Trade Bill (Sixth sitting)

Matt Western Excerpts

Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 30th January 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Gentleman, but we have already covered that ground as well. The agreements with Norway, Turkey and Switzerland will inevitably be dependent on our future trading relationship with the European Union, because of the unique way that each of those countries operates in conjunction with the European Union.

The hon. Gentleman says that we are not proposing changes. It is just as important to recognise that more than 70 of our partners do not want substantive changes to the agreements either. Perhaps we need to put aside for a moment some of the ways in which the Bill operates, and think about what is in the interests of our trading partners. It is as much in their interests as ours to have continuity of the existing agreements. It is therefore not a surprise to me that more than 70 countries have said that they are not seeking substantive changes to the agreements.

[Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)]

I appreciate the point that the Minister seeks to make. However, as he says, there are 70 of them and one of us. In any negotiation, the disadvantage is always with the minority. We are going to be in a very difficult position. One could well imagine—this point came up at the International Trade Committee last week—that the opportunity exists for those nations to renegotiate or, recognising the time pressure that we will be under, to make changes. Surely it should be for Parliament to consider any such change to a trade agreement, not for the Minister or a select few.

[Greg Hands]

The hon. Gentleman puts his question in a reasonable way. I know he is a member of the International Trade Committee and was there for the evidence session last Wednesday. However, it is not the case that we and the 70-plus countries are in some kind of plurilateral agreement. The number he talks about is the number of agreements, not the number of negotiating partners to that same agreement. Essentially, they would run the same risk that we would run if anyone were to want to renegotiate the agreement. The risk is that we would run out of time to have the transitioned agreement in place come the day that we leave the European Union. We have as much risk and as much downside as the counterpart does. That is the important thing to understand. The Government therefore consider the negative procedure to offer the appropriate level of further scrutiny over the operation of the power.

Turning to amendment 19, as we have made clear, the purpose of the Bill is to help maintain the effects of our existing trading arrangements as we leave the EU. It is vital that we secure that continuity without delay, to avoid disruption for businesses and consumers. That is why we are seeking a power that ensures that our transitioned trade agreements can be implemented in the nimblest and most efficient way possible, through the negative resolution procedure. A switch to the super-affirmative procedure would risk undermining that objective. Statutory instruments subject to the super-affirmative procedure may take even longer than using primary legislation to implement a transitioned agreement, which would therefore increase the risk of a cliff edge in our trading relationships.

[Matt Western]

Just to clarify—the Minister can correct me if I am wrong—the agreements will in many cases be trilateral because of our existing relationship with the EU and the relationship with the other country among the 70-plus the Minister mentioned. There is therefore an opportunity for that other country to make the negotiation or arrangement difficult. That is why we are seeking to put in place scrutiny in Parliament.

[Greg Hands]

I refer the hon. Gentleman to the comments I made earlier: none of the 70-plus countries that we have spoken to has said that it wants to do that. It would not be in their interests for them to do so, for reasons of maintaining continuity in our trade relations. That is very much in our and their interests.

Let me finally remind the Committee that Parliament still has oversight of statutory instruments introduced under the negative resolution procedure, using well-established processes as outlined in CRAG. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Brent North to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bill Esterson]

I think we should press on. The Minister has enough to worry about.

As Mr Stevenson of the Manufacturing Trade Remedies Alliance told us last week:

“Some see trade remedies as purely protectionist and would abolish them completely”.––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 January 2018; c. 65, Q124.]

It is key, therefore, that Parliament, through its relevant Committee, should get to scrutinise who the Secretary of State appoints as the head of the relevant body, and that it should make sure it is someone with the competence, experience and disposition to stand up for the best interests of British industries and the British people.

Similarly, amendment 22 would ensure that the Secretary of State cannot appoint non-executive members to the TRA at his whim and fancy. He should not be able to stack the TRA with members of a certain political and ideological persuasion that would mean they would be less likely to act on complaints brought forward and less likely to recommend measures. We heard from Mr Stevenson of the MTRA last week that if all its members

“thought trade remedies were protectionist, we would never get any trade remedies through”.––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 January 2018; c. 65, Q124.]

Parliamentary scrutiny of the membership of the TRA is even more important in the light of the evidence given to this committee by Mr Tom Reynolds of the British Ceramic Confederation. He highlighted to us at column 67 that, within the context of our membership of the European Union, the UK Government took on the role of the “liberal counterweight” opposing strong trade defence measures. However, now that we will not have the other 27 member states, of which a majority is for trade remedies, we cannot afford to take the same approach.

Unfortunately, according to Mr Reynolds, UK civil servants and experts are “steeped in that heritage” of the UK being a neo-liberal counterweight. We cannot afford to let that institutional memory dictate how our independent trade defence policy is conducted. We need to ensure that the non-executive board of the TRA is a watchdog that ensures balance in the system. The only way to do that is to allow this House, through the appropriate Committee, to have a say on the appointment of the board members.

Finally and most importantly, amendment 23 would ensure that the TRA includes among its non-executive members representatives of stakeholder bodies potentially affected by the recommendations of the TRA. Those stakeholders are the producers, the trade unions representing the workers and a representative of each of the devolved Administrations. We have put that into our amendment because we believe that the key stakeholders affected by unfair trading practices should be represented around the table where decisions are being made that affect the survival of their industries and jobs, and the wellbeing of their communities. The TRA will only be enriched by experts from industry, trade unions and the devolved Administrations, who are the ones facing the realities of dumping on a day-to-day basis and close to home.

[Matt Western]

Does my hon. Friend have a view on the recent situation with Bombardier and the involvement of the US trade body that found in its favour? Are there any learnings from that? I am specifically interested in the role of the unions on that body, as well as industry representatives.

[Bill Esterson]

My hon. Friend is right to raise that. The Bombardier experience shows that countries are prepared to apply very significant trade remedies. We have to be realistic. We need to be in a position to have our own trade remedies system, be prepared to use them and not expect that not using such processes is always appropriate. That is why we must have the right membership, including from the trade unions, to protect jobs, as my hon. Friend has said, because otherwise we leave ourselves wide open.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bill Esterson]

Of course that is right. My hon. Friend deserves credit for taking the time and effort to go and meet the ITC and to make the case with the trade unions and others from this country. The lobbying that he and others were involved in played no small part in delivering for workers and business in the UK. He deserves a lot of credit for that. I will return to my speech—

[Matt Western]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Bill Esterson]

What a good idea.

[Matt Western]

This reminds me of Saturday afternoons watching wrestling. [Laughter.] The crucial thing about the TRA is that it is a facilitator, not a barrier, to ensure the needs of sectors and those involved in the sectors, whether workers or businesses. That came across very clearly in the representations from witnesses last week as something they want. My hon. Friend mentioned the chairmanship. As with the Office for Budget Responsibility, it is crucial that the chair is seen as an important role and not some political lackey.

[Bill Esterson]

Yes, that is exactly right. The point is to get the balance between how the Conservative Government under David Cameron blocked attempts to use appropriate trade remedy measures to defend our steel industry and the excessive use of them by the Americans. That is what the new TRA should do and that is why it needs to have the right balance of membership.

The message from the evidence given by the witnesses last week was loud and clear: stakeholders want representation on the TRA. They want their voices to be heard and their concerns taken into account, and they want that guaranteed in statute, not through ad hoc discussions with the Government. George Peretz QC told us that the composition of the TRA

“ought to be balanced by statute and that it ought to reflect a variety of different perspectives.”––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 January 2018; c. 55, Q105.]

We also heard from James Ashton-Bell of the CBI, that:

“In anything where you are making choices about trade and how it will impact the wider economy, you should have a wide and balanced group of people advising Government, or an independent authority, about how to make those choices.”––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 January 2018; c. 25, Q54.]

Chris Southworth of the International Chamber of Commerce concurred, saying that

“the representation is a critical point. An independent body, yes, but there must be representation within that independent body to represent all the important voices”.––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 January 2018; c. 25, Q54.]

That responds to the question by my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington.

If the Minister will not listen to me, will he at least listen to business associations, industry representatives, trade unions, academics, QCs and civil society? They are all coming out against how he and his Department are going about this. I urge Members on all sides to support our three amendments, but if the inevitable happens and the Minister leads them into voting us down, I look forward to him bringing forward his alternatives later in proceedings.