(10 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman is flogging a dead horse, frankly. We do not need a frigate stationed in Scottish waters; we need good intelligence about the intentions of vessels approaching the UK’s area of interest, and we have that good intelligence. He talks about the number of frigates and destroyers available. He might like to tell the House how many frigates and destroyers his Scottish navy would have available within its extremely limited budget.
The hon. Gentleman also talks about the gapping of the fleet ready escort, which has occurred for 37 days in the past five years. During that period, there was no specific vessel designated as the fleet ready escort, but that does not mean that there were no royal naval vessels available to respond in case of necessity. In addition to the fleet ready escort, royal naval vessels are usually available to be tasked, as necessary.
If it is safe to assume that these Russian warships were not planning to bombard Mr Salmond, may we assume that they were there to establish the unimpeded rights of Russia to exploit oil in the Arctic? If so, will we have reciprocal rights to look for oil in the Russian Arctic?
The clear stated intention, which was subsequently borne out by events, was that the Kuznetsov carrier task group would proceed from Russia to the eastern Mediterranean, where it currently is. In accordance with the pattern of its last deployment, it stopped in the relatively sheltered waters of the Moray firth to re-oil on its way to the eastern Mediterranean. This is all perfectly normal procedure, and it was notified to NATO in advance.
(11 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
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I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, although I have to say that there was a little bit of fence sitting. Although we all recognise that the public are wary and weary of conflict, I did not hear a clear indication of whether he supports the actions that the Government propose to take in support of this French mission.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about the redeployment of troops from Mali to Afghanistan and I assume he meant Afghanistan to Mali. We are acutely conscious of the primacy of the operation in Afghanistan and the limits of what we have been able to offer the French in this operation are defined largely by the need not to degrade our capabilities in Afghanistan. We are looking all the time at what we can do without impacting on the air bridge or the operation in Afghanistan. As he noted, our initial response was to offer logistical support as that was what was urgently required to get French troops and equipment into Mali. The French ask has evolved to include additional surveillance capability, which we have now provided with the Sentinel R1. Over the next weeks and months the requirement will be for training of the Anglophone African troops who will provide the force in support of the Malian army in due course.
The right hon. Gentleman asked for an assessment of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. It is fair to say that our situational awareness of the Maghreb is not as great as we would like it to be. It is not an area where Britain has had traditional involvement, but we are making strong efforts to obtain awareness of what is going on there. We should not underestimate the potential for terrorist threats to emerge from the Islamic Maghreb, but nor should we overestimate the strength of the Islamists in this region.
The right hon. Gentleman also asked about our forces on the ground in Bamako. Bamako is well to the south of Mali and the problems are in the north. I agree that it is not impossible that Islamists could penetrate the south of the country in small groups, but there are many reasons why it might be difficult for them to operate there. The rules of engagement for British personnel will be on the basis of self-defence when they are based at Bamako. Force protection is provided within the airfield at Bamako by the French forces on the ground. As I said earlier in relation to any UK training mission, we will not allow any UK trainers to deploy until we are satisfied that adequate force protection measures are in place.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about the political process, and of course a political process is essential. I envisage that the European Union will be engaged in economic and political development in Mali in the future. The involvement of the Taureg people, of course, is essential to a sustainable and lasting peace in that country.
May I repeat to my right hon. Friend what I said unavailingly to his five Labour predecessors as Defence Secretary that the more frequently western forces intervene in Muslim countries, the greater will be the spread of jihadism throughout the whole Islamic world and the higher the threat of terrorism in this country?
I hear my right hon. Friend’s warning loudly and clearly, but of course precisely the problem that we are dealing with is that Mali is not an Islamic country. Mali is a country with a majority Christian population, with a significant Islamic minority. It is a country of two halves geographically, climatically, religiously, culturally and ethnically. That is the challenge, but the solution must be a democratically elected Government in Bamako who effectively represent all parts of that country. That is the long-term aim that we all aspire to achieve.
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman confuses basing, on which he talked about personnel in Scotland, with the structure of the Army, on which he talked about the Royal Regiment of Scotland. I simply do not think he understands what we are talking about today.
The key fact that the hon. Gentleman cannot deal with is that although he talks about a sixth regiment—I presume he means a sixth battalion—in the Royal Regiment of Scotland, the truth is that it has five battalions and has not been able to recruit to keep them up to strength. It is one of the most under-recruited regiments in the British Army. It is no good his asking for extra battalions and more regiments, because it cannot recruit to fill the ones that it already has. It also has one of the highest percentages of overseas-recruited troops in the British Army. That is the challenge that he faces before he can bring such issues before the House.
My right hon. Friend’s statement is an echo of the Geddes axe statement of the 1920s, for which the country, Europe and the rest of the world ultimately paid a very heavy price. One of the main reasons national service was abandoned was that it was decided that too many non-commissioned officers and too many of the best young officers of the Army had to be withdrawn from the fighting ranks to train 18-year-old national servicemen, who served for only two years. One thing that is absolutely certain is that the day will come when we need to increase our armed forces in some unpredictable crisis. Will the new, reduced Army have the capacity to train the necessary numbers of young men in the way Kitchener did, raising 1 million in a year?
I am not sure that raising 1 million troops in a year will be easy, but I can say to my right hon. Friend, who raises an important point, that one design parameter we set for the Army 2020 exercise is that the Army should be able to regenerate capacity if, at a point in the future, the strategic context demands it and the fiscal situation permits it. I can assure him that the Army, in designing Army 2020, has held that very much to the front of its consideration.
(13 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his welcome, and indeed for his continuing endorsement of the cross-party approach to this issue. He asked about the impact of the SDSR on the Afghan front line and I can tell him that in the very short time that I have had at the MOD, one of the first things I have done is to ask for an assessment of the equipment and personal protection available to our troops in Afghanistan. I am satisfied that they have the best level of protection they have had since this campaign began and appropriate equipment to carry out the task that they are being asked to carry out, and I will ensure that that remains my No. 1 priority. He asked about compulsory redundancies. No troops serving in Afghanistan will be subject to compulsory procedures either while they are serving in Afghanistan or during their recovery period upon return.
The right hon. Gentleman talked about the importance of the political track, and I absolutely agree with him. If Afghanistan is to have a stable and sustainable future, there has to be an inclusive solution to the political challenges that the country faces. I recognise that there are huge issues in achieving that but it must remain our focus. He was also right to draw attention to the success of our forces. A military solution alone will not be sufficient, but without a climate of security we will not be able to achieve the nation-building and reconciliation process that is so important for the future. I confirm that I will consistently make the case for the presence of our troops in Afghanistan.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about the current security situation. In the districts and provinces that have transitioned, the experience is good and the Afghan national security forces are showing good capability. Indeed, ISAF in Lashkar Gah has had to intervene only once since the transition took place.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about Pakistani militants, and I think he was referring to Haqqani network activity in the more easterly provinces to the east of where Task Force Helmand is operational. There has certainly been an increase in activity and the pattern clearly is that there has been a reduction in military activity in Regional Command South West but a corresponding increase in some other areas, including the area subject to Haqqani network influence.
The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to talk about the centrality—the crucial involvement—of Pakistan in the long-term solution to the problem. We should never forget that Pakistan has borne a burden as great as that of any other country in the fight against terrorism, taking more civilian casualties than any other nation. We will continue to work with the Pakistanis to ensure that they engage in the interests of Afghan security, and indeed of their own long-term security, by ensuring that the insurgency is defeated.
The right hon. Gentleman asked me about the infiltration of the ANSF through recruits. I absolutely accept that this is a critical issue. I have been assured that progress is being made, but I do not have the details that I can give to him across the Dispatch Box. I am very happy to write to him later today.
Finally, the right hon. Gentleman asked about protecting development gains. We are clear that a long-term lasting solution must involve the securing of those development gains and building on them—enhancing them. Afghanistan has to become a viable nation capable of offering its citizens basic services that they require, and capable, in a sense, of competing in its offer with what Taliban and other insurgents have been offering at local level. We have to build on those processes. We have to secure the gains that have been made, and I hope that at the Bonn conference the international community will take the opportunity to send a very clear signal of its long-term commitment to this process, beyond the draw-down of forces at the end of 2014.
I welcome my right hon. Friend to his vitally important post and wish him every success in it, but may I commiserate with him, as I have with his six predecessors, on bearing responsibility for what, despite the tremendous bravery of our troops, I have always predicted since 2002, future historians will regard as a fiasco as great as the first two Anglo-Afghan wars? The wisest thing the Secretary of State for Defence can now do is to bring our troops home as soon as possible.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his views. I am sure other Members of the House are familiar with them. That is not the view that the Government take. The Government take the view that we are embarked on a process. The Afghanisation of security is progressing. We have set out a timetable for the draw-down of forces, and we will continue to engage actively with the processes of nation-building, reconciliation and Afghanisation of security over that timetable.
(13 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis has always been at the heart of the deterrent argument. The whole point is that there is uncertainty about the circumstances in which the United Kingdom would respond, and the system therefore acts as a proper deterrent. We would hope that such weapons would never have to be used, because they would deter any threat against us. That is the principle and the core of the issue, and it is something that the unilateralists never understood.
Without, obviously, asking the Secretary of State to go into any sort of detail, will he make absolutely certain that the phasing out of Nimrod will not make our submarines more vulnerable to counter-attack?
We have a number of ways of ensuring the protection of our deterrent and, as my hon. Friend says, he would not expect me to go into detail. As for the Nimrod MRA4 programme, to which he might be referring, I must remind him that that capability was not available to us because the programme was already nine years late and the aircraft had not flown other than in one test that was abandoned for safety reasons. I am afraid that the failure of procurement over a number of years made that capability unavailable today.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe Prime Minister made it clear on his visit to Afghanistan, as the Chief of the Defence Staff and I have done, that if conditions allow, we may be able to see a reduction in 2011 of some UK forces. We may also decide to use UK forces in a different way, particular in more of a training mission, but that will depend on what happens on the ground next year.
May I ask my right hon. Friend, the sixth successive Defence Minister to whom I have pointed out the utter folly of our current intervention in Afghanistan—four of the quintet before him have wisely fled the House, and the first has just been banned from the Tea Room for five years—to whom he thinks the Afghan security force, which has been recruited from various tribes who have been bitterly hostile to each other for centuries, will owe their allegiance? Alternatively, does he expect a military dictator to emerge from their ranks to impose order?
(14 years ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Thank you very much, Mr Speaker. You may be the only person ever to have described me as modest in any way, shape or form.
I welcome the general tone of the shadow Defence Secretary’s remarks. There is much common ground. There are three reasons why we should support the general approach. There is the political approach, to bring France ever more closely into the heart of NATO which, as I think we all agree, is good for NATO, good for France and good for Britain; there is the military reason, for better interoperability and maximising our capability; and there is the economic case for getting value for money for both sets of taxpayers where that is possible. I can confirm to him that the treaty in no way provides any limitation on our ability to deploy forces when either nation believes that it is in its national interest to do so. We are trying to provide for better co-operation when we wish to act together in our mutual interest. Those are two very different concepts.
I shall not be able to get through all the specific points that the right hon. Gentleman made, but I shall write to him on any that, for reasons of time, I am unable to deal with. In terms of the carriers, the question of interoperability was key, and as he knows, when we came through the strategic defence review, the design of our carriers was changed to put in a catapult and trap system to give us better interoperability with our allies—not just France, but the United States. That would not have been possible, given the previous design, and that was a major consideration.
Clearly, if each nation operates a single carrier, when carriers are in for a major refit, a process that accounts for about three years out of every seven or eight, there will be an advantage in being able to train on carriers where we have much greater interoperability. There is also a chance of always having, for NATO purposes, one carrier free. Would that mean that we were able to force the French to do something against their will during that period, or vice versa? Of course it would not. We would hope that we would be able to act together, but there would be no means of coercing them to do so, and that is consistent with us behaving as sovereign, individual nations.
The ratification of the treaty will proceed in the normal way, and on nuclear co-operation, I was very grateful for the question about the 1958 agreement with the United States, which is key to the strength of our relationship. In my discussions with Secretary Gates, ahead of the defence review and afterwards, the agreement was one of the four elements about which the United States was most concerned. Our commitments under the 1958 treaty are in no way jeopardised, and the United States was fully consulted before and after the moves that we are discussing were made.
We must also remember that France itself co-operates very closely on nuclear issues with the United States. The United States, France and the United Kingdom form the nuclear capability of NATO, and, standing one step back, I must say that the fact that we are able to maintain the safety and predictability of our nuclear stockpiles without having to undertake nuclear tests is something for which the whole world should be grateful.
As I am married to a French woman, I have some experience of the unpredictability of Anglo-French relations, so may I take the Secretary of State back to the run-up to the Iraq war, when President Bush and Mr Tony Blair were hellbent on invading Iraq but President Chirac took a different view—actually, the correct view? If, in the future, there are diversions in British and French policy on military or foreign policy matters, who then gets the helicopters and the fighters on to the aircraft carrier?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that question. For a moment, I thought we were going to hear how “cordiale” in his private life the entente can actually be.
One of the big changes in French politics has been the emergence of President Sarkozy and the willingness of the French Government to put themselves at the heart of NATO.
(14 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberWhat I can tell the hon. Gentleman is that the total target set by the Afghan Government for the Afghan national security forces has been exceeded, that the number of recruits to the Afghan national army is more than two months ahead of schedule, and that the number of people entering the Afghan national police is increasing.
I can also tell the hon. Gentleman that there is a particularly positive trend in the Afghan national police as a result of a change of policy in Kabul. The pay for those entering the national police is now the same as the amount paid to the army, which has helped to increase recruitment. Moreover, literacy lessons are now provided for those joining the Afghan national police. In a country in which literacy levels are barely above 20%, that makes a major difference to recruitment to the security forces.
Why did British Ministers choose to ignore the advice given to them on Afghanistan by our exceptionally distinguished former ambassador to Kabul, as a result of which he has asked to be transferred to other duties?
The Government take advice from a wide range of sources; we are not in Afghanistan on a unilateral basis, but as part of an international coalition. Decisions are taken jointly with those in the international community. We listen to a wide range of experience but are not always able to satisfy every opinion.
(14 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. and gallant Friend makes a very good point, and at the NATO Defence Ministers’ summit last month my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary made it clear that command structure reform is a key priority for the United Kingdom and for the alliance, because NATO’s structure is too big and static, and too much is simply not geared up for the missions that we are undertaking, such as in Afghanistan. The House might like to ponder on the fact that, significantly, NATO did not employ elements of its command structure in any meaningful capacity in Afghanistan; instead, it put together a bespoke operation.
As the role of NATO in Afghanistan is increasingly criticised and the threat of terrorism here comes far more from our own disaffected Muslims than from the Tora Bora mountains, is it not rather bizarre that from on high we have heard recently that there are likely to be cuts in our counter-terrorist units here while we continue to sacrifice the precious, heroic lives of our young people in an unnecessary and unwinnable war against the Pashtun tribes?
Order. I know that in the reply from the Front Bench the hon. Gentleman will of course refer to the reform of NATO.