that the commitments given under the heading “Takeover Panel enforceable undertakings” are indeed enforceable and will be enforced by the takeover panel? Can the Government also confirm that all the commitments below the paragraph headed “Long-term commitment” are totally unenforceable? What powers do the Government have to enforce any of the empty promises from page 2 onwards that are not post-offer undertakings? My discussions with the takeover panel suggest that enforceability is indeed limited to the areas referred to in Melrose’s letter under the heading “Takeover Panel enforceable undertakings”. I must also express concern regarding the “flexibility” that Melrose requests in relation to any offers it receives to sell the aerospace division prior to 2023. What will the Government do to protect this business and, indeed, the other elements of the business that are not even referred to in Melrose’s letter? Do we take their omission as a clear indication that they will not be protected?
My third question is about the substantive content of the assurances. Why did the Government not ask for or receive any post-offer undertakings on maintaining or increasing employment at GKN over a 10-year period? These can clearly constitute post-offer undertakings under takeover code. Indeed, when SoftBank took over Arm Holdings, it promised to increase the total number of UK Arm group employees to at least double the total number as at the takeover date. It is also not clear why Melrose did not include UK tax residency as a post-offer undertaking. Similarly, I would argue that many of the things that the Government asked for were weak and meaningless. For example, when the Government asked for the maintenance of a UK workforce, what did they actually mean? Is one employee in the UK enough to fulfil this condition? Similarly, on investing in the training and development of the workforce, how much, and by what time?
My fourth question concerns the Secretary of State’s powers under the Enterprise Act 2002 to block the bid on national security grounds. It would be helpful if he confirmed that Melrose has indeed waived the condition to get the approval of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. More importantly, the Secretary of State still has the powers to block this on grounds of UK national security, so will he confirm unequivocally today whether he will do this?
Finally, there are reports that merger arbitrage funds are planning to accept the Melrose offer, but as they are holding derivatives of GKN shares, they will not pay stamp duty on the transaction. Will the Secretary of State undertake that if Melrose does indeed proceed with this offer, the Government will investigate all share dealings to ensure that the correct stamp duty has been paid?
If the Government think that today’s weak, late and unenforceable assurances from Melrose are sufficient, then they are deeply mistaken. There is nothing to assure workers, nor to put to bed concerns about our industrial strategy and national security. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey) so eloquently stated recently, GKN is a jewel in Britain’s industrial crown that employed generation after generation. It needed a Government prepared to fight for its future, and I am afraid that the response so far has been far less than adequate.
Everyone in this House, on both sides of the Chamber, agrees that GKN is a very important company that is crucial to vital R&D work and employs thousands of people across the country. That is why I consider it important, over and above my statutory powers—I have explained very clearly that this is without prejudice to the use of those powers—to encourage the bidder to set out much more clearly than it has done so far its intentions on many of the matters that the hon. Lady mentioned, such as research and development, being based in the UK, and a commitment to the length of tenure of this very important aerospace business. That seems to be an appropriate action at this stage in the proceedings.
Of course, this is a contrast to the sorry situation that arose—there are Members in this Chamber who will remember this—during the time in which the hon. Lady’s party was in government, when Cadbury was sold to Kraft and a plant that was expected to be kept open was closed forever. In response to that, when we came into government a regime was established that allowed legally binding undertakings to be given. I have said repeatedly in this House and to hon. Members that, given that that regime exists, I expect it to be used. I was not satisfied with the degree of commitments that had been given so far by Melrose, so I think that it was the right step, over and above my statutory powers, to set out those concerns in writing and to invite Melrose to respond to them.
The hon. Lady knows very well the statutory powers that I have. Again, they were passed when her party was in government, under the Enterprise Act 2002. The question of national security is a quasi-judicial one that will be addressed separately. It is not a subjective decision that I can take. It has to be based on a clear assessment. I make the commitment that I will take that assessment meticulously. There is a closing window for this bid, and it is right to use that window to obtain statements as to Melrose’s intentions.
The hon. Lady asked questions about the enforceability of the commitments. Melrose has said in its response that it is in discussion with the takeover panel. I regard that as the best way to lodge the commitments, so that they are enforceable with severe penalties, including contempt of court, if they are broken. The takeover panel monitors the adherence to the commitments after the event, were the bid to be successful. On security, the hon. Lady also asked about the company’s conversations with the US Administration. It is the case that the company took a decision to waive that condition.
The hon. Lady asked a question about commitment to the workforce. I have met the trade unions twice now. I specified in my letter to Melrose that I expected it to make a commitment to deal fairly with the trade unions in order to ensure that the future of the workforce is taken seriously, in lockstep with the trade unions. That is important. She also made a point about the avoidance of stamp duty. Clearly, any taxes that fall due ought to be paid.
I hope that the hon. Lady and the House—whatever their assessment of the bid—would, in recognition of the powers available, think that it is the right step to approach the bidder at this stage, before the timetable closes, in order to set out in a way that can be enforced for years to come, undertakings against which it can be held to account. That is the basis of my letter to the company.