European Union Bill

Nigel Evans Excerpts

Monday 11th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 3.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Lords amendments 5 to 13 and 15.

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[Mr MacShane]

Does the right hon. Gentleman recall the referendums on Scottish and Welsh devolution in the late 1970s, which required a threshold that was not reached? That was a grotesque humiliation for the Labour Government and was an exultant moment of glory for the Conservatives as Mrs Thatcher swept forward to victory. You really should not bury your successful past so quickly.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

Order. I am not trying to bury my unsuccessful past.

[Mr Lidington]

In 1979, I was still a university student and had other things on my mind than the devolution referendums in Scotland and Wales. If one takes the right hon. Gentleman’s point about the imposition of the threshold then and looks back at the history of the decade after, which resulted in no move towards satisfying what were genuine aspirations for a greater degree of devolved government in Scotland and Wales, it made the public disconnection from Westminster of the people in those two countries greater over the subsequent years. But this is a matter that historians can argue over.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

I think that I would test the House’s patience if I were to go into that in detail, particularly as there was a debate on bail-outs a few weeks ago, in which I think my hon. Friend participated, and to which my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury responded at some length. I am sure that there will be other opportunities to question Treasury Ministers about that.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

Order. For the convenience of the House, I remind Members that just because the debate has the word “Europe” in the title, that does not mean that we can have a wide-ranging debate on European issues. Some latitude has been given, as Mr Cash knows, but could we now please look at the specific amendments?

[Mr Lidington]

The amendments to clause 6 would introduce huge inconsistency in the referendum lock. They would make the method used to transfer competence or power the determining factor in deciding whether or not a referendum should be held, rather than the fact of the transfer of competence or power itself. There are four ways of amending the treaties to allow transfers of power and competence from the United Kingdom to the European Union. First, there is the ordinary treaty revision procedure. Secondly, there is the first part of the simplified revision procedure, which was the method used recently to agree the recent treaty change on the eurozone stability mechanism. Thirdly, the British veto could be given up using the second part of the simplified revision procedure set out in article 48(7) of the treaty on European Union. The fourth and final way is through the use of a decision or passerelle without formal treaty change.

The Lords amendments seek to remove the last two methods from the referendum lock. I do not see the logic in this. For example, the amendments would mean that were a future UK Government to decide to give up their veto over foreign and security policy under the ordinary treaty revision procedure, there would first have to be a referendum, but if they decided to give up that veto under the passerelle decision in article 31(3), which would have exactly the same effect as a change under the ordinary revision procedure, there would be no requirement for a referendum. I do not think that the British public would understand being able to vote on a treaty change that gave up the veto but not having a say over a passerelle that did exactly the same thing, and there are other such examples. As my right hon. and noble Friend Lord Howell argued, this would be tantamount to locking the front and back doors of a house but leaving the kitchen window open. It is not the way to restore the trust of the British people.

The amendments would also draw an artificial distinction between a possible future agreement on a common European defence that would involve the creation of a single, integrated military force and other similar decisions that would not. The amendment suggests that the only controversial element would be a decision to develop a “single, integrated military force”, but there would inevitably be confusion over the extent to which such a force would be established. For example, would the establishment of an integrated command structure, an integrated unit or integrated budgets count? That lack of clarity could allow each step to be presented as “not quite” leading to a single integrated military force, and therefore “not quite” justifying a referendum. It is important that we hold to the principle that were a British Government to decide to opt in to a common European defence, that should ultimately be subject to a decision by the British people. A common defence could undermine the pre-eminence or capability of NATO, notwithstanding any assurances provided in the EU treaties. Maintaining that pre-eminence has been a long-standing concern of this and previous British Governments.