Iran (UK Foreign Policy)

Philip Hollobone Excerpts

Thursday 6th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Straw]

I absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman. I was heavily involved after President Khatami reached out to the United States in the moment of need. Iran provided significant practical help, without which it would have been far more difficult to remove the Taliban and to retake Kabul. Iran got no thanks for that, however. It was unnecessarily rebuffed by the United States at the time, as it was during the 2003-05 nuclear negotiations. It was also rebuffed when it sought a comprehensive bargain with the west. I am afraid that that prospect was greeted in parts of the United States with suspicion. In my view, there was a worry that if a deal was struck that resulted in the normalisation of relations with Iran, the part of the American system—and, indeed, the part of the Israeli system—that always likes to define itself against some kind of enemy would have had that enemy removed.

Twenty-five years after the collapse of the Berlin wall, the metrics of the middle east have all changed. The view of the Netanyahu Government in Israel, which is echoed by many in the United States Congress, is that Iran now poses an existential threat to the state of Israel because of the doubts as to whether Iran’s nuclear programmes have a military purpose. Those programmes are the subject of the intensive negotiations that will, we hope, have reached a satisfactory conclusion by 24 November.

As it was I, along with my French and German counterparts, who began the original E3 negotiations with Iran in 2003, I offer the following observations. Iran is not an easy country to negotiate with. That is partly due to cultural and linguistic problems and partly for historical reasons, but fundamentally it is a product of Iran’s complex and opaque governmental system, in which the elected President has constantly to broker decisions with unelected elements, including those in the revolutionary guards and those in the Supreme Leader’s office.

Unlike North Korea, which pulled out of the non-proliferation treaty, or India, Pakistan and Israel—all nuclear weapons states which have never accepted the treaty’s obligations—Iran has stayed within it. The treaty protects

“the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”.

However, the treaty is silent on the question—critical to the outcome of the negotiations—of the enrichment of uranium. The Iranians claim a right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, and I hope the whole House will support them in that. The interim agreement signed last November explicitly recognised that.

The last set of negotiations, which took place between 2003 and 2005 and in which I was directly involved, ran into the ground. The Bush Administration had undermined the Khatami Administration through the “axis of evil” speech, and they did so again by refusing to offer Iran any confidence-building measures until it was too late. By that time, conservative forces in Iran had re-gathered their strength, with President Ahmadinejad the result.

When parliamentary colleagues and I met Foreign Minister Zarif in Tehran in January this year, he pointed out that when I had been negotiating with him in 2005, Iran had fewer than 200 centrifuges. After eight years of sanctions, it now has 18,800. We should be careful what we wish for. The good news about the current round of negotiations is that both sides have kept them confidential. However, it is no secret that the Iranian Government cannot do a deal unless it includes a continuation of enrichment for peaceful purposes, and unless the scale of the programme allowed does not involve the Government having to make significant numbers of its scientists redundant.

The negotiations are predicated on the basis that, because of Iran’s past failures to make full disclosures to the International Atomic Energy Agency, there remain unanswered questions about the true intent of Iran’s nuclear programmes. None of us outside the inner workings of the Iranian Government can know for certain what this is. My own instinct is that after the trauma of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran probably did begin work on a nuclear weapons system. More recently, however, a 2007 US national intelligence estimate—which has been reconfirmed by the White House in the past two years—concluded that Tehran had halted nuclear weaponisation work in 2003. If that is the case, there is no reason why, with some flexibility on both sides, a deal should not be concluded. If that happens, the gradual lifting of sanctions—which Iran so desperately needs—will help to bring Iran back fully as a partner in the international community.

[Mr Philip Hollobone (Kettering) (Con)]

I am listening carefully to the right hon. Gentleman’s well-informed speech, and I am impressed by it. In 2004, Hassan Rouhani, who was then the chief nuclear negotiator, stated:

“While we were talking with the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in parts of the facility in Isfahan…by creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work”.

Is not that an ominous warning for the current negotiations?

[Mr Straw]

I have seen that quotation before. One of the truths about the Iranians is that they have a history of sticking to the letter of what is agreed while trying to make that agreement as accommodating to themselves as possible. They are not the only country to do that. However, it was Hassan Rouhani—now President Rouhani—sitting across the table and leading the negotiations, and I believed that he was a man with whom we could do a deal. I am glad that the present British Government self-evidently still think that; otherwise, they would not be sitting across the table from his representatives now. There is no evidence one way or the other that what was being installed at Isfahan was related to the weaponisation of the nuclear programme. I have seen no such evidence whatever, and Iran has a right to a nuclear power programme in the same way as any non-nuclear weapons state does.

My plea to the British Government is that they do not make the best the enemy of the good in these negotiations. Just as the world changed 25 years ago with the collapse of the Berlin wall, so it is changing again before our eyes, especially in the middle east. With chaos in Iraq and in Syria, many now see the potential of Iran to be part of the solution, not part of the problem. A deal that is good for both sides would have other benefits, not least for human rights. There cannot be anyone in the House who does not share the profound concern about aspects of Iran’s human rights record, including the recent incarcerations and executions.

One of the truths about Iran’s complex and opaque system of government is that the elected Government do not control the judiciary. There are other unacceptable elements of the regime. The more we are able to do a deal—of course on acceptable terms—the more it will empower the elected Government and the better able we will be to secure a resolution of the other concerns, including those on human rights. The reverse is also true.

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[Sir Richard Ottaway]

I have great regard for my hon. Friend’s views, but there are not many countries in the region that have a human rights record quite as bad as Iran’s. None the less, he makes a valid point, and it has to be taken into account. The question I was asking was: can we trust President Rouhani? The right hon. Member for Blackburn, who has known him for many years, suggests that we can, and I hope that he is right. The question is: what if he is wrong? That is the challenge we all face.

Rather worryingly, the Supreme Leader has been interfering in Iran’s nuclear ambitions, with his call for industrial levels of centrifuges and nuclear material production, which caught the negotiators by surprise. When President Obama suggested enriching nuclear rods in the United States in 2009, the Supreme Leader pulled the rug from under that issue as well.

At the UN, President Rouhani suggested there should be a link between helping the west deal with the situation in Iraq and concessions in the nuclear negotiations. I have only one response to that, which is no, no, no. That cannot be the basis on which we proceed. To have a few more enrichment centrifuges for a bit of co-operation is exactly the wrong sort of deal.

Looking at the negotiations—the deadline is fast approaching—a number of deals have been suggested. Any settlement must have two main features. One is the break-out time. The Foreign Affairs Committee proposed a minimum of at least six months. The second is a verification programme that must be as robust as possible. That must be supported by a rigid inspections regime. It is critical that the International Atomic Energy Agency stays involved throughout the whole process and brings its professionalism to any verification and inspection. There is, in any settlement, a trade-off between reduction in capacity and the relaxation of trade sanctions as an incentive to encourage progress.

There is much talk about the number of centrifuges that can be used for peaceful production. I have been advised that the figure is somewhere in the region of 2,000 to 4,000, against the 18,000 currently in use. Obviously, the fewer centrifuges there are, the greater the time for break-out, and that has to be right at the centre of any negotiation settlement.

We also need to be satisfied that the objectives of the base at Arak, which is the home to the heavy water reactor, are peaceful. Iranians have yet to come up with a good explanation of those objectives. They argue that the facility is being used for medical research, but there is far too much capacity there for that, and no economic reason has been forthcoming.

[Mr Hollobone]

I am listening with interest to my right hon. Friend’s hugely impressive speech, particularly to the bit about the lack of inspections. I believe that the Arak facility was last visited in August 2011 and, despite repeated requests from the IAEA, no further visits have been allowed since.

[Sir Richard Ottaway]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and that goes to this question of trust. If visits are prevented, how can we trust people when they say what is going on there?

As we approach the deadline, there is little sign of a deal. There is still prevarication. The Foreign Office should be prepared to sign up to an extension of the deadline if that is what is needed. The time is on the west’s side at the moment: the sanctions have had an impact, even though they are a crude weapon; the oil price is falling; and the Iranian economy is shrinking fairly significantly. This is the right time to do the deal, but the window is narrow, as the situation has become more complicated by the mid-term election results in the United States. An increasingly confident Republican-controlled Congress is set to make life more and more difficult for President Obama as he reaches the end of his presidency. Rouhani’s time is also limited, as he is trying to fight off the hardliners. If there is no deal, Rouhani will be weakened, the hardliners will be back and they cannot wait for this deal to fail, and the hostility to the west will grow.

If Iran gets a bomb, the middle east arms race will accelerate, and the security situation will get worse. Russia has a role to play. There were reports yesterday that some processing may be done in Russia, which is a great idea if it is possible and achievable. As has been said about Ukraine over recent months, we must keep the lines of communication open with Russia, mainly because they are a key player in settling the deal in Iran.

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[Mr Philip Hollobone (Kettering) (Con)]

It is pleasure to follow the remarks of the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) about his constituent. Obviously, all of us in this House hope that the case can be resolved in a satisfactory way as soon as possible.

I have been hugely impressed by all the speeches I have been privileged to hear in the debate so far. We have heard from the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Sir Richard Ottaway), and my hon. Friends the Members for South Norfolk (Mr Bacon) and for North West Norfolk (Mr Bellingham). I am sure we will hear an excellent speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex (Sir Nicholas Soames) in due course.

What we have not heard, explicitly, is anyone saying that it would be completely unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon. That is the position that I stand by. I think it would be unacceptable to this country, and to the world, for a dangerous regime such as that in Iran to have a nuclear weapon. I do not particularly want to cast aspersions, but I suspect that some Members of this House would actually be content for Iran to have a nuclear weapon; indeed, I have heard Members say that. That is a perfectly defensible position, but I have not heard it put forward today.

What we have also not heard today is the Israeli perspective. Iran, as the right hon. Member for Blackburn said, is a country of 77 million people, second only in the middle east to Egypt’s 85 million. If we stack that up against the Israeli state, with 8 million people, we can see that from the Israeli perspective Iran is the biggest bully in the playground.

As my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex said, it all comes down to a question of trust. Why should we trust Iran? I very much respect the judgment of Members of this House who know far more about this subject than I do, especially former Foreign Secretaries and hon. Members who have been to Iran and know some of these individuals. However, if I were a citizen of Tel Aviv, despite the huge respect I would have for the right hon. Member for Blackburn, I would say to myself, “Well, this gentleman obviously speaks with a huge amount of experience, and he has spoken to Hassan Rouhani and others, but what if he is wrong? What if the regime in Tehran is mad enough and bad enough to want a nuclear weapon and to use it?”

We had a similar debate when China was developing nuclear weapons and Mao Tse-tung said, “What does it matter if we lose several million Chinese people? We can take out our enemies in one go.” It would be possible to take out most of Israel with one nuclear weapon. The holocaust was not really that long ago in strategic terms. Half the Jewish population of the world was wiped out in Europe, supposedly under the safety of a Christian civilisation, so if I were an Israeli citizen, although I might respect the right hon. Gentleman’s wise words, I would be saying to myself, “What if he’s wrong? Where’s my insurance?”

That is why this House has to wake up, smell the coffee and realise that there is simply no way on earth that Israel is going to allow Iran to have a nuclear bomb. It represents an existential threat to half the Jewish population of the world. It does not really matter what we in this Chamber think about that; Israel, quite rightly, will say, “We are not going to accept this.”

The Iranians are going about things in all the wrong ways. We have heard that there are cultural aspects to that. We are told, for example, that the Iranian way of approaching the world is different from that of the west; that there are complications of language and history; that the only rules they want to stick to are those that suit them; and that we should look at this through a diplomatic prism. At the end of the day, however, we are talking about 8 million Israeli citizens who fear for their lives. They fear that Iran will get enough nuclear material to stuff into one of its Fajr-5 rockets and launch it at Tel Aviv or Jerusalem.

Iran is going about the negotiations in all the wrong ways, because it is doing all the bad things that none of us like. Iran is a major exporter of terror, not just to the middle east, but around the world. If it really wants to do a deal with the west, why has it not backed off from supporting Hamas or from stocking up an arsenal of 100,000 rockets in southern Lebanon? Another Israeli fear, of course, is not just nuclear weapons, but Hezbollah launching 100,000 rockets all in one go at the Israeli population. It does not matter how sophisticated Iron Dome is—it is not possible to take out 100,000 rockets launched in one go.

The exporter of this terror—its funder—is Tehran. These are not nice people. They might have gone to English universities and they might have an understanding with very senior Members of this House, but this regime is extremely unpleasant, not only to its own people, but to others in the region and further afield.

[Mr Mike Hancock]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that one of the most important things the right hon. Member for Blackburn said was that we should be careful what we wish for? I think that some people sometimes wish for something that cannot be delivered. I strongly support the line taken by the hon. Member for Kettering (Mr Hollobone).

[Mr Hollobone]

The hon. Gentleman and I both hope that the right hon. Member for Blackburn is right, but what if he is not? That would put Israel in a really serious situation.

[Ms Abbott]

The hon. Gentleman has said that the Iranians are not nice people. Does he think it is wise to characterise an entire nation, and even an entire regime, in that light? Even within the regime there are different factions. Is it helpful to talk about them in those terms?

[Mr Hollobone]

The hon. Lady is quite right, to be fair. If I have implied that the Iranian people are not nice, I apologise. What I mean is that the regime is not pleasant. I perfectly understand that the Iranian people—the Persian people—are among the most sophisticated people in the middle east, and we have heard a lot about that in this debate. The hon. Lady is right to pick me up on that point. What I am saying is that the regime is extremely unpleasant and extremely bad and that some of its members are potentially mad. That is what worries the Israeli Government.

If I were an Iranian who wanted to impress the west with my intent and why I should be trusted, I would be keen to allow the nuclear weapons inspectors into my nuclear facilities. Despite repeated requests to access Natanz, Parchin and Fordow, inspectors have been either stopped or obstructed in undertaking their work.

Enrichment is also an issue. Iran has enough fissile material at 3.5% or 20% enrichment to be able to develop, if it has enough centrifuges, enough nuclear material at 90% enrichment for six nuclear bombs. That is the worry. The Supreme Leader has said recently that Iran has an absolute need for 190,000 centrifuges, which is 10 times the number it has at present. Any deal done on anything remotely like that basis would be a very bad one, because Iran would then have the ability to break out of any restrictions placed by any such treaty on developing the material for those six missiles. Of course, it already has the ballistic capability to deliver that material on to Israel or Saudi Arabia at very short notice.

The central question posed to all of us by my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex is: can we trust the Iranians? My answer is that I have not seen enough evidence to suggest why we should trust them. Of course, the big problem is that, if we get the answer to that question wrong and if the Iranians really are not trustworthy, it is not so much us in the United Kingdom who will pay the price, although the situation will be bad for us. The people who will really be at peril are those of Israel, Saudi Arabia and other countries in the middle east, and there will be a nuclear arms race that will add fuel to the flames in an already volatile region.