Counter-ISIL Coalition Strategy

Michael Meacher Excerpts

Monday 20th July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I do not wholly agree with my right hon. Friend. The fact is that none of us wants to see the Assad regime last a day longer than is necessary, but the regime has lost control of the part of northern Syria where ISIL is headquartered and from where its influence has spread. Tackling ISIL in northern Syria—tackling its command and control centres and interdicting its supply routes into Iraq—can be done in a way that does not prop up the regime, which was rightly the concern of the House when we last debated these matters. Of course, August 2013 was before the rise of ISIL right across Iraq and Syria, before the murder of British hostages there and before the slaughter we saw in Tunisia a few weeks ago.

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

Given the explicit parliamentary prohibition against British military action in Syria, is it not irrelevant whether or not British aircrews are embedded in US forces? In view of the gravity of this secret deployment—a possible mission creep towards war without a mandate—does the Secretary of State not recognise that the system of ministerial accountability to this House behoves him not just to apologise, but to consider whether his position is still tenable?

[Michael Fallon]

I am rightly accountable to this House, which is why I am making a statement to it. Let us be clear about the scale of what I have described. Hundreds—possibly thousands—of pilots have been involved in this action, which was begun by the Americans 12 months ago in August 2014, and at one point or another five of our pilots have been involved, but they have been involved in United States or Canadian military action. This is not a British military operation; had it been, we would of course have come to the House for preliminary approval.

Hostage Rescue Operation (Nigeria)

Michael Meacher Excerpts

Tuesday 13th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The operational security of our special forces remains paramount at all times, which is why we never comment on their operations and, indeed, never confirm or deny their involvement in any particular operation.

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

Christopher McManus was one of my constituents. I have been in touch with his family regularly both before and after his untimely death, and I want to pay a very real tribute to their unceasing efforts to secure his release—in conjunction with the Foreign Office, which was extremely helpful—not just in the most recent period, but throughout nine or 10 nerve-racking months.

I thank the Secretary of State for his statement, but may I ask him to say a little more about the exact nature of the intelligence that was collected in the raid on Boko Haram in Kaduna, which indicated that precipitate action was necessary to save the hostages’ lives? May I also ask why such expressly urgent action was needed that the Italian Government could not be consulted before a final decision was made, because the life of one of their citizens, as well as of Chris McManus, was at risk?

[Mr Hammond]

First, may I join the right hon. Gentleman in paying tribute to the McManus family? I attended a significant number of the Cobra meetings that have been held on this subject since October last year, and whenever there were reported contacts with the family, comment was made on how engaged they had been with the process and how focused they were on getting the result we all wanted. They were under tremendous pressure, but they conducted themselves with remarkable dignity and co-operated very well with the authorities throughout the process.

The right hon. Gentleman will understand that I cannot go into the details of the intelligence that was available, but what he has to understand is that there was a fast-evolving situation. On Tuesday evening, some people were arrested. During the course of their debriefing on Wednesday, several of them provided information that gave us a credible fix on where the hostages might be being held. Later, additional intelligence was available to corroborate that. So the level of knowledge and understanding was ratcheting up, and at the same time the deployment of Nigerian forces into the area in question raised a significant risk that the hostage-takers would become aware that the operation was under way.

UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan

Michael Meacher Excerpts

Thursday 9th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

First, I congratulate the Backbench Business Committee on its choice of this subject, which I am sure is widely welcomed and has led to a constructive and thoughtful debate.

On the subject of Afghanistan, we need to be honest: the situation is grim. Everyone recognises that the military prowess and determination of British forces, in conditions as difficult and arduous as will be found anywhere, have been of a high order, of which the nation can be proud. However, that cannot be allowed to blind us to the realities on the ground. The British casualty rate—334 soldiers killed to date—is now twice as high, proportionately, as the US rate, and as high, proportionately, as that endured by the Soviet forces in the 1980s. All the arguments for staying put are falling away. Some have been mentioned again today, including by the Defence Secretary, who told us that we are fighting in Afghanistan to protect the streets of London. That idea, I submit, is believed by almost nobody. Virtually all terrorist acts in the UK are home-grown and have mostly occurred precisely because of the occupation of countries by foreign troops. We are told—after nine years—that we need more time to get Afghan forces to the point at which they can adequately secure the country. Nobody on the ground believes that that will happen in less than several decades, if then.

We are told that President Karzai must be given time scales to root out corruption. Is there any evidence that he either can do so or has the slightest intention of doing so? We are told that the Petraeus doctrine in Iraq of winning over—perhaps one should say bribing—so-called moderate insurgents must be given time to work, but Afghanistan is completely different from Iraq: the exceedingly belligerent and conservative Pashtun Taliban will never play along with any such collaboration. Those are the unquestionable facts.

On the question of rationale, which was also mentioned, including by the Chair of the Defence Committee, it is significant that the ostensible rationale for NATO’s presence keeps on changing. First, the rationale was going after al-Qaeda post 9/11; then it was the endless war on terror; then it was nation building and female emancipation. The harsh and unpleasant fact is that the situation can only now be resolved by a deal between the Taliban, the Pakistanis and the corrupt clan around Karzai—as inauspicious a brew, I admit, as one could possibly find, but that is what politics and war are often about, and the arguments for such engagement are compelling.

Some people might deride talking to the Taliban, or even regard it as traitorous, but if the aim is not just an acceptable solution for NATO but to help Afghans to end 30 years of civil war, which surely should be our objective, there must be a process of intra-Afghan dialogue, backed by regional agreements on non-interference and co-operation with Afghanistan’s neighbours, as well as Security Council guarantees. Of course, it will be said that the Taliban have said that they will engage in no negotiations until all foreign forces leave—that is quite normal and no surprise; it always happens when secret contacts begin. Indeed, contacts have already begun between Karzai’s intermediaries and Mullah Omar’s people. In addition, it is reported that representatives of the Hekmatyar group, who are powerful Taliban allies, have already visited Kabul, and that Pakistan is also pressing Karzai to talk to the important Haqqani faction.

What is the US approach, on which everything hinges? At the moment, the US line is to support engagement, but to insist that it must be Afghan-led. That sounds very democratic, but it is a cop-out. The Afghanistan Army and Administration are nowhere near being in a position to take the lead, and it is a fantasy to pretend otherwise. The reality remains that the United States is overwhelmingly the major player. So how do we proceed? The United Nations was the convening power for the talks that led to the 1988 agreement for Soviet withdrawal, and I think that today it probably provides the best forum for Afghanistan’s regional neighbours. Its special representative in Kabul recently started convening ambassadors on a regular basis, which I consider very hopeful.

The slowly gathering mood music about negotiations is, however, complicated by concerns about underlying United States objectives in Afghanistan. The US has deployed 19 military bases in Afghanistan and central Asian countries since the war began in October 2001. Those bases operate autonomously from the territories around them. They are networked by airlifts, and obtain supplies from outside Afghanistan by air. I think it reasonable to assume that the US will not give up that arrangement in the foreseeable future. Indeed, General James Jones, Obama’s top national security adviser, said exactly that a few months ago.

So where does that leave us? The Prime Minister talks of leaving Afghanistan in 2015, but I suggest that in view of the harsh realities—the loss of British life, and the loss of support from British public opinion—he should bring that date forward by at least three years. He should come out publicly in favour of the US opening contacts with the Taliban. That is not a desirable course, but it is a necessary component in the Afghanistan equation. The Prime Minister need not, of course, give what would no doubt be seen as an ultimatum by saying, either publicly or privately, that if the US rejects a policy of negotiation the UK will leave unilaterally, but if within a year the US strategy has not shifted towards talks with the Taliban, he should make our position clear. He should make it clear that the UK has consistently argued that the best way to leave Afghanistan with dignity, as we want, is to broker a power-sharing Government that includes the Taliban.

If the US will not accept that position, we cannot continue indefinitely with an unwinnable war or a refusal to consider peace talks. I believe that, at that point, we shall be left with no alternative but to withdraw our troops.