Free TV Licences: Over-75s
Mike Gapes Excerpts(4 years, 10 months ago)
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Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Change UK)
It is not just this issue that is affected by the way the funding arrangements have changed. Until 2010, the BBC World Service was funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but £253 million in funding was stopped and the BBC was given the responsibility. Does the Secretary of State accept that the FCO has subsequently given money to the BBC for language services, so there is a precedent? Could we get around this by the Government paying the entirety of the World Service funding as they used to, so that we would not have this problem?
Jeremy Wright
Well, I do not know whether that is a way to deal with the whole issue, as the hon. Gentleman suggests, but he is right to point out that since the licence fee settlement, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has announced direct funding, in fact, of £255 million over three years to support language services for the World Service. He is right to point out that other streams of income are involved, but of course, we are talking about very much larger sums than that over a prolonged period in connection with this concession.
Sub-Committee on Disinformation
Mike Gapes Excerpts(5 years, 1 month ago)
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Westminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Mike Gapes (in the Chair)
We begin with a Select Committee statement. Damian Collins will speak on the publication of the 10th report of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, on the launch of the Sub-Committee on Disinformation for up to 10 minutes, during which no interventions may be taken. At the conclusion of the statement, I will call hon. Members to put questions on the subject of the statement and call Damian Collins to respond to them in turn. Hon. Members can expect to be called only once. Questions should be brief. I call the Chair of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Damian Collins.
Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gapes. Earlier this week, the Select Committee published its 10th report on the creation of the Sub-Committee on Disinformation, which followed our reports on disinformation and fake news—the final report was published in February this year, with the interim report published in July last year. Our reports on that important subject were based on an inquiry that spanned about 18 months and that took in thousands of questions and many witnesses.
The focus on disinformation and fake news comes from our belief that there is a genuine danger to democracy and society in the deliberate and malicious targeting of disinformation at citizens, largely using social media to influence what they see and their opinions about politics, society and institutions. In the discussion about disinformation, much of the focus has been on it being used in election campaigns or around political events, but it is by no means limited to that. Disinformation is becoming a serious issue in the health sphere, in particular, with anti-vaccine information and stories being disseminated through social media.
The problem of disinformation is not limited to the period of our inquiry. When we established our initial inquiry, we were particularly concerned about the role of disinformation in the United States presidential election and other elections around the world, and about the role of foreign states and, in particular, agencies such as the Internet Research Agency in St Petersburg that deliberately create campaigns and mechanisms to spread disinformation through social media and target people relentlessly.
That has become a bigger societal problem as people increasingly get their news and information through social media. In this country, about half the population receives news principally through social media. That means that, rather than going to a curated news space, such as a newspaper, a broadcaster’s piece of news or a news organisation’s website, they are receiving news and information that has been shared by their friends on social media in bitesize chunks, or they are being targeted with information by advertisers and other organisations that promote content.
We know that, during the US presidential election, the number of shares of the top 20 fake news stories was greater than that of the top 20 real news stories. The issue is fundamental to the way people receive news and information because, on the channel where they increasingly receive it, they often do not know why they are receiving it or much about the organisation that is sending it. Disinformation is often dressed up to look like real news, but it could be hyper-partisan content from people with a high degree of bias or, more seriously, content that is totally fabricated. That has been an issue for some time, but it is of growing importance because of the scale and reach of social media.
When we look at the potential application of technology, the problem is only set to get worse, given the phenomenon of deep fake content. That is when someone takes a recording of your voice—I am sure they would not do it in your case, Mr Gapes—and creates a fake video image of you, then writes their own words and has them played out through your mouth in the film. We are all familiar with those grainy films that emerge during political campaigns whose production quality is not great because they are often shot on someone’s smartphone. Imagine the capability to do that easily in a totally fake way and to release a film of a politician supposedly saying something malicious or misleading during the final days of an election campaign. That capability exists, and we need the tools in place to fight back against it.
Since we published the Committee’s report in February, we have seen other events that lead us to believe that this is an ongoing and growing problem. We were all shocked and appalled at the way in which harmful footage from the terrorist attack in Christchurch, New Zealand, was livestreamed on Facebook and shared continuously on social media platforms around the world, and particularly YouTube, for a number of days afterwards.
We are also concerned about the role of organisations that spread news and information about political events in this country—this is particularly linked to Brexit—but that we do not know much about. The Committee’s inquiry identified an organisation called Mainstream Network, which was contacting people through social media with adverts and asking them to lobby their MP to vote in favour of a hard Brexit and to “Chuck Chequers”—to use the expression at the time—and not support the Prime Minister’s negotiating strategy.
People have a right to a political opinion, and there is nothing wrong with that, but when they are being targeting by an organisation and they do know who is doing that, who is providing the money or who is supporting that organisation, that becomes a problem. In our campaigns as politicians, we have to put legal imprints on our leaflets, posters and flyers to make it clear who they are from, but people do not have to do that online, and those loopholes are being exploited. We have also seen campaigns and organisations other than just Mainstream Network, such as We are the 52% and Britain’s Future, where large amounts of money are being spent to target people with messaging, but we do not know who is doing that. That is going on all the time and on a growing scale.
The purpose of the Sub-Committee is to provide an institutional home for the Select Committee to build on the work of its initial inquiry, to look at new incidents of disinformation campaigns, where they lack transparency and where they are deliberately misleading, and to recognise that this is a form of harmful content that needs to be addressed. We look forward to the publication of the Government’s White Paper on online harms, which I believe will happen early next week, so that we can see what ideas they propose and understand more about their response to the Select Committee report, which covered many of those issues. The Sub-Committee will look at the issues arising from the White Paper and at the areas where the Government are looking for a response and consultation.
Damian Collins
The Sub-Committee will be the forum through which we look for areas where the Committee can analyse and respond to the White Paper. It will also be the forum through which we seek to hold regular sessions with important organisations and people who are investigating similar issues, and particularly the Information Commissioner.
The first meeting of the new Sub-Committee will be on Tuesday 23 April when we return from the short Easter recess. We will then question the Information Commissioner, principally about her investigation into the work of Mainstream Network and connected organisations, to understand more about who is funding that organisation and who is behind the dissemination of the content that it is sharing. That will be an important first step in the Sub-Committee’s work.
I appreciate that hon. Members have questions that they want to ask me—one of my Committee colleagues wished to jump the gun—so I will not use up every second of my 10 minutes. The Sub-Committee is a new step for the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, which has never created a Sub-Committee before. We have done so because we recognise the concerns about the spread of disinformation and the pivotal role that social media play in that.
Disinformation is a growing issue for democracy and society, and we need to provide robust public policy responses to tackle it at source, as well as through the channels through which it is shared. We also need to look principally at the responsibilities of big technology companies to act more effectively against the dissemination of disinformation, to provide more tools for their users to help them identify untrustworthy sources of information, and to provide greater transparency about who is promoting that content.
The Minister for Digital and the Creative Industries (Margot James)
Life in Parliament is full of surprises at the moment. I must confess that I had a complete misunderstanding about today’s hearing; I thought it was in the main Chamber. When I alighted on the Order Paper on my return from a meeting outside the House and saw that this hearing was absent from it, I thought that it must have been moved—along with so many other things in Parliament at the moment. That explains why I have no official documentation whatsoever.
However, as my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Damian Collins) knows, this is my top priority across what is a very broad brief. I will therefore respond based on my own understanding, the excellent remarks that have been made by hon. Members, and of course the report of my hon. Friend’s Select Committee, which I read from cover to cover. I commend his work as Chairman, and all hon. Members who serve on that Committee, which exemplifies the power and potential that a Select Committee can bring to policy making. I am delighted to hear of the new development that my hon. Friend has announced: the Sub-Committee that he has set up specifically to tackle disinformation sounds like an excellent initiative.
I was delighted to hear that at the first meeting of that Sub-Committee, Members will be able to question and hear from the Information Commissioner, whose office is the leading data protection agency across Europe. That is partly because of the reputation of Elizabeth Denham, the commissioner; partly because of the huge additional resources that we have given the Information Commissioner’s Office; and partly because the office is leading on an investigation into the misuse of data, primarily by Facebook but by other platforms as well.
Margot James
I see. I am so sorry. You have been very forbearing with me as I completely misinterpreted my role.
Margot James
I thought I was making closing remarks. Should I be asking questions?
Margot James
I will convert some of the comments I was going to make into questions, then.
My hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe indicated that he might want to know when the White Paper is coming out. We intend to publish it early next week—Monday, in fact. That White Paper is very broad, and I think it is an excellent piece of work. It has been informed by the work of my hon. Friend’s Committee, as well as by many other Members and external bodies, and also by the hard work of our officials in the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport.
The White Paper will raise a number of questions, and I will take the opportunity to ask my hon. Friend about closed groups, encrypted content, and anonymity. From my knowledge of the White Paper, I think those are the three biggest challenges when it comes to delivering on the objectives that my hon. Friend has set out for internet companies. There are various experts working in those areas of encryption and private groups, and I would welcome my hon. Friend’s comments.
Mike Gapes (in the Chair)
That is fine, but we have limited time, because we have another statement and then a normal debate after that. Thank you very much. Damian Collins, did you wish to respond?
Damian Collins
I will respond briefly. To add to the Minister’s comments, we have all benefited enormously from the work of Elizabeth Denham and the ICO. It has demonstrated that it is one of the world-leading organisations in its field, and the fact that it has invested so much of its time into this area has helped enormously. This was an extremely long inquiry, and I place on record my thanks to all the Committee Clerks, particularly Chloe Challender the Committee Clerk and Josephine Willows the Committee specialist. They worked tirelessly, well above and beyond the call of duty, to support the Committee in its investigations.
The Minister has touched on some important issues. We discussed closed groups earlier, which are an important mechanism for allowing content to be shared virally and at great speed, particularly on Facebook. That sharing can be done not just through advertising, but through those closed groups. We know that social media platforms can observe what is going on in closed groups, and part of their responsibility should be to monitor that activity, particularly if those groups are being used to spread harmful content.
Encrypted media is also an important issue, and I have some concerns about the vision that Mark Zuckerberg has set out for Facebook, effectively bringing Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp together. If that means all content being shared through encrypted channels, it would give the platforms an excuse to say that, because they cannot see what is being shared, they have no responsibility for it. I do not think that is acceptable, especially when those platforms will be using data gathered about their users to help facilitate contact via encrypted channels, and will still have a good understanding of what is going on. That is why the idea of a regulatory system is such an important step forward. As we have seen from the way Ofcom works with broadcasters, we need a regulator that has statutory powers—the power to go in and investigate, with the backing of Parliament—and the flexibility to look at new challenges as they arise and establish new standards for what is a responsible, ethical and acceptable way of working.
Elsewhere in the world, encrypted channels are increasingly becoming the principal mechanism for sharing information in election campaigns, particularly WhatsApp in India and Brazil. In any country that has a smartphone-connected electorate—as so many countries now do —sharing of political information through encrypted media will be an increasingly big problem. In our report, we tried to address many of the issues that exist today, and there are things that we can get on and deal with now. However, we may look back in five years’ time and say that, even having done all those things, the challenge of responding to disinformation being spread through encrypted media is one we still have to crack. We cannot leave that challenge to the tech companies on their own; we cannot leave it to them to solve that problem for us. We need to establish a clear legal framework, whereby it is clear what duty of care and responsibility tech companies have to ensure that their technology is not abused by people who seek to do others harm.
Draft Research Code of Practice and Draft Accreditation Criteria
Draft Statistics Statement of Principles and Draft Code of Practice on Changes to Data Systems
Mike Gapes Excerpts(5 years, 10 months ago)
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Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Lab/Co-op)
I am pleased that the Whips put me on this statutory instrument Committee because it gives me an opportunity to ask important questions that need to be answered.
Given the scandal over Cambridge Analytica, the appalling behaviour of Facebook and the way in which data and information, including information of this House of Commons, was stolen and then sold to The Daily Telegraph a few years ago, how confident can we be about the processes here and the transferring of data and personal information? The draft research code of practice for accreditation criteria states that that information will go to various organisations that will be allowed to process and use it. Many of those organisations will get commercial benefit from that. Will the state receive any income as a result of the commercial exploitation of personal data, which was not acquired for the benefit of a commercial company but was acquired for fulfilling a function within our health or education system or for the general governance of our society? Why should private companies benefit without the individuals themselves who presumably own that data or the Government Departments that collected that data being beneficiaries of that income?
Liam Byrne
My hon. Friend might know that our noble Friend Lord Parry introduced proposals to amend the Data Protection Bill to ensure that the wealth that may arise from the investigation of health records, for example, was held in a sovereign data fund. These ideas of sovereign data funds will catch on over the next few years, but at the moment we do not have any provisions to capture what is socially produced wealth—data—and to recycle that wealth for the good of the nation.
Mike Gapes
I am grateful for that information. I was not aware of that, but it adds to my knowledge.
Principle 7 on retention and onward disclosure states that the pre-processed data will be retained “for a limited time”, but that can then be extended. It is not clear how often it can be extended or whether there could be indefinite extensions. I want to know whether at those extension points a premium would be charged to the organisations that retained that data in order to continue to use it for years to come.
The various documentation is copious and I do not intend to delay the Committee unnecessarily, but I have one other question on the statistics statement of principles. Many organisations collect data. Every time I go into Sainsbury’s or Tesco and pay with my card, they seem to have collected information about what I have bought. When they send me their points, they send me vouchers to buy the things I normally buy to encourage me to go back to their store with that data. No doubt the data is very interesting and useful, but it could be very useful to the Government.
If bodies and institutions that are part of the Government—public sector organisations—must make data available to the UK Statistics Authority, why should there not be an obligation on private sector organisations, commercial companies and retailers to make data available? That would be very interesting. For example, if the Department of Health and Social Care could analyse the consumption patterns of a cohort of people by age and location, we might be able better to target our anti-obesity initiatives for healthy eating. We could make a judgment about the size of packets or whether orders of a product would be useful for the data within the Department of Health and Social Care.
I am not clear whether such obligations will apply to the private sector. From reading the codes superficially, it seems that they will not. I would be grateful to know whether there is a plan to think about that. We want joined-up government. Private sector organisations are able to exploit public data, but surely the public should be able to make use of it for the benefit of citizens as a whole and for the public good. Data will increasingly be a public good. Whether it is held by the Government or by private companies or individuals, it could be important in improving health, extending life expectancy and giving people better life chances. It should be made available in a timely manner, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill pointed out, to the Government when they are making decisions. I hope the Minister will address those points.
Margot James
I thank the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill and the hon. Member for Ilford South for their questions and comments.
The hon. Member for Ilford South expressed concerns about the use of publicly acquired data by private organisations for commercial gain. He rightly pointed out that much of the data collected, particularly in the national health service, was not collected with the intention of realising commercial gain. I assure him that, under these codes, only statisticians and accredited researchers whose projects are intended for the public good will have access to information held by the UK Statistics Authority. Individuals, households and businesses are never identifiable in any of the statistical output. That is a fundamental principle of international statistics management and we intend to adhere to it strictly, as we always have. I further assure him that, under the Data Protection Act 2018, there are significant penalties for anyone or any organisation that seeks to re-identify data that has previously been de-identified.
There are no plans to compel private organisations and companies to make public data that they have collected about the consumer behaviour that the hon. Gentleman cited as an example. There are protections in place because those organisations must comply with data protection legislation in the processing, collection and management of data. I hope that reassures him.
Mike Gapes
I asked whether there would be commercial gain from the use of this data, and if so whether we would expect the public sector to benefit from the commercial companies that use data generated by public bodies.
Margot James
The hon. Gentleman asks me to look to the future more that I am able to do. To reiterate what I said, all data that emanates from publicly funded research must be used for the benefit of the public good. That may in time also produce a commercial return, but it would have to be for the public good.
In the deal between DeepMind, a private sector company, and Moorfields Eye hospital, a national health organisation—they have come together in a joint venture—the data is being used with AI to improve diagnosis and treatment patterns at the hospital. The connection between commercial gain and the public interest is being well managed in that example, and strict rules will be in place to ensure that any further such commercial endeavours using public data will be similarly managed under an ethical framework.
That leads me neatly to the remarks and questions of the shadow Minister, the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill. I share his optimism that real-time data will hugely benefit public decision making and I am sorry if I downplayed that significant advantage in my opening remarks. I certainly believe that that will be immensely valuable, and that it is underpinned by the codes of practice we are discussing.
We are in the process of establishing the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation. A chair has been appointed, other board members will be appointed during the summer and its remit is available for public comment. In its embryonic form, it is working with the UK Statistics Authority to ensure seamless communication between the two bodies in future. I agree with the shadow Minister that that is important.
The shadow Minister talked about the ethical principles that must continue to underpin the use of data sourced in the way that the UK Statistics Authority manages. The use of data must have clear benefits to the users and serve the public good. Where individuals are concerned, identity is protected. Information must be kept confidential and secure, and consent will have been considered appropriately. Data used, and methods employed, are consistent with legal requirements such as the Data Protection Act, the Human Rights Act 1998, the Statistics and Registration Service Act and the common law duty of confidence. The access, use and sharing of data must be transparent and communicated clearly, and accessibility for the general public must be protected.
Russian Interference in UK Politics
Mike Gapes Excerpts(6 years, 4 months ago)
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Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Lab/Co-op)
There has always been, on the left of British politics, a group of useful idiots for authoritarian communism, and it has included people who have been very sensible on other issues. I refer Members to “Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?” written by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in the 1930s. There has also always been, on the far right of politics, a group of admirers of the strong leader, the national identity and the patriotic purpose of the Russian, and even the Soviet, regime. They loved Uncle Joe, and many of them today like Vladimir Putin.
Putin has, over recent years, tried to develop a relationship with various groups in Europe to further his own national interest and ideological goals. He has used, in that process, a man—an ideologist—from the far right who has connections with the American alt-right and with people including Nick Griffin, Nigel Farage and Marine Le Pen, who all attended conferences in Russia. That man is Aleksandr Dugin, and Members can google him and read about his vile ideology of trying to create some kind of Eurasian monolith based on authoritarianism and the crushing of religious minorities.
That is the essence of the nature of the Russian state. How is it going to develop? Putin has used that man, who was at one point referred to as “Putin’s Rasputin”. There is some concern in many other European countries about this type of work. On 25 November 2016, the European Parliament carried a resolution, by a very large majority, referring to Russia’s use of
“a wide range of tools…to challenge democratic values”
and to “divide Europe”. Different tools have been used, including the interference in elections, which has already been mentioned, and the attempted coup in Montenegro. The Hungarian regime of Orban has been given financial support via various forms of investment. It acts as an ideological Trojan horse in the European Union against the sanctions on Russia that are the result of the invasion and annexation of Ukraine.
Wera Hobhouse
The hon. Gentleman is being generous in giving way. I really believe it is important to be aware of beginnings. I celebrated the fall of the Berlin wall, having lived in cold war Germany and I hoped that Russia had changed, but when I went back to Russia only a year ago, people told me that, unfortunately, Russia was facing the same threats and problems that it faced during the cold war, so—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
Order. When the hon. Lady makes an intervention, she needs to be brief, because there is a lot of pressure on time.
Mike Gapes
Yes, absolutely. There is an idea that there was a fantastic, miraculous transformation in 1989-90, but, sadly, that was not the case. There is an authoritarian kleptocracy—that word was used earlier—and a regime under which opposition leaders are locked up, journalists disappear or are killed, and polonium is used to murder people on the streets of London. The Russian system of government is not a democracy in any sense that we would understand. Everybody knows that Vladimir Putin is going to be President until 2024 and that this regime will continue, and that is not democracy.
There are very serious flaws in that society, but even more serious is the attempt to undermine cohesion and to sow discord among Europeans in our societies. In the time I have left, I want to mention the kind of tweets put out by the Russian embassy. It put out a picture of a European Union stockade on fire, with a giant Russian bear, and the flag flying over the EU stockade was the LGBT one. That tells us all we need to know about the ideology of the Russian Government and the Russian state. These are not fringe elements; this is the core of the Government.
I refer hon. Members to the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the last Parliament, which was published in March, and the Government response. We must look seriously at these questions. I do a lot of tweets, and I get quite a lot of trolls. Some of them can be identified by the fact that there are eight numbers after the name, because they are produced by algorithms and come at very odd times during the night. I often tweet back, “What’s the weather like in Moscow?” The fact is that we all need to recognise that they are trying to interfere in our politics and to create discord. We need to be vigilant, and the Government must do much more.
Stephen Gethins (North East Fife) (SNP)
This has been a fascinating debate and this is an opportune time for it; I thank the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) for securing it.
It is also opportune to reflect on the fact that we are not the first to experience this. I had the great fortune a number of years ago, before I was an MP, to work in the former Soviet Union, and to have worked in Tbilisi for several years. As the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Mr Seely) pointed out in his excellent contribution, anybody who has spent time in the former Soviet Union will know that what we have experienced and are experiencing is not new; the tactic has been deployed over decades rather than just the past few months. It is useful for us to reflect on that. It is also illustrates why our engagement with the Ukrainians, the Georgians and others who have experience of this is so important.
As has been said, this debate is not about our relationship with the people of Russia. The people of Russia are wonderful, with their rich culture and rich history; the Russian Federation is the most extraordinary, diverse and wonderful country. The hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) is not in his place at the moment, but he said he did not want this debate to take place. I welcome the fact that it is taking place, however, and I want to use it to highlight the impact Vladimir Putin has had on his own people.
Last year, I spent some time studying the conflict in Chechnya. It is a much-forgotten conflict, but in 2003 the United Nations described Grozny as the most destroyed city on earth. It is easy to forget the devastating impact the current President of the Russian Federation has had on his own people; it is a far more devastating impact than he has had on people elsewhere in the world. It is always worth bearing that in mind.
I recommend a Foreign Affairs Committee report from a couple of years ago, that the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes) and I, along with other colleagues, put together. It was—as always, thanks to our officials—a thoughtful and useful piece of work, and I want to reflect on the evidence we took.
Some of the most impactful evidence we took was in St Petersburg. We invited groups from around the Russian Federation to come and give evidence, and learned of the impact of the Russian regime on lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender groups who have been threatened and bullied, and lawyers who fight for the rule of law with incredible courage that all of us in this House should reflect on.
The most impactful group I personally met was the Union of the Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia. These were the women whose young men, and often young women, had been sent into the army, sometimes to fight, and who had sometimes lost family members, and could not get information about them. That is devastating for any family, and we would do well to reflect on the ongoing suffering of the people of Russia, and in particular on the bravery of the women of the Union of the Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia. I encourage the Minister and all Members to reflect on that.
I have appeared on RT. The report we produced was incredibly critical of RT, and I remember asking its representatives, “Will you give us evidence of where you’ve been critical of Russian actions in Syria?” They gave us none; it was, I think, the only bit of evidence they did not want to give us. So I thought I should go on RT, because if we are going to criticise an organisation, we should give it the opportunity to answer back.
Mike Gapes
The hon. Gentleman has referred to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs inquiry. He will also recall that when we took evidence from RT and Sputnik, we were told that they had a charter just like the BBC’s. We asked, “Where is it? Is it published?” They said, “We’ll send it to you.” As far as I am aware, it was never received by the Committee, however.
Stephen Gethins
As always, the hon. Gentleman has a fine recollection of the facts and makes an excellent point.
It is important to state that Russia is one of the most dangerous places on earth to be a journalist. It is worth putting on the record the extraordinary bravery of journalists going right back to those who covered the conflicts in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia and North Ossetia, as well as over the border in the ongoing conflicts in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and of course Nagorno-Karabakh. Those areas do not often get debated because of everything else that is going on.
What is the solution to this problem? It is clear that our work with the EU has been very important. I hope that, regardless of where Members stand in the debate on leave or remain and where we sit in this Chamber, we will agree that the Minister must commit to continuing with our key partnerships with those organisations. The EU has a huge role to play. In terms of the development of the economy and the rule of law, we have done some extraordinary work with these organisations in Ukraine, the south Caucasus and elsewhere, and I hope the Minister will commit to continuing that.
I also pay tribute to the soft power that can be ongoing. We can do an extraordinary amount of work in cultural diplomacy, and I pay tribute to the British Council and others who are doing some fantastic work, including people who have worked for years in this area, such as Craig Oliphant—formerly of the FCO—Jonathan Cohen and Dennis Sammut. These are extraordinary people who have done extraordinary work in building our relations and understanding.
Finally, I say again that we must continue to work with the EU in stabilising and working with, and giving a carrot to, the countries that are threatened by the Russian Federation. The greatest threat to independence and sovereignty is not to the UK; it is often to the countries of the western Balkans, the Baltics and the south Caucasus.