(5 years, 10 months ago)
General CommitteesI will try to answer as many of the questions that have been put by hon. Members as I can. The hon. Member for Sefton Central referred to the people behind me as thinking that I was not speaking the truth. I want to clarify my point: as a member of this Government, I am committed to getting to a position where the UK has a deal with the European Union. However, any responsible Government, as we are, would be preparing for a no-deal scenario. The regulations before us will put us in a position where UK business confidence remains. We have confidence in the UK markets and are acting responsibly to ensure that in the event of no deal, we are in a situation where the law works correctly.
I would like to go back to the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Welwyn Hatfield. Should a deal be agreed, we might not see many changes. We are in this particular agreement, which is retained EU law, so EU laws are being introduced in the UK. It sets out how we will deal with certain audit provisions. Whether there is a deal or not, further changes will come through, because we will take decisions on how to work things and lay out further guidance on how we will assess qualifications and how we will assess the competency of authorities in the future. Fundamentally, this applies whether there is a deal or not, but obviously it focuses on a no-deal scenario.
As the hon. Member for Sefton Central will know, the transitional agreement is under this SI. For example, up to 2020, under the SI, there is confidence that we will be accepting the relevant professional qualifications and competent authorities within EEA states for the transitional period, so as not to be at a cliff edge.
The hon. Gentleman asked whether the FRC is confident that it will be able to establish mutual agreements, and whether it is in a position to do so. Currently it carries out—fundamentally speaking—oversight with respect to the regulation as it stands. I am therefore confident that it will be in a position to deal with further work that is necessary in the event of no deal—and in a situation where there is a deal, although we are talking about a no-deal scenario at the moment.
I want to touch on a question from my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley about recognition of qualifications, and authorisations. Under the SI—and the FRC is agreed—in the case of businesses whose financial years fall after 29 March there will be a requirement for auditors to register prior to the audit being signed. Effectively, there could be up to an extra year for auditors to do that, after 29 March. That is exactly so that it can be managed. There may be benefits for some auditors, because there is potential for them to say, as a selling point, they have done it ahead of time. Obviously that will not be before 29 March, and they will have until the time when they need to sign the audit to register. I hope that that gives my hon. Friend some confidence.
I think I understand what the Minister is trying to say, but just to confirm it, let us say a firm had the year end of 28 February 2019 and had to submit audited financial statements to a listing authority by some such time as the end of April or early May, and we had a no-deal Brexit. The auditors could not register for that before 29 March; but would they have to register before they could submit those accounts—so that they would have to do it very quickly in early April—or would they be grandfathered, in the event of no deal?
My hon. Friend has outlined a situation where the company’s end of year would fall before the withdrawal date. As things stand the new registry would be only for instances where the financial year started after 29 March. It depends on where the years fall. In the case he gave, effectively, the auditors would not have to do it.
As to the number of companies affected, there are currently 291 EEA companies registered on the UK markets, and approximately 240 UK companies that have registered securities on EEA markets. The regulations affect a small number of organisations and in some cases a few other European countries. We are talking about a small number of companies. To give the Committee an idea of the scale, there are 1,000 listed companies in the UK. We have 3.8 million companies registered in the UK, 98.5% of which are small businesses, 20,000 large businesses and 35,000 medium-sized businesses, so the direct impact will affect a small number of companies and audit firms that are registered within the EEA.
On the point about the Secretary of State taking those powers regarding approval of adequacy and competence that have lain with the European Commission under the EU regulation, there would be full parliamentary scrutiny, as there is, with the Secretary of State having that power. As the hon. Member for Sefton Central knows, all Secretaries of State face full parliamentary scrutiny, and I would argue that our Secretary of State having those powers represents far more scrutiny than the European Commission under the current position. It is a positive move for the Secretary of State to have those powers, and it is right that they are held at parliamentary level rather than being delegated, at this particular time, to an arm’s-length body such as the FRC.
Regarding what the hon. Gentleman says about my confidence in the FRC and its ability, this particular regulation deals with a no-deal scenario, but as he and the Committee know, Sir John Kingman’s report into the FRC was published at the end of last year. We also have the work that has been done in the audit market regarding competitions. Whether we have a no-deal or a deal scenario, those pieces of work on what we do in this area to ensure that our markets are working effectively and that our public bodies are acting effectively will be ongoing. If there were to be any changes in the future, this SI would be taken into account. That is what Governments do. In a no-deal situation we would be in a position to change whatever we might want to in this area. I do have confidence in the FRC and in how we would manage that, and that the FRC would be in a position to deliver what is required in both a no-deal and a deal situation.
Regarding bilateral agreements, the hon. Gentleman mentioned the position with Ireland and asked whether we had had those discussions with other European states. Currently, 200 of the around 240 companies affected operate in the Irish market, so Ireland is the main EU member state that we will need to work more closely with in the future. Our officials are in discussions with our European neighbours all the time across a number of topics in this area, and more of that will go on as we head toward European Union exit date and after 29 March, whether or not we are in a deal situation and working toward a future relationship. We are committed to ensuring that we are able to deliver those agreements with our neighbours in the future.
It is paramount that, as the UK exits the EU, we maintain the integrity of the UK system for audit regulatory oversight. These regulations will help to facilitate that by ensuring that oversight of the audit profession continues to work effectively following our withdrawal from the EU. The regulations do not introduce a change in policy. As I explained, the fundamental elements of the current statutory audit legislation will remain the same after exit. The regulations before the Committee make only the amendments that are necessary to ensure that audit legislation remains operable in the UK following our withdrawal from the EU. The measures in these regulations will ensure that, and mean that the UK system for regulatory oversight will remain coherent and understandable for the businesses that rely on it. I therefore commend the regulations to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That the Committee has considered the draft Statutory Auditors and Third Country Auditors (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018.
(5 years, 11 months ago)
General CommitteesI beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Takeovers (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Austin. The regulations will be made under powers in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. They amend part 28 of the Companies Act 2006, so that the United Kingdom’s corporate takeovers regime can operate independently in the event that the UK exits from the EU without a withdrawal agreement.
If the UK leaves the EU without an agreement in place, the instrument will provide legal clarity and certainty. The takeovers regime seeks to ensure that shareholders receive fair and equal treatment when the company in which they have invested is subject to a takeover bid. The effective operation of the takeovers regime is vital to business confidence.
Part 28 of the 2006 Act transposes the takeover directive 2004/25/EC into UK law. The directive was intended to harmonise certain aspects of takeover supervision across the European economic area. It created expectations of reasonable behaviour to which company shareholders could hold bidders. It also created a system of co-operation, in which member states’ regulators shared jurisdiction over a small number of cross-border takeover cases.
The 2006 Act requires the Takeover Panel to make rules to give effect to the directive in the UK. The panel has done so in the City code on takeovers and mergers. The regulations preserve the statutory underpinning of the code, and make only minimal changes to the way in which the UK regime functions. In developing the regulations, we worked closely with the UK’s supervisory authority, the Takeover Panel. The panel has published a consultation document on the changes that it will need to make the takeover code reflect the regulations.
The regulations make only three substantive changes to the way in which the UK takeovers regime functions. The rest of the regulations import and correct provisions from the directive that are necessary for the independent operation of the UK regime, but do not change how the domestic regime operates.
First, the EEA takeovers regime includes a system of shared jurisdiction for company headquarters that are listed in different countries. The supervision of a company captured by the shared jurisdiction system is usually done by two regulatory authorities: one in the country where the company has its registered office, and the other in the country where the company is listed. The shared jurisdiction regime ensures that there is clarity about which national takeover rules apply in such cases.
The shared jurisdiction regime works on a reciprocal basis. Since the UK will be outside that framework, the reciprocal arrangements will no longer apply after EU exit. The regulation will remove shared jurisdiction from the UK takeovers regime. The Act requires the panel to supervise UK companies with securities admitted to trading on a UK-regulated market. The panel may also choose to supervise companies that do not fall within that definition. The panel is currently consulting on the application of the takeover code in the light of the loss of the shared jurisdiction regime.
Will the Minister clarify what would happen if a takeover started before exit day, but had not been completed, and there was a co-operation arrangement, with two jurisdictions reviewing the proposed takeover? Presumably, after exit day, only one would be allowed to review it. Would a whole new process have to be started, or would one authority effectively just give up its scrutiny of the takeover?
I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention; he raises a very good point. Although the statutory instrument will remove the shared jurisdiction, part 28 of the 2006 Act still places a duty on the UK to co-operate with any country or territory on mergers. While the SI will remove the reference to the EEA, we will not remove the continued co-operation of the UK regime with other countries and territories.
The panel is currently consulting on the application of the takeover code in the light of the loss of the shared jurisdiction regime. It proposes to supervise takeovers concerning only companies that meet the residency criteria set out in the takeover code.
The second feature of the draft regulations relates to the duty to co-operate. Section 950 of the Companies Act places a general duty on the Takeover Panel to co-operate with its counterparts and certain other regulatory agencies in any country or territory outside the UK. It also imposes a specific duty to co-operate with supervisory authorities in the EEA, which is derived from the takeovers directive 2004. After our exit, EEA member states will no longer be bound to co-operate with the UK under the directive. The draft regulations will therefore remove the specific obligation to co-operate with EEA supervisory authorities, as it will no longer be reciprocal. However, the Takeover Panel will still be required to co-operate with the authorities of EEA member states under the broader duty to co-operate with any international supervisory authority with an equivalent role. This change will not, in practice, constrain the panel’s ability to co-operate.
The final feature of the draft regulation relates to restrictions on the disclosure of confidential information. Section 948 of the Companies Act restricts the disclosure of confidential information obtained by the Takeover Panel during its duties and sets the conditions under which information can be shared. It applies to both the panel and the organisations with which information is shared. Breaching the section 948 restriction is a criminal offence.
The Companies Act provides an exemption from the section 948 restriction for EEA public bodies using confidential information disclosed by the panel for the purpose of pursuing an EU obligation. These EEA public bodies are bound by their own national laws and by EU law to prevent the inappropriate disclosure of information passed to them by UK authorities. After our EU exit, these reciprocal protections will no longer apply to the UK. The draft regulation will remove the specific exemption from the section 948 offence for EEA public bodies and ensure that there is a sanction to deter inappropriate onward disclosure of sensitive information.