Eurozone Crisis

Rachel Reeves Excerpts

Thursday 27th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr George Osborne)]

I wanted to update the House as early as possible on developments in the eurozone overnight, and in the absence of the Prime Minister as he travels to the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, to report on the good progress made at yesterday’s European Council.

The crisis in the eurozone has caused instability in financial markets, has greatly undermined confidence around the world, and is having a chilling effect on economic growth in many countries, including our own. It is in our overwhelming national interest that a coherent, comprehensive and lasting solution to the eurozone’s problems is found, because the decisive resolution of this crisis would provide the single biggest boost to the British economy this autumn, and the break-up of the euro would be the single greatest threat to our prosperity.

Our view about how to solve the eurozone’s immediate problems has been clear, consistent and forcefully expressed. The Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and I have set it out to the House on a number of occasions: reinforcement, recapitalisation and resolution. First, eurozone member states need to reinforce their bail-out fund to create a firewall; secondly, weak European banks need to be recapitalised; and thirdly, the unsustainable position of Greece’s debts needs to be resolved. But if the solution is to last, as I said many months ago, members of the eurozone also need to address the logic of monetary union by pursuing greater fiscal integration within the eurozone, while at the same time we protect Britain’s interests.

We have to improve competitiveness: competitiveness in the peripheral economies of the eurozone as measured against the core economies such as Germany, and competitiveness across the whole European continent versus the rest of the world. This is the solution of the crisis that we have been advocating for months, and the solution again advocated by the Prime Minister at yesterday’s European Council.

Our view is that last night very good progress was made towards solving the immediate crisis—very good progress on all fronts. The deal put together is much better than was expected yesterday afternoon. But much detail remains unresolved, and having put pressure on the eurozone to get this far, we have to keep up the pressure to get the details completed. It has started down the right road; now it must finish the job.

Let me take each element of last night’s deal in turn and say how it affects Britain. First, on recapitalising banks, we are pleased that the European Council agreed to the proposal hammered out by myself and other Finance Ministers at the weekend ECOFIN. All major European banks will be required to hold at least a 9% core tier 1 capital ratio by the end of June next year, including marking to market all their exposure to sovereign debt. The European Banking Authority, based here in London, assessed that achieving this target means that banks will require an extra €106 billion of capital, and the Council yesterday confirmed that if this cannot be raised privately, Governments will have to step up to the plate.

I can confirm to the House today that in the assessment of the European Banking Authority and our own tripartite authorities, no British bank requires additional capital. This is an important expression of confidence in this country’s banking system at a time of global financial stress. EU member states also agreed to co-ordinate guarantees of term funding, should they be required, and we have ensured that state aid rules will be applied properly, and European banks will be restructured if necessary, just as the European Commission demanded of the last British Government two years ago.

While some would have wanted an even tougher banking agreement, and even more capital going into Europe’s weak banks, we should welcome what has been achieved with this agreement. We now have—unlike the totally inadequate stress tests of last year—a commitment to significant extra resources for the European banking system. However, the UK and others insisted that that commitment from the whole of the European Union on banking be conditional on the two other key components of the solution to the crisis that I set out: a reinforced firewall and a resolution of Greek debt. These are both properly matters for the Eurozone, not the UK—and they are both matters on which progress was also made last night.

On Greece, a headline agreement was reached to reduce the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio to 120% by 2020. The eurozone will contribute an additional €30 billion. Because the British Government have made sure that we are not part of the Greek bail-out, none of that extra €30 billion will come from our taxpayers, while private holders of Greek sovereign debt will be asked to accept a nominal write-down of 50%. A lot more work is needed to put all this into practice, including detailed negotiations with the private sector—but we said that Greece’s debts were unsustainable, and we are pleased to see a resolution in sight.

On reinforcing the size of the firewall, the eurozone has set out two options that could operate in tandem. One is to provide, from the bail-out fund, insurance on new debt issued by Eurozone countries; the second is to create special purpose vehicles that can attract resources from private and public investors. In its statement, the eurozone said that

“the leverage effect of both options will vary”

but that they could be

“expected to yield around 1 trillion euro”.

We have always believed that the role of the European Central Bank is critical, and I welcome the positive statement made by Mario Draghi, the incoming ECB president.

Talk of special purpose vehicles has given rise to questions about the involvement of the International Monetary Fund and major shareholders such as the UK. As I have said to the House on many occasions, Britain has always been one of the IMF’s largest shareholders and biggest supporters: we helped to create the institution 60 years ago; the last Government agreed to increase its resources two years ago; and this Government not only ratified that agreement but helped to make the IMF more representative of the new world economy by brokering a deal last year that gave countries such as China and Brazil a greater say, while securing Britain’s seat on the board. The IMF has been an active participant in the packages put together to support Ireland, Portugal and Greece. It has also been active in extending flexible credit lines to Poland and Mexico—neither of which is in the eurozone, of course—as well as supporting other countries in central and eastern Europe such as Hungary, Romania and Latvia. Indeed, it currently has 53 lending programmes around the world, of which only three are in the eurozone.

Supporting countries that cannot support themselves is what the IMF exists to do, and there may well be a case for further increasing the resources of the IMF to keep pace with the size of the global economy. Britain, as a founding and permanent member of its governing board, stands ready to consider the case for further resources and contribute, with other countries, if necessary. Let us remember that support for the IMF does not add to our debt or deficit, and that no-one who has ever provided money to the IMF has ever lost that money. But let me be very clear: we are prepared to see an increase only in the resources that the IMF makes available to all the countries of the world. We would not be prepared to see IMF resources reserved for use only by the eurozone. By all means the IMF can use its expertise and advice to help the eurozone to create the special purpose vehicle that it is considering. By all means let countries with large foreign currency reserves such as China consider putting their own money into the eurozone’s special purpose vehicle—that must be their decision—but the IMF cannot put its own resources in; it can lend only to countries with a programme for adjustment.

I confirm today that Britain will not put its resources in either. We do not have a surplus; we have a large deficit. We have had to use our resources to recapitalise our banks and to stand behind our currency. An active member of the IMF? Yes. Helping the IMF with advice and technical support? Yes. But the IMF contributing money to the eurozone bail-out fund? No. And Britain contributing money to the eurozone bail-out fund? No. That is Britain’s clear position.

We expect eurozone members to use the next few days—the next few weeks, at the most—to provide much more detail about their plans to increase their firewalls and sort out Greek debt. We have made it clear that the sooner that happens, the better it will be for the world economy. We must maintain the momentum.

This package will not on its own resolve the longer-term issues of how to make the euro work more effectively. Those longer-term issues were addressed yesterday, and there were proposals for greater fiscal integration and mutual control over the budget policies of eurozone Governments. I have argued that we need to follow the remorseless logic of monetary union, and that involves a loss of national sovereignty for countries in the eurozone.

It is in Britain’s interest that the euro operates more effectively, provided that the interests of all 27 member states are properly protected in key areas of European policy, such as the single market, competition and financial services. We are insistent that our voice will continue to be heard and our national interests protected. We have found allies among the other 10 members of the EU that are not in the euro. An important marker was put down in Sunday’s European Council conclusions.

No one pretends that sorting out this situation in a satisfactory way will be easy, but it is a necessity. That is the context in which we should approach potential treaty changes. The coalition Government have already proved that they can protect Britain’s interests by getting us out of the previous Government’s involvement in the eurozone bail-outs, holding down the European Union budget increases, and putting into law the guarantee that no further powers or competencies can be transferred to Brussels without the consent of the British people in a referendum. The Government will again protect Britain’s interests as the discussions on a possible limited treaty change begin. We will seek to rebalance the responsibilities between the EU and its member states, which in our view have become unbalanced.

Finally, the euro will not find lasting stability until its peripheral members become more competitive. That means credible plans to reduce budget deficits. That commitment was made in the very first section of yesterday’s agreement. However, that involves difficult decisions on pension ages, business tax rates, welfare reform and educational standards. Britain, thankfully, is not in the euro, but we are taking those difficult decisions at home, because the ultimate lesson of this crisis is that unless a country can pay its way in the world and compete around the globe, it will be next in the firing line. I am determined that our country will never be in the firing line.

[Rachel Reeves (Leeds West) (Lab)]

I thank the Chancellor for coming to the House to make that statement. With the shadow Chancellor in New York, I am responding on behalf of the Opposition, and I have a number of detailed questions. It is good that some agreement has been reached, but with so little detail, many unanswered questions remain. I hope that the Chancellor can help the House today, because whatever happens in the eurozone will have huge ramifications for British families and businesses.

First, on the recapitalisation of the banks, is the Chancellor confident that the deal announced is sufficient and that UK banks do not need further recapitalisation? Will he keep that under review? What estimates has he made of the exposure of UK banks to Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish sovereign debt? Will he confirm that the House of Commons estimates of $3 billion for Greece and $17 billion for Italy reflect the current position for UK banks? Although the agreement states that banks and other creditors are invited to accept a 50% loss on Greek sovereign debt, is the Chancellor confident that the vast majority will agree—and if so, by when?

On the expansion of the European financial stability facility, does the Chancellor believe that the €1 trillion package is sufficient? Does it amount to the “big bazooka” that the Prime Minister talked about earlier this month? Alternatively, will we be back here in a few months’ time, which would mean further uncertainty, undermining confidence, undermining investment and undermining growth? That is the last thing that Britain, or Europe, needs.

Can the Chancellor explain how the leveraging of the EFSF will work, and when he believes the detail of credit enhancement and special purpose vehicles will be finalised? If the EFSF must also fund bank recapitalisation, will it be sufficient to give the markets confidence, and will there be funds remaining to underpin any sovereign debt crisis and prevent further contagion?

Although we have a clear economic interest in the eurozone sorting out its problems, the interests of British taxpayers must be safeguarded. It would have been wrong for Britain to pay twice, both through ongoing temporary EU bail-out funds and through the IMF. If this package is indeed the final and permanent bail-out fund, any British role should be through the IMF alone.

I heard the Chancellor’s question and answer session with himself on the IMF, but will he clarify what he said on the radio this morning? He said that the IMF was not

“going to put additional resources directly into the eurozone, hypothecated for the eurozone.”

Does he believe, though, that there will need to be a further increase in UK contributions to the IMF? Whether he succeeds in persuading it to describe that as anything other than a hypothecated fund is irrelevant.

On the arrangements for future decision making, the agreement states:

“The President of the Euro Summit will keep non euro-area member states closely informed of preparations and outcomes of summits.”

“Closely informed”? Has Britain now been reduced to simply receiving a postcard from Brussels? How will the Chancellor ensure that Britain’s voice, and our vital national interest, is heard loud and clear in future negotiations?

On the forthcoming treaty changes, will the Chancellor admit what the Prime Minister was unable to admit yesterday? Is it now the Government’s policy to seek to repatriate powers as part of those treaty changes? Which ones, and on what timetable?

Finally, is not the missing piece in the agreement the lack of any plan for jobs and growth, which were not mentioned at all in the Chancellor’s statement? Is it not the case that without growth we cannot solve the debt crisis, we cannot solve the banking crisis, and we cannot solve the jobs crisis? At this time, Britain should be leading the charge and pushing for a proper plan for jobs and growth across Europe. But is not the truth that this Chancellor cannot do that? With unemployment at a 17-year high here in Britain, with no growth since last autumn, and with borrowing therefore now set to be £46 billion higher than he planned, he is clinging to an austerity plan that is failing here in Britain.

With the UK economy flatlining since this time last year, before the eurozone crisis of recent months, and with only Greece and Portugal growing more slowly than Britain, is it not time that we had a plan for jobs and growth—across Europe, yes, but here in Britain too?

[Mr Osborne]

I thank the hon. Lady for some of her questions. Of course, we miss the constructive and consensual approach of the shadow Chancellor. We are talking about the Bretton Woods institutions, and it turns out that he is at a place called Buttonwood, which adds to the pantomime feel of Labour’s economic policy.

Let me deal directly with the hon. Lady’s questions. First, of course we keep the capital and liquidity positions of the British banks under constant review. We would do that in the absence of any European agreement, but of course we have also participated in the recent work by the European Banking Authority. We thought it was important that that was done at EU level rather than eurozone level. I repeat what I said in my statement: the EBA and our own authorities confirm that no British bank requires additional capital, which of course is very good news for us all.

On the hon. Lady’s question about getting private sector involvement in the write-down of Greek debt, that is of course one of the key unresolved issues from last night. We now need to see whether the headline agreement reached on behalf of the private sector can be implemented in practice. I am confident that it can, but that is one of the crucial next steps that need to be got on with.

The hon. Lady asked about the exposure of the UK banking system and the UK economy to various peripheral economies of Europe. Those figures are published regularly by the Bank of England. I do not propose to repeat them today, but they are available for everyone to see.

On the question that the hon. Lady asked about the overall fund, €1 trillion is the number that the eurozone has put on its firewall. Of course, some said it should be larger, but it is very significantly larger than what we had yesterday, which we should welcome. As with private sector involvement in the Greek deal, we now need to see the details of how the eurozone will create that leverage. It has set out two options that can work side by side. One is a kind of first loss insurance on newly issued debt, and the second is the special purpose vehicle, by which it hopes to get external private sector investment. Of course, it is openly speculating about getting Chinese money into that.

The IMF can only lend directly to countries, and countries with programmes or agreed and negotiated flexible credit lines, which will remain the case. It cannot lend into that special purpose vehicle. That is also the UK position. We do not think that Britain, with its deficit, can contribute to the special purpose vehicle. If we were to do so, we would add to our debt, and we do not think that that is appropriate. We have had to use our own resources to deal with our own problems in this country.

It is of course crucial that the IMF remains a central economic institution in dealing with the world’s problems, and I urge the hon. Lady, newly appointed as shadow Chief Secretary, to reconsider Labour’s position—[Interruption.] I know that the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) led the Labour party in Committee to vote against the increase in IMF resources, which the last Labour Prime Minister negotiated at the London 2009 summit. Whatever I have said about the right hon. Gentleman—and I have said quite a few things—I do not think that anyone would doubt that the highlight of his premiership was the negotiation of the London 2009 G20 deal. It is completely astonishing that the Labour party voted against that agreement.

As we discuss over the next few months increasing the IMF’s resources to deal with all the countries of the world, I urge Labour Members to reconsider their position on that, and also their rather odd position on the euro. They seem to be holding out membership of the euro—[Hon. Members: “No!”] Well, that is certainly what the Labour leader was doing at the weekend. To be in the euro but out of the IMF strikes me as a rather bizarre economic policy at the moment.

That brings me to my final point. Britain has been arguing consistently for months that a solution to this crisis requires recapitalising the banks, reinforcing the firewall and resolving the Greek crisis. We have insisted that the appropriate issues are discussed at the level of 27, which is why there have been two European Councils this week, and an ECOFIN. We will continue to argue for Britain’s national interest as we enter the difficult discussions ahead on the potential treaty change, on making the euro work, and above all on getting the growth and jobs that the hon. Lady talks about across Europe and in this country, by making this continent far more competitive and stopping Britain and Europe from pricing themselves out of the world economy.