Economic Affairs and Work and Pensions

Matt Hancock Excerpts

Tuesday 8th June 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Darling]

Forgive me if I have misunderstood the hon. Gentleman, but throughout the three years when I was Chancellor, I do not think that I ever, on any occasion, concealed from anyone the difficulties that we and other economies would face as a result of the deepest global downturn in the past century. There can be no doubt about that.

However, I should tell the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues that by 2008, it was clear that this country, and every other major developed country in the world, faced the catastrophic consequences of the failure of the banking system. Had we not taken action to stabilise the banking system—many of those decisions were opposed by the Conservatives—and to ensure that we supported our economy when private sector investment dried up and died away, we would have had a situation in which recession tipped into depression. That is why we took the action that we did. We were right to do so, and the Conservatives were wrong to oppose us. Our economy is now growing, and as I said earlier, unemployment is half that in the downturn of the 1990s, and borrowing is coming down, because of the action we took in 2008 and 2009. We took that action along with most developed countries.

[Matthew Hancock (West Suffolk) (Con)]

rose—

[Dr Thérèse Coffey (Suffolk Coastal) (Con)]

rose—

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[Mr Richard Bacon (South Norfolk) (Con)]

rose—

[Matthew Hancock]

rose—

[Mr Darling]

I shall give way to the hon. Gentleman who I think used to advise the Chancellor at one point.

[Matthew Hancock]

The shadow Chancellor has mentioned the banking crisis several times. With hindsight, does he regret the system of banking regulation that was introduced in 1997, and recognise that it failed?

[Mr Darling]

No, I do not think that was the main problem. The system of regulation that we introduced in 1998 brought together about eight or nine different regulators—self-regulators, as the Conservative party used to be very keen on self-regulation. The problem in relation to the Financial Services Authority, the American regulators and most other regulators was that they simply did not understand the systemic risks that arose in the previous decade or the consequences of the failure of one bank for another. The system in this country was not the problem, but there was undoubtedly a failure on the part of regulators right across the world, including in our country. The FSA’s inquiry into what went wrong in Northern Rock demonstrated that the FSA had spotted problems in Northern Rock in February 2007 but had not taken action. I shall say this in the nicest possible way to the hon. Gentleman: he might want to have a word with one or two of the people who were running Northern Rock—members of his party—who might have had a better look at what they were supposed to have been doing when they were running that bank.