Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

Patrick Mercer Excerpts

Wednesday 14th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow both my right hon. and charming Friends, the Home Secretary and the deputy—sorry, shadow—Home Secretary. I am sorry; that was a Freudian slip, but almost a deliberate one.

Let me begin by wishing you a happy Bastille day, Mr Deputy Speaker. It seems appropriate, given the subject that we are discussing. I shall not recommend that we storm the barricades, but I do intend to divide the House on the motion. I tell Members that now, so that it is clear where we are going. We may not trouble the scorers greatly in the Lobby against the Government, but, given the historic role of the House in defending the liberties of our monarch’s subjects, I think it important that a policy which, whatever its rights and wrongs, has so far led to the imprisonment of three innocent people for 28 days is one on which the House should decide explicitly and not on the nod.

I welcome the Home Secretary’s intention to have a six-month review of counter-terrorism policy, but I say to her that, in my view, there is plenty of very clear evidence to demonstrate that 28 days is too many. I will also go through some of the points the shadow Home Secretary raised in his speech. These are not just matters of principle; they are matters of high principle and hard fact.

The shadow Home Secretary said he recognised that there are concerns that an authoritarian approach to counter-terrorism policy might have the deleterious effect of creating more radicalised Islamists—more potential terrorists—than a more traditional liberal British approach would. That is clearly the case. The hard fact supporting that assertion was given by the head of MI5 in his last speech to the country, when he said that there are 2,000 persons of interest—those are his words—to MI5, which is a 25% increase on the previous year’s figure. If the increase continues at that rate, no amount of security will defend us from the consequences of our own actions.

Radicalisation is, of course, created by more than just authoritarian policies, but such policies do drive it. Anybody who talks to the leaders of Muslim communities up and down the country will know that—they will pick that message up time and again. At the forefront of that trend is the 28-day policy. In relation to home-grown terrorism, detention without charge is the biggest recruiting sergeant for our opponents.

[Patrick Mercer (Newark) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that it was interesting that the shadow Home Secretary did not choose to mention the threat we currently face from republican terrorism coming from the north of Ireland? In view of the fact that we are approaching the internment day anniversary of 8 August, would it not be an extremely powerful statement to reduce the detention period from 28 to 14 days now, rather than to wait until later?

[Mr Davis]

My hon. Friend makes a very good case, and he knows Northern Ireland terrorism better than most people in this House. He also knows that internment was one of the best recruiting sergeants for the Provisional IRA and others in that period. So yes, he is right.

The second hard fact I want to draw on relates to the reasons given to me for 42 and 90 days by John Reid, the predecessor as Home Secretary of both my right hon. Friend the current Secretary of State and my friend the shadow Secretary of State. When John Reid briefed me, as shadow Home Secretary, on his Government’s proposals for those periods of detention, the most telling argument he had—to be fair, it was telling—was the prospect of the British agencies being overwhelmed by multiple prospective attacks at the same time. The circumstances he listed were as follows: multiple plots against multiple targets at multiple locations, with not all the information involved being in our control—perhaps some of it was coming from foreign intelligence agencies such as the Pakistani service—and with the plot already starting to be carried out, so that it was necessary to move quickly.

That was the case the then Home Secretary made, and within a month or so of his briefing me on it we almost had a rehearsal in Operation Overt, the Heathrow plot, to which the shadow Home Secretary referred. It was thought at the time that 10 aircraft had been targeted, although it now turns out that the true number was seven, as well as multiple locations—there were many suspects at the beginning in at least three different locations. There were also concerns about gaining access to some of the houses and other places where evidence was thought to be located, and foreign evidence was involved, too. It was a facsimile of the case John Reid had described.