Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Mark Hoban and Alun Cairns

Tuesday 24th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Alun Cairns (Vale of Glamorgan) (Con)]

T2. I welcome the Financial Services Bill, which we debated yesterday. It is a significant step towards re-instilling confidence in the financial services industry, but does the Minister accept that regulators, including the current Financial Services Authority, have an obligation to work with other regulatory bodies that go beyond their competence to bring about negotiated settlements when the product is far more complicated than is covered by their jurisdiction, such as in the Arch Cru affair?

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr Mark Hoban)]

My hon. Friend raises an important question. There are a number of cases—Arch Cru is one of them—in which different parties are in different jurisdictions. It is important that regulators work together, along with the parties involved, to ensure that a good deal is put in place to help investors.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Mark Hoban and Alun Cairns

Monday 23rd April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

New clause 4, which is the most significant of the Government new clauses and amendments in the group, provides a framework for implementation of the Government’s proposal to retain the important rights and protections of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 to ensure that consumers do not lose out as a result of the transfer. For example, we are likely to retain section 75 of the Act, which provides for the joint liability of creditors for misrepresentation or breaches by suppliers.

The Government’s preferred approach to the implementation of the transfer of responsibility for consumer credit from the Office of Fair Trading to the Financial Conduct Authority is to ensure that the Consumer Credit Act protections are replicated in the FCA’s consumer credit rule book, and that the relevant sections of the Act are repealed. That approach is in line with the intention to move to a more responsive, rules-based regime than the current statutory framework.

However, there are limitations to the type of rules that the FCA can make, which means that it will not be able to replicate in its rules all the CCA protections that we want to retain, including protections that impose rights directly on consumers and those that affect unauthorised third parties. That means that some CCA protections will need to be kept in the CCA itself, and that certain provisions of the CCA will therefore need to remain in force following the transfer. As a result, a number of changes will need to be made to both the CCA and the FSMA as part of the transition, to reflect the fact that the FCA will be responsible for regulating consumer credit and to ensure that the FCA, as well as local trading standards, can effectively enforce the retained CCA provisions. For example, it will be necessary to replace references in the Consumer Credit Act to the Office of Fair Trading with references to the FCA. We will also need to apply certain features of the FSMA, such as references to the FCA’s objectives, statutory immunity and fee-raising powers, to the FCA’s new functions under the Consumer Credit Act, and enable the FCA to use FSMA supervision and enforcement powers that would normally be used in relation to breaches of FCA rules for breaches of CCA requirements. New clause 4 enables the Treasury to make those changes and other necessary amendments to the CCA and the FSMA by order.

I should also draw attention to the addendum to the delegated powers memorandum, which the Department has prepared and provided to the delegated powers Committee. The memorandum sets out in more detail how this power is intended to operate and why it is necessary. Copies are available in both the Printed Paper Office and the Vote Office. The order to be made under this provision will be subject to further consultation following Royal Assent to the Bill. Government amendment 11 provides that any order under new clause 4 will be subject to the affirmative procedure and so can be made only with prior approval of both this House and the other place.

Government amendment 2 supports effective collaboration between the FCA and local trading standards following the transfer, enabling the FCA to contract trading standards for the provision of services in the same way that the OFT does now—for example, to undertake local inspections and follow up on enforcement action, including by local illegal money-lending teams. Government amendment 21, and related amendments 18, 19 and 20, insert into the Bill provision for the transfer of the OFT property, rights and liabilities, including staff, to the FCA.

I hope Members will agree that the Government amendments in relation to consumer credit are sensible and practical provisions to support an effective transfer of regulation to the FCA. The new clause and related amendments sit within a process of regulatory reform that seeks to tackle some of the issues raised by Members on both sides of the House about the functioning of the credit market. We believe the FCA will have much stronger powers and greater resources than the OFT has had in order to tackle detrimental practices in the consumer credit market. Unlike the OFT, the FCA will be able to make binding rules on firms to ban specific products or product features that cause harm, to issue unlimited fines, and to require firms to pay redress when things go wrong. It will also be able to apply greater scrutiny to applications for credit licences and make it more difficult for rogue firms to enter the market.

As a consequence of the transfer we have introduced into the Bill, there will be a fundamental change in the regulation of firms such as payday lenders and debt management companies. I am pleased that the provisions enabling that transfer were welcomed in Committee.

There are a number of Opposition amendments relating to consumer credit and debt management plans, and I want to say a few words about them now. On new clauses 5 and 9, I made it clear in Committee that I sympathise with concerns about some of the practices in the fee-charging debt management sector. That is why clause 6 enables the regulation of debt management companies to be transferred to the FCA. That is also why we have chosen to leave on the statute book the enabling powers of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.

More immediately, we are working with the industry to develop a protocol of best practice for debt management plans, which should cover, among other things, the nature and timing of fees. Indeed, on 14 June the Minister with responsibility for consumer affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb), will chair the first industry-wide meeting to discuss and take forward the protocol. That will follow several months of meetings with a smaller, representative group of stakeholders, which has talked through processes, commercial terms and advice, to reach an agreed position.

I also wish to refer the House to new guidance for the debt management sector recently published by the Office of Fair Trading, which sets out in substantial detail the standards expected of firms. I believe that it is appropriate that we give time and focus to current efforts to improve standards in the debt management sector, and take account of the significant changes to the wider regulatory regime enabled by the Bill, before we start talking about changes to a potential statutory scheme under new clause 5.

As I said in Committee, I do not think that we should throw the baby out with the bath water and shut down the market for fee-charging debt management services, as proposed by new clause 9, before fully exploring better regulation. Where suppliers of credit are aware of people who are suffering financial distress in repaying their debt, I encourage them to signpost their customers to fee-free debt advice services so that they can get the best possible advice to meet their needs.

On amendment 40 and new clause 10, I wish to reassure hon. Members that the Bill already enables the FCA to make the kind of rules proposed in those two provisions. Indeed, in relation to new clause 10, the Financial Services Authority already places a number of requirements on firms to ensure that borrowers are informed if their mortgage repayments are subject to change. I know that some hon. Members may wish to challenge the approach, saying, “But if the FCA can already make the proposed rules, what is the harm in accepting these proposals?” The point is that there are significant risks to specifying in great detail in the Bill the precise type of rules that the FCA may make. First, in doing so, we risk distracting the regulator from using its expertise and judgment to identify and address the risks that it considers pose the greatest risks to its objectives. As parliamentarians, we should be creating a framework within which technical experts can exercise their discretion, in a suitably constrained way. We should leave them to get on with the job, not provide a long laundry list of everything that we want them to do.

By specifying in detail what rules should or should not cover, we also risk creating the opportunity for challenge to the regulator’s ability to make rules that are not specified in the Bill. The lack of specific provision in the Bill does not, in any way, reflect on how seriously the Government take these issues. For example, in relation to high-cost credit, a number of initiatives are under way to improve standards in the sector. Those include work to improve industry codes on payday lending; research commissioned by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills into the impact of a cap on total cost of credit; and a review by the OFT of payday lenders’ compliance with its irresponsible lending guidance. As well as raising standards now, the findings of those pieces of work will feed into the FCA’s approach to regulating the sector following the transfer, including on the type of rules it may make regarding these charges.

[Alun Cairns (Vale of Glamorgan) (Con)]

I appreciate the comments that have been made about the Bill and, specifically, about amendment 40. Does my hon. Friend agree that there is a risk of amendment 40 moving into price regulation, which is very different from product intervention? Price regulation would be a very dangerous line to follow.

[Mr Hoban]

My hon. Friend makes an important point, as we face a challenge in that respect. First, we believe that the FCA has the powers it needs to tackle payday lending. That could include some form of price intervention—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hoban]

I think that it is important that the court’s non-executives perform a full role in scrutinising the Bank’s activities. They need to be able to look at the output of those reviews, consider them and express their views on them. On the issue of minutes, I will not say that we are getting into a semantic debate, because that would be unfair. What we want to do is ensure that a proper record of the court’s meetings is published.

I am not sure that the minutes should necessarily be verbatim, reporting every word that everyone has said, but they should certainly be a very good summary, catching the thought processes that took place in the court and the issues that were debated and discussed, so that Parliament and stakeholders can hold the Bank to account for the way in which it has used its powers not just when it comes to the Financial Policy Committee, but in other areas. I hope that that gives my hon. Friend the reassurance he looks for on our commitment to transparency and on ensuring that we do all we can to strengthen the transparency arrangements of the Bank of England.

I am very conscious that a number of other points were made, and I want to discuss them. The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) tabled two amendments on the appointment of the Governor of the Bank of England and Parliament’s role in it. We do not have time tonight to go into the detail of that procedure, but the Chancellor has said that there will be an open process, and having heard the debate in the House he will reflect on it when thinking about how the process should develop.

I turn to Government amendment 1. In Committee, the hon. Member for Nottingham East argued for a check on the PRA’s ability to decide not to disclose the use of its veto over the FCA. The Government accept that the PRA will always be the best placed organisation to determine whether or when to disclose the use of its veto, but there is room for an element of independent consideration when it decides against such disclosure. The Government have therefore decided to place a duty on the PRA, through amendment 1, to consult the Treasury on a decision not to disclose, and this will ensure that proper disclosures do take place.

I will respond in writing to the remarks that my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) made on the use of skilled persons. He raised some important issues.

[Alun Cairns]

Does my hon. Friend recognise the strength of a practitioners panel in relation to the PRA, given that he has already accepted the merits of a practitioner panel in relation to the FCA?

[Mr Hoban]

What is important is that the PRA establishes its process for consultation with regulated firms. It is required to set out in its annual report its process of consultation.

In conclusion, this is an important part of the legislation, and I am very disappointed that the hon. Member for Nottingham East has tabled a wrecking amendment that would take the guts out of the Bill. I thought that the Opposition supported the reform of financial regulation, but they clearly do not, so I hope that if the hon. Gentleman puts his wrecking amendment to the vote the House will oppose it.

Northern Rock

Debate between Mark Hoban and Alun Cairns

Monday 21st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Alun Cairns (Vale of Glamorgan) (Con)]

Does the Minister agree that this could be seen as the first step in returning normality to the banking high street after regulatory failure over the past 10 years? Does he accept that by doing that he is bringing a new, welcome innovator to the marketplace that will have a positive impact on competition?

[Mr Hoban]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We want to see new competitors in the market—people who can challenge the incumbents and offer a better service, better rates and better products—and that is to the advantage of consumers. That is a trend we are seeing across the banking sector as a whole, with new entrants coming into the market, and we should be encouraging it so that we have a more competitive financial services marketplace with better outcomes for consumers, whether they are business or personal.

Arch Cru Compensation Scheme

Debate between Mark Hoban and Alun Cairns

Wednesday 19th October 2011 Westminster Hall

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr Mark Hoban)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for Rutherglen and Hamilton West (Tom Greatrex) on securing this debate and on how he introduced it. Despite a barrage of interventions, he managed to maintain his pace and tone and set out a clear narrative of what happened to Arch Cru. I also congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Alun Cairns) on his tenacious pursuit of the matter, as well as the other hon. Members who have taken part in the debate.

I express my sympathy to the many Arch Cru investors who have lost a significant proportion of their savings as a consequence of the events that we are discussing. Regardless of how large or small the investment was, and whether they have lost all their savings or a fraction, they have lost out. It is important to think carefully about the cause and what lessons need to be learned.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Chippenham (Duncan Hames) rightly predicted, I must add a note of caution about Treasury responsibilities in the matter. We do not have investigative or prosecuting powers of our own. The Financial Services Authority is the independent regulator. I have spoken to its chief executive about Arch Cru and sought further information about the FSA’s investigations and the voluntary compensation package, and I will respond as fully as I can to the points made today. Hon. Members clearly have an appetite for a lot more detail. I understand, as I have the same appetite, but enforcement action is ongoing, so there is a limit to what can be disclosed in the House.

As the hon. Gentleman and others have said, the case is complex and involves multiple layers of responsibility. Many investors will initially have engaged with Arch Cru’s UK open-ended investment companies, or OEICs, through their independent financial advisers, with Cru Investment Management conducting the marketing of the OEICs. The management of the OEICs was then the responsibility of Capita Financial Managers Ltd as authorised corporate directors and of BNY Mellon Trust & Depositary (UK) Ltd and HSBC Bank plc as depositaries. Although the legal form is that Arch Financial Products acted as the delegated investment manager, in substance, it approached Capita and proposed that fund structure.

The OEICs invested principally in more than 22 Guernsey- domiciled incorporated cell companies, which were listed on the Channel Island stock exchange and required to comply with Guernsey regulations. The cell companies had two independent directors. The administrator of the cell companies was regulated by the Guernsey Financial Services Commission and was responsible, among other tasks, for producing valuations for the cell companies, which were made available to the Channel Island stock exchange. Arch was the investment manager for the cell companies and, of course, the OEICs themselves. Both the OEICs and the Guernsey cell companies were independently audited. That complex structure should make it clear that it is not easy to apportion full responsibility to any single player in the matter.

As part of the authorisation process for UK OEICs, the FSA assesses a fund’s proposition before launch and decides whether it complies with the rules. The FSA then reviews the fund’s prospectus and, after authorisation, continues its normal supervisory activity, which includes visits to authorised corporate directors and depositaries and thematic work such as the monitoring of financial promotions. As hon. Members have identified, the FSA does not regulate descriptions of funds, such as “cautious managed”. It is worth reflecting on what “cautious managed” means. It means that a fund invests in a range of assets with a set maximum equity exposure and a minimum exposure to fixed interests and cash. A minimum percentage of assets must also be held in sterling or euro-denominated assets. That describes what such funds should be.

The FSA is not an auditor and does not check underlying investments or the veracity of share prices. That is the responsibility of others. The regulatory regime is not a zero-failure regime, and the FSA conducts risk-based supervision. It does not visit every firm every year; the frequency of visits depends on firms’ risk and impact. If hon. Members reflect on that for a moment, they will expect more resources to be devoted to a big insurer than to an insurance broker on the high street. However, it is ultimately the responsibility of the firms involved to ensure that they comply with all the relevant rules.

What did the FSA do in this situation? It has been suggested that the FSA let down investors, but its financial promotions monitoring activity picked up some of the issues with Arch Cru OEICs, which were raised with the parties involved. Crucially, in October 2008, during the course of an ARROW inspection visit, the FSA identified issues with the funds, including the fulfilment of the OEICs’ investment objectives. Those issues were raised with Capita Financial Managers, the authorised corporate director, leading to the suspension of the OEICs in March 2009.

On the payment scheme, it should be clear from my opening remarks that the structure underpinning investment in an Arch Cru fund was complex and multi-layered. The FSA could have pursued a comprehensive package of redress, which would have needed agreement from all the parties involved, some of which were responsible for the management of the funds and some for their sale or promotion. Not all those parties are regulated by the FSA or based in the UK. To have put together such a package would have been time-consuming and complex. The FSA has reached agreement with the three parties responsible for the management of the UK OEICs: Capita, BNY Mellon and HSBC. The package was announced in June 2011, and will pay up to £54 million to investors. The amount of compensation takes into account distributions already made to investors and the remaining value of the funds.

The compensation amount also has an element of proportionality, taking into account the fact that while those three parties share some of the responsibility for the losses, they are not solely responsible. Other parties contributed to the failure, and the FSA is currently considering the positions of those other parties. The pursuit of a voluntary settlement with the three parties allows investors to opt to receive payments by the end of this year rather than having to wait several years for the uncertain outcome of a more complex process, which would include enforcement action against the relevant parties. It is a trade-off. Do we want investors, some of whom invested all their funds in Arch Cru, to receive money sooner or later? A question was asked about time scales. People have until the end of next year to decide whether to opt for the package.

The FSA has required the Financial Ombudsman Service to apply the payment scheme to complaints that it receives, under the provisions of the Financial Services Act 2010, which was introduced by the previous Government and supported by us. The provisions ensure certainty to investors and a consistent regulatory approach between the FOS and the FSA. Without them, the FOS would have to consider individual cases on their own merit rather than applying the same principle to every investor. I will explain what the FOS is bound to.

[Alun Cairns]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Hoban]

No, I will continue. I have three minutes left and more points to make.

The FOS is bound only in respect of complaints made against Capita, HSBC and BNY Mellon. Complaints made to the FOS about other parties to the investment chain, including independent financial advisers, can still be heard by the FOS. The limitation on the FOS applies only to complaints made about the three parties. That is a clear signal to investors that they can make further complaints about other parties. Investors are free to pursue action through the courts and to challenge the IFA who advised them to invest in Arch Cru funds over whether that advice was appropriate. Numerous people have already done so. If they are not satisfied with the IFA’s response, they can go to the FOS. If a complaint has been upheld but the adviser is no longer in business, investors can also complain to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme and apply for compensation.

Regulatory and Banking Reform

Debate between Mark Hoban and Alun Cairns

Thursday 16th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. We hope that the pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill will start shortly. It is programmed to take 12 sitting weeks. We want to make sure that the legislation progresses through this House and the other place as quickly as possible and that it is properly scrutinised. We need to make sure that we do not make mistakes in haste that we repent of at leisure. It is also important to recognise that the FSA is starting to adopt the new style of supervision that we would like to see it exercise, and that should give us some comfort that the lessons have been learned and are now being put into practice.

[Alun Cairns (Vale of Glamorgan) (Con)]

I welcome my hon. Friend’s statement, which I am sure will go a long way towards reintroducing stability within the economy in general and the banking system. What reassurance can he give that the stability will apply to the banks as well as consumers, so that the banks can go on generating wealth? That will reduce the risk that banks’ headquarters will leave the UK to establish elsewhere.

[Mr Hoban]

It is important that the UK should remain a global financial centre. We need to get the regulation and supervision in place that ensures that London can continue to prosper and grow and also that there is no wider threat to the economy and taxpayers.