National Security and Russia

Martin Docherty-Hughes Excerpts

Monday 26th March 2018 Commons Chamber

[Martin Docherty-Hughes (West Dunbartonshire) (SNP)]

I was glad that the Prime Minister started this debate by articulating the fact that this Parliament’s argument was not with the Russian nation or the diversity of its peoples. I am sure that the Foreign Secretary will forgive me for saying this, but some of the comments from Government Front Benchers over the weekend were perhaps unnecessary as we try to promote dialogue at this extremely difficult time.

We must acknowledge that there is still no definitive proof that the Salisbury attack was carried out by the Russian regime. There has been no admission of any culpability and nor are we likely to receive any. However, there is no doubt in my mind that it fits a clear pattern of behaviour and threat escalation not only here in the UK, but in a host of other European states, particularly those on the post-Soviet periphery. This is most worrying, especially in a broader geostrategic context, as it has coincided with a defence industry modernisation programme in the Russian Federation that has led many, myself included, to fear that we could be about to enter a new and unwelcome arms race in Europe, which would be in no one’s interest.

Let us not forget that in President Trump’s first call with Vladimir Putin after his inauguration, the then new President of the United States called the New START treaty, due to last until 2021, one of the worst deals signed by the Obama Administration, saying that it favoured Russia. Let us be clear: if the New START treaty falls, a whole host of other arms control treaties and agreements will begin to unravel. This is, of course, a treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, but the consequences for our own security are immense.

The evidence suggests that the UK is in a period of unprecedented weakness in terms of its ability to understand and interpret Russian strategy. Whether we like it or not, understanding Russia and its motivations is a fundamental duty of any Administration, yet I would contend that successive UK Governments have made a strategic decision to dismantle infrastructure, to disinvest from the necessary skills and people, and to divert funds that had previously been allocated to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the intelligence services and the Ministry of Defence to allow those agencies to understand the Russian Federation and the old Soviet Union, and to help the Government to make informed policy decisions.

I will give one example of how this capability has been systematically dismantled. The Soviet Studies Research Centre was Sandhurst’s in-house think-tank on Russian military policy. It became the Conflict Studies Research Centre in 1992, but was then changed to a tri-service capability and moved to Shrivenham, with a resultant loss in capacity, in 2005. It then became the Advanced Research and Assessment Group in 2007 before finally folding in 2010. All that remains of the Army’s in-house capability, with its 40-odd years of institutional knowledge, is the Russian military studies archive, which is still based at Shrivenham and is itself struggling for long-term funding.

[Mr Seely]

There is one gentleman—one Russian speaker —who mans that centre. I occasionally see him when he comes down from Scotland, and he is still going through the archives, which are effectively nothing more than a hugely understaffed glorified library. I agree that it is a great shame that ARAG was done away with just a couple of years after its most useful report into the Georgian war.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

The hon. Gentleman’s intervention highlights some of the issues around knowledge of the Russian Federation, and I also hope to meet that gentleman very soon.

Going back to the timeline of the Russian Federation, over the past decade or so we have had the murder of Alexander Litvinenko in 2006, the invasion of Georgia in 2008, Putin’s return to power in 2012, and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. I cannot help but come to the conclusion that, as the need to understand Russia’s growing assertiveness has increased, Governments of every colour have decreased the UK’s ability to get to grips with it. Quite simply, the UK’s inability to meet the upcoming strategic challenges that the Russian Government pose should cause us all concern. As we begin to contemplate a new era of increasing turbulence in global arms control, and as the prospect of a new arms race looms, we should all be scared.

In that context, the multiple examples of Russian donations to UK political parties seem particularly misjudged, and I hope that those parties would consider returning them. The ill-gotten gains from the stolen wealth of the Russian people has flowed through this city for far too long. It has entered into the bloodstream of politics. It has purchased property and greased the wheels of the financial sector. That that has happened while Governments have run down their understanding of Russia not only is complacent, but must finally be seen as an abdication of responsibility.

We must begin preparations for the post-Putin era, but who are the potential successors? It is likely that they will be of a generation that did not know the Soviet Union like Putin did. They will probably not come with the same KGB baggage that he did. That will be a huge potential opening, with the possibility of not repeating the past mistakes, made by both sides, that have led us to this profound point. That type of thinking cannot be done on the cheap, and I fear that a diplomatic service consumed by the difficulties—that is me being diplomatic —of Brexit will be unable to find the resources to do it.

Let me end by saying that while the horrific attack carried out against Sergei and Yulia Skripal may be a new low in our relations with the Government of the Russian Federation, we must not only push back firmly, as the Prime Minister indicated, but use it as a wakeup call. The potential for future misunderstanding and miscalculation is great, but let this violence not be in vain.