(11 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberIn their contributions this afternoon, members of the ISC have clearly underlined the robust scrutiny that is provided. These provisions relate only to operational matters—the new element added to the overall purview of the ISC that will result from the Bill. I have already highlighted the importance of clause 2(3)(a) and (b) for the two limbs, which covers the ability to require the provision of further information. If other more general inquiries take place, the provisions for the third limb are intended to denote the fact that the request to the agencies would not fall under the first two elements of the three limbs. It is a separate category.
I am conscious of how long I have already spoken for, but I will give way one last time.
The Minister has been generous and is providing an excellent defence of his position, but he does not need to be defensive because we know he is not being obstructive and is genuinely trying to find a way forward. He really should consider carefully, however, taking out the word “voluntarily” and then setting out his concerns in the memorandum of understanding. It is quite clear that it could be done in that way, so I urge him to consider doing it.
I hear the clear statements, but I have sought to respond in an equally clear fashion on why we judge that the need for that word still remains. Right hon. and hon. Members have argued loudly and clearly across the House in what I believe has been a good public demonstration of the clear and robust challenge that the ISC provides to Ministers and to members of the security agencies. I welcome the exchange we have had to underline the clear and focused challenge that will no doubt be given and enhanced as a result of the provisions.
I note that the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) has tabled amendment 71. Rather than delay her presentation further, I will if I may respond to the points she raises in my summing up, although I have already taken up a great deal of the House’s time. With those comments, I support Government amendment 56.
(11 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe operation to locate Ibrahim Magag is ongoing and the police are doing everything in their power to locate and indentify that individual. The hon. Gentleman would perhaps agree that the best place for a terrorist is in prison, and that is why the Government have committed additional resources to supplement the TPIM regime and ensure a balance of preventive measures as well as ensuring that people are brought to justice.
21. Lord Carlile recently confirmed that no individual absconded while subject to a relocation order. Is the fact that Mr Magag did not abscond while he was relocated but did abscond when he was allowed back to London clear evidence that the decision to remove relocation powers was a serious mistake? Will the Minister look again at that decision?
I do not accept the right hon. Gentleman’s point. Indeed, in evidence to the Home Affairs Committee, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner did not say that a parallel such as that the right hon. Gentleman seeks to make could be drawn. We are reviewing the incident closely, as we would any incident of this kind, and if practical issues need to be adopted we will certainly consider and adopt them.
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI congratulate the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), as other Members have done, on securing the debate. As it is a Back-Bench debate, I am conscious of the need to allow him some time to respond at the end, so I will try to keep my comments to the point and respond as succinctly as I am able to a number of points that have been raised.
I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman also on the manner and tone that he has brought to this afternoon’s discourse. I certainly recognise his desire to represent his constituents and obtain answers on behalf of his community. I know from discussions that we had around the time of the riots that he has stood up for his community in doing so, and that has been reflected in the manner in which the debate has been conducted.
I hope the right hon. Gentleman understands that because of ongoing legal and other issues, I cannot really comment on the specifics of individual cases. I am aware that the pre-inquest hearing in the case that he mentioned is due to be held next Tuesday, and there is an ongoing IPCC investigation. I certainly recognise the sensitivity of the issues that he has brought before the House this afternoon.
I pay tribute also to my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), whom I had the privilege to work alongside in opposition. I know how keenly he feels about these issues and the amount of work that he continues to put into answering the challenging question of how we can use intercept evidence.
We had an important contribution by my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab). I certainly do not see the justice system as an impediment to fighting crime, and justice and security need to go hand in hand. I do not see them as somehow mutually inconsistent. The right hon. Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy), with his experience as a former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and in his role with the Intelligence and Security Committee, highlighted some of the genuine challenges that exist, which I shall discuss. We also heard contributions from the hon. Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Jim Fitzpatrick) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips), and a balanced and helpful contribution from the Opposition Front Bencher, the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson).
I underline that the Government are committed to maximising the amount of sensitive material, including intercept evidence, that can be handled in legal proceedings. That is why we set out in the coalition agreement our intention to
“seek to find a practical way to allow the use of intercept evidence in court.”
We have also proposed measures in the Justice and Security Bill to permit intercepted material to be adduced in closed material procedures and certain civil proceedings. In doing that, we remain acutely aware that lawful interception already plays a critical role in tackling serious crime and protecting the British public. It is used in almost all the highest priority counter-terrorist operations and many other serious crime investigations. It is no exaggeration to say that interception constitutes one of the most important and effective capabilities in tackling serious crime and threats to our national security, so it is crucial that we get it right.
We have heard about the Privy Council review and the differing legal and operational circumstances that apply in that regard and it is worth highlighting the considerable burdens on some of the intercepting agencies. Inter-agency co-operation, such as the sharing of sensitive techniques, is less well developed in other countries than it is in the UK, but the comparable examples in other jurisdictions suggest that fewer investigations could be supported and the value of intercept evidence as an intelligence tool might be reduced. It is right, however, that we should continue to examine the examples highlighted in a number of speeches and find our way through this important question.
I should make it clear that when there is relevant and sensitive material, the Government wish to find a mechanism that will enable it to be used in evidence. Finding a means of using intercept as evidence is challenging, however. There can be no clearer demonstration of that than the seven previous attempts that have been made to find a way forward. Any proposal to remove the prohibition on intercept evidence for inquests, for example, runs into a number of difficulties, and we and previous Governments have grappled with them as they relate to the general question of intercept evidence.
One option proposed by the right hon. Member for Tottenham is the disclosure of intercept product to a jury and properly interested persons, such as a family member. This Government considered that, as did our predecessor, and we do not believe that there is a practical way of preserving national security and the basic tenets of the make-up of juries. Crucially, intercept products shared with either a jury or properly interested party takes us back to the more general challenges presented by intercept as evidence, including preventing sensitive capabilities, techniques and approaches from becoming widely known. As things stand, we do not see that there is a viable way forward on that specific point.
The right hon. Gentleman also asked whether it would be possible for a coroner with the status of a judge to view sensitive material, including intercept evidence. We already have a mechanism through which a coroner may request the appointment of a serving judge as an assistant deputy. That enables the judge coroner to order the disclosure of intercept evidence to him or herself alone when a case’s exceptional circumstances make that disclosure essential in the interests of justice.
The judge coroner would have access to all sensitive material and could consequently be satisfied that the material provided in open court was all that was necessary to hold a proper thorough investigation. That independent assessment would give assurance to the jury and comfort to the family that all the relevant material had been placed before them. Of course, in a small number of cases that sensitive material would be centrally relevant and the article 2 investigative obligation would be engaged. In those circumstances, a statutory inquiry would be needed so that the inquiry panel, as the finders of facts, could see all relevant material. The independent examination of the material, however, together with the appointment of counsel to the inquiry, should ensure that proper account is taken of all the available material and that the interests of the family are properly protected, even if the material cannot be shared publicly.
I apologise that I was not in the Chamber to hear some of the earlier speeches. I have listened carefully to the Minister. Given what he has just said, will the Government think again about their decision not to provide for a closed material procedure for inquests—something they are prepared to provide in a small number of civil cases?
As the right hon. Gentleman knows, that matter was considered during discussions on the Justice and Security Bill currently in the other place, but the Government have determined that at this time it is not appropriate to bring those procedures forward. I hope, however, that the right hon. Gentleman heard me say that there is an existing mechanism to assess sensitive material, either through the appointment of a judge coroner to assess the relevancy and centrality of the evidence, or through the inquiry process I have highlighted.
The intercept as evidence review is obviously key to this discussion. It is an extensive and detailed review to assess the benefits, costs, and risks of introducing intercept as evidence in criminal proceedings, compared with the present intelligence-only approach under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. It has a broader remit than previous reviews, thereby avoiding wasted effort on approaches that prove to be non-viable, or being artificially constrained by existing intercept practice. Instead, it will ensure a fair and comprehensive assessment of the pros and cons of intercept as evidence.
The issues are complex and difficult, and as we have heard, there have been seven previous attempts since 1993 to find a way forward. The work is being overseen by the independent cross-party Privy Council group, chaired by Sir John Chilcot, which was reappointed by the Government. As the review is still ongoing, I am not in a position to provide the House with an update on its likely findings, but we will consider issues raised in this debate carefully and return to the House on the matter in due course. We do not want some form of open-ended process, and we recognise the desire to find solutions and a way forward. This is a current review, and work is ongoing to consider whether there is a way to proceed in the face of the challenges we have heard about.
The current intercept as evidence review seeks to build on the findings of previous reviews and the potential impact of a need for terrorist prevention and investigation measures. One clear conclusion of that previous work is that intercept evidence is not a silver bullet that will negate the need for alternative ways to manage risk. We have heard some examples of that this afternoon, and I highlight recent evidence from David Anderson, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, who reiterated that intercept as evidence would not be
“a silver bullet that makes terrorism prevention and investigation measures unnecessary”.
A number of issues have been highlighted this afternoon, but I fear that time will not allow me to go through them all in the detail I would have wished. Many overseas countries, both EU and Commonwealth, operate effective intercept as evidence regimes within their legal context. Their experience indicates, however, that the burdens on the intercepting agencies are considerable. The issues of disclosure and how to secure a fair trial are obviously central, and that has been highlighted this afternoon in relation to article 6 provisions. Disclosure, and the practical impact of that on agencies and their overall capabilities, is relevant and something that is being examined closely in the cost-benefit, overarching analysis on capabilities.
I will conclude by reassuring you, Mr Deputy Speaker, that the Government are committed to finding ways for intercept evidence of sensitive material to be heard in legal proceedings. I am grateful to the House and all right hon. and hon. Members for helping to inform the debate this afternoon, and for assisting in this important work.
(12 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to the hon. Lady for highlighting that important constituency issue. As she knows, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure has reassessed the site following the installation of a water treatment facility and confirmed the security measures, and I can confirm that I have signed the necessary direction.
As the Minister responsible for national security, will the Home Secretary provide us with her understanding of the comments made yesterday by the Justice Secretary, who told the BBC that he has revised his proposals for closed material proceedings in civil cases so that judges always have the final say on when they are used?
(12 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am happy to congratulate the police on that work in Reading. My hon. Friend has highlighted the fact that serious and organised crime touches communities directly. The Government have recognised that in the organised crime strategy. Our focus on ensuring that organised crime is given a much higher priority has a significant effect on the crime that we see on our streets. Our work through the National Crime Agency will make an important difference and strengthen the response further.
Does the Minister expect the switch from the Serious Organised Crime Agency to the National Crime Agency to result in an increase in the level of reclaimed criminal assets? What proportion of those proceeds of crime will he demand is returned to the communities that are most directly affected by crime?
The right hon. Gentleman highlights an important point on the proceeds of crime, about which I feel strongly as a Minister. We are already driving changes to ensure that there is a focus on this matter in policing. The Serious Organised Crime Agency already has responsibility for it. I am pleased to tell him that since we got rid of the previous Government’s target-driven approach, the performance has improved.
(12 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am aware of the strong interest that the House attaches to this issue, which is evidenced by the fact that there are nine questions about it on today’s Order Paper. I believe that that constitutes a record number of Home Office questions on a single issue. My noble Friend Lord Henley, the Minister responsible for crime prevention and antisocial behaviour reduction, is well aware of the concern felt by Members of both Houses, and has told me that he would be very willing to meet members of the all-party parliamentary group.
13. What plans she has to review the Riot (Damages) Act 1886.
(12 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI do not accept that it provides uncertainty. It provides the courts with the ability to operate the regime effectively. As this matter was raised in the Lords, we are seeking this House’s consideration to ensure that the measure is properly applied. That is the basis on which we have introduced the amendment. I think it is appropriate to provide flexibility in the way that has been proposed.
Amendment 10 relates to the police reporting measure. It makes it clear that in addition to requiring the individual to report to a police station at specified times and in a specified manner, the Secretary of State may require the individual to comply with directions given by the police in relation to such reporting. That is necessary to ensure that the individual can be required to co-operate with the practicalities of reporting—for example, requiring him to report to the front desk of the police station, to speak to the officer there, and to sign to confirm his attendance. That has always been the intention behind the measure, and it is the current practice for control orders. It is necessary to ensure that the provision reflects the reality of how the measure is intended to operate. It is also in line with the general procedures for individuals required to report to a police station for any other reason—for example, individuals on police or court bail. Lords amendment 3 is necessary in consequence. It specifies that the definition of “TPIM decision” at clause 17(3) includes such a direction given by a constable in relation to the reporting measure.
Lords amendments 4 and 5 are essentially technical amendments which are necessary in consequence of changes to other legislation currently before Parliament. Section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which has not been commenced, increases the maximum sentence on summary conviction in England and Wales from six months to 12 months. When the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill was drafted, the intention was that that provision would be repealed by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill. Because of this, clause 23 provides that the maximum sentence on summary conviction for contravening a measure specified in a TPIM notice is six months. However, section 154(1) of the 2003 Act will not now be repealed. On that basis, these amendments are needed to revert to the previous practice when legislating for offences that are tried summarily. They provide for a maximum 12-month term in England and Wales, but include a transitional provision limiting the sentencing power to six months pending commencement of section 154(1) of the 2003 Act.
Lords Amendments 6 and 9 relate to the overnight residence measure. That is intended to ensure that the individual can be required to reside at a specified address and to remain there for specified periods overnight. The clear purpose of that is to manage risk. As part of that measure, it may be necessary to require the individual to remain within the residence and to prohibit them from entering any garden or outside area that forms part of the property or any communal area in a shared property during the specified hours overnight.
As it was drafted, the provision did not necessarily make it clear that the measure could be applied in that way. These are essential drafting amendments to remove that uncertainty and to make clear the policy intention. They put it beyond doubt that the individual may be required to remain within their residence—that is, essentially, behind their front door—during the specified overnight period. I should make it clear that, where individuals are required to remain at their residence or are electronically monitored in other contexts, they will usually be required to remain in their house or flat and will not be allowed out into their garden. The particular requirements imposed by the Secretary of State in each case must, of course, always be necessary and proportionate. The court will subsequently consider the proportionality of each measure as part of its review of the notice.
On the point about directions hearings that my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller) made, I should add that clause 8(5) still provides that the substantive hearing is to take place as soon as possible. I just wanted to reassure him in case he thought that the proposal was open-ended. That is certainly not the intention. I hope that the need to act expeditiously in this regard is clear to him.
Lords Amendment 7 deletes subsection (11)(a) of clause 26, which allowed a temporary enhanced TPIM order to amend any enactment. That subsection was drafted on the basis that the temporary enhanced TPIM order would need to amend other legislation to ensure that the enhanced TPIM system would function correctly. The Government considered it further following an amendment helpfully tabled in Committee in the other place by Baroness Hamwee. We concluded that the subsection was not necessary for this purpose and therefore amended the Bill on Report to remove it.
Lords Amendment 8 is necessary to ensure that the power to make a temporary enhanced TPIM order does not impinge inappropriately on devolved matters in Scotland. Clause 26, as amended, provides that a temporary enhanced TPIM order may not make any provision relating to devolved matters in Scotland, other than those already contained in the Bill, without the consent of the Scottish Government. In relation to those provisions touching on devolved matters that are already contained in the Bill, I can confirm that the Scottish Parliament passed a legislative consent motion on 17 November. I am grateful to Scottish Ministers and officials for their help in that regard.
Finally, Lords Amendment 11 relates to the transitional period provided by schedule 8. In the period following the coming into force of the Bill, the control orders in force immediately before the commencement of the Bill will remain in force, unless revoked or quashed before the end of that period. Such a period is needed to ensure that there can be a safe, orderly and managed transition of individuals from the old system to the new system. As the Government have consistently made clear, the police have confirmed that extensive preparations are being made and that arrangements will be in place to manage the move from the control order system to the TPIMs system.
I will just finish this point and then I will gladly give way to the right hon. Gentleman.
We have received advice from the police that as the transitional period will fall over the Christmas and new year holiday period, a small extension to the period is necessary. That will assist in the effective management of the process of transition for individual cases over the holiday period. It does not reflect on preparedness. Lords amendment 11 therefore extends the transitional period from 28 to 42 days.
I give way to the right hon. Gentleman.
I am delighted that the Minister did not give way when I sought to intervene, because he has been able to enlighten the House and demonstrate that Opposition Members who have been pressing him for months on whether the police and Security Service would be ready have partly been proved correct. Let us look at the bigger picture, however. With the Olympic games, a new system and the end of relocation, why does such a moderate Minister want to take so many risks with the safety of the public?
(13 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI have made clear the assurances that we have received. I know how the hon. Gentleman approaches these matters, and we have had numerous debates on numerous issues over the years. We have sought assurance. In preparing the Bill and the change to current practice, the Government have proceeded by seeking to assure ourselves that appropriate measures are in place to mitigate the risk posed by those who are suspected of being involved in terrorism but cannot be deported or prosecuted. As I have said consistently in relation to TPIMs, the legislation and the enhanced capabilities that the police and the Security Service will have ensure that there is a balanced package of measures that will operate as we intend. We are satisfied that the preparations in hand will lead to the changes envisaged by the Bill following Royal Assent.
I commend the Minister for the visit that he made to the Metropolitan police, but his assurances this afternoon go nowhere near far enough. Since his visit to the Metropolitan police, has he had a chance or has his right hon. Friend the Home Secretary had a chance to talk to the Prime Minister about the matter? On 11 August, when Parliament was recalled, I asked the Prime Minister to consider delaying or preferably cancelling the new provisions, particularly in relation to relocation. The Prime Minister said:
“I will certainly look very carefully and closely at what he says.”—[Official Report, 11 August 2011; Vol. 531, c. 1074.]
I have not had a chance to speak to the Prime Minister about that, but I am sure the Minister has. Will he update us?
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s case, and care will be required, but the House often considers topics in relation to which matters are before the courts. The emergency legislation deals with the principles, not with individuals. The House has demonstrated clearly that it is able to do that and to consider and debate matters where care is required.
Amendments 1 to 4 address situations where more stringent measures are needed to protect the public than those available under the Bill. Amendment 1 would in effect place a version of the enhanced TPIM proposals formally on the statute book through the Bill. We debated an almost identical amendment in Committee. It would add a new paragraph to schedule 1, allowing the Secretary of State to impose any measure, in addition to those otherwise specified in schedule 1, on an individual where
“there is a serious terrorist threat”
and where such measures are
“necessary for the protection of the public.”
It reflects the position in the enhanced TPIM Bill that the test for imposing such additional measures would be raised from “reasonable belief” of involvement in terrorism-related activity to being satisfied on the “balance of probabilities” that this is the case.
Amendments 2 and 3 offer an alternative approach to providing for the use of additional measures to that set out in amendment 1. Instead of provision being made on the face of the Bill, the Government would be able to add further measures to schedule 1 by order. Amendment 2 envisages that Parliament would approve those measures in advance; amendment 3 provides for retrospective parliamentary approval and so seeks to address other concerns. Amendments 1, 2 and 3 highlight a difference in approach between those on the Opposition Benches and my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Government Benches.
The Government’s position is that the Bill provides a robust and effective set of measures to manage the risk posed by suspected terrorists whom we cannot prosecute or deport, and it will be complemented by additional funding for the police and Security Service for covert investigation. The Government consider that more stringent powers will be required only in exceptional circumstances. So although the Government agree with the Opposition that there may be a need for additional measures to those contained in schedule 1, we believe, as we flagged up in our counter-terrorism review, it is right that those more stringent powers are not on the statute book or available at all times through an order-making power, as amendments 1, 2 and 3 would provide, but are contained in draft emergency legislation that is introduced only if required. This is also reflected in the Government’s approach to extended pre-charge detention.
Furthermore, the Government consider that it is appropriate for the measures available to the Secretary of State to be set out on the face of primary legislation, and to have been agreed in advance by Parliament. That is the clear approach adopted in the Bill before us, and it is also the approach that we have taken in the enhanced Bill. Indeed, I would argue that the more stringent nature of measures available under the enhanced Bill is an even greater reason for them to be clearly defined and agreed by Parliament, rather than decided on an ad hoc basis by the Secretary of State. The Government are therefore not in favour of amendments 1, 2 and 3. For the reasons that I have set out, I ask hon. Members not to press them.
Amendment 4 is specifically concerned with what would happen if the additional measures are required during a period when Parliament is dissolved. The same issue was raised during pre-legislative scrutiny of the emergency Bills for extended pre-charge detention. The Government have listened to the concerns expressed and new clauses 5 and 6, which I have already outlined, directly address the point. I trust that this means that Opposition Members will be content to withdraw their amendment.
I shall speak to amendments 1 to 4 and voice my support for Government new clauses 5 and 6. Throughout Second Reading and consideration in Committee, I have supported the principle of placing in schedule 1 a list of conditions that would be available to the Secretary of State under the TPIMs regime. Under control orders there is no such list. The Home Secretary can impose any condition, subject to accountability to the court. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) has continued to remind the House throughout the debate, there is that continued oversight over the existing regime.
The problem with schedule 1 is that the list of conditions that it provides is inadequate. For example, it requires that the Home Secretary must—not may, as I hope we will discuss later—allow someone subject to a TPIM to have access to the internet and to have a mobile phone and a land line. There is no option; the Home Secretary must do that. Equally, the Home Secretary has no power to relocate an individual away from an area if she judges that to be necessary. I hope that we will soon debate that aspect as well.
The nagging concern that hon. Members—on both sides of the House, I hope—have is what happens when the Home Secretary has intelligence about an individual that requires a certain measure to be put in place, and she cannot do so because it is not in schedule 1. The good news since we considered the issue in Committee is that the Home Secretary has clearly recognised that there may be circumstances where the list of measures in schedule 1 is not sufficient, and she has now published draft legislation, the enhanced TPIMs Bill, that will allow relocation and curfew and will prevent access to mobile phones and the internet where that is necessary. I support the fact that in that Bill she is giving herself the powers to introduce an enhanced TPIM if Parliament is dissolved and she judges it necessary at the time.
The bad news is that the only way that the Home Secretary could exercise these enhanced powers when Parliament is sitting is via fresh primary legislation. I assume that the Home Secretary intends that there should be a rigorous process of pre-legislative scrutiny in relation to the enhanced TPIMs Bill that has been published. Presumably it will be scrutinised by a cross-party Committee and presumably the Committee will be made up of Members from both Houses. Perhaps the House will consider making the Committee Chair a well-respected Cross Bencher, such as a former Cabinet Secretary with huge experience of Government business. The Committee would be expected to take evidence from all the experts and, on the basis of that evidence, it would then be asked to come to a unanimous view on the matters before it.
I know that the hon. Member has made that point before. I responded to him then as well. I think that the House is able to debate the principle of the underlying issues, although in relation to detailed, confidential briefings and so on, we would seek to provide more detailed information to Opposition spokespeople on privy counsellor terms, as appropriate, in order to assist debate. However, we believe that Parliament is able to consider emergency legislation in that way. In many ways, it is important to put out the draft legislation now to ensure that there is a mechanism—a tool—that has been considered coolly and calmly outside some of the febrile situations that understandably arise in the sorts of horrendous situations that, sadly, we have seen in the past. That is why it is important that we have the scrutiny that would be applied by a Joint Committee—and obviously it is for the House to resolve the matters around that. That is an important way of ensuring that legislation is considered in a more rational way.
The Minister has been very generous in giving way this evening. He has refused to be drawn on “second-guessing”, as he put it, the level of threat that would lead him or the Home Secretary to believe that these enhanced TPIM powers were necessary. However, he said that part of his consideration would be whether the threat was “imminent”—that was the word he used. An “imminent threat” could mean the next 12 hours, the next 24 hours, the next 48 hours or the next week. How does he square that level of risk with the fact that he is prepared to put measures in the Bill that would require separate primary legislation that might take at least a week to procure—perhaps even longer during recess? How can he square those two things? In my view, they simply cannot be squared.
It was precisely to ensure that legislation could be secured quickly that we have published the draft Bill now—to aid in that consideration and to ensure that matters could be dealt with swiftly. I recognise that the right hon. Gentleman does not accept the principle of emergency legislation, and I know that he has taken that approach consistently. There is a difference of view about the enhanced powers and the basis on which they are set, and I do not think that we are likely to resolve that difference between us.
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the hon. Lady for her comments because they allow me to underline the Government’s gratitude for the continuing work of CEOP and the importance that we place on it. That has certainly been highlighted by the thematic assessment that it is undertaking of the appalling incidents uncovered as a consequence of Operation Retriever. We are looking closely at the specific characteristics that need to be retained to ensure that CEOP continues to thrive, including a clearly delegated authority for its budget, operational independence and the ability for external partners to continue to work alongside it. We regard CEOP as very significant, and will continue to support it.
On that last point, I am sure that the Minister will acknowledge that one of CEOP’s great strengths is the partnerships it has created with the private sector and children’s organisations. What evidence can he give to the House, therefore, that under his proposals CEOP will continue to be able to raise about one third of its running costs from sources outside Government?
An important point to make is that some people have suggested that were we to decide that CEOP should form part of the new national crime agency, it would in some way change its characteristics. The right hon. Gentleman will know probably better than most that CEOP is already part of the Serious Organised Crime Agency, where it has been able to attract partners from the voluntary and community sector as well as the private sector. We are clear that that relationship needs to be maintained into the future, whatever the format or wherever CEOP sits when we finally reach our conclusions in the current review.