Energy BILL [ Lords ] (Third sitting) Debate

Full Debate: Read Full Debate
Thursday 28th January 2016

(8 years, 9 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
Read Full debate Read Hansard Text
Alan Whitehead Portrait Dr Whitehead
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I want to pick the Minister’s brains, particularly on clauses 43, 45 and 46, which relate to sanctions, enforcement and financial penalty. As the Minister has already guided us, this is the area where the OGA gets heavy with people who have not resolved their disputes properly or not done what had been decided.

This part of the Bill lays out a number of ways in which that circumstance can be approached, including through sanctions on companies—although I am unclear how exactly those would be enforced—and enforcement notices. I assume that sanctions lead to enforcement in a linear process, but the connection is not completely clear.

I want to refer briefly to the financial penalty. I presume the process has been followed of worrying about what has gone wrong, a possible resolution, a sanction notice, failure to comply with that and an enforcement notice that is also not complied with. A financial penalty notice finally arrives to underpin that process. That is my understanding of how this part of the Bill works.

Then we have the amount of that financial penalty. Clause 46 states:

“The financial penalty payable under a financial penalty notice in respect of a failure to comply with a petroleum-related requirement…must not exceed £1 million.”

That appears to give a clear ceiling on the penalties. I presume the companies concerned in the exploitation of the North sea will read the clause closely and decide that is what could happen to them, were they to go through the whole process, and that is the financial penalty that might come their way. That is not a particularly high financial penalty, compared with some of the fines imposed by Ofgem, for example, relating to practices in the energy market; we have seen fines ranging from a few million to tens of millions related to the practices of energy companies.

At the end of this part, an interesting caveat is placed on the regime and the penalty limit of £1 million. The caveat is in clause 46(7), which states:

“The Secretary of State may by regulations amend subsection (1) to change the amount specified to an amount not exceeding £5 million.”

That appears to put into the Bill considerable uncertainty. Is the amount £5 million? Is it £1 million? Is it that if too many companies do too many bad things over the period, the Secretary of State will decide that the penalty is not high enough and will then, by regulations, introduce an additional penalty—the general tariff maximum? Or is it that the Secretary of State has a reserve power—there is a threat—over the period to ensure that companies toe the line on sanctions and enforcement notices?

To return to what I might do were I a company involved in the North sea and I looked at this provision, I am not sure how I would react. Would I say, “That’s okay, because the worst that can happen to me is a £1 million fine,” or would I say, “Hang on a minute. The Secretary of State might actually levy a £5 million fine”? Presumably, by the time the Secretary of State has levied the £5 million fine—because that requires the provision to be amended by regulations—I will have finished with my £1 million fine. A company or companies might be undertaking fairly flagrant abuses in the system that are advantageous to them to an extent well in excess of £1 million, but provided that they can take on board the £1 million fine, they can presumably get on with undertaking those abuses. I think that there are extreme powers in the Bill to force disinvestment by companies that are completely in breach of conditions.

The Secretary of State’s power to up the fine limit would be applied only once the horse and cart were well down the road and the stable door was wide open. The Secretary of State would then, under the processes of the House, have to work out how to undertake regulations to put the fine limit up and make the regime different. It might be wiser simply to place in the Bill an upper limit that may be varied downwards, rather than having in the Bill a limit that appears to be not the limit, which would be another limit entirely. Is the Minister amenable to looking again at the provision to see whether a better formulation could be brought about in relation to fines? Alternatively, is there a deeper explanation, which I have not understood, as to why the relationship between £1 million fines and £5 million fines is in the Bill in the way that we see it?

Philip Boswell Portrait Philip Boswell (Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill) (SNP)
- Hansard - -

I was going to speak on the same subject— clause 46 and the amount and nature of the financial penalty in relation to the numbers that we are dealing with in terms of daily production—but I will not labour the point, because the issue has been more than adequately covered by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test.

Andrea Leadsom Portrait Andrea Leadsom
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Thank you—short and sweet.

These clauses provide the OGA with powers to regulate compliance with new and existing duties imposed by the Bill, the Petroleum Act 1998 and offshore licences by imposing civil sanctions on persons who are in breach of those duties. In the Bill, the duties are referred to as petroleum-related requirements. A key recommendation of the Wood review was for the new regulator to acquire new sanctions to guard against behaviours that are known to have obstructed the objective of maximising economic recovery of UK petroleum. We have therefore worked to develop a framework of sanctions that is fit for purpose and that provides a transparent and independent means of appeal.

These clauses allow sanctions to be imposed for breaches of the duty to act in accordance with the strategy to enable the principle to be met. They allow sanctions to be imposed when holders of offshore petroleum licences are in breach of the conditions of those licences. They also allow sanctions to be imposed when relevant persons are in breach of other statutory duties imposed by part 2 of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---
The new clause is fairly straightforward, but it is absolutely necessary, given the scope of the activity we are undertaking and the extent to which various thoughts are swirling around on what the decommissioning industry is actually likely to consist of over the next period. It would be a great help if that material was available in an annual report for all who are looking at that process. That is the heart and purpose of the amendment, which would be a thoroughly constructive addition. I trust that the Minister will immediately take it on board and decide to run with it.
Philip Boswell Portrait Philip Boswell
- Hansard - -

We are conscious that Oil & Gas UK already publishes an annual decommissioning insight, and that that is the leading forecast for decommissioning activity in the UKCS. Oil & Gas UK has also published guidelines on decommissioning cost estimation from 2013, providing a methodology for breaking down the process of decommissioning into separate phases, to enable the development of robust and consistent decommissioning cost estimates that can be meaningfully compared across the industry.

As the decommissioning sector evolves and matures, it is important that the industry has an accurate and consistent basis on which to estimate costs. Oil & Gas UK’s new decommissioning cost estimation guidelines build on the industry’s latest experiences in the practice and will be used extensively in planning future projects.

We have some concerns that such frequency of report by the Secretary of State might duplicate and, depending on the methodology used, conflict with the industry work already going on in the area. It might also create additional onerous data-reporting demands on the OGA. However, reliability, transparency and effective cost-management in this respect are critical. We would also expect wide consultation across the OGA, the Department of Energy and Climate Change and the industry to be undertaken.

As such, we are minded to support the amendment.

Andrea Leadsom Portrait Andrea Leadsom
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am delighted to tell the hon. Member for Southampton Test that I welcome his bringing forward this proposal, as it is an important area for debate. It gives me the opportunity to set the record straight on the economic narrative of the North sea. I am sure all hon. Members here will be aware of the issue, but it is important to put it on the record.

The Government believe in making the most of the UK’s gas and oil resources. To date, the oil and gas industry has contributed more than £330 billion to the Exchequer, and it is the UK’s largest industrial investor, supporting hundreds of thousands of jobs, supplying a large portion of the UK’s primary energy needs and making a significant contribution to GDP. Those jobs are not just in Aberdeen, or indeed in Scotland, but right across the UK. Members have all paid tribute to the contribution made by that North sea basin over many years.

With between 11 billion and 21 billion barrels of oil equivalent still to be exploited, the UK continental shelf can continue to provide considerable economic benefits for many years to come. That is what we are here to try to sort out, with the establishment of the OGA.

As the hon. Member for Southampton, Test pointed out, decommissioning is an inherent cost of doing business in the UKCS. Capital allowances are available on decommissioning expenditure, as they are for most of the costs of doing business in the UKCS. The rate of allowances for decommissioning match those for oil and gas research and development, exploration and appraisal, and mineral exploration and access.

I will answer the specific point raised about whether the tax relief situation might encourage people operating in the North sea to hurry to decommission, lest they be whisked away. The tax relief rate is guaranteed by way of decommissioning relief deeds between Government and operators so there is not a likelihood that either they will disappear or that people need to take precipitate action to avoid the risk that they might disappear.