Professional Standards in the Banking Industry

Mark Reckless Excerpts

Thursday 5th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Clive Efford]

My hon. Friend has made the point, and in the interests of brevity I will leave it there for the Government to comment on.

The Attorney-General is wrong to say that we cannot set up an inquiry such as the one the Opposition are calling for today while a criminal investigation is taking place. At least two criminal investigations are going on while the Leveson inquiry is taking place.

We have been here before. On 4 September 2010, the News of the World issued the following statement:

“We reject absolutely any suggestion there was a widespread culture of wrongdoing at the News of the World.”

We all know what that meant. The then editor of the News of the World, Colin Myler, told the Press Complaints Commission in August 2009 that

“Our internal inquiries have found no evidence of involvement by News of the World staff other than Clive Goodman in phone-message interception”.

Let us compare that with Mr Diamond’s comment in his letter accepting the invitation to appear before the Treasury Committee:

“This inappropriate conduct was limited to a small number of people relative to the size of Barclays trading operations, and the authorities found no evidence that anyone more senior than the immediate desk supervisors was aware of the requests by traders, at the time that they were made.”

We heard exactly the same sort of defences being made against the Leveson inquiry being set up, suggesting that this was a small matter that needed to be investigated. This is too deep an issue to investigate through a Joint Committee of this House or a Select Committee.

I am instinctively supportive of the idea that we should set up such Committees, but fundamental reform of this House of Commons would be required for us to carry out such an inquiry. Back Benchers would need to be able to conduct business independently of the Executive. We do not have the structures to deal with an issue such as this. We would also have to change the culture of this place. Back Benchers would have to have a duty to the public, rather than to our respective Front Benchers.

[Mark Reckless (Rochester and Strood) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

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[Mark Reckless (Rochester and Strood) (Con)]

In 1993, I joined Warburg’s as UK economist. One of the first things I recall is visiting the chairman of the bank, Sir David Scholey, in his office with my entry cohort. He said to us that what the bank had that mattered most was its reputation, that capital would always flow to good ideas and that if we did not have great amounts of capital, that was not a problem because we had our client relationships. He said that we must always remember to put our clients’ interests first, never our own.

My first boss was George Magnus, the chief economist at Warburg’s, who is still active. I remember him saying to me that we should never talk our book, and that we were there to be objective. He said that we should never be particularly proud if we got something right or concerned if we got something wrong, but that we should be proud of the integrity of our way of thinking. When I was given a bonus, I expressed gratitude. The culture had not yet become that we should look upset in the hope of more next time.

Only when I went to do an MBA at Columbia university in New York did I realise that the fact that I had become a rated analyst was of personal value to me and that I could perhaps have gone to another bank and got more money. When I came back from America, the position here had changed. We had the regulatory system of the FSA, and I was more involved in advising retail banks.

One case that I worked on for a substantial time was that of a retail bank merging with an insurance firm. It was clear to me that to treat customers fairly in merging the compliance function, as I was tasked to do, we had to focus on how that insurer might sell products to the bank’s customers. There was nothing wrong with that per se—that, along with stripping out cost, was the rationale for the merger—but it clearly brought risks, and we needed a function that would stop inappropriate sales to customers for whom they were not correct. Yet the main issues in dealing with the FSA were a turf war between the bank and the insurance regulator and a vast amount of time spent on box-ticking compliance. The question is not just whether the system is over-regulated or under-regulated, it is about the quality of the regulation.

I then became a lawyer—I am both a qualified barrister and a solicitor—when I worked on bank recapitalisations and FSA litigation. I served as a judicial assistant to the vice-president of the Court of Appeal. The motion asks for a judge-led inquiry. I have enormous respect for our senior judiciary, but they have almost entirely been judges and lawyers—they have not worked in financial services industries and are not, as hon. Members are, representative of wider society.

On LIBOR, two separate things happened with Barclays. First, there was market abuse—we will see what happens in respect of other banks. Because the two mid-quartiles of LIBOR were measured, it was thought there could be no gain by giving a low or high response, but there was collusion by so many players that there was market abuse, and the FSA was asleep on the job.

I would encourage hon. Members to think about the second Barclays aspect in terms of the perspective of the time. The British Bankers Association says that LIBOR

“is not necessarily based on actual transactions”.

Banks are asked a question:

“At what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size”?

We should note that the question refers to “offers” rather than “an offer”, but the BBA goes on to say:

“Therefore, submissions are based upon the lowest perceived rate at which a bank could”

borrow. It also says that “reasonable market size” is not defined and that

“it would have to be constantly monitored and in the current conditions would have to be changed very frequently.”

Whitehall was therefore using Barclays reports for a purpose for which they were not designed. It was looking not at LIBOR, but at one particular bank’s reports, which were quite possibly compiled by a junior person, in an incredibly difficult market position. Therefore, if Barclays reported a higher rate than other banks, it might be that it had different perceptions of “reasonable market size”, or it might not ask the offered rates because the market had frozen. Which banks were asked and how are those considerations to be reported? The banks are not being asked: “What are your bid and offer rates?” They are being asked: “What do you perceive one of your competitors might offer you were you to ask?” In the context of the financial crisis, that is potentially different from the market abuse I have described.

We should also consider the UK in the international context. We have a huge banking industry in this country. If a regulator says that much of it is socially useless, people might reply, “Yes, but the employment and prosperity of many people in the country depend on it.” How do we clear it up so we can offer a market and export our financial services to the world sustainably and in a way that will keep our reputation? Hon. Members can rail and bash the bankers for the bust we are suffering—that is quite fair and proper—but we must accept that the bankers also gave us our boom. Our borrowing and extra spending was based on candyfloss, and on a boom that the bankers created. They are as responsible for what we enjoyed in the boom as they are for the bust.

[Mr Jenkin]

Is my hon. Friend saying that wrong regulation rather than under-regulation robs the system of discipline, and that we want a more capitalist, self-disciplined system rather than more bad regulation?

[Mark Reckless]

Elements of such regulation have been backed, but we must look at the quality of regulation. We can have a market system in which people are clear what the regulation is, or a system in which the Government run regulation and bail everyone out, making the taxpayer responsible. We were betwixt those two separate models. Some parts of the market but not others were regulated, and people put stress and reliance on LIBOR that it was never designed for, which led to much of the problem.

We cannot take what the regulators say as Gospel. Many say that Barclays accepted that the Bank of England and Paul Tucker had not told it to lower the rate. Barclays was let off tens of millions in fines because the regulators agreed that, but the regulators have a vested interest—people might ask why they were asleep on the job in the earlier phase, and what LIBOR was doing in 2008-09. Hon. Members should consider what reliance Ministers or officials at that time put on LIBOR—we should ask what LIBOR said about Barclays, why the Government were trying to push Barclays into a bail-out it was trying to resist, and why there was such reliance on that rate.

[Mr Jenkin]

My hon. Friend is making a very interesting speech. Is he saying that because it was widely known that the Government were prepared to rescue the banks, the self-discipline that liability for bankruptcy provides in a banking system was abandoned and the whole market was distorted?

[Mark Reckless]

For the calculation of LIBOR, I wonder whether it had been abandoned for RBS and Lloyds HBOS—as it became—while Barclays continued operating in a market context. The BBA now says that banks have to quote on the basis of an unsecured, unregulated, non-Government-supported rate, but I do not know whether that was the definition it gave at the time. That would have been a concern.

In conclusion, Members of Parliament, representing their constituents, have the necessary range of experience to have a reckoning, as a society and a nation, with what has happened with our banks, to assess the costs, as well as the benefits that we enjoyed, and to consider how to move on and put the matter behind us. I know, from my experience on the Home Affairs Committee, that we can have a non-partisan Committee that can reach across. We have people with the necessary experience and independence of mind. We can get together a group of people to come up with a report that downplays partisanship, to find out what went wrong and to learn the lessons for the future.

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[Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

Today’s debate—especially the beginning of it—makes the case more eloquently than I ever could for a forensic, judge-led inquiry, free from charges of partisan political game-playing of the type in which the Prime Minister and, even more disgracefully, the Chancellor have engaged since last Monday. Anyone genuinely wishing for cross-party agreement on the approach to be taken in an inquiry into this incredibly important industry would not have conducted themselves as they have since last Monday. However, since then we have had a more nuanced and calm debate, which I was not expecting after the beginning we had. I am glad that temperatures have cooled.

As I said last week when news of the LIBOR fixing scandal first broke, the potentially criminal behaviour that has been uncovered at Barclays is truly shocking. We also know that other banks are certainly involved, and that investigations are currently being conducted by regulators across three continents. This should not be an occasion for petty party-political points scoring, therefore; it should be a matter of the utmost concern on both sides of the House. Our constituents want us to concentrate on getting to the bottom of this and putting it right, and that is what this debate should be about.

Today, we have a choice between a Government motion proposing a tightly drawn, limited parliamentary inquiry and a motion, supported by all the Opposition parties, proposing an independent, forensic, two-part, judge-led inquiry, with the first part reporting by the end of 2012 on the scandal surrounding LIBOR, and the second part reporting within a year, looking at the wider issues of culture and practices in the banking industry.

The House must today consider whether the scale of misconduct in the banking industry justifies a judicial inquiry, rather than a quick parliamentary examination. In deciding which approach is more appropriate, we need to consider the following questions. Are there issues of culture and practices across the industry that need to be forensically examined? Does the scale of misconduct in the banking industry threaten the future prosperity of the UK if problems are brushed under the carpet and the situation quickly returns to business as usual? Is the culture of multi-million pound bonuses for bankers as a reward for high-risk, complex trading—a culture that took root in the 1980s—something we should worry about? A moment’s consideration reveals that the answer to all those questions is yes.

[Mark Reckless]

rose—

[Ms Eagle]

I will give way to the hon. Gentleman, but I ask him to remember that I only have 10 minutes.

[Mark Reckless]

The Opposition motion says we need a judge to examine forensically the culture of banking. Is the culture of banking really susceptible to legal analysis in that way?

[Ms Eagle]

With expert advice, certainly. That is therefore the approach we must choose.

The banking industry does not want a judicial inquiry; it wants—a multi-billion pound—business as usual. We saw that in its response to the Vickers commission on reform. Top banking executives lobbied hard to protect the status quo, and the Chancellor caved in, but the British people want a judicial inquiry, because they are sick to death of bankers taking mega-bonuses while refusing to lend to small business—we have heard about some instances of that—or to support struggling households. They are angry that greed and irresponsibility in the banking sector led to the credit crunch and they are angry about the real suffering it has inflicted. They want change, not the status quo. They do not want business as usual.