Humanitarian Situation in Sudan

Monica Harding Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd July 2025 Westminster Hall

[Monica Harding (Esher and Walton) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. I congratulate the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Harpreet Uppal) on securing this important debate and on putting Sudan in the spotlight, where it needs to be. This war is the greatest humanitarian catastrophe since the advent of the modern age, with 25 million people in acute hunger, famine abounding and a war on civilians and women and girls. It has displaced 13 million people. It directly affects us in Britain, too: about 10% of those arriving on small boats are Sudanese. I would like to focus on three questions: is our response to Sudan’s humanitarian need enough, are our diplomatic efforts enough, and is our work to support the establishment of a democratic civilian Government enough?

Across a world of proliferating conflicts, we are observing a growing disregard for international humanitarian law, with warring parties increasingly seeing access to humanitarian aid as a weapon to be wielded. The UK has attributed famine conditions in parts of Sudan to systematic aid obstruction by both the RSF and the SAF. We must continue to push for aid to get in and for warring parties to respect international humanitarian law, but we must also recognise that under these conditions, local groups are often best placed—and better equipped than international NGOs—to meet civilian needs.

Sudan’s emergency response rooms have become the international symbol of such groups. They are community kitchens, shelters and medical centres; they provide clean water; they treat and protect victims of sexual violence. Currently, they are reaching more than 4 million people. In response to my recent written question on the ERRs, the Government directed me to the £120 million spend announced by the Foreign Secretary at the London conference and said that a

“portion of this uplift”

would go

“to local responders…through the Sudan Humanitarian Fund”.

But so far this year, the Sudan Humanitarian Fund is just 23% funded. The total shortfall is over $3 billion, and a cliff edge looms because of cuts to USAID and other international donors. Our current contribution, although welcome, does not touch the sides of what is required.

I understand that the Government are still assessing how best to support ERRs and local actors, but I ask the Minister: since USAID has done the hard work of due diligence and bureaucracy, can we not step up now and do more? This Government have slashed Britain’s international development budget to its lowest level this century. Again, I urge the Government to reverse that. Ministers claim that Sudan will remain a priority, but it is unclear whether they will have the resources necessary to make a real impact.

The Government’s cuts now require us to rethink and reform. Localisation has risks, but we must acknowledge that when it comes to Sudan, the old ways may not work. The emergency response rooms may be an example of how to do it. Can the Minister please provide an update on how much of the £120 million pledged at the London conference has been allocated, and through which channels? Does that include support for displaced Sudanese in the region, particularly in Chad and South Sudan?

I turn to the subject of diplomacy. Before the International Development Committee, the Foreign Secretary told me that since the London conference he has had separate conversations on Sudan with the UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. He did not elaborate, however, so perhaps the Minister can. Have these conversations produced any tangible progress? If not, should the Prime Minister become involved to drive action at a higher level?

The war in Sudan is being worsened by outside state actors offering diplomatic, financial and sometimes military support to the warring parties. I am pleased that Britain has consistently expressed opposition to such behaviour, but words are not enough. It has been consistently reported and alleged, most prominently by The New York Times, that the UAE has been funnelling weapons to the RSF. The UN’s panel of experts on Sudan told the Security Council that those allegations are credible.

The UAE is a significant buyer of British military exports, so its purported actions raise serious concerns in relation to the strategic export licensing criteria. Not only are they a material consideration in relation to the risk of diversion, but they violate the spirit of other criteria. The FCDO is vital to decisions made by the export control joint unit, so I ask the Minister what assessment she has made of the reports that the UAE is supplying weapons to the RSF. That is a question that I have asked of her and the Foreign Secretary, and I have since received an inadequate response from the Minister for Africa. I will be grateful if the Minister can say what view the Government take of the compatibility of such actions with the strategic export licensing criteria.

It is not only arms that are fuelling this war; it is also gold. In response to a written question in June, the Government told me that since the war began,

“the UK has frozen the assets of nine commercial entities linked to the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces.”

With the exception of the November sanctions on two RSF commanders, all those measures were imposed under the last Government. It has been more than a year since this Government took office—a year in which famine conditions were confirmed, and in which almost nothing has been done to address Sudan’s war through further sanctions. Why? It is good that three Russian entities linked to Sudan’s illicit gold trade have been sanctioned, but Russia is not the only implicated nation. It is not even the most significant. By far the most important player in the global trade of Sudanese conflict gold is the UAE, so why have no steps been taken to impose consequences on the UAE for its role in that trade?

To make a dent on the global trade in Sudanese blood gold, Britain would have to use sanctions strategically with a view to dismantling entire systems, as opposed to merely punishing one or two offenders. We will have to work closely with willing partners, particularly the EU, Canada, the Nordic states and the United States. Can the Minister assure me that these conversations are ongoing?

Simultaneously, we must drive high-level initiatives to bring key commanders and external actors to the table. There are reports of a new peace framework taking shape in Washington—one built not on inclusion and democracy but, it seems, on power sharing, resource control and the legitimisation of the SAF and the RSF. A deal must not be made by outside states over the head of the Sudanese people, so I am glad to see the Foreign Secretary’s commitment to a Sudanese-led transition to civilian government and to extending the UN fact-finding mission to Sudan, investigating human rights abuses and crimes. However, the Government can and should be doing more to support Sudanese civil society and democratic groups, both in Sudan and in exile.

I am aware that the Government, through Global Partners Governance, help to fund the anti-war, pro-democracy coalition. How is the Government ensuring that these groups in exile remain representative and accountable to the Sudanese people? Can the Minister outline the recent work of the UK special envoy to Sudan? How is the special envoy engaging with pro-democracy organisations and diaspora groups, particularly those in exile throughout the region? We must work with as many like-minded partners as possible and with willing allies such as Canada, the Nordic states and others. Can the Minister share how Britain is building diplomatic support for an inclusive peace process, centred on the civilian democratic voices in Sudan for a sustainable peace?