Recall of MPs Bill

Debate between Michael Ellis and Julian Huppert

Monday 24th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Michael Ellis]

There is nothing objectionable about a disqualification provision for those persons who have previous convictions, so the point that was made earlier about police and crime commissioners is not the point that I am addressing. The point in respect of retrospective penalty is the one that I have made—that to pass a penalty that did not apply when the offence was committed is contrary to natural justice and the provisions of English law as it has always existed.

I voted for real recall, as it is called, proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park (Zac Goldsmith). I very much support the provision that would allow the electorate to have their say in this matter, but the amendments are unconvincing. Misconduct in public office is another offence that I have prosecuted. Those prosecutions often related to police officers who had misconducted themselves, for example, through the misuse of the police national computer for their own personal reasons. Intervening courts are not the right way of processing the issues that we are addressing here. It should be a matter for the electorate.

I am unconvinced by new clause 4 and the pledge, as was my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset. The oath that we already take covers the circumstance. When we as Members of Parliament take an oath to be faithful and bear true allegiance, that encompasses a duty on us to uphold standards in public life. Therefore I am not convinced by the assertion by the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) that another oath is necessary.

An election court is unnecessary and would be a departure from our practice. The election courts that we currently have do not exist 365 days a year. They are brought into existence only on a petition, in very exceptional circumstances. They are rarely established. They are not investigative, so they cannot investigate matters as we would envisage them wanting to do. There is no process of appeal, so an election court would not be the right basis. It would also be bureaucratic and expensive.

The amendments attempt to bring the electorate out of the equation and to put the matter in the hands of third-party expensive and bureaucratic interests, which I do not support. I have doubts about the reduction to 10 days because those persons who are found to have been rude, who have not apologised to the House, or who have done something that falls below the standards expected should not be open to such a provision.

I support real recall. The amendments are in many cases a device to avoid public scrutiny. The electorate should have a say in the matter. Those are my views.

[Dr Huppert]

We have had an interesting and somewhat complex debate, and it is good to have more Members present at the end making arguments than there were at the beginning to hear the arguments made in the first place. It seems clear that there are those who agree with the principle of new clause 2 but not with the detail of it, there are those who oppose the principle of it, and there are those who oppose the principle of extending recall at all. It would not be appropriate for this House to delegate to the other place all our decisions about how we should be recalled. I therefore wish to test the opinion of the House on new clause 2 to see how many Members support that option in principle. I wish to press amendment 15 as well, because I believe the House would want to say that any MP who has been convicted of misconduct in a public office should be subject to recall.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Forensic Science Service

Debate between Michael Ellis and Julian Huppert

Monday 27th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Michael Ellis]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. The hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) spoke about criminals getting off free. Such scaremongering is not acceptable. One has to juxtapose such suggestions with the fact that the private sector has been involved in forensic science for years and is currently responsible for up to 50% of the work.

[Dr Huppert]

There is no dissent across the Chamber on the fact that the private sector has a role and performs it well in some instances. If we are going to talk about management structures, I understand that 20% of LGC is owned by its management and staff, and that all its staff have phantom shares. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that there is a great argument for employee share ownership, because it drives companies to care about their staff and staff to care about what they are trying to achieve?

[Michael Ellis]

That sounds like a perfectly sensible idea.

Cycling

Debate between Michael Ellis and Julian Huppert

Thursday 23rd February 2012 Westminster Hall

[Dr Huppert]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely correct about training support, and I will talk later about that issue. I am very pleased that the Government have continued to fund Bikeability training for young people. It is very important to catch people at a young age.

[Michael Ellis (Northampton North) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Dr Huppert]

I will give way to my colleague on the Home Affairs Committee and then I will make some progress.

[Michael Ellis]

I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way and I congratulate him on securing this debate. I have had a number of letters from my constituents in Northampton North, which is a business hub with a lot of haulage traffic—lorries and the like. Those vehicles can and do present a danger to cyclists. Does he have any suggestions about how that problem can be alleviated?

[Dr Huppert]

A number of things have been done, and a number of other things can be done about that problem, including providing sensors and mirrors around vehicles, and training. There are various exchange programmes to allow cyclists to understand what it is like to be in a heavy goods vehicle and heavy goods vehicle drivers to understand what it is like on a bike, so that there is more awareness and everyone can behave more sensibly.

Why are so few people cycling? It is not for a lack of bikes. Each year, more bikes than cars are sold in the UK. Also, the costs of cycling are quite low. Bikes are not as expensive as a car or a travelcard; a cyclist does not have to join the AA; and maintenance costs are low. All a cyclist has to do is to eat some food. Cycling is also reliable: there is no waiting around for a bus or train; cyclists will not be caught up in traffic; and if—unfortunately—a cyclist is late, it is normally because they left too late.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Debate between Michael Ellis and Julian Huppert

Wednesday 30th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Huppert]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I apologise for being confusing; I was trying to be helpful.

It is a pleasure in many ways to continue the work that we did on the Bill Committee with many right hon. and hon. Members whom I see around the Chamber. These are slightly larger, grander surroundings than those in which we had our last, rather extensive, discussions.

[Michael Ellis]

But about the same number of people.

[Dr Huppert]

Indeed. We have had a fair discussion in Committee, and I am glad that we are continuing it.

The shadow Minister spoke about a desire for delay, and I can understand why he sees that as his role. I am sure that the Minister will respond to the detailed points that he made. I was rather touched by the shadow Minister’s comment about how I would behave if I were in his position. He did not make it clear whether that was in a scenario where the Labour party had completely collapsed and was now a minor party, whether that had happened to the Conservatives, or whether there was a Labour-Conservative coalition. I am sure he can comment on that later.

I want in particular to speak about Government amendment 14, which deals with a rather detailed point raised in Committee by my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh West (Mike Crockart). It is a great pleasure to see him in his place. He spotted that lines 4 and 16 on page 22, in clause 30, did not quite fit together—that there was a drafting error. That led to an interesting discussion in which we genuinely explored some ideas—I think we all learned a lot—about what should be the process for suspending a police and crime commissioner, the standards and thresholds and the effects of such a suspension. There is an interesting balance to be struck as regards what should happen. The amendment corrects the drafting error and leaves the provision that a commissioner may be suspended by the panel—I emphasise that the term used is “may” rather than “must”—if charged with an offence that could lead to a term in prison of greater than two years.

Is the balance right? First, the position of police and crime commissioner is very responsible and we would not want to see a holder of it being seriously investigated for a major crime, which would put them in a position that would simply be untenable in the public eye. On the one hand, one could suggest that we should bring the threshold lower and lower until, if we want to be absolutely sure, they would be suspended if they were accused of anything. I think that would be going too far, and I shall come up with a suggestion on that point a bit later.

The flip side of the argument, however, is that such a commissioner has been charged, not convicted. There is a clear difference and a clear principle. Members on both sides of the House mentioned in Committee that we should not punish people excessively based on the fact that they have been charged. There is the principle of innocent until proven guilty that still applies to most public law—I shall avoid talking about terrorist offences on this occasion. Clause 30(3) says that during a suspension period, a commissioner does not draw their salary, their pensions or their allowances. That is a punishment, in effect.

We had a number of discussions in Committee and the Liberal Democrats have had some discussions about our proposals on the way forward. We have also discussed that with the Minister. There is the question of what offences we wish to catch. My hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh West gave a number of examples of offences that would not be covered by the rules for the possible suspension in the context of offences with sentences greater than two years. I shall not go through every example, but they included racially or religiously aggravated assault or harassment, and I think we would have concerns about a police and crime commissioner who was charged with that. Other similar offences include aggravated vehicle taking, causing damage to property and causing injury. Vehicle taking without consent has a sentence of six months, as does assault on a police constable, as my hon. Friend pointed out. One would have great concerns if a police and crime commissioner was being charged with assaulting police constables, particularly on a regular basis. That would suggest that the relationship was not working

We must work out what to do. Our proposal—I hope that the Government will respond to it and will consider it as a way forward, and I look forward to hearing any other contributions—is that the period should be brought down from two years to six months, as suggested in the amendment originally proposed by my hon. Friend. It should be specified that the charge should be carried out by the Crown Prosecution Service—by a prosecutor—rather than a police officer, as they have powers to charge in some circumstances. We do not want police constables to be able to get at a commissioner with whom they disagree over some issue.

The flip side of bringing the threshold down to give greater public certainty is that there should be no loss of pay, no loss of pension and no loss of other allowances that would be incurred in the job—the person might not be doing that job during that period, but there might be some ongoing costs. That would avoid excessive punishment while providing public certainty that a prominent figure in such an area was not under a cloud and could not get out from under it.

There should also be a provision, regardless of the threshold, for the commissioner to be able effectively to suspend themselves and to say that there is an allegation against—

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[Dr Huppert]

Thank you, Mr Speaker, although this is a matter of great interest, so I have sympathy for the hon. Gentleman, having made my own mistakes earlier this afternoon. I lean towards pure localism. Let us remember that the people on the panel making the decision will be councillors appointed by their local authorities. In Cambridgeshire, for example, I find it hard to see how, say, the representative from Cambridge city council could look at a budget that was insufficient to provide the basic policing and say, “Yeah, that’s fine. I can’t be bothered to interfere with this one.” I do not have that lack of faith in our local councils or our local democratic system. I have concerns, although I prefer the new clause to the original proposals, under which the Secretary of State would have had a strong role. However, I do not entirely agree with everything in the new clause. In particular, I am not comfortable with the idea of having to have a three-quarters majority, which we discussed in Committee, as Members will know. I tend towards a somewhat lower figure.

[Michael Ellis]

My hon. Friend has misgivings about having a 75% majority, but does he not feel that it ought to be that high, because that is what would be required to overrule a democratically elected figure, which ought to be a severe circumstance and rare happening?

[Dr Huppert]

It is important to remember that, with the exception of the two independents—another example of how I would not have designed the system—the majority of panel members will be democratically elected, representing their councils in their system. They are not directly democratically elected, but they are indirectly democratically elected. As I am sure the hon. Gentleman will know, the model in London is a two-thirds majority for scrutiny of a democratically elected individual, so I am more comfortable with two thirds. That does not make a huge difference for a typically sized panel, which will have 12 people. We said in Committee that the difference will be between nine votes and eight votes, but it is more useful to look at it the other way. In order to stop the veto, the commission would have to get four or five people either to vote with him or not to be there. That makes a bigger difference as the panel gets bigger.

The structure of the new clause is more positive than has been described, because it leans towards trying to have sensible discussions and negotiations. It starts with a commissioner making a proposal. Then the panel looks at the proposal and comments on it, before the commissioner works out what he will do. Unless it is vetoed, the precept is set, but if it is vetoed, it does not go to a referendum straight away. Ultimately, that is something that we are all trying to avoid, because of the associated costs of running unnecessary referendums and the risk of re-billing, which is a particular problem with this issue and capping. There is then another opportunity, over 14 days, for the two sides to negotiate and see whether they can come to a more sensible arrangement that works for both of them. Only if that is not possible is a further step taken.

That step is not about saying, “Secretary of State, tell us what to do. It’s up to you.” It is about saying that what should be done is up to local people. It is up to the commissioner to set one option and the panel to set another, and then the public will decide which they prefer. That is a much more appropriate way of doing things. The panel would act responsibly when it came to cost, with the exception of the independents, who do not have that responsibility and are a piece of undemocratic grit in the system. However, it will be local decision making that makes a difference. Local people should have a say in how their precept should be set and how their policing should be run. That is what I would like to see. I am delighted that the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) has moved the new clause for discussion, and I hope that the Government will consider it carefully.

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[Dr Huppert]

I had much experience of disagreeing with the hon. Gentleman on this matter when the Bill was in Committee. I am now trying to understand how he squares what he is saying with what is actually happening. As we have heard, eight of the mere 10 applications that have been made in 10 years were rejected by the district judge, so the threshold is clearly higher than he is suggesting. Moreover, the clause does nothing about the process of applying for an arrest warrant. People could still apply for one; there would just be a delay before it could be granted.

[Michael Ellis]

I have a feeling that any Member of Parliament who was subject to the arrest warrant would not be so cavalier as to consider that one or two instances were nothing to worry about. We ought to have a system that applies fairly across the board.

According to a case study, in March last year the former Vice-President of Bosnia, Ejup Ganic, was arrested at Heathrow airport after Serbian judicial authorities issued an extradition warrant. He was accused of conspiracy to murder 40 Yugoslav People’s Army soldiers in an attack in May 1992. He was subsequently released on bail when the judge remarked that the arrest warrant issued by Serbia had been politically motivated. It was reported that Serbia had yet to produce any real evidence, and that most of its supposed evidence consisted of news articles about the incident. City of Westminster magistrates court blocked Ganic’s extradition in July last year. The presiding judge—who, as was pointed out by the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Sir Gerald Kaufman), had considerable experience—said that he had been led to believe that the extradition proceedings were

“brought and being used for political purposes, and as such amount to an abuse of the process of this court”

Having worked in the criminal justice system for 17 years, I am concerned about the way in which the English legal system is perceived abroad, and the ramifications of some of the incidents that have occurred. For generations, the United Kingdom has been at the forefront of peace conferences and other such meetings. The very recent meeting to discuss Libya is a classic example. Circumstances in which people were fearful of entering this country because an extremely low threshold might result in their arrest would be injurious not only to the reputation of the United Kingdom’s legal system, but to the UK’s overall reputation for being a place where peace can be sought and arrangements can be made across the negotiating table. It is not in the interests of world order and international peace for obstructions to be placed in the way of people wishing to enter this country in the way that they have been doing. That does not, of course, apply to only one country; there are several other examples.

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[Michael Ellis]

There seems to be a fear, including in apparently authoritative newspapers, that the provision will grant immunity from prosecution, but all it does is raise the test to the same level as for prosecutions that occur by the thousands per week in this country. Whenever there is an allegation against an individual—whether for murder, shoplifting or anything in between—the Crown Prosecution Service has to consider two tests: whether it is in the public interest to proceed, and whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction. No one suggests that the need to consider whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction in those contexts in effect means immunity from prosecution for everybody, and that is all that will be applying here.

[Dr Huppert]

This brings us on to what I consider to be an important point. Shortly after an arrest, the Attorney-General has to engage with deciding whether to continue with the private prosecution; that is one of the weaknesses of the private prosecution system. Does the hon. Gentleman think that one way in which this clause might help with prosecutions is that it would be hard for the Attorney-General to overturn a decision by the Director of Public Prosecutions, because he could not come up with the claim about the relevant person being just a magistrate? In fact the Attorney-General might find that he was in a weaker position, and it would be easier to proceed with a prosecution.

[Michael Ellis]

I am not concerned, as my hon. Friend appears to be, about the Attorney-General, because safeguards are built into our system in this country. The Attorney-General has been in a position similar to that envisaged in the Bill for decades, and there is no evidence whatever that that has been a problem in other areas. There are prosecutions in this country that can take place only with the consent of the Attorney-General, and there are other prosecutions that can take place only with the consent of the DPP—I myself have been involved in one or two of them—but no one is suggesting that those cases involve political interference. The reality is that we have to have safeguards against the misuse of a process that has increasingly been employed in highly controversial circumstances and has deeply injurious effects on international relations and British relations. As I have already enunciated, my primary concern is to maintain the good standing of the English legal system.