Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff Cap) Bill

Oliver Letwin Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons
Tuesday 6th March 2018 Commons Chamber

[John Penrose]

I agree that there is a difference between a freeze and a cap, but there are a couple of things that, none the less, make it an extremely risky and dangerous proposition to go down that road. For example, what if Ofgem picks a number and the international price of energy falls the very next day? What then? Switching customers in the ultra-competitive part of the market would find their prices drop quickly as energy firms react to the news, but Ofgem’s capped prices for loyal, non-switching customers on default tariffs—that is the example my hon. Friend talks about—would not move at all for another six months, when the cap can be reset according to the terms of the Bill. In that situation, the cap would be ineffective at protecting the customers it is designed to help and, because it is officially blessed by Ofgem, it would embed and legitimise high prices. Things would get worse rather than better.

It is not just me who is worried about that. Which? says it is

“not certain that customers on a capped default tariff will benefit as market conditions change in future”.

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

As my hon. Friend knows, I have some sympathy with his arguments. Does he recognise that, as drafted, the Bill enables Ofgem to set the cap by formula, which could be related to wholesale prices and have the flexibility required to overcome the problem he describes?

[John Penrose]

I wish I shared my right hon. Friend’s confidence in Ofgem. All the discussion of the Bill so far from Ministers, from comments on the Bill and from people inside Ofgem is not what he describes. They are talking about an absolute cap in which people sit in a room and come up with a number, which stays that way until it is reset after six months—that is the way the Bill is drafted.

If the Bill can be amended in a way that allows it to be far more flexible—that is one of the things I hope to encourage both Members here present and Ministers at later stages to consider—we might be able to iron out some of these issues, but I do not share my right hon. Friend’s optimism in that regard.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Looking at clause 2(1)(b), as drafted, it seems perfectly clear to me that Ofgem will have to set out how the cap is to be calculated, which positively points in the direction of a formulaic rather than an absolute position.

[John Penrose]

But as my right hon. Friend will know, it is also stated elsewhere, particularly in the guidance and in many of the other documents on this, that we are looking at an absolute cap. The word “absolute” is used repeatedly, and it has been used repeatedly to me in conversations with Ministers. If we can remove those other points as well, so that they are not going to push us in the direction I worry about, many people here would be a great deal more reassured. We will have to come back to this on Report—

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

rose—

[John Penrose]

I will give way one more time and then I will have to make some progress, because Madam Deputy Speaker is catching my eye.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I certainly will not press the point beyond this. Does my hon. Friend not need to distinguish between absolute, which means not relative—to offer tariffs—and formulaic and flexible, which the drafting certainly does allow, as opposed to a point that is set by a Committee for six months?

[John Penrose]

We will need to come back to this matter, but it would be tremendously helpful if Ofgem came up with some clarifications on it, because that might reassure me and others. So far I have had nothing to reassure me in that direction—in fact, quite the opposite.

As I was saying, it is not just me who is worried about this: both Which? and uSwitch worry it will mean cheaper fixed deals will be withdrawn from the market; and leading challenger energy firms such as Octopus Energy, Utilita Energy, Utility Warehouse, Ebico and Good Energy are all worried that Ofgem’s price-fixing efforts will inevitably get it wrong. The lawyers and lobbyists for the big six are licking their lips at the prospect of all those fat fees from legal challenges and persuasive lunches. It is no coincidence that they are already demanding the Bill should allow expensive and time-consuming appeals to the Competition and Markets Authority whenever Ofgem’s committee sets a price.

If all these people think the Bill’s details create problems, what is the alternative? What needs to change? The thing to remember is that default tariff prices are just a symptom of a much deeper problem. The moral flaw at the heart of this market—the thing that sticks in the throat —is the mark-up loyal customers are charged compared with competitive switching deals. I am talking about the enormous, unjustified, sneaky price hike the big six hit people with, without their consent, just because they are loyal or simply too busy to switch. That is the unfairness, the burning injustice and the thing that drives customers—our constituents—to write to each and every one of us demanding, “This must change”.

If the problem is the mark-up as between the competitive deals and the default tariffs, why does the Bill only address half the problem—the price of the default tariffs—rather than the gap between the two? If we are really serious about solving the problem, why not cap the gap instead? A cap that creates a maximum mark-up would deal directly with this moral underlying problem—the cause of the rip-off—rather than only half of it. It would mean default tariffs would have to move in tandem with the ultra-competitive, consumer-friendly part of the market. People who took the trouble to switch would still get the best deals, but customers who forgot or did not want to switch would get protection, too.

Capping the gap is future-proof as well. If the international price of energy fell suddenly, as we were discussing earlier, it would not just be the competitive switching deals that would get cheaper; the price of capped tariffs would fall, too, and people would not have to wait for six months for Ofgem’s all-knowing committee to meet and change it. Capping the gap would not dilute or derail the all-important underlying market changes which are going to make energy feel competitive and normal either. Customers would still have plenty of incentives to start switching. That is why this Bill and its introduction make this a great day— I meant it when I said it. This Bill is important, even though it is only temporary. It will save millions of customers hundreds of pounds on an essential product. Although it is not perfect and it could be better, it is a very important step. So for the moment, for the principle of the thing, for the Second Reading debate today, let us just celebrate the fact that it is here at all and support it.

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[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

In the interests of brevity, I want to make one point about the rationale for the cap that I do not think has yet been stated in this debate, and two points to reassure my hon. Friends about issues that have arisen.

On the rationale, it is true that Ramsey pricing—the gouging of so-called loyal or, in other words, inertial customers—is a major issue, but predatory pricing on the other side of the balance sheet is equally important. As the hon. Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves) said, large suppliers are making uncovenanted surpluses out of the default tariffs, which they are using to cross-subsidise their competitive tariffs to exclude entrants from the market to the greatest possible extent. Once they are deprived of the ability to generate oligopolistic returns from the default tariffs, as my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose) mentioned, they will have to do what they are very reluctant to do —namely, recognise more closely the true cost of their own inefficiencies in their more competitive tariffs, thereby allowing much greater penetration of the market by small challengers.

That is why I celebrate the fact that the Government have made the cap a temporary one with reviews. The shadow Secretary of State, when she was engaging in what sounded on this side of the Chamber suspiciously like scraping the barrel to find things to object to, asked the question: how will we know that the time is ripe for the cap to be removed? The answer is when the challengers have actually been able to move into the market in great numbers, because the cross-subsidy in the predatory pricing model has faded away and we therefore have a proper energy supply market.

Of my two crumbs of comfort, I want to offer one directly to my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare. We all owe him a great debt of gratitude for banging on about this for a very long time and thinking about it deeply. I assure him that the Bill, whatever anybody may have said about it, clearly allows for a cap that, far from being a freeze, will never be a freeze, as he recognises, and will also not be an absolute point tariff either—or need not be an absolute point tariff. It is entirely in Ofgem’s gift to decide how the cap varies or does not vary depending on circumstances in the external supply markets for energy.

Knowing the current personnel in Ofgem, and having talked to them about this—I am grateful to the Minister for Energy and Clean Growth for facilitating some of those discussions—I am absolutely convinced that they will in fact make this a calculated, formulaic cap that properly reflects the changes in external international circumstances. It will therefore be miles away from the lunacies, although they were politically attractive lunacies at the time, of the Labour party’s original proposal for an absolute price freeze, which, incidentally, would have crippled customers at a time when energy prices were falling.

The second point I want to make to my hon. Friends is that this is the right kind of structure.

[John Penrose]

I seek a little further reassurance from my right hon. Friend. He seems to be coming up with an elegant mechanism for redefining an absolute cap to encompass relative caps, but just relative to the wholesale market rather than relative to other tariffs. If so, that would be incredibly elegant. Does he believe that that would allow repricing within the six-month period before the Ofgem committee sat again?

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Who knows? The point I was just about to make is that the Bill will hand the whole thing over to Ofgem. This is basically an “Ofgem—you get to decide it” Bill, so we will only know when we see what it produces. However, I would bet my bottom dollar—not that I have very many bottom dollars—that Ofgem will actually produce a formula, not a number, so the cap will vary continuously, or pretty much continuously. Ofgem is pretty sophisticated economically and it knows perfectly well what happens in the wholesale markets. I do not think it will lock itself in to an unvarying cap.

My main point is structural: the Bill will hand the issue to Ofgem. The good news is that that is not nationalising the pricing of the energy markets. It is not taking it into the hands of the Government. What my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said is true—one of the great achievements of the last 30 or 40 years of the evolution of our utilities markets as a whole is that we have reinvented what the Victorians once had, which we lost in the early and middle part of the 20th century, which was the whole idea of the Government establishing a set of technocrats who are not politically motivated or driven by electoral dynamics, and so are not inclined to do things that are stupid in the long run but look good because they win votes in the short term. Instead, they try to get economically rational results.

Ofgem is such a case. It is not perfect—no regulator is—but it will be a hell of a lot better than politicians at setting prices over time. The Bill therefore has the right structure. It is not a Marxist takeover, a price freeze or a recipe for point tariffs. It is a recipe for allowing a regulator to set an economically rational means of preventing a combination of Ramsey pricing and predatory pricing, and as such those of us who believe in the purities of markets can perfectly well subscribe to it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Caroline Flint]

Absolutely, and I am going to come on to renewables. Ministers should beware of any proposal to exempt green tariffs or low-carbon tariffs from the price cap, and let me be clear why. In 75% of days in 2017, wind power supplied more energy than coal power in the UK. Nuclear and renewables are central to our power output in the UK energy market and the generators are well rewarded for that. The notion that any energy provider should charge a premium for so-called green tariffs does not stand up to scrutiny. Consumer support for 100% green energy is welcome, but the idea that they should pay the most expensive tariff cannot be justified. I therefore hope that the Secretary of State will rule that out and deliver a comprehensive cap.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am listening with increasing admiration to the right hon. Lady’s speech, which reminds me of why there was once a Labour party with which I had a great deal more sympathy than I do at present. I strongly agree with what she says about green tariffs. We want to promote green energy, but to do so on a basis that is economically rational.

[Caroline Flint]

I welcome the cross-party support that continues to blossom on this issue.

I urge Ministers to ensure that Ofgem is equipped with all the powers it needs to act as a consumer champion, and to deliver both a price cap and penalties for corporate misbehaviour. I have not been uncritical of Ofgem. For too long the regulator did not hold the big six to account for poor customer service. Where fines were issued, companies were allowed to strike a deal to use the so-called fine to subsidise tariffs for new customers—there was nothing for their loyal customers stuck on default tariffs. Thankfully that has changed.

We saw last week the CMA having to rule on a challenge by SSE and EDF against Ofgem when they tried to modify industry rules. Ofgem determined that those modifications would have led to consumers paying a £120 million rebate to generators and said no. Ofgem was immediately challenged. In this instance, the CMA backed Ofgem and the consumer interest was protected, but let us be under no illusion: there is a constant veiled threat that the energy giants will contest its decisions. We need to be certain that Ofgem has the powers and remedies it needs under the Bill so that it can do the job this House expects and does not become a scapegoat for failure.

Finally, may I urge Ministers to use the period of the cap to review the structure of the energy market? Good regulation, fairness and innovation from existing and new players must all be part of a reshaped energy market of the future. Let us get on with it. The Bill has my support; let us give Ofgem the power to act and cap unfair energy bills.

Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff Cap) Bill

Oliver Letwin Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Monday 30th April 2018 Commons Chamber

[Dr Whitehead]

On reflection, I can join the hon. Gentleman in being slightly perturbed that I am quoting The Sun in this context. I assure him that although I quoted The Sun, a range of authorities from the Daily Mail —getting better?—up to the BBC’s website suggested that the Prime Minister did actually say that people would save £100. If the hon. Gentleman thinks that quoting The Sun was not entirely appropriate under all the other circumstances, I can do nothing other than agree with him.

Amendment 7 would ensure that vulnerable customers, including those already protected by a tariff cap, do not lose that protection as a result of the overall cap being introduced.

[Sir Oliver Letwin (West Dorset) (Con)]

If we put together the hon. Gentleman’s remarks about amendments 5 and 6—the general gist of which I have no quarrel with—and if Ofgem were subject to legal challenge as a result of trying to impose a cap of this size on that timetable, what does he suggest would be the effect of his amendments if they had entered law? How would Ofgem deal with the conflict between the courts and an Act of Parliament?

[Dr Whitehead]

My understanding is that the question of a timeframe for implementation of the cap would be strengthened considerably regarding a potential legal challenge by providing for a maximum period for the introduction of the cap, rather than a specified date. I think that we accept the principle that there should be some indication in the Bill of when the cap is to arise; certainly, in previous discussions of the Bill, there has been a real concern about the body responsible for implementing a cap after the legislation has been passed through the House taking any or no specified period to prepare the cap for its actual execution. The preparation of the cap will also be part of the process by which it is strengthened against legal challenge. That therefore needs to be done carefully and properly so that it is implemented it in a way that is proofed against such legal challenges. Ofgem indicated in its evidence to the Committee the period that it thought reasonable for it to be required to take forward the implementation of the cap. Placing that period in the Bill therefore seems, at least to the Opposition, to be adding to the proof against legal action rather than detracting from it.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I completely accept that it is advantageous to give Ofgem a push to do this on the timescale that the hon. Gentleman is describing. However, clause 1(1) says that

“the Authority…must modify the standard supply licence conditions”,

and under his amendments, it would have to have done that by a given date, yet the court may be preventing it from doing so. I still do not understand how he deals with that legal conflict.

[Dr Whitehead]

The Bill says that what needs to be done to modify licences to bring the cap about, among other things, has to be done by Ofgem as part of its implementation process. The question of legal challenge to Ofgem concerns, at its heart, what Ofgem does over whatever period may be specified to ensure that the implementation of the cap does not deviate from what is set out in legislation. That is the clear basis on which the cap should be undertaken, and that is the responsibility of Ofgem.

The second issue is the time within which Ofgem considers that it can introduce that cap in the way that the right hon. Gentleman has described, given its workload and capacity to do so. Indeed, Ofgem is on the public record, through the evidence that it gave to the Committee—he will know that that has some weight through being a public statement in Hansard—as saying that it felt that it could do it within five months. The amendment merely tries to tidy up the process by putting that timeframe into the Bill, while not in any way detracting from the strength or otherwise of what Ofgem is required to do in acting to implement the cap in a way that is both effective and legally watertight.

I am not sure that I can go too much further with the right hon. Gentleman’s point. I am happy to take it up with him separately if he wishes. However, I have explained where we are in seeking a combination of watertightness in the Bill and clarity that the wishes of this House can be undertaken in through the price cap coming in during the period when it is supposed to come in.

Amendment 7 relates to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West (Gareth Thomas) about vulnerable customers and people who are not in a position to take advantage of all the devices that other, less vulnerable customers would be able to take advantage of—that is, customers protected by the existing tariff cap in particular. In our view, it is important that those who are protected by the tariff cap do not lose that protection as a result of the overall cap being introduced. It would be helpful if the Minister, even if she is not minded to accept the amendment, put it beyond doubt that that is the Government’s intention and that they will not seek to lose the current safeguard tariff as the overall tariff cap comes in.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

Amendment 6, as I recall, would simply place the Prime Minister’s words into legislation. It was estimated that a saving of at least £100 would result from the measures, and one aim of the legislation was to bring that saving about. It does not mean that the amount would be exactly £100—indeed, had the Prime Minister not reported that to The Sun, we might have got a rather more complex version of that price promise. We are merely reflecting what was heard on that occasion, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will take the amendment in the spirit in which it is intended.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I just want to be clear, because I have got very confused about these propositions on a relative cap. On the face of it, the words of new clause 1 are strikingly similar to those of amendment 2. Is the hon. Gentleman proposing that after the absolute cap, there should be a relative cap?

[Dr Whitehead]

It can be interpreted in that way. We are fully in accord with the Government’s idea of an absolute cap, as opposed to the relative cap proposed in the amendments. We suggest that what has been characterised as a relative price cap plays an entirely different function, which is to narrow the gap between tariffs after an absolute price cap has been in place so that companies cannot game the market by switching tariffs in the way I have described. That is nothing to do, at that point, with a price cap; it is about tariff stability over a period and, indeed, an assurance for customers that they are not going to be ripped off as a result of entering on a particular tariff and subsequently being placed on a very high tariff once that initial tariff has come to an end.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Penrose (Weston-super-Mare) (Con)]

I rise to speak to amendments 2 to 4, which stand in my name and those of a variety of Conservative colleagues, including two members of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee as well as former Ministers and Cabinet Ministers.

I should pause to say that I am not arguing against the Bill overall—I spoke and voted in favour of it in principle on Second Reading—and I hope that everyone involved in the campaign I have headed in this area for the past year and a half appreciates that I believe an energy price cap is much needed. I pay tribute to the 214 cross-party MPs who signed up to the idea, plus the Prime Minister and the Minister, who have all been vital in getting us to this point today.

My concern is about not the principles but the detail—the type of price cap envisaged under the Bill—because, to put it bluntly, a fair number of free market Tories are pretty concerned that we are choosing the most anti-competitive, complicated, bureaucratic and inflexible cap on offer. It is inflexible because the Bill specifies an absolute cap that will be set by an all-knowing committee of Ofgem regulators every few months. However, the international price of energy moves around every day, and it is impossible to know what the price will be in the next six minutes, let alone six months, so the cap price will be out of date in moments and will stay out of date until it is reset again months later. That means it will not protect customers in the way we all want and, because it will be officially blessed by Ofgem, it will embed and legitimise high prices. It is not just me who is worried. Which? says it is

“not certain that customers on a capped default tariff will benefit as market conditions change in future”.

The proposed cap is also complicated—hideously complicated. Why? The assiduous folk at Ofgem have already started publishing details of how they might go ahead and they are warming to their task. It would not be just a single cap, they say; it would be 42 different ones to cover gas and electricity, different meter types and different parts of the country. There would be more than 42 different caps, however, because each one may be split into several different versions depending on whether people pay by direct debit or in some other way, and each will have a fixed standing charge and a variable element—oh, and there is headroom, too. Each of those three items can be calculated in a marvellously technical and complicated variety of ways. For example, the variable element could use a basket of market tariffs, an updated competitive reference price, or a bottom-up cost assessment. Those things might be calculated using a periodical review of realised costs, or third-party data with pre-specified allowances for certain cost items, and so on and—turgidly, complicatedly—on.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

My hon. Friend and I have had an engaging conversation about this for many months, but given all the things he reports Ofgem as planning, surely that means we will have not a single point tariff that rapidly becomes outdated, but rather a tariff that will respond—for example, to input costs?

[John Penrose]

As my right hon. Friend says, he and I have had many conversations about this over many months. I can only say to him that if his argument is that Ofgem might come up with a version of an absolute cap that is a bit less absolute and a bit closer to what I am proposing—in effect, one that caps the gap: a relative cap—I would agree with him that that is a good thing, but if that is the case, as a source of advantage for the cap, why would it not be even better to go the whole hog and have a relative cap in the first place?