Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Mike Wood and Steve Darling

Committee stage
Thursday 6th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mike Wood (Kingswinford and South Staffordshire) (Con)]

The clauses outline the steps and safeguards before the Minister may impose a penalty. Getting these provisions right, ensuring that due process is followed, affected individuals and businesses have a right to respond and penalties are not imposed arbitrarily, is crucial.

Clause 56 sets out the procedural rights of a person facing a penalty. It ensures that penalties are not imposed without the affected party first being allowed an opportunity to respond. Subsection (2) requires that a notice of intent be given to any person facing a penalty, inviting them to make representations before a final decision is made. Under subsection (3), the notice of intent must include the amount of the proposed penalty, the reasons for imposing a penalty of that amount, and the means by which representations may be made, as well as the timescale for doing so.

As we are approaching the end of part 1, I know that the Government will be disappointed if I do not have a long list of questions on these provisions for the Minister. A theme from Tuesday’s sessions was the time limit on representations. The Bill states that individuals and businesses must be given a minimum of 28 days to make representations. There is a little more flexibility in the provisions we debated on Tuesday, but do the Government intend to set a maximum limit, whether in the legislation or perhaps the code of practice, on the number of days that would be available for such representations? If not, how will it be ensured that the process does not become excessively prolonged, as the Minister spoke about on Tuesday? As well as causing delay for the public authority seeking to recover funds, it might cause uncertainty for businesses and individuals. We are also interested to hear about guidance that might be issued on when it would be appropriate to vary the 28 days and allow a longer period for representation in order to strike a balance.

On the issue of authorised officers, and assuming that the decisions are being delegated, the Minister has previously referred to the Carltona principle whereby Ministers can delegate decision-making and executive powers to appropriate officials. In the light of the Government’s intention to repeal the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023, I am interested to know whether they have assessed the impact that might have on the operation of the Carltona principle in these circumstances. The principle is derived from pre-second world war case law, but it was significantly weakened in the Gerry Adams challenge. It was one of the things the previous Government were seeking to change, as a response to amendments in the House of Lords to re-establish the principle. In the absence of the 2023 Act, will the principle still be legally robust enough to allow the delegation that the Government intend under this Bill?

We assume that the decision on whether to maintain, reduce or cancel a proposed penalty will be made by an authorised officer rather than the Minister for the Cabinet Office, so will the Minister set out the level of seniority of the authorised officers within the PSFA and how that decision was reached? What training will those officers be required to undergo for this specific function, and what steps is the PSFA expected to put in place to ensure consistency in decision making across different cases?

Clause 57 outlines the process for issuing a penalty decision notice once a final decision has been made. Again, the requirements in the clause appear to be sensible and necessary if we are to ensure that individuals and organisations are fully informed of their liability and have an opportunity to challenge decisions that they believe to be incorrect or unfair, so we support the clause standing part of the Bill.

Clause 58 deals with reviews of penalty decisions. I have a few questions about who in the PSFA or Government will conduct the review. Who will ensure that they are properly separate from the individual decision-making process and if the reviews are to be conducted by officials, what will be the level of seniority required?

The clauses set out important procedural safeguards that seem to be appropriate to ensure penalties are not imposed unfairly. If we are given clarification regarding the degree of discretion available, the seniority, and training in decision making and the safeguards that ensure fairness, we will be content for the clauses to stand part of the Bill.

[Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. The Liberal Democrats broadly welcome the proposals in the clauses. Safeguarding people is an essential part of the Bill. I suspect we will go into that in greater depth as we embark on part 2.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Mike Wood and Steve Darling

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mike Wood (Kingswinford and South Staffordshire) (Con)]

Clause 13 sets out that the Minister can use powers to recover amounts from a penalty, such as late payment, but also relevant costs to be awarded by a court or tribunal. Relevant costs rightly also include costs that are reasonably incurred by the Minister in exercising the powers in chapter 4.

Can the Minister share details on what this measure might include? What is reasonable and what are the expected amounts that might be recovered in this way? Does this also cover legal costs—for example, court fees and legal representation? Will it include investigatory costs, such as the use of forensic accountants or data analysts? Does it extend to administrative costs, such as the work of civil servants processing cases? How is reasonableness to be determined within these clauses? What criteria or guidelines will be used to assess whether a cost is reasonable and will there be an independent review process to prevent excessive or disproportionate costs from being been claimed? Will the affected individuals or entities have the right to challenge, at an appropriately early stage, costs that they deem to be unreasonable?

On the expected scale of the costs, do the Government have an estimate of the average cost that could be incurred and recovered under these provisions, and will there be caps or limits on the amount that can be recovered from an individual or organisation? Does the Minister expect those to vary? How will cost recovery be monitored and reported to ensure transparency?

Given the potential financial impact on those subject to enforcement proceedings, it is crucial that clear safeguards, transparency and accountability mechanisms are in place to ensure that costs remain proportionate and fair. I would appreciate further detail from the Minister about how these costs will be defined, managed and reviewed.

Clause 14 provides that the Minister can recover an amount due in respect of a penalty only when the time for appealing has passed without an appeal, or any appeal has been finally determined. We think that that is perfectly sensible and will support the clause.

[Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)]

In the oral evidence, Professor Levi highlighted some powers regarding asset freezing that the police have had since 2017. I would welcome the Minister’s reflections on whether these powers could have a significant impact in this area of the law—in particular, whether they would apply to international organisations, and the impact on individuals. I think that would be helpful to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mike Wood]

Clause 17 establishes that when a payable amount is recoverable, the Minister can issue an order for direct deductions from a liable person’s bank account, either through regular deductions or a lump sum payment, as she said. Clause 18 further clarifies that those deductions can be taken from any account in which the liable person has a beneficial interest. That is extremely important, given the difficulty in establishing the different networks of bank accounts that may be held, particularly in cases of serious and organised fraud. We welcome the flexibility the clause introduces.

Although the provisions aim to improve efficiency in recovering public funds, there are still questions regarding fairness, proportionality and the safeguards that are in place, starting with the definition of beneficial interest in clause 18. Clause 18(1) allows the Minister to make an order on an account that is held by the liable person and contains an amount that the Minister considers the liable person has a beneficial interest in. What criteria or evidence does the Minister expect the PSFA to use in determining a person’s beneficial interest in an account, given the complex ownership and title structures that may be in place? On the flip side of that, how will the rights of third parties be protected, particularly if funds belong to someone other than the liable person that might be held in a shared account?

That brings us to the question of joint accounts. Clause 20 assumes that a joint account is split equally between account holders unless the Minister has reason to believe otherwise. What types of evidence would be accepted to demonstrate that the liable person’s beneficial interest is different from an equal split? The Minister referred to bank statements, but would those investigating also look at legal documents or perhaps third-party testimony? Would that be appropriate in some circumstances? Will additional checks be carried out to ensure that joint account holders are not unfairly penalised for debts that might not be theirs? It is not uncommon for people in marriages or long-term partnerships to have a domestic joint account. It might well be that one of the partners in the relationship is, in practical terms, paying more into an account, but also using the account more than the other partner, despite the two names being equally on the face of the account.

Clause 21, on the notice and the right to respond, sets out the process of notifying banks and liable persons before deductions are made, and includes provision allowing them to make representations within 28 days. The clause allows the Minister to notify the bank first before informing the liable person, to prevent account closure, asset withdrawal or other measures being taken to deprive the taxpayer of the recovery of sums that might rightfully be recoverable. Can the Minister point to a precedent for that approach in other areas of law? How does that align with best practices in financial enforcement?

Although clause 21 allows the liable person to make representations to the Minister, there is not an explicit provision for an independent appeal mechanism. Is there a reason why the Bill does not provide for such a process? Would the Government consider an independent review mechanism, beyond the systematic review that is in place for the Bill, to ensure that decisions are fair and transparent and do not disproportionately affect people in individual cases?

To go back to the potential risks of financial and domestic abuse that I touched on earlier, deducting money from joint accounts could create serious risks for individuals in financially abusive relationships. What safeguards will be put in place to prevent financial hardship, particularly for vulnerable individuals who might not actually be responsible for the debts that the PSFA seeks to recover? What specialist training will staff receive to identify and mitigate the risk of financial or domestic abuse? The effectiveness of the measures will depend on strong safeguards, clear guidance and robust oversight mechanisms to ensure fairness and proportionality. I would appreciate further clarification from the Minister on those points.

[Steve Darling]

I rise to speak about clause 20 in particular. Liberal Democrats are heartened by clause 18, which clearly says that if there is another account the money could be drawn from, that will be utilised. However, we are particularly concerned about coercive and controlling relationships.

In my 30 years serving the people of Torbay as a councillor, I found on a number of occasions that people who are happy to conduct fraud against other parties, whether the state or other organisations, are often very happy to financially abuse their partners as well. That leaves their partners in a very vulnerable situation. I found that often the individuals affected are very trusting people who have vulnerabilities elsewhere in their lives, which would be recognised by the Department for Work and Pensions if it were supporting them.

I really want to hear from the Minister how the DWP is going to support people and be alive to the risk. It is about making sure that there is a culture of knowledge of the issue among the investigators. Although it is essential that we get the money from fraud in, we do not want collateral damage on people who have been abused.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mike Wood]

Clause 19 grants the Minister significant powers to obtain financial information from banks before making a direct deduction order, including the ability to request three months of bank statements, or perhaps statements covering a longer period where specified. The power to issue an account information notice requires banks to provide statements to determine what deduction should be made, and the power to issue a general information notice requires banks to disclose an individual’s account details, balances and correspondence addresses.

Clearly, in many investigations there will be good reason why some or all of that information is necessary, appropriate and justified. Of course, some of the information will be extremely sensitive, so we need necessary safeguards and appropriate oversight to ensure that sensitive information is requested and subsequently shared only where it is directly necessary to the investigation, and where the Minister or PSFA has justifiable grounds to think either that an error is costing the public sector significant amounts of money or that there has been a case of deliberate fraud. As I said about the previous grouping, a prohibition on banks informing the liable person that an information notice has been issued is a sensible measure to prevent that person from taking action to frustrate attempts to recover money that ought to be recovered—they could, for example, empty their account before deductions could take place. In principle, we support powers designed to ensure effective debt recovery under the right circumstances and when used in the right way, but there are several concerns regarding proportionality and oversight when it comes to protecting legitimate privacy rights.

First, on the unlimited timeframe for bank statements, clause 19 states that the Minister must obtain at least three months’ worth of statements, but can request a longer period if specified in the notice. What criteria will determine whether more than three months of statements is needed? Is there a reason why no upper limit is specified within the clause on how far back those requests can go? Clearly, the further back that requests are made for a bank statement, the greater the risk that they could lead to overly intrusive requests that may not be entirely necessary for the debt recovery.

On the broad information-gathering powers, the general information notice allows the Minister to demand a full list of all accounts held by the liable person, their details and their addresses. Presumably, that is for the specific financial institution that the notice refers to. Are there any safeguards to prevent excessive or disproportionate use of those notices? Must there be a reasonable suspicion or at least a threshold to be met before those powers can be exercised? The Bill states that the Minister can only request information to exercise their core functions, but that is obviously a very broad measure so could be interpreted very broadly.

Banks would be prohibited from informing the liable person that an information notice had been issued. Although that prevents individuals from evading deductions, it means that they may be unaware of a Government investigation into their finances even after the event. Are there any circumstances in which the liable person might be informed that their financial data has been accessed—perhaps after an investigation has been closed? Does the Minister envisage any independent oversight to ensure that those powers are used proportionately?

On the burden on banks and financial institutions, on which my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon and I have tabled amendments to be debated later in the proceedings, these powers will require banks to process and respond to Government information notices, likely adding costs and administrative burdens to those institutions. Have the Government consulted with financial institutions to assess how proportionate the kinds of requests envisaged under the Bill are, the ease or the difficulty of compliance, and the estimated cost to banks and the financial sector? During evidence last week, some financial institutions did not seem to have any idea of what scale of burden that would be putting on their members. Again, a large part of this came back to the lack of visibility of draft codes of practice.

On privacy and data protection concerns, although the Bill states that the Minister can only request relevant information, that can be interpreted broadly. What legal protections exist to ensure that financial data is accessed and used appropriately for the very narrow purposes for which these clauses are intended? Will there be an independent review mechanism to assess whether those powers are used lawfully and proportionately?

Finally, given the wide-ranging implication of the powers, further clarity and safeguards are needed to balance effective debt recovery against individual privacy rights. I would welcome further details from the Minister on those critical issues, so that we can be comfortable going forward that the wide-ranging powers that we would be granting to the Minister and the PSFA cannot be misused and that individual privacy rights will be protected and respected.

[Steve Darling]

I ask the Minister to reflect on how speedily the Bill is going through Parliament. As we heard from the hon. Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire, financial institutions are not clear about the impact on or the cost to them. When we legislate in haste, challenges will often come out of the woodwork in the longer term. In this particular area, again, the issue is about the safeguards. We assume that we are dealing with reasonable people, but we do not have to look far in international news to see what can go wrong when unreasonable people gain power.

Where are the safeguards? When holding a Minister to account, it is often assumed that the Minister will be a reasonable person. Sadly, however, in the future the Minister may not be a reasonable person, so where are the safeguards for individuals? Also, as alluded to earlier in the debate, it would be helpful to have some assurance on the banks and the impact on them.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Mike Wood and Steve Darling

Committee stage
Thursday 27th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mike Wood]

Clause 3 would give the PSFA the power to issue information notices to a third party, compelling them to provide information within a deadline. The amendments set out the circumstances in which that would be done and set what we think is a perfectly reasonable test of reasonableness, as well as exploring the time provided for the recipients of notices to respond. Our amendments are designed to probe some areas of this process. The powers given to the Minister for the Cabinet Office in clause 3 are wide-ranging, so we wish to ensure that these are used reasonably and proportionately, and solely in connection with the explicit purpose of the Bill. We have tabled amendments 11, 10, 14, and 9 to that end.

We have to remember that the powers can be used against individuals and small businesses. While we might expect most of the notices to be issued against multinational companies, particularly financial institutions, we also need to consider those who do not have the capacity of larger organisations. The powers must be used reasonably and effectively in all circumstances.

Amendment 11 sets a reasonableness test relating to whether the information being requested is likely to relate to the fraud in question—for example, in private text messages—and therefore whether it is reasonable to ask for that information, and whether the cost involved in recovering the required information is likely to be reasonable and proportionate. The Minister referred to equivalent powers that are available in other forms of investigation that the Government and their agencies and bodies carry out. We see the reasonableness test as equivalent to that which HMRC must meet in its notices.

We also wish to ensure that the powers are not misused, and amendments 9 and 10 are directed towards that purpose. Although clause 3 states that the Minister can use the powers only against someone

“whom the Minister has reasonable grounds to suspect has committed fraud against a public authority”

the Bill provides no definition of “reasonable”, so amendments 9 and 10 are designed to fill some of that gap.

Amendment 10 specifies that the Minister for the Cabinet Office

“has reasonable grounds to suspect a person has committed fraud against a public authority if…there is an objective basis for the Minister’s suspicion based on facts, verifiable information or intelligence, and…a reasonable person would be entitled to reach same conclusion based on the same facts, information or intelligence.”

We want to be clear about what we do not think are reasonable grounds. These would include, for example, if the Minister’s suspicions were based in any way on a person’s physical appearance—protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010 that the person may have, or appear to the Minister to have—or were based solely on any generalisation or stereotype giving rise to a belief that certain groups or categories of people are more likely to be involved in criminal activity. We want to ensure that the powers are exercised responsibly and appropriately.

Amendment 9 gives the definition of “reasonable” as meaning that

“the Minister must have formed a genuine suspicion in their own mind, and the suspicion that fraudulent activity has taken place must be reasonable. This means that there must be an objective basis for that suspicion based on facts, verifiable information and or intelligence which indicate that fraudulent activity will be found, so that a reasonable person would be entitled to reach the same conclusion based on the same facts and information, and or intelligence.”

Amendments 9 and 10 are based on the reasonable grounds for suspicion that are contained in the PACE—the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—code A.

Bearing in mind that these powers will be exercised against individuals, some of whom might struggle to provide information, we want to probe the choice of 10 days as the timeframe in which to provide information. Amendment 14 increases the minimum notice period from 10 working days to 28, which is similar to the standard minimum time that people would expect to be given to respond to written requests for information from HMRC. Given the scope of the information that might be requested, appropriate time must be given to organisations and individuals to comply. External circumstances should also be taken into account when considering the time periods. If an individual is on annual leave or off sick for a few days, they may have less than a week to provide the information or they will face significant fines. That does not seem reasonable.

We are not necessarily saying that 28 days is a better time period than seven, but I would be grateful if the Minister explained why the Government set the minimum time that they did. That is particularly pertinent, as failure to provide the information required would carry a civil penalty of £300 a day, which, for an individual, can amount to a considerable sum of money very quickly.

In its current form, without being more specific about what it means to be “reasonable” or expanding the timeframes, we are a little concerned that the powers that clause 3 gives the Minister may not include the necessary checks and balances, so I would appreciate her reassurances on that point.

[Steve Darling]

Perhaps the word that the shadow Minister used most was “reasonableness”. In our strange political world in recent months, the question of what is reasonable in our society has changed significantly following the change of President in the United States. What normal society would expect is “reasonable” of an elected official, both here and in America, gives me, as a Liberal Democrat, cause for concern in relation to how we can make sure that a Bill like this, which gives very significant powers to the state, sets safeguards in stone to protect our communities. We will come to that later, but I would welcome reassurance from the Minister. Although I am sure that we are all reasonable people in this room, others who are unreasonable might take power at a later stage of our lives. With this legislation, how can we put safeguards in place? I hope that we will cover that later, but the Minister’s early thoughts would be welcome.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mike Wood]

The amendments are all about ensuring that there is not just independent oversight but an effective independent channel of appeal against information notices that does not just go back to the same organisation that issued the original notice. Clause 4 will allow for the person to whom the information notice is given to appeal the notice up to seven days after it is issued, but that appeal will go back to the Minister for the Cabinet Office—or, in practice, the PSFA—to review it and decide whether to revoke, amend or uphold the notice. As drafted, it gives the Minister significant power, as really the only responsible person who can review the decision to give the notice.

There therefore appears to be a significant lack of independent oversight. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why there is no ability to have an independent appeal of the kind that would generally take place against HMRC decisions and notices, through the first-tier tribunal. That is why we tabled amendments 15, 16, 17 and 18: to change the appeal body from the Minister for the Cabinet Office to the first-tier tribunal. We are concerned that, given it is the Minister who has been given the power to investigate fraud, it is then a case of allowing the Minister to mark their own homework if they—or the people acting on their behalf—review the decisions themselves.

I would like to understand the Minister’s view on whether that is an effective use of ministerial time and capacity. Does she envisage that any such appeal decisions would be delegated? In the amendments, we propose to replace the Minister with the first-tier tribunal in that process, which would be equivalent to the processes that would be expected when a decision of HMRC is reviewed. Our amendments would ensure that an independent third party is involved with the review process.

I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why there should be no ability for such an appeal to be made, whether it is made immediately against the notice for information or perhaps as a second appeal stage. We need to be satisfied that there is a good reason why people who are the subject of those notices, which may be quite onerous, particularly for individuals and smaller organisations, should not have the ability to appeal to an independent body. Normally, natural justice would assume that to be the case.

[Steve Darling]

I concur about the safeguarding of individuals. While there may be an independent reviewer or chair, the challenge, for me, is who appoints them. If it ends up being the Minister who appoints the chair, how independent will they be? Given what we are seeing elsewhere in the world, how do we ensure that we build a structure of independence into the Bill that we may not previously have thought was needed? I am somewhat supportive of the proposals from colleagues, but equally, I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say on the challenge.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mike Wood]

Sorry, it has been a while since I have been on a Bill Committee.

The amendments would allow the individual or organisation to apply for an extension to the 10 working days within which they are currently required to provide information requested in an information notice, if they are reasonably unable to comply. This is a common sense approach to support people who are engaging with the process and prevent them from being hit with penalties, which was never the intention of the legislation. This is also important because we do not know precisely what information the Minister will be able to ask individuals to provide, other than that an information notice cannot require the giving of particularly sensitive—such as excluded or special procedure—material, as defined in sections 11 to 14 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. This includes confidential business records or journalistic material. Otherwise, the Minister for the Cabinet Office has a very open-ended power to require different types of information. It would be helpful if the Minister could explain whether the Government would consider allowing those issued with information notices to apply specifically for an extension if they cannot reasonably provide the information within the time period requested.

[Steve Darling]

I can add very little to what the shadow Minister said. Again, I am broadly sympathetic on the need to have these safeguards in the legislation, and on not knowing what the practice notes are. We are very much in the dark, so that does give us cause for concern.

[Steve Darling]

I welcome that reassurance from the Minister, which we will take onboard.

[Mike Wood]

I thank the Minister for her response, which offered some moderate reassurance. We would be comfortable if either it was included in the Bill or we at least had sight of the code of practice, which will actually define that decision-making process. A fundamental flaw of this Bill Committee is that we are being asked to make decisions on something that may be produced in the future, of which we have no advanced sight. For now, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Steve Darling]

The Minister referred to a review process; it would be really helpful if the Committee could be aware of how long that process is likely to take.

[Mike Wood]

Clause 4 gives the Minister a considerable amount of power to compel individuals, as well as organisations, to provide an unspecified range of information within what could be very tight timescales, on pain of a fine of £300 a day if they fail to comply. The only route to appeal these powers is going back to the person or organisation that is exercising them, and we are concerned about the natural justice of this approach.

The legislation, as drafted, involves no impartial third party in the review process on a case-by-case basis, so it leaves individuals with nowhere else to go if they disagree with what is being asked for, or cannot practically comply with the request in the specified timeframe. Our amendments aim to balance these powers, and I am naturally disappointed that the Minister was unable to consider accepting at least some of them.