(2 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberAllow me, Dame Eleanor, for I think the penultimate time, to thank hon. Members who have spoken in Committee. I would like to turn to the clauses under discussion in this debate. With the leave of the Committee, I will deal with some of the amendments very briefly.
Clause 13 outlines the exclusions that seek to redress the feeling that there is a democratic deficit created by the arrangements for the implementation and enforcement of the protocol. The present role of the Court of Justice of the European Union clearly causes Unionists to feel less connected to, and part of, the United Kingdom. That was reflected in the September 2021 joint statement by all Unionist parties on the protocol. Clause 13 provides that any provision of the protocol that confers jurisdiction on the CJEU over arrangements in Northern Ireland is excluded provision. That means that CJEU decisions, including infractions, will no longer have effect in domestic law across the entire protocol.
I confirm to the Committee that the Bill does not disapply the withdrawal agreement’s arbitration process, which would be convened at the international level in the event of a dispute. It simply affirms that the arbitration provisions in the withdrawal agreement do not have effect in our domestic law, and that is normal for international treaties. It then helps to restore the UK Government’s sole oversight of arrangements on the ground in Northern Ireland, providing that the provisions relating to the powers and presence of EU representatives are excluded. Finally, via subsections (4) and (5), clause 13 allows for the establishment of new arrangements for co-operation with EU authorities to monitor the trade boundary regime, and enables us to implement robust data sharing on the operation of the trusted trader scheme and on all goods moving between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. That will support assurance processes to uphold our commitment to protect both the UK internal market and the EU’s single market.
Clause 14 supports the coherent functioning of the Bill by fully insulating any excluded provision from being brought back into our domestic law as a result of obligations arising from other provisions of the protocol and withdrawal agreement. If needs be, regulations under subsection (4) can be used to make appropriate provision in connection with any provision of the protocol or withdrawal agreement to which this clause relates. The clause provides important clarity on the interaction between excluded provision and any wider provisions in the protocol or withdrawal agreement related to it.
Clause 18 provides a power for a Minister to engage in non-legislative conduct where they consider it appropriate in connection with one or more of the purposes in the Bill. The clause also clarifies the relationship between powers to make secondary legislation under the Bill and those arising by virtue of the royal prerogative. The clause will ensure that actions not requiring legislation, such as issuing guidance to industry or providing direction to officials, can be taken in a timely manner by a Minister of the Crown. It is not, as I think has been misconstrued in some quarters, an extraordinary power. It simply makes clear, as would normally be taken for granted, that Ministers will be acting lawfully when they go about their ministerial duties in support of this legislation.
Clause 20 allows for the proper functioning of domestic court proceedings following the removal of the domestic effect of CJEU jurisdiction. That means that domestic courts would no longer be bound by CJEU principles or decisions when considering matters relating to the protocol. The clause provides a power to make related new provision. Regulations made under the power could, for example, provide for a procedure to refer questions of interpretation of EU law to the CJEU if a domestic court considered it necessary to conclude its proceedings.
If the hon. Member would not mind, I will give way to him when I come on to his amendment specifically. I would be very grateful if he would give me that indulgence.
Clause 20 is important to the functioning of the Bill to allow domestic courts to consider proceedings relating to the protocol without being subject to CJEU jurisdiction, in line with the general principles of the Bill.
I now move on to the amendments in order. Some, with the leave of the House, I can deal with very briefly. Amendments 38, 39, 42 and 43, in the name of the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) and the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), would, as has previously been explained regarding similar amendments, in our view wrongly apply a necessity test for the use of such powers. Parliament has previously determined, for example in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, that “appropriateness” is the appropriate word. That is my response to that series of amendments.
Amendment 12 in the name of the right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn) would remove the power for Ministers to engage in conduct in relation to the protocol which is normally within the Executive’s competence but not otherwise authorised by the Bill. As I explained a short while ago, this provision simply makes it clear that, as would normally be taken for granted, Ministers of the Crown would be acting lawfully when they go about their ministerial duties—for example providing instruction to civil servants or guidance to industry—in support of this legislation. It is not an extraordinary power, but rather it provides certainty that the Government can implement our proposals. I urge the right hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.
Amendment 48 from the hon. Member for Foyle (Colum Eastwood) would be unworkable. It would require the Assembly—which is of course not sitting, which is part of the whole essence of this Bill—to pass a prohibitive number of votes to enable swift implementation of the solutions delivered by the Bill, so I ask him to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 49 also from the hon. Gentleman would require Ministers to have due regard for the principle that the Belfast/Good Friday agreement should be protected in all its parts. The hon. Member states this amendment is based on the fourth point in the preamble to the protocol which sets out the United Kingdom and the European Union’s affirmation of their commitment to do just that. The Government’s overriding commitment—I emphasise this as strongly as I can—is to protect the Belfast/Good Friday agreement in all its dimensions. That commitment is absolute, but the balance within that agreement, and which was critical to its negotiation, must be maintained, and it is for that very reason that the Government have introduced this Bill. Although I welcome and endorse the sentiment underlying the amendment, it is, for the same reason, unnecessary, and I urge the hon. Member to withdraw it.
Amendment 46 from the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry) would require the Assembly to approve clause 20. That is inappropriate under the devolution settlements because it would prevent the Bill from making important changes that go to the heart of the current democratic deficit. Does the hon. Gentleman wish me to give way now?
Yes, I am grateful to the Minister, and I assure him this is only a probing amendment and I will not be putting it to a vote. In terms of the Government’s position of removing the ultimate jurisdiction of the ECJ, do they recognise that in doing so they will in effect unpick Northern Ireland’s access to the single market for goods in that we would not be fully in line with the required EU law for that to take effect?
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention. “Urgent” does not necessarily mean “immediate”; it means, “As soon as we can reasonably and practically do it.” I think he knows that. I will come to article 16 in due course, but we are going as fast as we can given when the House is sitting.
Additional parliamentary procedures after Royal Assent would risk delays to the regime coming into force, and undermine the certainty and clarity that we are looking to provide through the Bill. That would risk undermining the aim, which we all share, of seeing an Executive back up and running and delivering for the people of Northern Ireland, and risk real harm to businesses and citizens.
If I may, I will make some progress. The amendment is well-intentioned, but I hope the Committee will understand that our priority as a Government is to proceed in a way that best supports the functioning of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement and its institutions, which in this case means giving certainty to the people of Northern Ireland that the regime we propose under the Bill will be in place as quickly as possible. That is why I ask my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst to withdraw the amendment.
I thank my right hon. Friend for making that point.
With your permission, Dame Eleanor, I will speak to amendment 25 and new clause 7 together, which are in the name of the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry). The Bill is designed, as I have said, to bring swift solutions to the issues that the protocol has created in Northern Ireland. These solutions are underpinned by the designation of elements of the protocol as “excluded provision”. Put simply, it is by excluding some elements of the protocol and withdrawal agreement in domestic law that the Bill is able to introduce, with the necessary certainty, the changes that are needed in Northern Ireland. By requiring the prior approval of the Northern Ireland Assembly, the amendments would undermine the ability to exclude elements of the protocol, and therefore undermine the entire operation of the Bill. That is unworkable. Because of the protocol, no Northern Ireland Assembly is currently sitting to pass the approving resolution that the amendment would require. The Bill as introduced aims specifically to restore stability in Northern Ireland, and a working Executive and Assembly. Therefore, in requiring the Assembly to approve the operation of the Bill, there is an essential flaw in the logic of the amendment.
As the hon. Member for North Down will be aware, the Sewel convention applies to this Bill, as it does to all Bills of this Parliament that intersect with devolved competence. I confirm that in the absence of functioning institutions, senior officials in the Foreign Office have already made contact with the head of the Northern Ireland civil service regarding legislative consent, and we hope to reach a positive solution as soon as the institutions are restored. By contrast, the amendment would allow the Northern Ireland Assembly to constrain the UK Parliament’s power to legislate, even if that legislation related to a reserved matter. That, of course, is wholly inappropriate under devolution arrangements. The Government will consult stakeholders in Northern Ireland, including Members of the Assembly, on the operation of the Bill during its passage and thereafter. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.
The Minister has mentioned the word “logic” on several occasions and linked the necessity of the Bill to the restoration of power sharing. Does he recognise that there is a real danger in setting a precedent of linking the two together? Have the Government considered a scenario in which Sinn Féin reacts to the Bill and, very regrettably and irresponsibly, withdraws from power sharing? Where does that leave us? Are we any better off? Are we not in a different form of crisis?
I will come on to the hon. Gentleman’s question—forgive me; I was distracted. Would he reiterate his point?
I will happily do so. I am talking about a situation in which the Government have linked the passage of the Bill to the restoration of power sharing in Northern Ireland. I am asking on a point of logic: if a dangerous precedent is set by that, how do the Government respond to a situation where, as a reaction to the passage of the Bill, Sinn Féin, very irresponsibly and regrettably, walks out from power sharing devolution and leaves us no better off overall?
My understanding is that Sinn Féin is willing to go back in and has not set preconditions. That is the actuality of the position, rather than the hypothesis raised by the hon. Gentleman.
(4 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis is clearly a very important issue. We are performing better than comparable Commonwealth countries, but there is always more to do, and the hon. Member is right that we want to avoid delays as much as possible. For example, 128 rooms suitable for jury trials are currently available, and this will rise to 250 by the end of October. We are doing everything we can. The Crown Prosecution Service is now eating into its backlog—so the backlog is no longer increasing; it is decreasing—and will continue to do more. The Ministry of Justice has responsibility in this area.