European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Oliver Letwin Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons
Monday 11th September 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Bone]

I think the hon. Gentleman would agree that if the affirmative mechanism were used, the whole House would vote on the matter, so I do not accept his argument.

This Bill is about a principle: I think it is called the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, and I think I introduced—

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Mr Bone]

Not for a moment, because on this particular point I think I am right: it is called the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. I remember introducing a number of such Bills, or certainly speaking in favour of a lot of them. At that time, they were rather dismissed by the Government and we did not make much progress, so if I have an opportunity to support a Government Bill called the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, as I do tonight, then I am going to take it, and I hope other Members do too. What the Bill primarily does is end European Union legislation and control over this House when we leave, while the second bit incorporates all EU laws into our laws—“retained EU law”, it is called. It is quite right that in future we should look at all those laws and decide whether to improve, reject or keep them, but there has to be a mechanism when we come out to have all those laws in place or chaos will occur.

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[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

This Bill is utterly pernicious. It is dangerous, it is fundamentally un-British and it has at its heart a lie. It pretends to bring back power to this country, but it actually represents the biggest peacetime power grab by the Executive over the legislature, by the Government over Parliament, in 100 years. It allows the Government to drive through changes to any law by the simple fiat of a Minister. That includes the powers of the House of Lords, the date of the next general election, the composition of the House of Commons and the number of Ministers. In the most extreme instance of all, it allows Ministers to alter the very Bill itself. That is a dangerous spiral of autocracy. Some Members seem to think it is a compliment to refer to them as Henry VIII powers. I know that Henry VIII, in 1536, legislated to allow two MPs to come here from Calais, but on the whole the Tudor exercise was not a proud demonstration of democracy. These are clauses of which Erdoğan, Maduro and Putin would be proud.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way and I am sorry to interrupt his flow of eloquence. Is he conscious of schedule 7, in particular part 2, and especially paragraph 6, sub-paragraph 2, sub-sub-section (g), in which it is made perfectly clear that it is only by affirmative resolution, and not the fiat of Ministers, that amendments to Acts can be made?

[Chris Bryant]

I am perfectly aware of all the measures in schedule 7, but I merely point out to the right hon. Gentleman that, since the Bill itself can be changed by the Government, that is one of the elements the Government can change. What happens, even under the affirmative process—this is the problem with secondary legislation—is that, because there is no opportunity to amend, the Government will say, “Take it or leave it”. They will then suddenly say, “There is a real emergency and you’ve got to take it, because otherwise there will be chaos.” That is the sword of Damocles that Governments always hold over Parliament when a clause hands matters over to secondary legislation.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am doubly grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. Will he withdraw his remark that it is by ministerial fiat, and resort instead to the argument that the drafting would enable the Government to exert some pressure on Parliament, which presumably he and his colleagues would resist?

[Chris Bryant]

No, I am not withdrawing it. The Bill, at several points, makes it quite clear that the Government will hold powers to bring in regulations under secondary legislation through the negative process. The whole point about the negative process is that the statutory instrument comes into law unless it has been annulled, and the only process by which it can be annulled is if the Government themselves allow time for us to debate the matter and to have a vote. I would be happy to trust the Government if in recent years—I do not know why the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker) is looking up at that point; he never used to trust the Government until he became a Minister—they had been happy, since 2010 or 2015, to honour the traditional doctrine of the House, which is that if the Leader of the Opposition demands a vote and a debate in this Chamber there will be one. They have, however, consistently refused to do that. Enormous changes to our law, affecting student nurses and every student in the land, and affecting benefits for all our constituents, have been driven through via secondary legislation. It should never have been used for such measures, without us ever being able to insist on having a debate or a vote. The worst of it, to which I have already referred, is that when we do have a debate, the Government get to decide whether it should be in Committee or on the Floor of the House. If it is in Committee, all we get is a motion stating whether or not we have debated the matter in hand.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

rose—

[Chris Bryant]

I am not giving way to the right hon. Gentleman again. I am sure he will manage to catch your eye, Mr Speaker.

It is not as if the Government do not accept that they will have to introduce hundreds and hundreds of statutory instruments. What they should have done, before introducing the Bill, was suggest an alternative way of dealing with this process over the next two years, so that there can be proper triaging of genuinely technical and minor consequential amendments to legislation that need to happen, and significant measures where the whole House would want to take a view.

Since 1950, Parliament has rejected only 11 statutory instruments, so we know that this is an autocratic process, but let me get to a much bigger worry for me: clause 9. I am sure that hon. Members have read it. It states very clearly:

“Regulations under this section may make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament (including modifying this Act).”

When I said last week in the House that this was truly exceptional, all sorts of Government Members, including Ministers, came up to me and said, “Oh no, there are hundreds of examples. I’ll give you examples by the weekend.” The first example I was given was the Scotland Act 1998, but it does not apply. Section 113(6)—I am sure the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) will know this subsection—states:

“But a power to modify enactments does not…extend to making modifications of this Act or subordinate legislation under it.”

In other words, the Minister who told me that had missed out the word “not”, rather conveniently.

Then the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) came up to me and said, “No, you’re completely and utterly wrong. The greatest constitutional expert in this country”—I think he might have meant himself—“tells me that section 75 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 gives the Government the right to change the Act itself by statutory instrument”. Unfortunately, he was wrong as well. It actually states:

“If…it appears to the Secretary of State…that…the enactment is capable of preventing the disclosure of information”—

in other words, gives the Government too much power to prevent disclosure—

“he may by order repeal or amend the enactment for the purpose of removing or relaxing the prohibition.”

It is a measure that gives the Government not more but less power. Even the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, which applies to circumstances when by universal accord—probably—the Government would need emergency powers, and which builds on previous Acts of Parliament, states categorically, in section 23(5):

“Emergency regulations may not amend…this Part of this Act”—

in other words, all the major elements of the Act.

If hon. Members who are trying to cover their tracks by saying, “We think all this secondary legislation business is terribly worrying, and obviously we’ll change that in Committee”, really care about those matters, they should consider the Government’s track record. What have they done recently? They engaged in what I would call jiggery-pokery with the DUP to ensure a majority—and let us hope we have a vote on Estimates Day on the £1 billion for the DUP; they delayed setting up Select Committees until now to make it impossible for us to scrutinise many of the measures going through during the summer months; and tomorrow, they are trying to make sure that, for the first time in our history, a Government without a majority in the House have a majority on every single Committee. If that does not make one question the bona fides of this Government, nothing will, and that is why I say to hon. Members: do not sell your birthright for a mess of pottage; vote against this Bill!

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[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

The Bill provides dangerous and sweeping powers to Ministers, rides roughshod through the devolution settlements, removes important legal protections and creates legal uncertainty, so, like most Opposition Members, I will definitely vote against Second Reading tonight.

Lots has already been said about the extraordinary proposed powers for Ministers in various Henry VIII clauses, to which the response has generally been, “Such clauses are already common”. It is true that they are far, far too common, but that does not mean that we should throw caution to the wind and hand them out like confetti. We should be fighting back against Henry VIII clauses, not handing out some of the most wide-ranging and dangerous-in-scope examples, as proposed in the Bill.

On the face of it, the proposed powers are so broad that Ministers could use Henry VIII powers to remove the very limits that are supposed to constrain their exercise, including the sunset clauses, and they are so wide that it is anticipated in the Bill that the Henry VIII powers will be used to create—guess what?—yet more Henry VIII powers!

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree with me on the point that was discussed with the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant)—namely, that the amendments of which he speaks could occur only after an affirmative resolution of the House?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I do not necessarily agree with the right hon. Gentleman, nor do I have faith that even the affirmative procedure is necessarily a proper safeguard against wide-ranging powers such as those in the Bill. Such power does not belong in a Henry VIII clause at all.

Limits could be placed on the powers in the Bill at later stages. We could perhaps restrict which matters could be dealt with by delegated legislation, list further protected enactments, and define key terms such as “deficiencies”, or introduce a test of necessity, rather than rely on subjective ministerial judgment, and thereby improve the Bill. If it is to proceed, that must happen. But none of that would resolve the fundamental challenge of how we parliamentarians are supposed to play a substantial role in the whole process, beyond the usual inadequate procedures for scrutinising secondary legislation. Other Members have gallantly suggested alternative mechanisms—for example, some sort of filter—but to my mind they have been far too modest. At the very least, we need a procedure that allows us to table amendments to regulations, rather than meekly accepting take-it-or-leave-it, all-or-nothing proposals from the Government.

We are more than 13 months on from the referendum. Transposing EU law into UK law was always going to be a monumental task. The Government’s assuming that we could just use the same old procedures we always use was either negligence, complacency, arrogance, or a mixture of all three. Such procedures are not fit for the normal business of this House, never mind for the vital task that lies ahead.

With respect to the devolved competencies, the Bill rides roughshod over the devolution settlements. Can you imagine, Mr Speaker, the federal Governments of Germany or the USA—or of lots of other federal places—attempting such a unilateral power grab? It would be greeted with outrage, and rightly so.