Business of the House

Debate between Oliver Letwin and John Redwood

Wednesday 3rd April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Mr Speaker, you will rule if I move out of order, of course, but the point that my hon. Friend is making is about the Bill. In section 1(6) and (7) of the Bill, if I recall that correctly, there is a requirement for the Government to bring back what the EU asks it to do, but that matter is probably better debated as part of the debate on the Bill, because it is not a question of the business of the House motion. In response to her, however, I want to repeat that the lack of scrutiny of which she complains arises from the fact that, unfortunately, in the absence of an extension request, this country leaves the EU on Thursday next—a point that she and others of my hon. Friends have often made, and rightly. We do not have the choice between a long look at the Bill and no look at the Bill; we only have the choice between a short look at the Bill and no look at the Bill. She prefers no look; I prefer a short look. Those are the only two options.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

My worry about expending this time today is that the only proper thing that the House can debate and influence is whether we ask for an extension. We know that the Prime Minister wishes to ask for one. He, however, indicated that he would want the Bill to be amended or developed so that the House may express its view on what the length of the extension had to be. We know that last time the Prime Minister asked for an extension to 30 June, but she got one to 12 April. Once we have asked for an extension, it is the EU’s decision. This House, for all its mighty powers, has no ability to legislate for what the EU should do.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

My right hon. Friend tempts me to stray into the particulars of the Bill, but I was not suggesting that it should be developed to have the effect that he describes; it already has that effect. The Bill provides for the House, upon the Prime Minister putting forward a motion about the length of the extension, to determine whether it wishes to amend that length, and then provides for her to seek the approval of the House for whatever she comes back with from the EU. There are issues about whether this is the best drafting, but they can be considered in the Lords stages of the Bill if the Government so wish. We had productive discussions with the Government this very morning about their views on whether more flexibility should be built in. We are very open to that—I think I can speak for my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford on that—but at the moment, the Bill does exactly what I described, and not what my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) described.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Redwood]

Again, I fear that my right hon. Friend did not listen carefully. I never suggested any impropriety. I said that we wished to proceed in an orderly manner, which Mr Speaker will ensure that we can do, and that there are occasions on which we need to change our procedures or modify our Standing Orders. On this occasion, however, the case I want to make is that there are some fundamental issues that are worthy of rather longer time than is being offered in this business motion.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

rose—

[John Redwood]

I would quite like to develop my argument, but I will give way to my right hon. Friend.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way. I rather agree that it would be desirable to have longer to discuss these things, although, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) just said, I am not suggesting any impropriety. Nevertheless, there is innovation here, and it would be nice to have longer.

Is not the fundamental difference between us that my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) thinks—I know he genuinely thinks this, and he has thought about it a lot—that leaving on Thursday week without a deal is not an emergency, whereas many of us who support this motion think, rightly or wrongly, that leaving on Thursday week is an emergency? Is that not the real difference between us?

[John Redwood]

We are going beyond the business of the House motion, but of course it is not an emergency. We have had two years and nine months to prepare for it, and the Government have assured us that they are ready to leave without an agreement, if necessary. More than half the public now think it is the right thing to do, but that is a matter of substance and not a matter of the business of the House motion.

I will briefly mention three elements that give the Government an advantage so that they can claim to be the Government and behave as the Government, if they have the wit and the votes to do so—of course, they need to keep enough votes enough of the time to fulfil their role.

The first element is control of the Order Paper. Of course the Government should not have complete control of the Order Paper and, by convention, they agree with the Opposition on providing Opposition days, which they must do, and allow the Opposition to debate the things they wish to debate, either in their own time or in Government time. If the Government do not do that, things can break down and become a matter of controversy, and the public may side with the Opposition, so the Government have to behave in a sensible way through the usual channels on business.

By tradition, for many years now, the Government set a Queen’s Speech programme of legislation, which is meant to be a coherent and consistent programme—and under a good Government it is—that reflects what they have persuaded the electors to vote for, because they have more seats than anyone else in the House. The programme is presented by Her Majesty, usually annually—we are in a strange Parliament because we only do Brexit, so there was no need for a new annual speech because this Parliament has been on groundhog day for two years and nine months.

As someone who used to be interested in this subject, I actually want to go on and talk about some of the other subjects in which I am interested. I would like this done. By convention, we have an annual Queen’s Speech in which the Government present what they think is a coherent programme of legislation that fits into how they are trying to govern the country, and then it is up to Parliament to rip it apart, amend it, improve it, say that bits of it are not acceptable and try to influence the future programme.

Business of the House

Debate between Oliver Letwin and John Redwood

Wednesday 27th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Again, that is a perfectly reasonable set of questions with a definitive set of answers. On a third meaningful vote this Thursday or Friday, that timetable has been set by the EU—it is not the making of any Member of the House or the Government. The EU made it clear in its legal decision that the withdrawal agreement had to be agreed by the House by 11 pm, I think, but in any event late at night, on Friday in order for 12 April not to be activated and to move us to 22 May. That would be necessary for the Government to pass the withdrawal and implementation Bill, which is in turn necessary for their meaningful vote to be meaningful—without the Bill it is a nothing, as both my hon. Friend and others on both sides of the House who study this very well understand. The fact is that the Thursday/Friday schedule this week has been set by the EU, not any of us, and there is nothing that I or anybody else here can do about it. It is very important therefore—for those of us who want to make sure we do not drop out without a deal on the 12th—to ensure that, if my hon. Friends do not support those of us who would be in the Lobbies voting for MV3 by Friday night, there is an alternative, and this is the only way we can do that.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

If the House voted for a particular outcome for negotiation with Europe that the Government thought either not desirable or not negotiable, who would do the negotiating, given that it is normal for only the Government to be a recognised negotiator?

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

My right hon. Friend, who is one of the two or three most distinguished and long-serving Members of Parliament and had a distinguished record in government, knows as well as I do that he is absolutely right: only the Government of the United Kingdom can negotiate with foreign powers. That is obviously true. It is also true, however, that the Government, like the rest of us, are governed by the law. Just as much as any private individual, Ministers are governed by the law. It frequently happens that, when Ministers bring legislation before the House of Commons and that legislation is amended in a way that they did not wish, they are still compelled to implement the law that the House and the House of Lords have passed as it is written. That is a justiciable matter and they are subject to judicial review if they do not do so. Now, I have said frequently that I do not think the Prime Minister’s Brexit strategy has been ideally suited to the task, but I have never met an hon. Member of this House, or any other living human being, who is more law abiding than the Prime Minister, so I am certain that she would follow not just the letter but the spirit of the law were there a law that flowed from a majority view of the House of Commons.

[John Redwood]

When, as is normal, the Government have control of the Order Paper, if the House amends legislation in a way the Government do not like, the Government need not bring that law into effect or go through the remaining proceedings necessary to make it a law.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

As one would expect, my right hon. Friend is right, but actually the Government often choose not to do that; they often allow legislation that contains things they do not quite like to go forward because they have some greater objective. The truth is, therefore, that Ministers often do—he and I as Ministers had this experience—find themselves implementing legislation with which they are not wholly in accord, but they know how to do that, and the civil service knows how to support them in doing that, and that is of course what would happen in these circumstances.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Oliver Letwin and John Redwood

Report stage: First Day: House of Commons
Tuesday 16th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[John Redwood]

There is also the point that, if we are scrutinising that after it has happened, that is not a lot of use. That can alert Parliament and the public to problems that the new law might create, but if it has been agreed under the rules, it is law and we have to do the best we can and live with it.

Having sat through quite a few debates on the Floor of the House—in Committee, and on Second and Third Readings of Bills—while being a Member of Parliament, I do not think I have ever seen a Bill that has been so extensively debated, dissected, discussed, analysed and opposed. A huge amount of work has gone in to proposing a very large number of detailed and rather general amendments, discussing the philosophy, principles and technical matters in considerable detail.

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

Before he moves on to another point, does my right hon. Friend agree that the narrowness of the Henry VIII clauses has actually been very considerably intensified by the amendments tabled on Report to clause 7(1) and 7(2)?

[John Redwood]

Yes, I agree. I think the Report stage may even produce some agreement between my right hon. Friend, me and our right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield that improvements have been made in that respect, with some powers for Ministers being narrowed and the House having an even bigger role. I am perfectly happy that that has happened.

The wider point I want to make is that this very extensive, forensic and thorough discussion could be a model for other legislation. It is interesting that MPs on the whole do not get as interested in other legislation as they have done in this Bill. The Lords should take into account the fact that, on this occasion, the Commons has done its work very extensively and thoroughly, and has considered a very wide range of issues in amendments. I am sure that the Lords will take that into account when it comes to have its important deliberations on this legislation.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Oliver Letwin and John Redwood

Committee: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 12th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

The hon. Gentleman is a doughty defender of his party interest and of the House of Commons. On this occasion, if such an assurance is given from the Dispatch Box and if the advice of the committee is not followed, people on both sides of the House will cause a sufficient fuss to ensure that the House does have the opportunity to debate instruments under the affirmative procedure.

[John Redwood]

Will my right hon. Friend clear up one other uncertainty created by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie)? Is it not the case that the powers that we are debating are strictly time limited to two years from the date of departure? This is not a long-term issue.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

One of the most striking moments of hyperbole was when the hon. Member for Nottingham East asserted that the situation would last for many years. He will of course know, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) points out, that the provisions are sunsetted.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Oliver Letwin and John Redwood

Committee: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 6th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

With his customary eloquence, the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) has given a splendid speech about many things. I wish to divert slightly from his path by taking his new clause seriously as a legislative object, rather than engaging in the interesting questions he raised about the utility or otherwise of the whole of Brexit. The Committee is called upon to decide whether proposed amendments to the legislation are meritorious in terms of achieving the objects of the Bill, and that is what we have done in Committee on many other occasions as we have gone through the Bill.

It is obviously right that Parliament should control public expenditure. The withdrawal agreement will be an element of public expenditure, so one might think that new clause 17 was meritorious. However, it is clear that the payments that the new clause describes will, if they arise at all, be part of an agreement. The Government, rightly, have already said that Parliament will have a vote on the agreement. We cannot vote on an agreement without voting on the financing of an agreement, because the agreement will stipulate the financing. Therefore, new clause 17 is entirely otiose and there is no reason for the House to vote in favour of it. The House should reserve its voting for a later moment when the Government introduce the amendment to allow us to control the agreement, which I shall certainly support.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

I think the Government have gone further. They have said that if there is an agreement, primary legislation would probably be needed to implement it, which means that the full procedures for statutory approval would be required in order for there to be the power to make any payments—as I understand it, there are no legal grounds for making additional payments to the EU, and if the Government wish to do so, they will need legal grounds—and then to cover the full implementation of the agreement.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

As so often, my right hon. Friend snatches the next words from my mouth. I was about to say that the House will, as he rightly observes, be called on to vote on primary legislation, as we understand it, which will of course require something called a money resolution, with which I know the hon. Member for Nottingham East is fully familiar because I have heard him make long speeches about them on several occasions. He is an expert at doing so, and no doubt he will enjoy doing so again when the relevant resolution comes before the House, but new clause 17 is not necessary to achieve the objective.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Oliver Letwin and John Redwood

Committee: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 15th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[John Redwood]

Clauses 2 and 3.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Sorry, clauses 2 and 3. I do apologise. My right hon. Friend accurately corrects me, and I hope that Hansard notes that correction.

If that is therefore what my hon. and learned Friend said, I have nothing further to add to it. However, I want to point up one connection with the useful discussion we had yesterday about clause 6. The more I have thought about this over the past few weeks, the clearer it has become to me that the ultimate resolution to the problem of the unrestrained abilities of the Supreme Court under clause 6(4)(a) is to make it clearer in the Bill that the method by which any change in the snapshot legislation that my hon. Friend the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, was talking about should be made not by the Supreme Court, but by Parliament. The point is that, so far as there is fundamental change, and in particular so far as there is fundamental change in the interpretation of the plain words of directives, regulations and treaties, it should be made by primary legislation.

That puts primary legislation in the right place, and hence puts the Supreme Court in the right place, because the Supreme Court is there to interpret the common law, which this is not, and to interpret statute, which this could and should be, and it can certainly also interpret European law using European principles except to the extent that, through statute, this Parliament has changed those things.

That would be a perfectly recognisable pattern. As I mentioned yesterday, it is not my ideal pattern, as I would like to unwind in the Bill a good deal of the expansive interpretations of the European Court of Justice that have gone before exit day, but I recognise that the Government might not want to do that. It does not worry me if they do not, because this Parliament, post-Brexit, will have the ability to do it, which is, from my point of view, even speaking as someone who on balance was a remainer, the big advantage of exit. We will be able to make those decisions as a Parliament through the proper process of primary legislation.

By coming forward with the package that I think my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General offered the Committee a little while ago in this debate, he will also point the way to at least a great part of the solution to the problems of clause 6. While we are at it, just as a bonus, we have not yet debated clause 5—assuming I have my numbers right—but we will do so anon. When we do, we will hit exactly the same set of issues in a slightly modified form. While we are at it, we will hit this again in clause 7, in another way. The same package that the Solicitor General has suggested will handle all the problems arising from clauses 5 and 7, and point the way to handling the problems with clause 6, once we have got rid of the clause 6(4)(a) error.

We have a pattern here that can make the Bill work in its own terms. It can provide the flexibility that the Government need in order to correct deficiencies, to transpose or adjust things when references are technical or incorrect, to bring to the House important matters that need adjustment but are not fundamental, and to give this Parliament the power it needs to change the law fundamentally and to make that something that Parliament does, rather than the Supreme Court. If we can get to that point, we will have a Bill that is perfectly good in its own terms and that will serve the purposes that the Government intend for it, and I shall rest happy in the knowledge that I have in a small way been able to contribute to a series of debates that will have provided legislation of which we can be proud.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Oliver Letwin and John Redwood

Ping Pong: House of Commons
Monday 13th March 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend, but it seems to me that for this purpose we do not even need to raise that question, because there is only one other possibility in this Court action—that the Court decides that the Prime Minister has implicitly made the decision. I do not quite know how the Court would get to that answer, but we could speculate that if the Prime Minister had acted differently in the course of the negotiations, the European Council would have acted differently, so implicitly the Prime Minister has made the decision.

Under those circumstances, subsection (4) would, purportedly, come into effect. That is, I suppose, what its authors intended. However, if the European Council has not by the end of the two-year period made a unanimous decision and if the courts decided that the Prime Minister had thereby implicitly decided, the courts would be requiring Parliament to do something that it is impossible to do—namely, to get the Prime Minister to reverse a decision that, as a matter of ordinary language, the Prime Minister would not have made at a time when the Prime Minister could not undo a decision that, as a matter of ordinary language, the European Council had made.

I am perfectly aware that it is of the greatest importance for Members of this House to show due deference to the other place, and I also genuinely admire the skills of the authors of the amendment, but I put it to them that even the House of Lords in all its majesty cannot compel the Prime Minister to do something that is impossible. That is beyond the scope of any human agency.

[John Redwood]

Is that not evidenced by Lord Pannick himself arguing seriously in court that the letter is irreversible?

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I agree with my right hon. Friend, although the Supreme Court went to great pains not to refer the matter to the European Court of Justice, for very good reasons, so we can leave even that argument aside.

My point is very simple. Either subsection (4) would have its intended effect or it would not. If it did, it would be inimical to the interests of this country, because it would induce the worst possible agreement to be offered—as a matter of fact, it will not have that effect in plausible circumstances—and if it did not, it would be bad law. I put it to you, Mr Speaker, that this House should not be passing legislation that either is inimical to the interests of this country or constitutes bad law, and that we should therefore reject the amendment.

Deregulation Bill

Debate between Oliver Letwin and John Redwood

Monday 3rd February 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Letwin]

I have good news for my hon. Friend: it is not a matter of considering it; we have done it. Every single new regulation we have brought in—incidentally, their number is limited by our one in, two out principle, which means they are slightly more than twice balanced by things that we have removed from the statute book—contains a sunset provision. We took that step right at the beginning of our taking office, and the purpose is to ensure that people do not mindlessly roll out the same regulations long after they have passed their sell-by date.

If I may, I want to return to the Bill—for a moment at least. To set the scene, the Bill is just one small part of the process. The red tape challenge looked at about 6,000 regulations. The one in, two out constraint holds back the stream, while the red tape challenge removes water from the lake behind the dam. In addition, and just as importantly, we have spent an enormous amount of time and energy focusing on enforcement, because it is not just a matter of what regulations or indeed statutory guidance are in place, but a matter of how things are enforced. We have been taking considerable steps to ensure that the agencies responsible for regulation enforce in a way that is much more conscious of the needs of our businesses.

In that context, clause 61, which is probably the single most important clause in the Bill, creates a growth duty—[Interruption.] Do look it up, please; it is useful for Opposition Members to know about a Bill when they are about to launch an attack on it. The clause requires our non-economic regulators, every time they make a decision, to spend time and energy considering whether that decision takes proper account of the need for economic growth. That is not to say that that consideration should overrule all regulators’ duties, but we are trying to create a sense of proportionality and to ensure that our regulators consider effects on growth as they go about their duties.

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

That is an excellent idea. I welcome the clause, but is it not the case that now that the EU regulates comprehensively in areas such as the environment and business, we do not need domestic regulation on top, but just the UK consequences of EU rules?

[Mr Letwin]

In many instances there is a good case for not layering further domestic obligations on top of international or EU obligations. My right hon. Friend has a pretty long and distinguished record of involvement in this area, so let me give him an example from the Bill. Clause 59 provides for “ambulatory references” in international maritime regulation. We took the approach that the law of the sea is basically formed by international agreements, and that there is every reason for our regulation not to add to that, nor even to qualify or interpret it, but rather simply to refer to it so that every shipping company and captain of a vessel knows that it is the international agreements that apply to them. That has the advantage that we can be sure that our regulation is aligned with international regulation, which tends to induce shipping to come to this country, and it also simplifies the statute book. That is the kind of shift that we are trying to achieve in many domains.