Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill (Eighteenth sitting)

Matthew Pennycook Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 6th September 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Jones]

As ever, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Paisley. I hope that colleagues had a good summer and, in many ways, are suitably refreshed and raring to go with our consideration of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill in Committee.

These three amendments are aimed at ensuring that proposed new section 93G of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, which is created by clause 99, works as intended. The amendments propose two changes. First, new section 93G does not refer to the correct section of the 1990 Act as the basis for the grant of planning permission. Therefore, the two technical corrections set out in Government amendments 74 and 75 are considered necessary to make clause 99 legally accurate. Secondly, to ensure that references in new section 93G concerning when new development has begun have the same meaning as those elements set out in existing section 56(2) of the 1990 Act, a consequential amendment is required. This is set out in Government amendment 76.

Overall, the amendments will ensure that clause 99 works as intended, without ambiguity. For those reasons, I hope that members of the Committee support them.

Amendment 74 agreed to.

Amendments made: 75, in clause 99, page 117, line 25, leave out “58(1)(b)” and insert “70”.

This amendment corrects a cross-reference.

Amendment 76, in clause 99, page 117, line 29, at end insert—

“( ) In section 56 (time when development begins), in subsection (3), after ‘92,’ insert ‘93G,’.”—(Mr Marcus Jones.)

This amendment adds a consequential amendment to section 56 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (which determines the time when development begins).

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Matthew Pennycook (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to reconvene after the summer recess under you in the Chair, Mr Paisley.

Clause 99 will insert proposed new section 93G into the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, as the Minister said. The new section will require those carrying out certain development types to serve a commencement notice to the relevant local planning authority before any development takes place. Such development notices will be required to outline the expected start date of construction, the details of the planning permission, the proposed delivery rate for the scheme, and other relevant information. The example in the explanatory notes accompanying the Bill suggests that this provision will most likely apply to large-scale residential schemes as a means, albeit a limited one, of preventing land banking and slow build-out by larger developers.

We welcome this sensible new duty. However, I would be grateful if the Minister provided further clarification as to what kinds of developments are likely to fall within the “prescribed description” bracket in subsection (1)(b) of the proposed new section and therefore be required to submit one of the new commencement notices.

[Mr Jones]

As I am sure the hon. Gentleman will appreciate, the description of the particular type of development he refers to will be dealt with in regulations and we will bring forward further details in due course. We will do so in consultation with both local authorities and industry.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 99, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 100

Completion notices

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[Tim Farron]

I gather it is a struggle to get back into the Toon afterwards—I will cadge a lift to the Bigg Market with you.

My concern is—this is why the amendment is important—that when we talk about planning and the powers that communities have, so often Governments, particularly this one, listen to a range of voices, but especially to the interests of developers. Here is an opportunity for the Government to listen to and give power to communities. In my constituency and around the country, there will be many instances like the one referred to by the hon. Member for South Shields, where planning permission has been given, work begins and then it is not completed. The powers available to the local council or local planning authority—let us be honest, we are talking about the powers available to the local community to have any control over all that—are very limited.

If the Government accepted the amendment, it would indicate that they are serious about empowering communities over the things that happen in them. That way, we are not allowing things to happen to communities, but allowing communities to have real sovereignty over what happens within their boundaries.

[Matthew Pennycook]

Very briefly, I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for South Shields on this excellent amendment, which we support. She made clear that the problem she has highlighted of private plots lying derelict for extended periods of time with no real prospect of development being completed has a real impact on local communities. Allowing the 12-month completion notice deadline to be circumvented in the circumstances set out in the amendment, with the proportionate requirement set out in proposed new subsection 3B, is sensible and we urge the Government to consider it seriously.

[Mr Jones]

I listened closely and carefully to what the hon. Member for South Shields said. I am sure she knows that because of the role of Ministers in the planning system, I cannot discuss that particular situation in detail, but I can say that I am aware of such situations, even in my own constituency. I am sure there are similar situations across the country.

Amendment 170 relates to the proposed updated legislative framework for completion notices in clause 100. Those notices are an existing tool available to local planning authorities that can be served on developments that, in the opinion of the local planning authority, will not be completed in a reasonable period. We want to equip local planning authorities with the tools necessary to deal with sites that have experienced long periods of inactivity or slow delivery. That is why, through clause 100, we propose to modernise the procedure for serving completion notices to make them simpler and faster to use, giving more control and certainty to local planning authorities in the process. To achieve that, clause 100 will remove the need for a completion notice to be confirmed by the Secretary of State before it can take effect and allow for a completion notice to be served on unfinished developments sooner, providing the planning permission has been implemented.

Amendment 170 proposes two fundamental changes to clause 100. First, there would be a shorter completion notice deadline below the current 12-month minimum in certain circumstances. Those are where a local planning authority is of the opinion that development has not taken place on a site for a prolonged period; that there is no reasonable prospect that the development would be completed in a reasonable period; and that it is in the public interest to serve a notice.

While I support the intention, I remind the Committee that completion notices, when served by a local planning authority or the Secretary of State, must provide the recipient with an opportunity to complete the development. To put it another way, a completion notice requires a person to use or lose their planning permission. Therefore, that person must be afforded the chance to use the planning permission and complete the development before the granting of that permission is removed. Providing the opportunity to complete is a critical aspect of the procedure governing the use of completion notices and reflects the longstanding position that planning permission is a development right and that revoking that right should be subject to compensation.

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These changes will help make completion notices a more attractive option for local planning authorities in England to galvanise delivery or to remove unused or unwanted planning permissions. These reforms make clear to the development industry and communities our commitment to ensuring that planning permission is built out as quickly as possible, and that where there are unreasonable delays to delivery, local planning authorities have more control and confidence in exercising their powers to bring about a timely completion of development. I commend clause 100 and schedule 10 to the Committee.

[Matthew Pennycook]

Clause 100 would amend the provisions in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 relating to completion notices. It does so by removing two requirements: that the Secretary of State must approve a completion notice and that the notice must be served only after the deadline for commencement of the planning permission has passed. We welcome these sensible revisions to the 1990 Act. I do, however, have two questions for the Minister, but I am more than happy for him to get back to me in writing if needed.

First, given that the changes sought by clause 100 are intended to work in conjunction with the new duty provided for by clause 99 on commencement notices, will the Minister explain why such notices are restricted to certain types of as yet undefined development, while the changes made to completion notice provision will continue to apply to all types of development? Secondly, subsection (2) of proposed new section 93H makes it clear that a local planning authority can serve a completion notice if it is of the opinion that the development will not be completed “within a reasonable period”—a power that in theory would allow the cases my hon. Friend the Member for South Shields just raised to be addressed in a timelier manner. Will the Minister clarify what is meant by “within a reasonable period”? If he cannot, can he tell us who will determine what it will mean in due course and whether there will be any limits whatsoever, given how ambiguous the phrasing is?

[Mr Jones]

On the first question, I will take up the hon. Member’s offer to write to him. To his second point, that reasonable period of time will be set out in guidance. The local planning authority will be the one to deal with the matter directly, rather than getting the Secretary of State involved. The authority will be able to determine how to deal with a particular situation by taking into account the factors relating to each development involved.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 100 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 10 agreed to.

Clause 101

Time limits for enforcement

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

The Government are clear that effective enforcement action is important to maintain public confidence in the planning system. This chapter introduces a number of measures long called for by colleagues in this place to strengthen the enforcement powers of local authorities and to close loopholes. Local planning authorities presently have a wide range of enforcement powers, with strong penalties for non-compliance, to tackle such situations. While we believe that the current enforcement framework generally works well, we acknowledge that we could make improvements in a number of areas. We want to strengthen planning enforcement powers and sanctions, reinforcing the principle that unauthorised development should never be viewed as preferential to proper, up-front planning engagement.

Within the planning enforcement framework, there are statutory time limits for the commencement of enforcement action. It is necessary to have a statutory time limit to provide certainty when the passage of time means that enforcement action is no longer feasible. However, there are currently two time limits for commencing enforcement action, depending on the nature of the breach. For a breach of planning control consisting of building operations or the change of use to a single dwelling, the time limit for commencing enforcement action is four years. For any other breach of planning control, the time limit for commencing enforcement action is 10 years from the date of the breach.

Stakeholders have raised concerns that the four-year timeframe can be too short, and in some cases can result in opportunities to commence planning enforcement action being inadvertently missed. For example, a person may not initially raise concerns with their local planning authority, assuming that a neighbouring development has the correct permissions or will not cause disturbance. Should the development prove disruptive, they may then try to come to an agreement with the person responsible for the development. By the time they raise their concerns with the local planning authority, some time may well have passed. The local planning authority may not initially be aware of that, prioritising other investigations. When an investigation begins, it may then become clear that the time limits for commencing enforcement action have inadvertently passed.

The four-year time limit can cause frustration for communities, whose initial pragmatism may result in unauthorised, harmful development becoming inadvertently immune from enforcement action. The clause will bring the time limit to commence enforcement action in England to 10 years in all cases, either from the date of substantial completion or the date of the breach, depending on the specific nature of the breach. That will provide greater confidence to local planning authorities that they will have the time to take enforcement action, and indicate to the public that planning breaches are taken seriously and should never be viewed as a preferential approach to proper engagement with the planning system. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 101 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 102 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 103

Enforcement warning notices

[Matthew Pennycook]

I beg to move amendment 116, in clause 103, page 122, line 36, at end insert—

“(4) The Secretary of State must provide sufficient additional financial resources to local planning authorities to enable them to implement the provisions in this section.”

This amendment, along with New Clause 36, would require the Secretary of State to provide sufficient additional resources to local planning authorities to enable them to implement the changes required by Chapter 5 of Part 3.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 36—Duty to provide sufficient resources to local planning authorities for new burdens: enforcement of planning controls—

“The Secretary of State must provide commensurate additional financial resources to local planning authorities to enable them to implement the provisions in Chapter 5 of Part 3.”

See explanatory statement for Amendment 116.

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[Matthew Pennycook]

Planning enforcement is vital if the integrity of the planning system is to be upheld. For that reason, we broadly welcome the measures set out in chapter 5 of this part of the Bill. Taken together, the amendment and new clause 36 would simply require the Secretary of State to provide sufficient additional resources to local planning authorities to enable them to implement the changes required by the provisions in this chapter.

As we discussed in relation to many previous amendments, we know that as a result primarily of local authority belt tightening in response to funding cuts by central Government, the resources dedicated to planning within local planning authorities have fallen dramatically over recent years. Planning enforcement has not escaped the impact of that general resource reduction. When it comes to the impact on enforcement activity, the figures speak for themselves: the Department’s own data on enforcement action show a marked decline in the issuing of planning contravention and enforcement notices over the past decade. Given that planning enforcement action, as opposed to the investigation of planning breaches, has long been classified as a discretionary service—rather than a statutory duty—our concern is that without sufficient additional resources many local authorities will simply determine to cut back on planning enforcement teams, rather than make full use of the new and enhanced powers provided for by the clauses in this chapter.

The National Association of Planning Enforcement, based on feedback from its members, has detailed how funding pressures are even leading some local authorities to consider removing their planning enforcement services budgets altogether, or reducing the provision to essential services only, with the suggestion that that means electing only to enforce certain breach types or taking enforcement action only on a select number of cases. In evidence recently submitted to the Select Committee on Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, the Royal Town Planning Institute highlighted that budgetary pressures were now so acute for some local authorities that they are prepared to risk the challenge of potential judicial reviews and formal complaints to the ombudsman, rather than spend resources they simply do not have on staffing planning enforcement teams.

We believe that it is right for clear expectations to be set when it comes to local authorities fulfilling their planning enforcement obligations. However, they deserve to be properly resourced to carry out those obligations and given adequate funds to undertake enforcement action, including in relation to biodiversity net gain. To the extent that the provisions in this chapter, including extending the period for taking enforcement action to 10 years in all cases and introducing new enforcement warning notices, clearly constitute additional work pressures on planning enforcement teams, it is only appropriate that local planning authorities receive sufficient additional resources to carry them out.

I hope that rather than merely once again paying lip service—as happened on so many occasions before the summer recess—to the need to ensure that planning authorities are resourced to deliver the reforms in this Bill, the Minister will feel able to demonstrate a commitment on the record to resourcing local planning authorities properly by either accepting our proposals or detailing precisely what additional funding authorities can expect in order to carry out the new functions.

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[Mr Jones]

I thank the hon. Member for York Central for that important point. I have acknowledged that there are capacity and capability challenges. I have also acknowledged that the Government want to go further by allowing local authorities to bring in more income. We have discussed and put the principle out there of doubling fees for retrospective planning applications, which often put often unnecessary additional pressure on local authorities, if people would have put forward their planning applications in the first instance in the proper and usual way.

On new clause 36, effective enforcement action is important to maintain public confidence and trust in the planning system. The package of enforcement measures in the Bill will strengthen the enforcement powers available to local planning authorities. Generally, the provisions make the existing framework easy to use by enforcement officers and, as such, they will not create significant additional burdens or resource pressures for local planning authorities. The use of new tools, such as enforcement warning notices, is discretionary. We are also working with partners to deliver a capacity and capability strategy to support the implementation of our planning reforms so that local planning authorities have the right skills and capabilities to make creative decisions and drive forward ambitious proposals, and we are committed to new burdens principles.

For those reasons, we cannot accept amendment 116 and new clause 36. I hope the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich is sufficiently reassured to withdraw the amendment.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I regret to inform the Minister that I am not sufficiently reassured. I note what he said about fees and about the strategy the Department intends to bring forward. Yet, what I hear time and again in responses to amendments that seek to press the Government on local authority resourcing is a seeming unawareness of how acute the problem is. The Minister referred to it in very diplomatic terms as capacity and capability challenges, but it goes way beyond that. Local planning authorities are under acute pressure, which has a direct impact on planning services in those local authorities and, because it is a discretionary service, on the enforcement part of those planning services.

I am concerned to hear the Minister say that he does not think the provisions in this chapter constitute additional work pressures. It seems to me that they do. When looked at in the round, the measures introduced in the Bill certainly constitute additional work pressures on departments. I am not going to press these proposals to a Division, but we will come back time and again to the issue of local authority resourcing, because planning is under acute pressure in terms of capability and skills, and the Government have to provide stronger commitments as to what they will do to address that. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

On the basis that we have debated clause 103 at some length, I commend it to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 103 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 104

Restriction on appeals against enforcement notices

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[Mr Jones]

The retrospective planning application process is a necessary part of the planning system. It allows those who have made a genuine mistake to remedy the situation. However, we are aware that it is also used by people who have intentionally undertaken development without permission, who then attempt to delay enforcement action.

Prior to the Localism Act 2011, an appeal could be made both against the refusal of a retrospective application and against enforcement action, on the ground that permission ought to be granted. Through the 2011 reforms, we reduced the circumstances in which an appeal could be made, preventing an appeal on the grounds that permission ought to be granted if an enforcement notice was issued before the end of the statutory determination period. However, the reforms inadvertently created a loophole, which has allowed appellants to continue to appeal twice in certain circumstances, against the refusal or non-determination of a retrospective planning application and against an enforcement notice, on the ground that permission ought to be granted. Both appeals, in effect, assess the planning merits of the case.

The loophole exists because, in some circumstances, a local planning authority might not issue an enforcement notice before the end of the determination period for a related retrospective application. That could be because the local planning authority might have invited the retrospective application in the first place, and does not want to be seen to prejudge the outcome, for example. In such cases, if the development were subsequently found to be unacceptable and retrospective planning permission was refused, an enforcement notice would be issued after the end of the determination period.

There would remain two opportunities to obtain permission retrospectively: first, by appealing the refusal of the retrospective application, and secondly, by appealing the enforcement notice on the ground that permission ought to be granted. A similar situation would occur if the determination of the retrospective application were delayed and the appellant appealed the retrospective application on the ground of non-determination.

Therefore, the clause will extend the period during which an enforcement notice can be issued and during which an appeal on the ground that permission ought to be granted can still be prevented to two years. The applicant will not then be able to appeal an enforcement notice on the ground that permission ought to be granted during that extended period. Instead, they will have only one route to obtain planning permission retrospectively—through a successful appeal of the refusal or the non-determination of the retrospective planning application. Appealing an enforcement notice on other grounds will still be permitted.

The clause will reinforce the message that people should seek planning permission before they start a development. Where they do not do so, they should have only one opportunity to obtain planning permission after the unauthorised development has taken place so that the matter can be rectified as soon as possible. That will speed up enforcement action and prevent resources from being wasted assessing the planning merits of the same case twice. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I would like to make some further remarks on clauses 105 and 106. Clause 105 will give the Secretary of State a new power that allows them to dismiss an appeal in relation to an enforcement notice or an application for a lawful development certificate in England should it appear to them that the appellant is causing undue delays to the appeals process. This is another point of clarification, but I simply wish to get a sense from the Minister of what causing undue delays as per proposed new section 176(6) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 will be taken to mean in practice.

Clause 106 will amend sections 187A and 216 of the 1990 Act in relation to England to increase the maximum fine for failing to comply with either a breach of condition notice or a section 215 notice. We do not oppose those changes, but I would like reassurance from the Minister that the Government have properly considered the possibility that increasing the maximum fine in such a way might have the unintended consequence of discouraging from seeking retrospective permission those who have, for whatever reason, made genuine mistakes on their planning applications.

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[Mr Jones]

The Government are committed to increasing opportunities for meaningful and early community involvement in planning decisions. Throughout the Bill, we are introducing measures that do just that. Communities should be given a say on developments that affect them, and should have those views taken into account when decisions are made. We are also keen to ensure that issues are dealt with early on, so that decisions are not unduly delayed. That is why we are introducing this minor but important change.

Clause 108 will make permanent the powers in sections 61W to 61Y of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 that enable the Secretary of State to mandate the types of applications for which applicants will be required to carry out consultations with those in the vicinity of the development, and with any other specified people—for example, statutory bodies—before submitting a planning application to the local planning authority. The powers also require applicants to have regard to any responses received in the pre-application consultation, including views expressed by local communities.

The powers have been used only to require pre-application consultation on onshore wind turbines where two or more turbines are being installed, or where the hub height is over 15 metres. We want to explore additional opportunities to use the powers where pre-application engagement will be most beneficial, and we will engage on that before bringing forward the necessary changes through secondary legislation. Making the powers permanent will allow the Government to further strengthen community engagement with the system. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 108 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 109 to 112 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 113

Infrastructure Levy: England

[Matthew Pennycook]

I beg to move amendment 142, in clause 113, page 131, line 38, leave out “a charge” and insert “an optional charge”.

This amendment would ensure that application of the Infrastructure Levy would be optional rather than mandatory.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Amendment 143, in schedule 11, page 283, leave out lines 27 and 28 and insert—

“(1) A charging authority in England may, if it determines that IL would be more effective than the community infrastructure levy for delivering infrastructure in its area and would not prevent it meeting the level of affordable housing need identified in its local development plan, in accordance with IL regulations, charge IL in respect of development in its area.”

This amendment to inserted section 204B, which is connected to Amendment 142, would ensure that application of the Infrastructure Levy would be optional rather than mandatory

Amendment 145, in schedule 11, page 289, line 18, leave out “or require”.

This amendment and Amendment 146, would give charging authorities discretion over the basis on which infrastructure levy rates are calculated.

Amendment 146, in schedule 11, page 289, line 30, leave out “or require”.

See explanatory statement for Amendment 145.

Amendment 147, in schedule 11, page 308, leave out from line 40 to line 13 on page 309 and insert—

“may be given under subsection (4) for authorities that have adopted an IL charging schedule, only if it is necessary for–

(a) delivering the overall purpose of IL mentioned in section 204A(2), or

(b) avoiding charging a specific development more than once for the same infrastructure project through both IL and the following powers—

(i) Part 11 (Community Infrastructure Levy) (including any power conferred by CIL regulations under that Part),

(ii) Section 106 of TCPA 1990 (planning obligations), and

(iii) Section 278 of the Highways Act 1980 (execution of works)

unless this is essential to rendering the development acceptable in planning terms.”

This amendment would avoid restrictions being placed on the use of the community infrastructure levy, section 106 obligations, and section 278 agreements at the Secretary of State’s discretion unless necessary to avoid double charging for the same infrastructure provision.

Clause 115 stand part.

[Matthew Pennycook]

Part 4 of the Bill concerns the infrastructure levy, which is the Government’s proposed replacement for the present arrangement by which local planning authorities secure developer contributions, comprised of the community infrastructure levy—or CIL—and section 106 planning obligations, albeit with a significant role, as required, for section 278 agreements providing for permanent alterations or improvements to a public highway.

In our view, this new levy is one of the most consequential aspects of the Bill, with potentially far-reaching implications for not only the provision of core infrastructure but the supply of affordable housing. For that reason, I intend to spend a fair amount of time considering it.

Clause 113 introduces schedule 11, which would amend the Planning Act 2008 to provide for the imposition, in England, of the new levy. It is worth noting at the outset that the levy proposed in the Bill is a quite different proposition from the one suggested by the Government in their 2020 “Planning for the Future” White Paper. The latter was premised on a nationally set rate or area-specific rates, and its introduction was to be accompanied by the replacement of the current system of section 106 planning obligations. The amended approach proposed in the Bill, which allows charging authorities to set their own infrastructure levy rate or rates and retains an important role for section 106 on—albeit presently undefined—large sites, is without doubt an improvement on the excessively rigid system put forward in the White Paper.

However, the Opposition still have serious concerns about the possible implications of the revised infrastructure levy outlined by the Government. I deliberately use the word “possible”, because schedule 11 merely provides the basic framework for the levy; as with so much of this legislation, almost all the detailed design is to follow in regulations after some form of consultation.

In general terms, we have two main concerns about the new levy. First, when we consider how it might work as proposed, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that it will result in a system of developer contributions that is at least as complex as the present one; it is likely to be even more complex. In short, we worry that it may prove onerously complicated to operate in practice.

Secondly, there is good reason to suspect that the levy as proposed will fail to secure as much, let alone more, public gain from developers. In short, we worry that it will lead to less infrastructure and less affordable housing in the future, while putting the development of less viable sites at risk entirely.

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[Matthew Pennycook]

That is a very apt point, and I will address it when I talk about how the levy might work in practice. One of the criticisms of the system that Ministers often cite are the problems relating to viability inherent in it. We know that local planning authorities struggle with that element of the system. This new levy introduces a need to value and incorporate viability into every planning decision covered by the new levy, rather than just those where viability is a consideration, so I think the resourcing pressures will be exacerbated by its introduction.

However, we accept that the Government have no intention of removing part 4 from the Bill, so our focus is firmly on trying to amend it and schedule 11 to mitigate any harmful effects of the levy. This first group of amendments on part 4 seeks to achieve that mitigation simply by reversing the presumption in the Bill that the use of the infrastructure levy will be mandatory for all charging authorities, and by fixing core elements of its design. In short, they all aim to provide for a greater degree of discretion.

Amendment 142 would amend clause 113 to make it clear that IL would be an optional charge. Amendment 143 would have the same effect in relation to schedule 11, while making it clear that the decision to adopt the levy would be premised on a judgment that it would be more effective than CIL for delivering infrastructure and would not prevent affordable housing need from being met. Making IL optional would necessitate allowing charging authorities that choose not to adopt it to continue to make use of the current system, so amendment 147 seeks to ensure that the Bill places no restrictions on the use of the community infrastructure levy, section 106 obligations and section 278 agreements, unless doing so is necessary to avoid double charging for the same infrastructure provision. To give charging authorities that freedom, it is necessary to leave out clause 115 entirely, given that it restricts the use of CIL to Greater London and Wales.

Finally, amendments 145 and 146 are designed to provide an additional safeguard by enabling charging authorities to determine the best way to calculate the amount of IL payable, rather than forcing them to base such a calculation on gross development value—a metric that, as I will come on to explain, we believe is likely to generate a host of serious problems if made the default means of calculating levy charges. We feel strongly that these amendments, by giving charging authorities discretion in these important respects, would help to avoid the obvious risks of imposing the levy universally, given the significant variation in development and land values not only across the country but in individual local authority areas, and would better allow charging authorities to tailor developer contribution arrangements to their local circumstances, so that they can get the best for their area.

I have already alluded to our belief that there are a series of inherent flaws in the levy as proposed. Chief among those are the fact that its proceeds will be expected to cover not only core infrastructure, but all affordable housing, and the fact that charges will be based on a percentage of final gross development value, or GDV. To convey to the Committee precisely why we believe that these features are so problematic, and why we feel so strongly that charging authorities should have discretion on whether to adopt the new levy, as well as on the metric on which it is calculated, let me give a worked example that shows the differences between the existing and proposed systems, based on my understanding of how the new levy is likely to operate.

Let us imagine, for the purposes of this worked example, that under the present developer contributions system, a local planning authority receives an application for a 100-home development, with 1,000 square metres of commercial floor space and an on-site community facility—a simple planning application. We will assume that the LPA has a local plan in place, and that it specifies a requirement of 50% affordable homes by unit; that would be 50 of the 100 homes on this hypothetical site. Let us imagine further that, as so often happens, the applicant uses viability assessments to reduce the affordable housing contribution levels to 40%. If that is approved, under the existing system, the local planning authority will know that in this scenario, despite the reduction on viability grounds, it will secure 40 affordable homes to buy or rent on this site, and with a local CIL rate of, say, £100 per square metre, it has certainty at the point of planning determination that the applicant is required to make a contribution of approximately £520,000 for infrastructure, taking into account social housing relief.

Now let us assume, in contrast, that this Bill receives Royal Assent unamended, and that the same local planning authority receives, some years from now, an identical application, having been forced to adopt the new infrastructure levy. It is an extremely challenging exercise to specify even hypothetical infrastructure levy rates, given the overall lack of detail at present and the numerous assumptions that are required to estimate what sort of rates will be needed to achieve the same level of value capture as at present—a subject I will touch on in more detail when we deal with the amendments relating specifically to rate setting. For the purposes of this scenario, let us specify that the authority’s levy charging schedule has set a minimum cost threshold of say, £3,000 per square metre; an IL rate of 50%—because, whatever the specific range, we know that IL rates will have to be far higher than CIL rates to cover the costs of all required infrastructure and affordable housing; and that the authority in question seeks to apply a ‘right to require’ amount—that is, the proportion of the levy proceeds to be allocated to on-site affordable housing— of 90%.

Under the new system, how many affordable homes would the levy implemented by this charging authority provide on our hypothetical site, and what contribution would the applicant make toward the provision of other local infrastructure? To answer those two relatively simple questions, one would need an assessment of the gross development value of the proposed development, GDV being the metric that the Government wants the new levy to be based on. To assess the development’s GDV, valuations would have to be secured. To accurately assess the value of the mix of flats and houses of different sizes, features and locations across the development, one would need to reference the value of comparable new build properties in the area, assuming those exist. To accurately value the commercial floor space in the proposed development, one would need to undertake an assessment of likely rents, using comparable local properties, again assuming that those exist. Those likely rents would then have to be capitalised using a yield based on an analysis of the sale of comparable commercial buildings in the area, again assuming those exist. The resulting figures would then have to be divided by net saleable and lettable floor space to generate a per square metre value for that commercial floor space. Generic or standardised information could of course be used, but that would run the risk of significantly increasing the margin of error, with consequential impacts for the amount of affordable housing and infrastructure provided on our hypothetical site.

Armed with those assessed values, and given that end value is the metric on which this levy is calculated, in order to estimate the amount of IL generated for affordable housing on the site, the local planning authority would deduct the minimum threshold of £3,000 per square metre, multiply the remaining number by the IL rate of 50%, multiply it again by the 90% “right to require” proportion, multiply that figure by the proposed amount of floor space, and divide the remaining figure by the different values of market homes and affordable homes, which in themselves would require additional valuations.

All of that is to say that the exact proportion of affordable homes that the levy will generate will vary from site to site in any given local planning authority area, even if the authority chooses to set a single rate, rather than multiple rates, as is its right. It will depend on myriad different, and far from simplistic, time-consuming assessments of end value. However, calculating the levels of affordable housing generated by the levy is not the end of the process. The local planning authority will then need to calculate the infrastructure contribution for our site, namely the difference between the total levy amount and the proportion allocated to affordable housing, and the value of the community facility as another piece of on-site infrastructure.

Moreover, every one of these valuations—each critical to arriving at an assessment of the GDV of the development as a whole—will presumably not be set in stone, because the value of the market and affordable homes, the commercial floor space and the community facility on our hypothetical development will change over time, as would any other. That means that the local planning authority will almost certainly have to carry out further valuations at different stages in the development process, with the final liability not being known until years after the application was submitted—and that is setting aside the very real possibility that the new system will, along with problems relating to avoidance, generate frequent disputes over valuations, which could delay and complicate the process further.

Imagine for one moment a senior planning officer or an elected councillor in our imagined local planning authority who is confronting that new system and trying to accurately assess at the planning application stage how much affordable housing will be provided on our hypothetical site, and the amount of infrastructure funding that will be extracted from the developer. I put it to the Committee that doing that would be extremely challenging, if not impossible, for them—let alone for a local resident who has taken a passing interest in the proposed scheme.

As my hon. Friend the Member for York Central said, most local planning authorities simply do not have the expertise and the resource to oversee such a complicated process, and that leaves aside other pertinent questions. What if the final infrastructure levy liability, based as it will be under the Government’s proposals on end-value GDV, turns out to be lower than the value of the on-site affordable housing and infrastructure that has been constructed in the interim? In such circumstances, would the local planning authority have to refund the developer on the basis that an overpayment has been made?

What is more, the difficulty that charging authorities will face in estimating the affordable housing and infrastructure payments generated by the new levy, and by implication they difficulty that they will have in setting rates in the first place, are not the new system’s only weaknesses. The significant uncertainty that will result from the decision to base the levy on a proportion of GDV is likely to cause issues in relation to the price of land and development land sales. It will almost certainly hamper the ability of local planning authorities to properly assess the benefits of proposed development, and whether it will contribute sufficiently to meeting local housing need and infrastructure requirements. Also, the new system will not remove the need for some type of site-specific legal agreement to ensure that the contributions extracted from developers are used to deliver the affordable homes on site, and that all the relevant requirements in terms of tenure type, discount rates and eligibility are ultimately met.

Perhaps most contentiously, the decision to make GDV the metric for the new levy is likely to result in applicants making their IL payments at the end, rather than at the beginning, of the development of a site, because the potential for interim payments or payments on account will be complicated by the fact that the final IL liability will not become clear, due to all the problems inherent in valuing GDV, until near the point of completion. That raises the very real prospect of the new levy creating a system in which the infrastructure required to support development will not be in place when it is needed.

One assumes from several passing comments made by previous Ministers that the Government believe that the answer to this obvious problem is to allow local authorities to borrow against future levy receipts to fund the delivery of infrastructure up front. However, the Minister must surely recognise that all that proposition entails is a transfer of risk and cost from the private to the public sector; it does nothing to address the uncertainty at the heart of the new process. Even with the opportunity to borrow against future levy receipts, it would remain the case that net receipts from post-completion valuation would be hard to predict, and rates on borrowing would reflect that uncertainty, resulting in infrastructure being more expensive to deliver. The idea that local authorities will collectively take up this borrowing option at the scale needed to offset the delay in securing levy contributions is, frankly, for the birds.

It may be that the Government believe that infrastructure on any given site will be paid for by levy contributions extracted from already completed developments, but if that is the case, it will give rise to a situation where there is no guarantee that the infrastructure funding delivered by a new development will be spent in the vicinity of the development. Whatever way one looks at it, the outcome is likely to be fewer overall approvals, more unsustainable development where development does occur, and greater local opposition; either development will not be accompanied by the up-front provision of core infrastructure, or there will be no obvious link between an individual development site and infrastructure provision in the area.

In sum, and with the obvious proviso that the detailed design of IL will be delivered through regulations and so we can only judge the new system based on our current understanding of the Government’s thinking, there is very good reason to suspect that the levy will not be a simpler, more transparent, more certain and more effective system of developer contributions than the one that presently exists. As a result, we feel strongly that the Government should think again about legislating to make its adoption mandatory.

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For the reasons I have set out, I commend clauses 113 and 115 to the Committee.

[Matthew Pennycook]

How to respond to that? That was a valiant attempt to make the best case possible for what is ultimately a flawed proposition.

The Minister has outlined that the existing system has flaws. I agree with him, as I said earlier, although I do not think they are the flaws that he set out. Some of the issues around viability—I spoke to the reasons earlier—have been addressed, and the Government can take other steps, not least under clause 110, to strengthen the existing system. However, we are considering the framework for a system that, as far as I can tell from looking back at CIL and previous attempts, has never been tried. We are talking about a single, fixed-rate levy mechanism for securing all affordable housing and infrastructure. That has never been tried, and certainly not on the basis of a metric as problematic as GDV.

The Minister says that we know the sale value at the endpoint of a development, but we do not necessarily—it depends on what the development is, and with phased development it becomes even more complicated—and knowing that does not address the inherent uncertainty that GDV creates at the point of the planning application being determined. With the current system, there is no sense of how much affordable housing or infrastructure we are going to get, and we certainly have no guarantees that we are going to get that infrastructure up front, which is a live point of concern across the Committee and across the House.

It is okay to say that perhaps local authorities will have greater certainty, by means of the borrowing power that the Bill will provide for, but what will they do—store up infrastructure levy reserves for a couple of years before they start to bring forward infrastructure developments on sites? Even if they can do that, this system will break the link between individual sites and IL contributions, so in all our constituencies we will get greater local opposition to plans because, even more so than with the current system, our residents will not be able to understand the link between a planning application being brought forward and what public gain they and their community will get out of it.

I do not think that the Minister, as much as he attempted to, has responded to the serious concerns that I have set out about GDV and the new system to the extent that we can be reassured that, in passing this framework this morning, we will be introducing a system that will have better outcomes and that addresses the real complexities in the current system.