Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Nick Clegg Excerpts

Tuesday 18th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Deputy Prime Minister (Mr Nick Clegg)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

I am grateful to Members who have taken part in debates on the Bill, in particular the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen), who sadly is not in his place, and members of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, who have been forensic in their scrutiny.

The Bill’s reforms are an essential part of the Government’s drive to modernise Parliament. Currently, a Prime Minister can, effectively, call an election on a whim—a situation that my colleague and friend, the late Lord Holme of Cheltenham, once described as a race in which the Prime Minister is allowed to approach the track with his or her running shoes in one hand and the starting pistol in the other. Something as important as the timing of a general election must not be determined by the whims of Prime Ministers and the self-interest of political parties. I believe that all parties agree on that. The Bill proposes the introduction of fixed-term Parliaments, bringing a new stability to our political system and, crucially, ensuring that when Parliament does dissolve early, that is a matter for this House.

Debate on the Bill has been vigorous. That is why we allowed extra time in Committee. While we may not see eye to eye with colleagues on the Opposition Benches on every detail, throughout the debates there was broad agreement on what it seeks to achieve.

Let me turn briefly to some of the issues that have attracted most attention. First, on early Dissolution, the Bill provides that Parliament will be dissolved early only if at least two thirds of MPs vote for Dissolution or if a Government are unable to secure the confidence of the House of Commons within 14 days of a no-confidence vote—passed on a simple majority, exactly as is provided for right now.

Those arrangements are complementary. They are workable. Most importantly, they strengthen the power of Parliament to hold Government to account. We are proposing a new power for the House to vote for an early Dissolution, as well as, for the first time, giving legal effect to the existing procedures for a vote of no confidence. I ask Members to note that the Constitution Committee in the other place has endorsed those two mechanisms for triggering an early election.

The Government do not accept the concern that the new right to dissolve Parliament will undermine this House’s exclusive cognisance. Such an important constitutional innovation absolutely should be laid down in statute, but we are confident that the courts will continue to regard matters certified by the Speaker as relating to proceedings in Parliament, which are, in turn, protected by the Bill of Rights. I was delighted that the Constitution Committee—a Committee that includes distinguished parliamentarians and lawyers—agreed with the Government’s assessment of the Bill’s interaction with parliamentary privilege.

On the length of Parliaments, we have looked into the suggestion that four years is preferable to five. It is true that this is not an exact science. It is a question of judgment, but, all the arguments considered, we remain of the strong view that five years, the current maximum and more recently the norm, will encourage the stability and long-term perspective that British politics too often lacks.

[Sadiq Khan (Tooting) (Lab)]

Can the Deputy Prime Minister give us one example in which he or another leading member of the Liberal Democrats before May last year was in favour of a five-year fixed-term Parliament?

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

We were in favour of fixed-term Parliaments above and beyond all else, and always accepted that the issue of whether it was four years or five years was a matter of judgment, as I said. Five years, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, is the maximum term available to us already, and of the last five Parliaments three stretched to five years, including the last Parliament under a Labour Government.

[Austin Mitchell]

But the judgment of the Liberal party was that four years was the appropriate length of a Parliament. That is what was in the Liberals’ manifesto and what they put up to the Labour side in the coalition negotiations. They asked for four years and election by single transferable vote. Why suddenly switch to five?

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

As I said, the principle of a fixed-term Parliament was by far the most important thing. Whether that is four or five years—some people argue for five, some argue for four—might divide opinion and might create synthetic objections from those on the Labour Benches, but it is none the less secondary to the principle of giving the House greater power over the Executive. That is what the Bill establishes. Personally, I would not fetishise about 12 months one way or another in a term of four or five years. We have decided in the coalition agreement and as a Government—[Interruption.] It is a decision from the Government. I know that the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) finds it deeply uncomfortable not to be in government. He is not. We are, and we have decided five years.

[Sheila Gilmore (Edinburgh East) (Lab)]

One of the consequences of the decision to have a five-year term in the first instance will be the coincidence of the date of the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly and Northern Ireland Assembly elections in 2015. In the debate in Committee, we were advised by the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, the hon. Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper) that there would be discussions with the devolved Administrations on that. Can the Deputy Prime Minister report to us now on the outcome of those discussions?

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

I am not sure whether the hon. Lady was present for my hon. Friend the Minister’s update to the House on Report, when he gave a full account of the ongoing discussions with the devolved Administrations and the Presiding Officers of the devolved Assemblies. I understand that people have different views on the coincidence of the two elections in 2015, but I hope the hon. Lady and everyone else will recognise that the Bill does not create the possibility of a clash of elections. Indeed, a clash in 2015 could easily have occurred under the existing arrangements if this Parliament had continued until 2015.

What the Bill does is alert us well ahead of time that there is going to be such a clash. It allows us to anticipate and plan for a date that coincides in that way. As it happens, such clashes will occur only every 20 years. The discussions that we are entering now with the devolved Assemblies, the Presiding Officers and the leaders of the devolved Executives are precisely to take advantage of the fact that we have advance warning of an overlap or a clash, which otherwise we would not have had.

[Naomi Long]

Although I accept the argument that parliamentary and Assembly elections could have coincided anyway, as might have happened in 2015, is this not a missed opportunity to take a constructive decision on whether such a coinciding is a good or bad thing so that we could then routinely avoid it or make it happen? Instead, it is again being left somewhat to chance.

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

I agree that in principle a clash of elections to the devolved Assemblies and to the House of Commons should be avoided. As I have said before in debates, there is a world of difference between the potential for confusion among voters being asked to vote for two different Parliaments that will in turn create two different Executives or Governments—a wholly more serious issue—and the coincidence of such elections with a referendum on a specific yes or no issue, as will be the case with the AV referendum and the elections this May. We have always accepted the fundamental assertion that we need to find a way around that. We have had ongoing discussions and will continue to do so with an open mind. We made the suggestion that the devolved Assemblies should have the power to shift the date of their elections by six months either before or after the general election. That has not been greeted with universal approbation, but it is none the less a sincere attempt on our part to try to find a way forward.

[Chris Bryant]

I am grateful to the Deputy Prime Minister, who is being generous in giving way. Can he confirm that the provision set out in clause 1(5) will extend the maximum length of a Parliament beyond five years and that therefore it would be the longest fixed-term Parliament in the world, other than Rwanda? There is no fixed-term Parliament in the world of five years.

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

The hon. Gentleman has read the provisions of the Bill correctly, and I think that his point was confirmed by the Minister on Report. On the point about the coincidence of elections, Northern Ireland Office Ministers are conducting separate discussions with the parties in Northern Ireland, where the issues are slightly different. It would be inappropriate for me to prejudge the outcome of those ongoing discussions. We will of course endeavour to keep colleagues on the Opposition Benches informed.

[Andrew Percy (Brigg and Goole) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is entirely right that the judgment about how long a Parliament should last is not an exact science. During the debates in Committee, I opted for four years because I felt that that was more appropriate. It would avoid the clashes and mean that we would engage regularly with our electorate, which we should all be doing. It would be important in helping to keep us all in touch with our constituents. Would he say more on the thinking behind the decision to have five years rather than four?

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

As I said before, that is the existing maximum and has been for a very long time. It has recently become the norm, as five of the past nine Parliaments stretched to five years, including the previous Parliament. The hon. Gentleman might disagree, but I hope that he will at least accept the legitimacy of the argument that a four-year Parliament, politics being what it is, would naturally incline parties in power to look towards the next election well ahead of that four-year deadline and that government would be arrested and suspended as the party in power positioned itself months or sometimes a year or so before an impending general election, which would curtail considerably the time in which Governments can do difficult and brave things. Five years, however, is clearly a period during which Governments can take difficult and bold decisions that from time to time, as we very well know now, are necessary.

[Sir Peter Bottomley (Worthing West) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend was asked about clause 1(5) and the length of time between general elections, but my reading of that provision is that it does not extend the life of a Parliament. Parliament will still expire after five years, but the general election has to come within two months after that if it is extended, which is a shorter period than the current maximum.

[Chris Bryant]

That is not correct.

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

I defer to my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley) on the theology of those things. The hon. Member for Rhondda says that he is wrong, but my understanding is that the Bill is fairly clear on that point, even if it a little opaque to me on that very specific point. As my hon. Friend knows, the provisions purely address highly exceptional circumstances that arise for one reason or another, such as unforeseen emergency circumstances. Foot and mouth is an obvious recent example of where it is self-evident that an election simply could not be conducted either practically or politically. That is what we had in mind when we drafted the Bill in those terms.

In conclusion, the Government believe that fixed-term Parliaments represent a simple but absolutely fundamental change: strengthening Parliament, providing stability and moving us towards the new politics that we have all promised the people of Britain. I commend the Bill to the House.