Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Mike Kane Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate - 9 February 2021: House of Commons
Tuesday 9th February 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Robert Courts)]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Charles. Clause 1 provides a definition of “airspace change proposal”, which is referred to in clauses 2 and 3. An airspace change proposal is a proposal that

“relates to managed airspace or the flight procedures or air traffic control procedures used within it”

and which is submitted to the Civil Aviation Authority for approval. The powers in part 1 of the Bill will provide vital support for a modernisation of our airspace, helping to make journeys quicker, quieter and cleaner, and to maintain the UK’s position as a world leader in aviation. Clause 1 is required in order to provide clarity on what is within the scope of the Secretary of State’s powers to direct, which we will come to under later clauses in part 1. I therefore beg to move that this clause remain part of the Bill.

[Mike Kane (Wythenshawe and Sale East) (Lab)]

I concur with the Minister: it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Charles.

This country has a world-class aviation sector—the third largest on the planet. We want to protect that, grow it and make it better. We also want to facilitate the study of STEM subjects—science, technology, engineering and maths—for all our young people who want to go in for it. We will get past this pandemic and we will keep our eyes on the horizon, and I think that this legislation will help us to do that.

We are discussing airspace modernisation in the UK. Our airspace is an invisible part of our vital infrastructure. It was originally designed in the 1950s and ’60s and therefore needs urgent modernisation. In fact, we now have an analogue system in a digital age. It needs to be upgraded. We support that ambition, and I know that the Minister is keen on that ambition as well.

In the other place, my noble Friend Lord Rosser pointed out that not only has airspace provision not been updated in this House since the ’50s or ’60s, but the provision for drone technology—my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South will deal with that when we get there—has not been updated since the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990, and he pointed out that that is closer to Yuri Gagarin’s first trip into space than it is to today. For the record, I point out that when Yuri Gagarin was the first cosmonaut, or the first human to enter the cosmos, on 12 April 1961, he came to the UK in July that year and landed at Manchester airport in my constituency. He was invited by the Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers. He visited their offices in Moss Side after he landed in my constituency and then went on to a civic reception at Manchester Town Hall. Members can tell that I am a Mancunian to the core, so I wanted to get that on the record.

We currently have the covid crisis and there is limited air traffic, but we need to ensure that our airspace—our infrastructure in the sky—is fit for a post-pandemic world. By simplifying UK airspace, we make it more efficient, it will deliver more precise and more direct routes, prevent rising delays and reduce congestion, and, more importantly in this eco-friendly world, it will become more sustainable. The Airport Operators Association is concerned about the lack of definition in the enforcement power in the clause. Although the Government have presented this as necessary for the implementation of airspace modernisation, a current or future Secretary of State could use the power for other airspace-related purposes.

I therefore again raise my concern, as I did on the Floor of the House last week, about the scope of the powers attributed to the Secretary of State for Transport by the clause. I understand that the Minister has engaged with the AOA over its concerns. Despite his assurances about the duty to consult—there is a robust appeals process—I still have misgivings as to why the Bill should not simply have a specific definition of the powers. I therefore ask the Minister to consider this matter and perhaps explain to the Committee why that has been omitted.

[Robert Courts]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for making those points. He is absolutely right to set this in an historic context, because this is an historic piece of legislation that updates an historic legacy airspace environment, and of course makes it fit for the new technology that we will discuss later. It will make a simpler, more efficient airspace.

Turning to the hon. Gentleman’s specific points on enforcements powers, his concern is that a future Secretary of State might use them for other airspace-related purposes. Any Bill has to be a balance between enabling the flexibility of the Government to take the steps required. Airspace in particular, as we will discuss when we come to drone technology, is in the vanguard of technological change, so there has to be an element of flexibility built in. I refer the hon. Gentleman and the Committee to the safeguards that exist within the remainder of this part of the Bill. I will stray from this clause in so referring to them but, with your permission, Sir Charles, I will briefly deal with them, and we will come back to them later when we get to clause 7.

There are, for example, some requirements in advance of the safeguard ever being used. It is intended to be a last resort if the airspace change is not progressed voluntarily. That is the Government’s initial intention. It is therefore to be limited, certainly at the outset. It is meant to be within the context of the CAA’s airspace strategy. The CAA’s oversight team is to work with airports before it recommends to the Secretary of State that the power is used. It is not intended to be used where there are factors outside the airspace sponsor’s control. So my first point is that before we ever get to the stage of the Secretary of State using his powers, there are numerous steps that ought to be taken in advance.

The Secretary of State’s reasons for so acting under clause 4 are expected to be in writing and are published, so there is democratic and press scrutiny of any such decision. We will come to clause 7 and enforcement and appeals in due course, but I will briefly refer to them now to address the point that the hon. Gentleman made. There are grounds for an appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunals: an error of fact that the decision was wrong in law, or discretion was exercised, but an error was made in the context of that discretion being exercised. This is a balanced act. There is a considerable amount of consultation or engagement in advance, and various safeguards are built in, which are very much on a par with what we seek in other regulatory spheres. For those reasons, I submit that no further definition is required.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

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[Robert Courts]

This clause gives the Secretary of State the power to direct a person involved in airspace change, following the consultation I referred to a moment ago, to prepare or submit an airspace change proposal to the CAA or take steps to obtain its approval following submission or to review its operation following implementation.

These powers will ensure that airspace change proposals that assist in delivery of the CAA’s airspace strategy can be taken forward if a sponsor does not do so voluntarily. We intend the powers to be used, at least initially, to deliver changes identified in the airspace change masterplan, as the intention is for this to be incorporated into the CAA’s airspace strategy. This will ensure that airspace modernisation can be achieved to deliver quicker, quieter and cleaner journeys.

Without this clause, the Secretary of State would not be able to ensure that airspace change proposals identified as being important in helping to deliver the CAA’s airspace strategy are taken forward. That would mean that an airport could hold up other airports if their airspace change proposals were interdependent, as many are and would be. The full benefits of modernisation would therefore not be realised without those powers.

[Mike Kane]

This takes us to the crux of the Bill. Upgrading UK airspace is a complex process at the best of times and in normal times, but we do not have normal times. It has to be paid for and delivered by the industry. While we support that, national air traffic control is responsible for modernisation of the en route network. Airports modernise approach and departure routes in their local airspace, through a process set out by the Civil Aviation Authority publication CAP1616. As modernisation is complex, particularly in the south-east of England, where there are high levels of interdependence between airports sharing the same airspace, the industry is committed to working to a masterplan. We know that the process is managed through the Airspace Change Organising Group, with oversight from the CAA, the DFT and, therefore, the Minister.

The pandemic has caused some of this work to slow down, which is my concern. The Minister knows that I have pushed him on this publicly and privately. Airports in the UK are close to mothballing at the moment—I am not going to be critical. We have asked for an aviation-specific support package, and I know that the Government have given some packages to airports and airlines, but we know they are in big trouble. They are huge capital assets that are bleeding cash as we speak and getting no passengers through, which is their key revenue. They are now beginning to shut down their airspace change teams—if not today, then in the next few weeks, if the Government’s package does not come through.

The Airspace Change Organising Group is still waiting for the funding promised last year by the Chancellor to continue its work. Without that, the modernisation of the UK’s airspace, where we have the third biggest industry on the planet, world beating and world leading, will fail. The impact of covid on the industry’s finances makes paying for the programme even more difficult. The Airport Operators Association has suggested that the Government should consider helping out with the costs, as airports lead the way for our UK economy out of the pandemic.

The Minister and I share the same enthusiasm for this, and we both agree that there is an urgent requirement for airspace to be modernised in order to achieve the environmental, noise and operational benefits. Therefore, I cannot see how the Bill will ensure that will happen. How can this clause ensure that Government direction will be followed when the sector simply does not have the means to pay for it currently? That is my main point for the Minister today.

[Robert Courts]

Clearly, the Government recognise the great challenge that the aviation sector faces at the moment. I will not rehearse the wide economic measures that the Government have undertaken in order to support all businesses—I know that the shadow Minister is aware of those and I would drift a long way from the purpose of the Bill if I did rehearse them. However, I will refer to the business rates relief that we introduced recently, and I will observe that, although covid is clearly having a substantial impact on the industry, aviation will recover in the long term. It will remain a central part of the UK—of its trade policy, its strategy and its place in the world. It is a successful—indeed, world-leading—industry, as the hon. Gentleman quite rightly referred to it, and I am confident that it will return to that place in due course.

It is a long-standing policy that those who benefit from an aviation policy—air passengers—ought to pay for it. It is therefore right that we continue that policy within the context of the Bill. However, in the event that there are some aspects in relation to which the Government might consider taking an alternative view when looking for the ability to fund airspace change, the ability to fund will need to be taken into account in deciding whether or not to give such a direction, because that is what we are dealing with here—whether the Secretary of State directs that an airport should bring an airspace change forward. The Secretary of State will continue to consider the ability to fund as a part of that process.

The Government recognise that there may be occasions when small airports require financial assistance to carry out some aspects of an airspace change proposal. We would expect the CAA’s oversight team to work with the airport operator before recommending that the Secretary of State use those powers in the first place with regard to an airspace change proposal. If at that time the airport operator expressed concern that it did not have sufficient funding for it to proceed with a particular proposal, we would expect that oversight team to suggest alternative solutions.

There are a number of possible alternative solutions, and I will quickly refer to them: an alternative sponsor might pay for the changes; or there might be alternative funding support; or there may be, on a case-by-case basis, Government funding under section 34(1)(b) of the Civil Aviation Act 1982, if an ACP were to have an adverse financial impact. We are a long way away from that circumstance, as there are a number of steps that we could take in due course. In any event, the funding—the payment basis—would be taken into account before it is directed that those powers are exercised.

[Mike Kane]

I thank the Minister for that response. I think that we will have numerous conversations in the months ahead about the mechanisms, which he has quite rightly outlined, that he can use to bring forward the airspace modernisation programme. We must not fail on this programme, because it is vital for the industry, including for its confidence as we bounce back post pandemic, hopefully later this year. I will continue to hold the Minister’s feet to the fire on this issue, if he does not mind—and I will do so even if he does mind.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Direction to co-operate in airspace change proposal

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Robert Courts]

This clause gives the Secretary of State a power to direct a person involved in airspace change to co-operate with another person involved in airspace change. This direction might be needed if, for example, the original sponsor was unable to progress an airspace change proposal, so that someone else agrees to progress it but requires assistance from the original sponsor in order to do so.

Without the clause, an ACP that was identified as being important in delivering the CAA’s airspace strategy may not be taken forward if the original sponsor is unwilling, or unable, for any reason—such as those we have touched on already, or for other reasons—to take the ACP forward. The clause is therefore important to ensure that if an alternative sponsor were to become involved in progressing an ACP, the original sponsor can be compelled, if necessary, to co-operate in ways that the Secretary of State considers appropriate, such as providing information and documents to enable that ACP to progress.

Again, this measure is intended to ensure that airspace modernisation can be achieved quickly, in order to deliver the quicker, quieter and cleaner journeys that we would all like to see.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Directions under sections 2 and 3: supplemental

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Robert Courts]

This clause gives the Secretary of State powers to delegate the Secretary of State’s functions under clauses 2 to 4 to the CAA, with a notice of this in writing to be published by the CAA. It enables the Secretary of State’s direction-making powers to be delegated to the CAA should this prove to be desirable in the future.

The CAA, as the national airspace regulator, has the expertise to take on this role if so required. Given that both the Secretary of State and the CAA have various roles in relation to airspace change, it is clear that appropriate internal governance structures would need to be put in place in both organisations to manage any possible conflict of interest risks, as required.

Without the clause, the Secretary of State would lack the flexibility to be able to delegate functions to the CAA, and would therefore need to amend this primary legislation should it prove desirable in the future to delegate such functions. Although such circumstances are not currently foreseen, a lack of flexibility could risk delivering the CAA’s airspace strategy and the successful delivery of the airspace modernisation programme if circumstances arise in the future whereby the Secretary of State was no longer better placed to exercise those direction-making powers.

[Mike Kane]

As the Minister eloquently outlines, this will give the Secretary of State the power to delegate to the CAA. However, the Minister will be aware that the Airport Operators Association believes that there is a fundamental conflict of interest with this proposal, and I would like to explore that for a few minutes. The Government have sought to reassure Parliament and the industry that appropriate separation would be maintained with the CAA in the exercise of these functions. Although there may be a significant extent to which this is possible in theory, it fails to address the perception challenge. In particular, the regulator is opened up to criticism for bias from parties which have agreed with the specific CAP1616 policies I referred to earlier being mandated. Some communities around airports already believe that the CAA is biased towards industry, and this would help neither that perception, nor the importance of rebuilding trust between the aviation sector industry, the regulators and communities.

When we debated the Bill on the Floor of the House last week, a number of colleagues on the Government Benches pointed out that communities often feel overlooked when it comes to airspace change and noise. I know this is of particular concern to a number of Conservative Members who raised it last week.

Could there be a conflict of interest where the Secretary of State can delegate power to enforce a programme to the CAA? Does the Minister think that? Does the Minister agree with the Airport Operators Association that the CAA is established to act as a neutral adjudicator of CAP1616 proposals? If the regulator is asked to enforce an ACP, is it being asked to mandate an application that it will have to make a judgment of suitability on? Is there a conflict of interest with the CAA being delegated enforcement powers when it is also responsible for making the judgment on suitability? It appears that it will act as both judge and jury, and I hope that the Minister will explore that conflict today.

[Robert Courts]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising those points. There are a number of answers that I will give—perhaps three. First, there is the safeguard to which I referred to at the beginning of our debate, which is an overarching safeguard in any event against any decision that is made. Secondly, there is the CAP1616 process, which stands out with this Bill. It is a consultation process that started in 2018, so it is relatively recent. That will enable a great deal more consultation for local communities than in the past, and will help to manage such concerns.

With regards to the thrust of the hon. Gentleman’s points on the internal potential for a conflict of interest, I accept that in delegatory responsibility terms there will be a need to ensure that such governance structures are in place. I stress that we do not plan to delegate these at present, but that is in order to build in flexibility for the Bill in future. Such internal governance structures would need to be put in place to manage any potential conflict to which, quite rightly, he alerts us.

The CAA has already created an internal governance structure that separates out its role in tracking airspace change proposals and advising on the use, powers and decisions on ACPs. For example, this includes different directors, with decision making kept separate up to board level. The CAA is able to create a new team to take on responsibilities related to directing an ACP, should this power be delegated to it by the Secretary of State. Those structures will need to be created; I am confident that they can be.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Provision of information

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Robert Courts]

This is a slightly difficult aspect and, if I may, I will add one or two extra words. As it is slightly complicated, it is worth going through it slowly.

Council Regulation (EEC) No. 95/93 requires airlines with allocated slots at level 3 airports to use those slots at least 80% of the time in the preceding scheduling period, in order to retain that slot in the upcoming equivalent period. Prior to the covid-19 pandemic, that 80:20 rule of “use it or lose it” helped to encourage efficient use of scarce airport capacity. It also allowed a degree of flexibility for airlines and their operations. There are eight slot-constrained airports in the UK, to which the 80:20 rule applies: Birmingham, Bristol, Gatwick, Heathrow, London City, Luton, Manchester and Stansted.

Due to the unprecedented impact of covid-19, in March last year, the European Commission took the decision to waive the 80:20 rule. Airport co-ordinators were instructed under that waiver, when determining slot allocation for the upcoming summer season, to consider slots as having been operated, regardless of whether they were used. That covered the summer 2020 season and was subsequently extended to cover winter 2020-21.

The UK supported the European Commission’s position. Without that alleviation, airlines may have incurred significant financial costs by operating flights at low-load factors needed to retain those slots. Alleviation has helped to protect future connectivity and airline finances, and reduced the risk of empty or near-empty ghost flights being run to retain the slots, which would have a financial impact on airlines as well as an environmental impact. We anticipate that the effects of covid-19 on the airline industry will regrettably continue for some time. Passenger demand is not predicted to return to 2019 levels until at least 2023.

After the EU transition period ended on 31 December, regulation 95/93 was retained in UK law. However, when it was retained, the power of the Commission to extend the period of alleviation from the 80:20 rule, which was transferred to the Secretary of State, was expressly limited to 2 April 2021. We expect disruption to air travel to continue for a number of years, so it is imperative that the UK has at its disposal the powers to provide alleviation, should the evidence suggest that that is warranted.

Returning to the 80:20 rule, while the covid-19 disruption continues, it might mean that some airlines will protect their commercial interest in retaining their slots by operating fights with empty or near-empty aircraft, despite the associated costs, both financial and environmental. Without this clause, the Government would be unable to provide flexibility on slot usage to deal with the ongoing impacts of the covid-19 pandemic at slot co-ordinated airports beyond the summer 2021 season. That flexibility will also provide certainty, to enable airlines to manage their slots efficiently.

This clause inserts a new article, 10aa, into retained Council regulation 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of slots in UK airports. This would provide the Secretary of State with a power to provide air carriers with an alleviation of the requirement to operate slots allocated to them 80% of the time in order to retain those slots in the next equivalent scheduling period. This power would be exercisable until 24 August 2024—so it is time limited—and for scheduling periods up to and including winter 2024-25. To allow for flexibility, this clause also includes powers to modify the 80% requirement relating to slots usage, which will be an alternative to applying a full alleviation of the 80:20 rule for a specified scheduling season. This recognises that there might be alternative ratios that could be applied to ensure the efficient use of slots, and then moving back to 80:20 as demand recovers. The Secretary of State will also be able to make certain other modifications to the slot usage rule: for example, setting a deadline for the return of slots not intended for operation, or providing that a waiver should not apply to slots of an airline that ceases operations at an airport.

This clause will also allow the Secretary of State to make certain other changes to the operation of the rules relating to the allocation of slots under regulation 95-93. For example, the Government could change co-ordination parameters to reflect partial closures of airports, adopt temporary rules for the most efficient allocation of unused slots to new entrants, or give the slot co-ordinator enforcement powers, such as where unused slots are not returned with sufficient time to enable them to be effectively re-allocated. Having the powers to vary the 80:20 ratio and modify the operation of the rule in this way will allow appropriate measures to support the sector’s recovery as passenger demand for flights returns. Any such changes would be based on an assessment of the current situation, and would be supported by evidence based on the latest available data.

[Mike Kane]

The Minister was right to spend a little extra time focusing on this clause, because it will be extraordinarily important in the years to come, as the aviation sector tries to recover. It came into focus this year that one of our national carriers was not acting in the national interest, by using the pandemic to change the terms and conditions of tens of thousands of its workforce. National carriers should always act in the national interest. I am glad to see that some of that damage between the workforce and the management is currently being repaired.

However, it was this national carrier’s grandfathered rights—particularly at Heathrow, and the way it wanted to retain its rights at Gatwick but move out its operation—that brought this issue into focus. Again, it did not seem fair or right to use what is almost a monopoly bias in what, in my opinion, is a very large closed shop when it comes to slots. If I remember rightly, in “Henry V”, when the Archbishop of Canterbury is trying to explain female hereditary rights in Salic law, Shakespeare says something that we could also say about airport slots: it is as clear as mud. I am afraid that is what airport slots are, which is why I think this will be dodgy territory—not party-politically dodgy territory in particular, but for the Secretary of State and the Minister over the next four or five years, whoever they are.

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[Robert Courts]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for those points. I enjoyed his Shakespearean reference, and I understand it entirely. This is a rather tricky part of the Bill and it took a while for us all to get our heads around it, particularly where the statutory instruments fit in, earlier in the year. He raises a number of points, and it is important to distinguish between what we are dealing with here and the wider policy aspect.

The issue of which airline has which slot is dealt with by Airport Coordination Ltd, independently of Government. The hon. Gentleman refers to a carrier being perceived to have not acted in the national interest. The Government do not involve themselves in that; it is dealt with by ACL. The wider future policy aspect is another matter, which I will come to in due course. However, he refers to grandfather rights, which I will deal with at this stage.

Obviously, we recognise that we have the ability to change the policy now that we have left the European Union’s transition period, and we will look at future slots policy in due course. Clearly, any further amendment of policy will require significant consultation and engagement with industry, and will require a good long look at what the ongoing policy will be. We are dealing here with the extraordinary times in which we live, in order to cope with the suppressed demand. There are slightly different imperatives between what we are dealing with today and what the hon. Gentleman is pressing me to look at. It is more a question of where and how we look at it. I suggest that it is not appropriate to look at that issue here.

The hon. Gentleman asks me if the date can be brought forward. The date is there because that is the date of the expected demand recovery that I referred to in my opening remarks. It means that, regrettably, we are not expecting demand to recover to 2019 levels until around 2023, or roughly that time. That means that the date in the Bill is what is required to enable that power to exist, should we require it. That date is in there because of the time taken to recover. I will add two points. First, any such decision has to be taken on the basis of data and market conditions at the time. I hope that is a reassuring factor for hon. Members. Secondly, this is a power and not an obligation. If the Secretary of State looked at that data and decided that the power was required, it would be open to him or her to exercise that power. The fact that the power is there does not mean that it has to be used. That is the reason it is there. As for conferring an unfair advantage, the power gives the opportunity for conditions to be attached. There is greater flexibility with regards to the wider policy perspective in the Bill than at present. We would have to go further into primary legislation after the usual process if we wanted to do anything further. I hope that gives the hon. Gentleman the reassurance that we have done what we can at this time and some reassurance as to the reason for the timescale.

[Mike Kane]

I am grateful to the Minister for his considered explanation. I hope that, in the cross-party nature of getting this right, he will commit to keeping an open mind about ensuring that new operators coming into the market will not be competitively disadvantaged by the clause. I want to work with him on that over the next few years to make sure that that is not the case and that we reactivate our aviation industry from this pandemic as soon as we possibly can.

[Robert Courts]

I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s comment and the constructive nature of that engagement. I am committed to working with him to ensure that we get future aviation policy right.

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[Robert Courts]

Clause 13 introduces schedule 8 to the Bill. This makes provision about general powers of police officers in relation to offences involving the use of unmanned aircraft and also amends sections 93 and 94 of the Police Act 1997. Without this clause, schedule 8 would not form part of the Bill.

Schedule 8 provides the police, the civil nuclear constabulary, and custodial institutions with the powers they need to protect the public from the unlawful use of unmanned aircraft. Schedule 8 contains powers for a police constable: first, the power to require a person to ground an unmanned aircraft if they have reasonable grounds for believing that person to be controlling it and if they have reasonable grounds for suspecting that it has been, is or is likely to be, used in the commission of an offence; secondly, the power to stop and search persons or vehicles where the constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting they will find an unmanned aircraft, and that it is or has been involved in the commission of certain offences under the Air Navigation Order 2016 or a relevant prison offence, such as assisting a prisoner to escape or conveying illicit articles into or out of a prison; and also, the power to enter and search premises under warrant.

Schedule 8 also amends section 93 of the Police Act 1997 so that counter-unmanned aircraft technology, which involves interference with property or wireless telegraphy, can be authorised in relation to certain offences involving unmanned aircraft. The Police Act 1997 is also amended so that the CNC and specified officers and staff in custodial institutions such as prisons may authorise this technology in relation to certain offences involving unmanned aircraft. Such unlawful use of unmanned aircraft can pose safety and national security risks, particularly around critical national infrastructure and prisons. For example, serious and organised crime groups currently use unmanned aircraft to deliver contraband into prisons, which threatens safety, destabilises prisons and undermines the efforts of hard-working staff and prison officers in delivering effective rehabilitative regimes.

It is therefore essential that custodial institutions are able to disrupt the supply of contraband by criminal gangs using unmanned aircraft and to maintain the security and the safety of prisons and their staff. Similarly, civil nuclear sites, which include some of the UK’s most sensitive assets, must be protected from unlawful unmanned aircraft use. The powers in the schedule enable the CNC to respond more effectively to unmanned aircraft incidents at civil nuclear sites. Stop-and-search powers and powers of entry and search under warrant are necessary for the police to be able to investigate offences effectively.

Take a scenario in which an unmanned aircraft is being flown in the flight restriction zone of a protected aerodrome. The police arriving at the scene suspect that they have identified the individual who was the remote pilot. The constable suspects the remote pilot has breached article 94A of the ANO 2016—the navigation order—by flying at or near the aerodrome without permission. However, the remote pilot has already ceased flying and put the unmanned aircraft in their car. Currently, the police have no powers to search the car for the unmanned aircraft, so no action can be taken. The powers in the Bill would permit the vehicle to be searched in such circumstances. Without the schedule, the ability of police, prison officers and the CNC to protect the public and our critical national infrastructure and prisons from the unlawful use of unmanned aircraft would be limited.

Briefly, Government amendment 2 to schedule 8 is a simple amendment to correct an omission in the Bill. Paragraph 5 of schedule 8 sets out the meaning of a “relevant unmanned aircraft offence”. As currently drafted, the offences in the Air Navigation Order 2016 included in the definition are summary only offences. In relation to Scotland, the definition should also include offences in the ANO 2016, which are triable either way or on indictment. Such offences were included in the definition of “relevant offences” in the Bill as introduced in the other place in January 2020. They were inadvertently omitted from the Government’s amendments tabled on Report in the other place, when the provisions setting out the definitions that apply in relation to the power to enter and search under warrant, and the supplementary power to retain evidence seized, were restructured.

If the amendment is not accepted, there would be no power for a justice of the peace, a summary sheriff or a sheriff in Scotland to issue to a constable a warrant to enter and search premises in relation to offences in the ANO that relate to unmanned aircraft and that can be tried under indictment. Nor would the supplementary power for a constable to retain items seized using powers in schedule 8 for forensic examination, investigation or as evidence at a trial apply in relation to such offences. The policy intention behind the Bill remains unchanged, and the amendment would not add to any offences or powers that were not already in the Bill as it was introduced in January 2020.

[Mike Kane]

The rapid deployment of drone technology offers great benefits for society, but as the Minister points out, it can also pose great threats. Clause 13, which deals with the powers of police officers and prison officers, is important. When the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) was Prime Minister in 2018, Gatwick was brought to a complete halt by the use of drones, and we did not have the powers to stop it. The Opposition are supportive of the clause. The Minister and I cover the Maritime and Coastguard Authority, and the potential of drones in search-and-rescue operations—particularly some of the technology that great British manufacturers such as Airbus are developing to help with rescue operations on land and at sea—in the years ahead is really exciting.

We support the additional powers. We agree with the British Airline Pilots Association and others that the powers are proportionate to the threat that unmanned aerial vehicles pose. There is a concern that the deterrents might not be a factor if the police are not sufficiently resourced for the powers, and I have some questions for the Minister. Do the police have the capability to bring down drones? We want to be tough on drones and tough on the causes of drones in the wrong places. Do the police have the resources to detect misuse and breaches of protected airspace? A final worry is whether this legislation will keep up to date with the rapidly changing use of unmanned vehicles in the UK.

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[The Chair]

Might I say that I think I heard the Minister make a point of order? That is what I was meant to hear. That was not entirely a point of order, Minister, but it was rather brilliantly put.

[Mike Kane]

On a point of order, Sir Charles. The American sociologist Margaret Mead said we should never doubt that a small group of committed people could change the world, because nothing else in history ever has done. Well done to all Members today; there was thorough scrutiny of the Bill.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South and his staff for helping with the heavy lifting, and the Whips for keeping us safe. Today, democracy was seen to be done and to be in action, despite the pandemic. Sir Charles, thank you for your excellent chairing. To the Department for Transport civil servants and the Clerks of the House, my heartfelt thanks.