(10 years ago)
Commons ChamberAs the House will have seen on the amendment paper this morning, there are seven new clauses, two new schedules and several amendments. I propose to divide the amendments into several sub-groups, although others may choose to deal with them in a different way. For the sake of clarity, it might be helpful if I draw together a number of different threads. I will start with new clause 1 and new schedule 1.
For context, and for those who read our debates, perhaps we should remind ourselves that we are talking about whether, from every £100 of our wealth, we should give 70p each year to those who will use it well. It is important for people to know that some Conservatives—probably most—want the Bill to go through and some oppose it, and some of these discussions help to delay the passage of the Bill.
I do not want to be drawn immediately off target. We are considering some rather detailed provisions this morning. I accept that there are different views. There are many on the Government Benches who think it would be a good thing to use some of our public money—moneys that we have taken from the taxpayer—to pay for international aid. To a large extent, I go along with that, but what the Bill does is entirely different. It tries to enshrine in statute one particular area of Government spending, which no other areas of Government spending enjoy. It could be argued that it is better for a Government to spend whatever they want, be it 0.7% or 0.8%, of their own free will, rather than being obliged by statute to do so. There is another point. There may be those who, once they see that the 0.7% target has been enshrined in statute, think the job is done.
The people of this country have a long and proud history of giving generously to charity, and long may that continue, but is not there a danger that some—although not all—might think that, because 0.7% is enshrined in statute, the Government are doing that job for them? I for one do not wish to go down that road. I would like people to feel that it is also their responsibility, as an act of charity, to contribute to international aid.
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
I am moving Third Reading, Mr Speaker, with the consent of my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr Hollobone), who is the Member in charge of the Bill.
The Bill will make a small change, but one that will be very important for those affected, to the law on the process by which tenants can take advantage of the right to participate in collective enfranchisement and extend the leases of their flats. I am conscious that the Bill was not debated in the Chamber on Second Reading and that this morning provides the only opportunity to explain its purpose and the reasoning behind it. For the benefit of the House, I will set out the current position and the change the Bill seeks to make.
The Bill is, I fear, a rather complex and technical measure, but I will endeavour to explain it as simply as possible. We are fortunate that the issue in question has been the subject of litigation, although I am sure that the participants in the litigation did not think that it was at all fortunate that they were so involved. It does mean, however, that we can use a real-life case to illustrate the problem that the Bill seeks to solve.
First, let me place on record my thanks to my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering, who presented the Bill as I was not able to attend the House on the date set for the presentation of Bills. He has calmly and without complaint fielded the many inquiries that have arisen as a result of the Bill’s title. I must apologise to the many people outside the House who have corresponded with me about leasehold reform and who had rather more ambitious aims for this Bill, and I regret that they might be somewhat disappointed by its lack of content.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend and our hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr Hollobone) for bringing the Bill this far. May I sympathise with him and say that rather than putting the load of necessary leasehold reform and so on on to this Bill, which would not get through the House if it were expanded, we ought to try to ensure that we in this House, the Government and the property chamber bring together the problems, abuses and difficulties that leaseholders face and see whether we can find simple ways of making their lives easier and better?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention and I know that he has a specific and long-standing interest in leasehold reform. He is right to draw the House’s attention to the fact that this area of law is complex by any measure. Many outside the House also feel that it would benefit from simplification, whether by the Law Commission or by the Government of the day pulling together the different pieces of legislation that govern the leasehold tenure provisions. There is plenty of scope for improvement, and I think he would agree with me on that.
As I said, I fear that those outside the House who have an interest in this area of law had rather ambitious hopes for the Bill when they saw its title appear on the Order Paper. However, as my hon. Friend will know, it is not really appropriate for a private Member’s Bill to try to deal with all the matters that he may have in mind and would like to see resolved in future; it would run into all sorts of problems in the House if it did.
Hon. Members will appreciate that private Members’ Bills are fairly narrow; they have to be, if they are to make progress. It is not usual for them to make whole-scale changes to a particular area of law. I should add at this point that unusually for a private Member’s Bill that has reached this stage—Third Reading, the final stage in its legislative process through the House—this is a genuine private Member’s Bill. I say that not in any way to belittle private Members’ Bills that contain legislative proposals suggested by the Government of the day, because invariably—indeed, as we have seen in every Session of this Parliament—those Bills contain sensible measures, which are welcomed by those affected. However, this legislation demonstrates that it is entirely possible for a Bill to make progress through the House even though it was not originally conceived within Government.
I have referred to the Bill as a genuine private Member’s Bill. However, I must pay tribute to the work of the Association of Leasehold Enfranchisement Practitioners, which brings together both solicitors and valuers who act on behalf of landlords and tenants in respect of collective enfranchisement and lease extension matters. It seeks to promote best practice and has been campaigning for improvements to the legislation dealing with leasehold tenure, which, as I said, is a particularly complicated area of law. In particular, I wish to place on the record my thanks to Mr John Midgley, the property enfranchisement partner at Seddons solicitors and a member of the advisory committee of ALEP, for his sage advice and assistance.
There are traditionally two types of tenure of land in this country: freehold and leasehold. An owner of the freehold interest in land may either retain the right to occupy that land themselves or choose to allow someone else to occupy the land for a fixed period. The terms and conditions that govern the relationship between the freeholder and the holder of the lesser interest in the land—the leaseholder—are set out in a document that we all know as a lease.
Initially, owners of long leases of dwelling houses were given the right to buy the freehold interest in the land on which the dwelling house was built by virtue of the Leasehold Reform Act 1967. However, that Act applied only to houses; people who lived in flats were excluded. Some 26 years later, long leaseholders living in blocks of flats gained what was called a collective right to buy the freehold of the blocks they lived in under the terms of the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993. That Act also provided for a leaseholder to acquire a new lease to extend the period of years for which they held the property.
To commence the process by which the right of collective enfranchisement can begin it is necessary for a tenant to serve on their landlord a notice pursuant to section 13 of the 1993 Act. A similar notice is required under section 42 of the Act to trigger the statutory procedure to enable a leaseholder to acquire a new lease. Currently, where a leaseholder wishes to give notice under either section 13 or section 42 of the 1993 Act, section 99(5)(a) provides that any notice served pursuant to either section 13 or section 42 must be—and this is the crucial part of the Act that we are hoping to remedy—
“signed by each of the tenants, or (as the case may be) by the tenant, by whom it is given”.
As I will explain, that statutory provision has been interpreted by the courts to mean that the notice must be signed personally by the tenant. Normally, solicitors can, and frequently do, sign legal documents for and on behalf of their clients. It is also normally possible for any person who chooses to do so to execute a power of attorney to appoint someone else to act on their behalf and sign legal documents on behalf of the donor of the power.
Unusually, in my experience, this is one area of law where even a person holding a valid power of attorney would be prohibited from signing the notice on behalf of the donor. As the House can doubtless immediately imagine, that could have potentially devastating consequences for the affected person. Incidentally, the same problem would arise where someone was appointed by the Court of Protection to manage the affairs of someone else who, by reason of mental incapacity, was unable to manage their own affairs. That would happen if an individual became mentally incapable of managing their own affairs but had not previously entered into an enduring power of attorney, or what is now called a lasting power of attorney; the difference between the two terms is of little relevance.
Before I proceed further, it may assist the House if I refer to St. Ermin’s Property Company Ltd. v. Tingay, the leading case on this issue. It concerned the validity of a notice given under section 42 of the 1993 Act. I will refer to the facts of the case, as set out in the judgment of Lord Justice Lloyd, sitting in the chancery division of the High Court of Justice, on appeal from the decision of His Honour Judge Morgan, sitting at Staines county court.
In this case, the tenant of a first floor flat situated at 10 Hill Court on Wimbledon Hill Road in London SW19 held her property under a lease dated 14 May 1976, which granted her and her husband a lease of 60 years less a few days. She maintained that the flat was occupied by her as her only or principal home for almost the whole of the 10-year period up to the date on which the notice was given, which was 11 October 2000. The tenant was elderly. By the time the High Court judgment was given on 19 July 2002, she was less than a month short of her 90th birthday.
In March 2000, the tenant moved out of the flat into accommodation in which her needs could be better attended to. In anticipation of her deteriorating health, this elderly lady had done what we would think of as the right thing to do: executed an enduring power of attorney that gave general authority to her son and daughter to act—jointly and separately—on her behalf.
The elderly lady’s lease was one to which the provisions of the 1993 Act applied, thus allowing her to claim the grant of a new lease. Accordingly a notice was given under the terms of section 42 and, pursuant to the power of attorney, it was signed by her son. The landlord served a counter-notice that made four points, one of which was that the notice did not appear to be in the correct form. The landlord then commenced legal proceedings to seek a declaration that the tenant had no right to acquire a new lease and that the notice was invalid or defective.
At the county court hearing, the judge followed a 1998 decision of His Honour Judge Cowell in the West London county court and held that the notice was not valid. However, the judge gave permission to appeal because the point was not covered by any authority higher than the county court.
I shall quote directly from the High Court judgment of Mr Justice Lloyd, as he set out the problem succinctly. He said:
“It is a short point, but a somewhat puzzling one…As a general proposition things that can be done by an individual may be done either personally or by a duly authorised agent. That is true under the common law generally, and under statute. There are, however, exceptions. In some cases the provision which allows for, or requires, the thing to be done also prescribes that it must be done personally and not by an agent. In other cases, the nature of the thing is such that it requires personal skill or discretion, and cannot be delegated.”
Counsel for the tenant argued that to construe section 99(5)(a) would produce unintended anomalies, but the judge held:
“However, whatever anomalies this provision may produce, or however much of a trap it may be for tenants and their advisers, I agree with His Honour Judge Cowell that the distinction drawn in the construction (in the sense of putting together, as opposed to reading) of sub-s (5), between the method of signature of notices under s 13 or s 42 on the one hand, and other notices on the other hand, is so clear and so plainly deliberate that I cannot give s 99(5)(a) the meaning that it would have in isolation, and I must interpret it as requiring personal signature by the tenant, and not permitting signature on her behalf by anyone else, whether an ordinary agent or an attorney.”
I apologise; I did not have foresight.
May I, through my hon. Friend, put it to the Minister that the Government need to consult senior judges to determine whether, following this Bill becoming an Act, an overall provision is required so that any other unintended consequences arising from the use of the word “personally” can be sorted out without relying on good-natured Members to promote Bills that make minor amendments to major Acts that affect good people?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his submission to the Government as it might well be that such a problem exists in other aspects of our body of legislation. I agree that passing a catch-all provision would make corrective legislation such as this private Member’s Bill unnecessary.
The High Court judgment continued:
“A signature by an attorney is still a signature on behalf of the tenant rather than one by the tenant, in the terms of s 99(5), and would therefore be valid for the purposes of s 99(5)(b), but not valid for the purposes of s 99(5)(a).”
The judge went on to say:
“I would only add that another respect in which a distinction was drawn in the legislation between a personal act and an act by an agent is to be found in the provision that I have mentioned, s 42(3)(e), under which the tenant’s notice may state the name of a person appointed by the tenant to act for him in connection with his claim.
One might think it curious that the notice has to be given by the tenant, personally, in a situation in which the tenant has already decided that dealings in connection with the claim are to be with some other person, whether an attorney, a solicitor, valuer or whoever it may be, but the distinction is clear and it is, of course, even clearer in the context of s 99(5) itself. I mention s 42(3)(e) because it shows that in the wider context of the legislation there is other provision, which draws the same distinction.
For those reasons, which are much the same as Judge Cowell in Viscount Chelsea v. Hirshorn…I hold that a notice under s 42 can only be signed by the tenant, personally. A signature by an attorney is invalid, and I therefore dismiss this appeal.”
I think that that case clearly and vividly demonstrates not only why the Bill is such an important measure, but why it is important that legislation passed by the House is carefully scrutinised and that every effort is made to consider all possible unintended consequences of new laws.
I submit to the House that there are five simple reasons why it is right that the Bill should be passed. First, the problem does not apply to leaseholders seeking to exercise their rights under the Leasehold Reform Act 1967. Someone living in a house does not have a problem; it is only leaseholders of flats who are affected by the provision in the 1993 Act. Secondly, in respect of flats, the requirement for personal execution does not apply to landlords, so why on earth should tenants be disadvantaged in such a way when landlords are not?
Thirdly, the Bill does not apply to other notices required to be served under the 1993 Act. It is purely the initial trigger notices that have been found to need a personal signature. Fourthly, the Bill will remove the disadvantage faced by tenants who, perhaps because of mental incapacity or physical disability, are unable to sign. Fifthly, the Bill removes the problems faced by tenants who are temporarily absent from the country, be that on business or on holiday. Bizarrely, if a tenant dies having occupied a qualifying property for two years prior to their death, it is possible for the executors or administrators of their estate to serve a valid notice on the landlord, provided that they do so within two years of the issue of a grant of representation, so someone cannot sign a notice validly if they are alive, but their executors can if they are dead.
The House will be aware that the Bill was amended in Committee. I place on record my thanks to all those who agreed to serve on the Committee. The Committee’s sitting will always live in my memory and was particularly poignant because it was the very last time that I spoke to Paul Goggins, the late Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East, who graciously agreed to serve on the Committee. I remember that, as I left the room, he spoke to me for the last time to thank me for my work on this matter.
The amendments agreed to in Committee essentially made two changes to the Bill. First, they provided that the Bill would not apply to Wales. Since the 1993 Act was enacted, housing matters have been devolved to the Welsh Assembly. Consequently, even if the Bill reaches the statute book, the requirement for tenants to sign notices personally under sections 13 and 42 of the 1993 Act will remain in Wales, unless the Assembly chooses to pass a similar measure. The second small change made in Committee provides for the Bill to come into force two months after the date on which it receives Royal Assent, rather than the one month stated when the Bill was first published.
Tenants who are interested in taking advantage of their rights under the 1993 Act but who may be put off by the complexity of it all will be relieved to know that help is available from a range of sources, including the Leasehold Advisory Service, which published a guide to collective enfranchisement called “Getting Started.” I apologise to that body because, if this Bill is enacted, it will have to amend that document. As page 13 of the guide, which details what is required in the initial notice, correctly states:
“The Notice must be signed by all the participating tenants; no one can sign on their behalf.”
If we are successful in getting the Bill on to the statute book, the wording will need to be revised. I suggest: “The notice must be signed by, or on behalf of, all the participating tenants.”
A private Member’s Bill will generally not make any progress unless it has at least the tacit support of the Government of the day. I am grateful to officials in the Department for Communities and Local Government for recognising the strength of the arguments in support of this small legislative change. I thank them for their help and advice on drafting, and on the technical aspects of the Bill. I also thank the Government and Her Majesty’s Opposition for supporting the Bill. I thank the staff of the Public Bill Office for helping me to navigate the legislative pathway that a Bill of this nature has to follow.
Finally, to aid the understanding of Members and the wider public, explanatory notes were prepared and published with the Bill, but following the minor changes made in Committee and in order to bring the explanatory notes in line with the usual format, it is intended that the notes will be slightly amended and reissued before the Bill is considered in the other place, if it is read a Third time this morning. The Bill is a small but important measure, and I commend it to the House.
(12 years ago)
Commons ChamberI used to feel the same way as my hon. Friend, but I think that if a prison officer decides that an unauthorised item should be destroyed or disposed of, a senior manager of the prison ought to agree with that. The issue is not about whether an article is unauthorised or being used in a way that is unauthorised; it is about the disposal of the article afterwards. I am now convinced that the right approach is for a prison officer to be able to confiscate an article and for the governor or director of the prison to decide about disposal.
My hon. Friend makes a valuable point, and he has persuaded me on it. I would be interested to know, however, whether the Minister has had any feedback on amendment 3, perhaps from the Prison Officers Association.
Amendment 4 is a sensible proposal, and I have nothing further to say on it this morning.
Amendment 5 is of considerable interest. I asked in an intervention whether my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley had deliberately not put “registered” before “charity”. Whether or not that is the case, it is the right decision, as it overcomes any bureaucratic problems that might arise over whether a local charitable organisation had gone through the registration process. Such an organisation may be in the process of registration—indeed, that is often the case. The amendment would serve to avoid long-winded discussions as to whether individuals who are doing good work should be prevented from benefiting from confiscated property. Most of this property is mobile phones and there is a considerable market in recycling them, so they have a great value, especially as nowadays most of them are, in fact, small mobile computers.
Amendment 9 addresses the question of the data on these phones. The right solution is for the data to be routinely taken off the phones and stored on a central hard disc, logged with the prisoner’s name and number. Therefore, if at any point in the future it turns out that some of that information is pertinent to an alleged offence, it can be used in evidence.
That is right. Our concern is that property that was disposed of might later turn out to have contained evidence that was central to securing a conviction. I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for Pudsey, the promoter of the Bill, would not want that information to be unavailable. There is a great deal of merit in having routine cleansing of phones, but only after having saved all the data contained on them on a central hard disc for possible future use.
We know from the Minister’s comments on Second Reading that 41,000 phones are currently stored, so I accept that storing these data would be a major task. We were told on Second Reading that the cost of storing the phones is £20,000 a year, and they are seized at the rate of 800 a month. This is a major problem, therefore, and there would be a great deal of merit in the Minister’s exploring the possibility of a standardised system whereby information is taken off phones and stored for future reference.
About 13 years ago I became rather conscious of what was going on in prisons. I had taken part in a campaign to help overturn the convictions and to free Ruth Wyner and John Brock, who had been working at the Wintercomfort project in Cambridge, helping the homeless. I remember helping to lead a procession across London that had the slogan, “Help the homeless: jail the social workers?” An account of these events is given in Alexander Masters’ book, “Stuart: a life lived backwards”. With the knowledge of the police, these two people were running a project for homeless people, some of whom were addicted to illegal street drugs. Another police officer found that some people were exchanging drugs on or outside the premises, and for some ludicrous reason the people running the project were prosecuted and jailed.
In jail, Ruth Wyner was asked to sign a confidentiality agreement so as to give counselling to other prisoners who were getting illegal street drugs in prison. I asked how many times each year someone in prison was detected as having used illegal street drugs. The answer was about 20,000, which is really quite high. I then asked somebody who had worked for me but who went on to work in the Prison Service how the drugs got into prison. The answer was, “Sometimes they’re thrown over the wall.”
I also refer Members to the first book Lord Archer wrote about his prison experience. It described how new prisoners, most of whom were inexperienced at crime—and at life—were sent to a high-security prison for a period, and if they were not on drugs before they went, they were often on drugs by the time they had finished their three weeks there, because the senior, experienced prisoners would arrange for the new prisoner to get their family to pay the experienced person’s family or associates outside the prison. That demonstrates why the mobile phones issue is important and why detecting unauthorised possession of mobile phones matters.
We ought to support the Bill. The question of how to deal with the amendments will be determined by the Minister’s responses to the points made by my hon. Friends the Members for Shipley (Philip Davies) and for Bury North (Mr Nuttall). I am grateful to the Bill’s promoter, my hon. Friend the Member for Pudsey (Stuart Andrew), and I wish him success with it.
We must address the underlying issue, which is that 800 mobile phones are detected a month, and many more surely go undetected. A technical fix ought to be possible, so that any use of a mobile phone in a prison is linked to the identification number of a phone, and if any phone is used that is not part of the approved list, investigations should take place and people should find out where it is. The technology cannot be that difficult. Perhaps that is how it is done anyway, and that is why the detection rate is as high as it is.
I am a great believer in helping prisoners to be rehabilitated, but if there is a currency in mobile phones in a prison, let alone in controlled or illegal drugs, we need to stop it. The Bill is about the particular issue of how one can dispose of or destroy items that are not illegal to possess but that are unauthorised in prisons. Its limited purpose is one that this House should support, and I do support it.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend is absolutely right. One of the dangers of these provisions, and one of the ills that the amendments seek to address, is that they send out a very negative message about entrepreneurship. It sends out the message that if someone tries to use their initiative and start off in the motor trade we will jump on them, try to put an end to it and stop them starting out in life.
Regrettably, I suspect that our hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Mr Bone) has misled our hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall).
Unintentionally. If the entrepreneur were selling soap from a stall with four wheels on the public highway, with or without the use of the internet, that would normally be caught by local government regulations. The fact is that selling a car with four wheels on the highway, using the internet, is not the same as selling soap. One can either ignore the fact that the internet has been developed since previous local authority powers over selling cars on the highway were introduced, or say that the internet needs to be taken into account. If a local authority is saying, “We would like to have the same power to deal with trading on the public highway using the internet for advertising as we have for trading using the local newspaper,” I am not absolutely certain that a single sentence of the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North is directed at what the power in clause 9, or clause 10, are aiming to do.
I see where my hon. Friend is coming from, but clause 9 does send out a message, because I do not see such people as street traders. They may well have just one vehicle to sell, and they have to put it somewhere, but, as we have seen from the case to which I referred earlier, there is a danger that it would be caught by the clause.
I also draw the attention of the House to another problem that I have identified with the clause. The clause is headed, “Street trading: vehicles and the internet” and deals specifically and only with
“exposed or offered for sale on the internet”,
in subsection (2). It does not deal with the many other ways in which a vehicle might be offered for sale in the modern world without actually being said to be “on the internet”. Perhaps the biggest example is when a company has an intranet. An intranet is by all definitions, as far I have been able to check in my research, not regarded—