(12 years ago)
Commons ChamberI am prepared to accept anything that my hon. Friend says; I just wish she would do the same with me.
If, as my hon. Friend the Member for South East Cornwall (Sheryll Murray), who is promoting the Bill very successfully, has said, there have been no prosecutions, presumably she will have no trouble with the deletion of clause 5 altogether, as it clearly is not necessary.
Or perhaps just deleting new section 40C—the enforcement element—would suffice. Nevertheless, my hon. Friend cheerfully makes the point, and the deletion of clause 5 would have been accepted in another place on another time—but this is a different House and a different year.
I will conclude my remarks for now—although with the leave of the House, or even without it, I might make a comment towards the end of the debate—by saying that in essence the test is: will the genuine concerns, which were recognised in the past, be recognised this time?
I say to my hon. Friend the Minister that if the Bill passes today—there are many good, uncontroversial elements to it—that code of practice, with people signing up to and agreeing it, will make a significant difference. I will not put it more boldly than that, but I hope that the message has clearly got through.
I have to say to my hon. Friend that I suspect that the vast majority of boat movements around the south coast of Britain on any given weekend are undertaken by boats that are not carrying a radio. The fact that she is unaware of that gives me huge cause for alarm.
I should like to give the House an anecdote. When our daughter, then aged 11, sailed an Optimist from Priory bay on the Isle of Wight to Chichester harbour and then over to Portsmouth harbour, there was hardly room on board to carry food for the day, let alone a radio. My hon. Friend is illustrating the potential for a naive, newly designated harbour authority to do something impractical, and we need to pay attention to that.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for confirming that point.
Another scenario could involve a stipulation that all ships, including sailing and motorised dinghies and other small craft used in navigation, must carry specified equipment such as anchors. I do not know whether my hon. Friend the Member for South East Cornwall believes that every boat carries an anchor, but I can assure her that the vast majority do not do so. It could be decreed, however, that they must do so in a tideway so that they could get out of the way and drop anchor. Another possibility could be a requirement that fairways must be avoided by recreational craft, irrespective of whether other shipping is present.
Further possibilities include unjustifiable prohibitions from navigating within a specified distance of environmental features, and prohibitions from anchoring for recreational purposes. Indeed, there is a major dispute at the moment between yachtsmen in the Solent and the National Trust over anchoring in Osborne bay on the Isle of Wight, close to the home of Queen Victoria. The National Trust appears to have exceeded its powers in demanding that yachtsmen should not anchor in the bay adjacent to Osborne house. That is yet another illustration of how unelected authorities can impose a regulation, without having the power to do so or, indeed, without any thought for competing interests. Even if a harbour authority exercises its discretion not to prosecute the skipper of a recreational craft for infringing a harbour direction, the mere existence of that direction may be sufficient to invalidate the vessel’s insurance policy under section 41 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906.
Such general powers of direction have been attained over the years by a number of individual harbour authorities, starting with the Port of London Authority in 1968 and have then gradually taken the place of byelaws, which, unlike harbour directions, have to be confirmed by the Secretary of State and are subject to clear checks and balances. That is why I hope I can persuade the Bill’s promoter to accept amendment 7.
The Royal Yachting Association has become increasingly concerned in recent years at the potential for such powers to give harbour directions to be exercised indiscriminately in a manner that is unnecessary and harmful to the lawful exercise of recreational and other navigational rights. There are instances—quite a number of them—of harbour authorities routinely disregarding the views of their statutory advisory committees. For example, the Saundersfoot harbour commissioners have ignored the views of their statutory advisers, while the Wells harbour commissioners have purported to issue harbour directions despite not having the lawful authority to do so. Those examples do not give me confidence that the power contained in clause 5 would be exercised rationally and with due regard for the interests of all harbour users.
I consider the powers to give harbour directions, in the form proposed in the Bill, to be generally unmerited for a variety of reasons. The making of harbour directions involves the creation of new criminal offences, which many local harbour authorities are not equipped to do. Even democratically elected local authorities do not have such powers and the Bill contains none of the supervisory safeguards usually imposed for law-making bodies. I say to the Minister in all sincerity that granting an unelected harbour authority law-making powers that are not subject to democratic checks and balances and full transparency runs counter to the Government’s own localism policy.
Harbour directions could be made under the power over wide areas used by recreational craft in a disproportionate manner, without proper risk assessment or consideration of the full implications and possible alternatives. They could be used to impose very significant and potentially burdensome restrictions on the navigation and use of recreational craft. It is worth noting, as I described earlier in relation to the Southampton harbour authority, that many harbour authorities have jurisdiction over substantial areas going out to sea, and not just over partially enclosed harbour areas.
Prior consultation is an inadequate safeguard, not least because—notwithstanding that prior consultation—inappropriate or flawed decisions often still follow, as experience across the public and private sector generally shows. Furthermore, as my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley) pointed out, judicial review is not an adequate remedy against an objectionable direction where, as here, powers are expressed without meaningful limitations. There is unlikely ever to be any procedural or substantive illegality to provide a course of action.
The RYA has expressed its concerns over a number of years to representatives of the port industry and to the Government, including in a response to a Government consultation on the draft Marine Navigation Bill of 2008, which contained an equivalent provision to that set out in clause 5. As my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West said, a meeting between the RYA, the Member in charge of the Bill and the Minister has now taken place, but the RYA understands that those behind the Bill do not propose to drop the provision or amend it in any way to meet the RYA’s concerns. I have to say that that gives me cause for concern. [Interruption.]
I beg the Minister’s pardon. I thought at that point that his body language was moving towards the Dispatch Box.
Yes, it is about compassion for those facing an experience that, obviously, none of us has had. This is the most difficult of subjects, which is possibly why Parliament has been resistant to debating it for many years.
May I turn to the amendment by the right hon. Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Dame Joan Ruddock), which calls on the Government to consult on whether the code should be put on a statutory basis? The law is clear: if someone assists a person in ending their life, it is a criminal offence. However, the Director of Public Prosecutions has made it clear that in a narrowly defined set of circumstances, he will not prosecute. The crux of the point is that it is quite possible that, sometime in the future, the guidance will be changed without parliamentary approval. Parliament should be consulted before any further change, and the amendment ensures that.
There is another point: putting the policy on a statutory basis would address the charge that this debate is the thin end of the wedge, or the slippery slope. It is the complete opposite. The policy exists, and can be amended without parliamentary scrutiny. If we enshrine the policy in statute, it would take another statute to amend the law. Members will have their say on all sides of the debate, and will then vote. That is how we make laws in Parliament, and the public expect no less. In my opinion, the amendment deserves support.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, and may I say how much I welcome what is on his website, which explains some of the issues? On the motion and amendment (a), the original motion that the House thought it was to consider included a reference to putting matters on a statutory basis. The motion was changed, and the amendment was brought forward. The first, and possibly only, vote this evening may put back into the motion what was taken out and put in amendment (a). Is that coincidence, or clever parliamentary practice?
I make no secret of the fact that the original motion included the words in the amendment, but in discussion with colleagues on both sides of the argument, people rightly pointed out that there were two separate arguments in the motion, and one part might be successful, and the other defeated. The part that people agreed with might be defeated because of the bit that they did not agree with. It seemed perfectly sensible to separate the two bits. I confess that I had a conversation with the right hon. Member for Lewisham, Deptford, and she has bravely undertaken to move amendment (a) today.
I turn to the other amendment selected—amendment (b), on palliative care, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce). I am happy to accept the amendment. I would have signed it, if it would not have looked odd to sign an amendment to my own motion. I pay tribute to those working in the area of palliative care, and in particular to St Christopher’s hospice in south London, which works closely with a number of people in my constituency.
The previous and current Governments deserve credit for the progress that they have made towards greater access to care, notably through the end-of-life care strategy. We all recognise the first-class palliative care services provided by hospices, and we should be united in hoping that it can be replicated across all care settings. I give a warm welcome to the additional funding for end-of-life care announced last week by the Secretary of State for Health at the Marie Curie Cancer Care reception, but we should recognise that—as was acknowledged by Baroness Finlay, the renowned palliative care professor and passionate campaigner against a change in the law on assisted dying—such care is not a panacea to all the suffering that the dying process can cause.
Some people, regardless of the care available to them, will seek to control the time and manner of their death. Melanie Reid wrote about that in a moving column in The Times today, which I commend to the House. She is not terminally ill; she is a tetraplegic, following a riding accident. She admits to contemplating ending her life regularly. She wrote:
“Knowing that I have a choice is a huge comfort to me; it sustains me on the days when I make the mistake of looking too far in the future. But the point is, I am blessed precisely because I have a choice.”
In other words, even if we can provide universal access to good-quality end-of-life care, some Britons will still seek to end their lives. The law must be equipped to deal with such cases and to help the vulnerable.
I was struck by a recent debate in the other place on the DPP’s policy, secured by the former Leader of the House of Lords, Baroness Jay. In that debate, there was a clear division between speakers on whether the law should change to allow doctor-assisted dying, but there was unanimous support for the DPP’s approach, with Baroness Finlay describing the policy as “clear, firm and compassionate.” Furthermore, in a recent Synod debate that overwhelmingly rejected a change in the law, the Archbishop of Canterbury, who has repeatedly made clear his opposition to a change in the law, said:
“We can be realistic, we can be compassionate in the application of the existing law”.
I hope that today, whatever view individually we may take on the law, we can agree that the approach taken by the DPP is both realistic and compassionate.
If there is a majority in the House in favour of this motion, we will have done the nation a service. If there is a majority against it, we will have a problem, as the DPP and 82% of the public will be saying one thing, and the people’s elected representatives another. I urge the House to support the motion and show compassion to those facing this terrible dilemma.