Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 4) Rules 2023 Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateMike Freer
Main Page: Mike Freer (Conservative - Finchley and Golders Green)Department Debates - View all Mike Freer's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(6 months, 4 weeks ago)
General CommitteesI beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 4) Rules 2023 (S.I., 2023, No. 1397).
It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Mrs Cummins. I welcome the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney—it is good to see Whips taking their rightful place.
This statutory instrument amends the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, known as the CPRs, to provide a closed material procedure for court proceedings relating to prevention and investigation measures. I will refer to these as STPIMs—state threats prevention and investigation measures—to distinguish them from terrorism prevention and investigation measures, which are known as TPIMs.
STPIMs are new measures established under provisions in part 2 of the National Security Act 2023 that closely replicate the provisions for TPIMs in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. STPIMs provide a suite of restrictive measures that can be used, where necessary and proportionate, to prevent, restrict and disrupt an individual’s further involvement in state threats activity, where prosecution and other disruptive actions are not possible. STPIMs will be used sparingly and as a measure of last resort to mitigate the immediate threat an individual poses while they continue to be investigated by the authorities.
STPIMs require specific procedural provision in order to be workable. This statutory instrument, while not establishing STPIMs, makes that procedural provision to enable their operation. The imposition of STPIMs requires the permission and review of the court and contains a procedure for appeal by the STPIM subject. This statutory instrument amends the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 to provide the court with a bespoke closed material procedure for proceedings relating to STPIMs.
My hon. Friend says that there would need to be court approval. What level of court would it be, and will there be any ministerial approval required, or is it just the court?
My understanding is that this would require High Court approval. There is a review mechanism by the subject, subject to the purview of the Home Office, but it does not involve the Secretary of State for Justice.
The procedure includes, in particular, for applications by the Secretary of State for permission to impose measures, directions for a review hearing after the imposition of the STPIM and appeal against the imposition of the measure itself, or any other determination in connection with the STPIM. Both the review hearing and any appeal hearing will be determined on judicial review principles.
These cases will inevitably involve sensitive material. This instrument therefore sets out a procedure to enable the sensitive material to be relied on by the Government, and the evidence against the STPIM subject, to be tested by the court, but through a closed procedure that will ensure that it can be adequately protected in the public interest. This rule change is effected by amending part 80 of the CPRs, which contain rules relating to TPIM proceedings, so that the rules cover the equivalent STPIM proceedings.
In conclusion, the Government have publicly committed to provide operational partners with the tools needed to combat state threats. STPIMs are important measures within this toolkit, and this instrument is vital in ensuring that STPIMs are a usable tool that can be fully defended and justified in our courts through both open and closed proceedings. Given the sensitivity of the evidence, which will be a key component in why an individual cannot be prosecuted and why the use of an STPIM is necessary, it would fundamentally undermine the scheme if closed proceedings—where sensitive intelligence and national security arguments can be made—were not available. I hope colleagues will agree.
Let me touch on a couple of points. First, yes, we are content that the Secretary of State has the relevant powers to ensure that these measures are used correctly, and those involved also have an appeal mechanism to ensure that they are being applied correctly.
One reason why the closed material procedure is required is that, while we all appreciate the need for transparency and for justice to be seen to be done, putting sensitive information into the public domain would disclose the sources of that information, which could put people at risk and might also create a flight risk. Another reason is that, sometimes, the Security Service may wish the person operating on behalf of a state actor to continue their activity while they can be monitored, and disclosing information might cause that activity to cease while the security services are undertaking that work. That is why, on balance, we think these measures are a necessary step to ensure that our national security needs are met and that justice is met.
Question put and agreed to.