Strategic Defence and Security Review

Penny Mordaunt Excerpts

Thursday 16th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[Penny Mordaunt (Portsmouth North) (Con)]

Allow me to take you back to the evening of 31 March 1982, Mr Deputy Speaker. The Prime Minister has just delivered a statement to the House of Commons, and is working in her office behind the Chair in which you now sit. She is occupied by thoughts of the uncertainty of Argentine intentions towards the Falkland Islands. The Defence Secretary telephones in a state of some agitation to report that the Argentine fleet is in full sail and likely to invade the Falklands in the morning of Friday 2 April. His advice is that should the islands fall, they cannot be retaken.

A meeting is convened with Foreign Office and MOD officials. Turning to the Chief of the Naval Staff, Sir Henry Leach, the Prime Minister asks for his assessment. Sir Henry replies: “I can put together a taskforce of destroyers, frigates, landing craft and support vessels, which will be led by the aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible. It can be ready to leave in 48 hours.” The Prime Minister gives the order to assemble.

Developments such as the Falklands war, the collapse of the Soviet Union and 9/11 were largely unforeseen; others, such as the ongoing dangers of international terrorism, are more readily perceived. The dangers of unpreparedness are real and the consequences extreme.

These are difficult times for every Department, but especially for the Ministry of Defence. The MOD cannot conduct its spending review with a blank sheet of paper because we are at war. The equivalent might be the Department of Health trying to balance its books in the midst of the cholera epidemics of the 1800s. In those circumstances, the question we must ask is this: can we knowingly fail to equip ourselves with a defence capability that will be relevant in all possible military scenarios, one that can be deployed with speed, and one that in many cases will be the lead point of action? Emphatically, the answer is that we cannot.

We cannot with conscience be without the security of the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers, which would greatly enhance Britain’s defence and security position. They would permit the UK to deploy essential offensive air power with our entire range of fast jets or helicopters that we have or may have without regard to establishing a land base or a supply chain, and without receiving overflight permissions. British forces could act at the discretion of our political and military command without the staying hand of uncooperative third states, and, once in position, with more penetration and versatility than our current carrier fleet.

Our country may be small, but we are a large nation. We have responsibilities to ourselves and our international partners. The Queen Elizabeth carriers will ensure that we can act unilaterally, as in the Falklands, and guarantee a leading role in bilateral and multilateral operations. The carriers will support larger and more frequent sorties than our current ones, and their amphibious assault capability means that they can cover when HMS Ocean is unavailable. They could support unmanned aircraft, and the flexibility provided by their large deck space will increase our potential to support humanitarian and evacuation missions.

The very nature of a carrier strike means that we can intervene militarily without needing to commit troops on the ground or, where soldiers are required in theatre, that the way can be prepared with air strikes and those troops landed from the same ship. Yet such is the military capability of these carriers that their deployment would serve as a significant deterrent to action within Britain’s sphere of influence, filling the deterrence gap that exists underneath the level of action which is obviated by the nuclear deterrent.

Ours is an island nation, defined by ocean-bound borders. The defence of the realm, the security of our fuel and food supply, and our international presence depend on naval strength. What I have described is the challenges that we face and the capabilities that we need to meet them. These challenges do not rest; global terrorism does not operate on a part-time basis and conventional military threats are not confined to traditional campaigning seasons. We must be ready to meet whatever faces us, at all times and at a moment’s notice. To do that we must commission both the Queen Elizabeth and the Prince of Wales carriers. Arguments to build just one or to sell the second off fail to understand the practicalities of maintaining the operational readiness of a carrier strike force or their export market, which lies solely in design, and not in finished ships.

I have long argued that the key to securing our shipbuilding industrial base is to ensure that our Royal Navy ships are exportable and to build on those markets. We can then have a slower drum beat for British ships, because we will be less reliant on Royal Navy work. A more sensible drum beat would mean that we could make savings and, I hope, be able to afford the number in the surface fleet that we should have. Unlike the Type 26, which has strong whole-ship export potential, if we are sensible about the amount of gadgets and gizmos it has, the carrier’s export market is limited to its design and, of course, its excellent engines and other components. Let us not forget that these, too, will provide British jobs and receipts to the Exchequer.

Although I have sympathy with the arguments of the off-the-shelf exponents— we should, of course, be using our defence budget to get the best kit at the best price, to best equip our forces—they fail to grasp the merit of retaining the capability to develop and maintain our assets. The unique collaboration between the Royal Navy and the private sector at Portsmouth navy base delivers on the MOD’s challenging targets for operational readiness of the surface fleet. Yet even with this excellence in repair, refit, development and—let us not forget—training, no ship can be at sea, or ready to go to sea, for 365 days a year. Therefore, if we want to have this carrier capability, we need two ships; one carrier is not an option—it is all or nothing, and nothing is not an option.

In recent years, carrier strike has been employed in the Falklands, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan, extending Britain’s reach into landlocked countries and across the globe. When the carrier fleet has not been pressed into action, its constant presence has served as a deterrent to those who harm us and our interests. If anyone needs further persuasion, they should consider who is equipping themselves with carrier strike capabilities. It is not only our old colleagues on the Security Council, but emerging nations such as Brazil and India. To sustain our position in the vanguard of world diplomacy and our seat on the permanent Security Council, we must not be left behind.

With two carriers we will have continual and immediate protection. In an unpredictable world, it is hard to evaluate the return on investment, and in a defence context the ultimate return on investment can be achieved only in the most dread of circumstances. The Queen Elizabeth carriers are well able to meet the challenges of this unpredictability: they are multi-use; they can perform amphibious operations as well as carrier strike; they are value for money; they will last for 50 years; we will use them; they will prevent conflict; and they will lead our response when those dread circumstances do arise.

There is often a lack of appreciation and understanding of what the Royal Navy does and of our complete reliance on carrier strike. That ignorance is testament to the Royal Navy’s effectiveness. We have taken it for granted.

We are used to our admirals saying that we can be ready in 48 hours. If we want that to continue, we must realise that we can afford to build both carriers and that we cannot afford not to.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Penny Mordaunt Excerpts

Monday 21st June 2010 Commons Chamber

[Penny Mordaunt (Portsmouth North) (Con)]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. Having waited for over a month to speak in a debate, it seems a little strange to call this my maiden speech. Perhaps it could be more aptly described as my spinster speech.

I must thank the Speaker for introducing the new rules that have permitted me to show a little ankle and flirt with participation in the proceedings of the House. As those who know me will testify, keeping quiet for a whole month would have been a great strain, but silent I would have been, for I was determined to speak for the first time in a defence debate.

During my first days as a Member of Parliament it was not at all clear from which set of Benches I would be delivering this speech. In the week following the election, as the fog of uncertainty resolved into strong and stable coalition Government, I had time to reflect that I and colleagues who had to wait past the midnight hour for our results made our first utterances as Members of Parliament on the 70th anniversary of the Norway debate. That momentous occasion in 1940 precipitated the fall of the Chamberlain Administration, caused the King to send for Churchill and the formation of the formal coalition Government.

During that historic debate, the hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth Sir Roger Keyes rose from his place in full dress uniform with six rows of medals pinned to his chest, and delivered what Harold Nicolson called the most dramatic speech he had ever heard. Sir Roger began:

“I wish to speak for some officers and men of the fighting, sea-going Navy”.—[Official Report, 7 May 1940; Vol. 360, c. 1125.]

My uniform remains in my wardrobe, and I do not pretend to high drama, but I have come to the Chamber today, and will come again on many other days, to do as Sir Roger did: to speak for the Navy.

First, however, let me make mention of another of Sir Roger’s successors. I am speaking today because Sarah McCarthy-Fry is not. This election was, if the House will indulge a topical metaphor, the second match of our personal contest, and so I can really only claim to have levelled the score, although given the size of the current majority I think I can say that I am ahead on goal difference.

In the intervening years, Sarah was very much the super-sub, occupying almost every ministerial job going, including a mere fortnight at the Department for Communities and Local Government. I pay tribute to Sarah’s service to our city, and in particular to her fight to keep Portsmouth naval base open and viable. I will continue that campaign, although unlike her I hope not to have to fight my own Government to achieve it.

I am happy to report to the House that Sarah has quickly gained new employment and has taken a job of hard labour—or hard Labour—which might have gathered dust on the average Jobcentre Plus shelves. I am sure that my hon. Friends will join me in wishing her well as campaign manager for the shot at the Labour party leadership of the right hon. Member for Morley and Outwood (Ed Balls). In light of his recent utterances, it must be a great comfort to the right hon. Gentleman that he did not have to look to immigrant labour to do a job that most British people simply would not have touched.

I could have spoken today about any of Portsmouth’s manifold attributes: the innovation and ambition across all sectors, the world-famous Pompey spirit so evident at the recent FA cup final, and my pride that my home city has put its trust in me. However, there is one particular issue at the heart of Portsmouth’s history and daily life on which I wish to speak today: the Navy service.

I was at primary school in Portsmouth during the Falklands conflict. Britain did not expect to face such an act of territorial expansion, but the Navy was unfaltering in its readiness and commitment to the defence of the British people. That spirit of duty and service made a deep impression on me, even though the Navy had already played a major role in my life before that. Indeed, I am named after HMS Penelope, which was the first cruiser able to do a complete about-turn within her own length—a manoeuvre that I hope never to have to deploy here.

That spirit of service is as strong as ever in the Royal Navy, but although it is understandable that recent debates in the House and the wider media have focused primarily on the Army, the senior service has, as a consequence, often felt under-represented and unappreciated. I am sure that Members on both sides of the House recognise the contribution that the Navy makes to our way of life, to our ability to trade, to hydrographical and meteorological services, to tackling crime and to providing help in times of crisis. However, the breadth of its role should not detract from the depth of its contribution to the defence of the realm—continuous at-sea deterrence, delivery of commando force and air assets and mine counter-measures are but a few of its roles.

In the review, we must not be sea-blind. We face very tough challenges and calls for immediate cuts. To see the scale of the challenge, one has to look just at the disparity between what the last strategic defence review suggested for the Navy and the current number of ships in service or planned to be in service. For example, the last review recommended 12 destroyers, but we are building only six. To close the gap between need and affordability and to preserve the development and maintenance capability that we want in our bases and dockyards, we need a planned but flexible approach to procurement. The review must listen to the drum beat of production in those UK yards and must seize every opportunity to strengthen UK exports.

We need to take a longer-term approach to our ordering of ships and we need to end wasteful delay to production schedules. As the Secretary of State pointed out earlier, the decision to slow the rate of the Queen Elizabeth class carriers in 2009 increased overall costs by £600 million. Having seen the carriers being built last Friday, I can report that they are already at an advanced stage and that they have gone beyond the first cut of steel. Lessons should be learned from the carriers and the Type 45s. We could have laid down nine destroyers one after the other, thereby supplying the Navy with what it needed when it needed it, allowing the yard to maximise returns on its investment and ensuring the defence budget was sustainable. Of the six we are building, the last will be ready for sea trials in January 2013. Small orders built at lightning speed short-change the Navy and the yard and place stress on the defence budget.

The Type 26 presents an opportunity to act upon those experiences. Consideration should be given to the timing and specification. If they are to be built, let us ensure that other navies will want them too. After all, if they are good enough for the Royal Navy, they are good enough for any navy. If we achieve that, it will be a dreadnought moment in UK procurement. We have not sold a new Navy-designed ship abroad since the 1970s, but it is achievable. Britain is already selling standard kit to the US navy. Innovative Rolls-Royce gas turbines will power the DDG-1000 and are already powering the USS Freedom. We must focus on trade deals where they are viable and strategically advantageous. I am sure that there will be disagreement about my views, but I will not falter in making this argument, and I point out to my critics that HMS Penelope latterly became known as HMS Pepperpot because of her ability to endure massive amounts of shelling and remain afloat and able to return fire. I thank hon. Members for listening to my arguments and I shall end as Sir Roger did, by quoting Lord Nelson, whose words are as relevant now as ever:

“The boldest measures are the safest”.