UK-Rwanda Partnership

Debate between Mark Francois and James Cleverly

Wednesday 6th December 2023 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

That has been confirmed. I regularly speak to Ministers in the Department but, ultimately, these questions should be about the Bill rather than individual Members.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

If the Immigration Minister, who is a good man, has resigned over this Bill, that is deeply worrying. I want to hear the verdict of the star chamber chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) but, while we await that verdict, the Home Secretary pointedly ducked several questions about individual appeals. Every person we would seek to send to Rwanda is an individual. If they can continue to appeal and appeal in order to delay being put on a flight, what is the point of the Bill?

[James Cleverly]

The point is that all legal and judicial processes have an appeal process. By extension of my right hon. Friend’s argument, the point that there is an appeal process in UK criminal law, for example, would mean that no one ever goes to prison, and my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Justice has just been discussing prison places.

The point is that an appeal process is an important part of any legal process. It will not preclude people from being sent to Rwanda. This is a robust scheme that strengthens our position and ensures that the decisions we make in this House—that he, I and others make in this House—define the UK’s immigration policy, not decisions made by unelected people elsewhere.

Integrated Review Refresh

Debate between Mark Francois and James Cleverly

Monday 13th March 2023 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

The right hon. Gentleman seems have embedded in his question the idea that our posture to the Indo-Pacific is a one-off event. It is not; it is a permanent recalibration of our foreign and defence policy. My first set of bilateral visits as Foreign Secretary was to Japan, South Korea and Singapore. The Defence Secretary is flying to Japan at the moment to build upon the agreement that we have made between the UK, Italian and Japanese Governments. We have made a long-term commitment that is being resourced. The carrier strike group’s main voyage to the region is building towards what is a permanent recalibration of our international focus, to recognise that the centre of gravity of world affairs is moving eastwards and southwards. We are responding to that.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s crystal-clear commitment that from 2025 we will spend 2.5% of our GDP on defence. I will be interested to know whether Labour will match that. Part of that spending, referred to in the document, is the AUKUS programme, which will be a world-class collaboration between the United States, Australia and us. Does he agree that that not only will help deter Chinese expansionism in the Pacific, but is a perfect example of global Britain?

[James Cleverly]

My right hon. Friend makes a very important point. When I was running through the list of things that underpin our Indo-Pacific focus, I did not mention AUKUS, because I know that the Prime Minister will do so extensively later on today. My right hon. Friend asked whether I think the Labour party will match that commitment of 2.5% on defence spending. I say no, for two reasons: first, no shadow Defence Minister has made such a commitment; and secondly, the Labour party will not be office in 2025—we will.

European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (Exit Day) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2019

Debate between Mark Francois and James Cleverly

Monday 20th May 2019 General Committees

[James Cleverly]

I completely understand. I have been knocking on doors, as I am sure my right hon. Friend has, and I am well aware of the anger—I will not be euphemistic and use the word “frustration”—out there about the fact that Brexit has not yet been delivered. Again, I will come on to that specific point.

I will have to be ungenerous with regard to further interventions, because I am conscious—

[Mr Francois]

Will the Minister give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[James Cleverly]

I would have to refer to Hansard to make a decisive comment on that. I can only assume from the certainty with which my hon. Friend delivered that intervention that he knows the chronology. The main point is that the Prime Minister was required to act by an Act of Parliament, and as my hon. Friend the Member for Stone highlights, we all—and that includes the Government—have to act within the law.

The agreement reached with the European Council was for an extension until 31 October 2019, but with the important caveat—this was the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford—that it could be ended earlier if the withdrawal agreement is ratified prior to that date. That was agreed by the UK and the EU and the new date of 31 October 2019 was fixed in international law in the early hours of 11 April.

[Mr Francois]

Will the Minister confirm two things? The first is that we cannot extend article 50 again unless the UK Government consent—in other words, that the EU cannot extend it again against our will. Secondly, will he confirm that no indicative vote in this House would stop us leaving on 31 October and that if we do not ask to extend, the only thing that would legally stop us leaving on that date is an Act of Parliament? Is that correct?

[James Cleverly]

The Government have made it clear that the default position if no other proactive measure is taken by the House is that we leave on 31 October, without an agreement if that is the case. That is the default position and that is why the Government maintain preparations for what we call a no-deal Brexit on 31 October 2019.

[Mr Francois]

So only an Act of Parliament will stop it.

[James Cleverly]

The default position is that that is how we leave. The House would have to do something proactively to prevent that.

The purpose of this statutory instrument is to align UK domestic legislation and international legislation. Hon. Members will recall that for the first extension of article 50, the equivalent SI was subject to the affirmative procedure and debated in both Houses before it came into force.

NATO

Debate between Mark Francois and James Cleverly

Wednesday 20th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Francois]

My right hon. Friend is right about that, and it is no mistake that NATO’s centre of excellence on cyber-warfare is now located in Estonia.

As I was saying, such an attack would no doubt be accompanied by a considerable disinformation campaign, the widespread employment of deception and fake news, and quite possibly the appearance of large numbers of “little green men”, as we saw in both Crimea and Ukraine, perhaps under the guise of so-called “local defence units”. That would very likely be accompanied by Spetsnaz and other special forces activity, potentially backed up by airborne or air assault forces. It is worth noting that the Russian 76th guards air assault division, based at Pskov, is located only 100 km from the Estonian border.

Any such intervention would probably be covered by a wide-reaching air defence umbrella, including highly capable air defence systems, such as the S300 and S400, to help establish an anti-access area denial—or A2/AD—shield, designed specifically to prevent NATO air power from intervening. In any such scenario, speed would be of the essence, as we saw in Crimea, where the key elements of annexation were effectively carried out in a matter of days. Russia’s likely aim would be to present NATO with a fait accompli, to undermine the article 5 guarantee, which Russia would no doubt regard as a meaningful victory.

How should we best respond to this? In May, the Select Committee took evidence from the Secretary of State for Defence, who is in his place, including on our readiness in the UK to respond to a Baltic scenario. He explained that our two high readiness formations, 16 Air Assault Brigade and 3 Commando Brigade, could be deployed to the Baltics in a matter of days, although it would have to be by air and therefore assumes that air heads would still be in friendly hands. In response to questions, he further explained that it would take about 20 days to deploy a mechanised brigade, whereas to deploy a full war fighting division, as envisaged in SDSR 2015, would take about three months, by which time the conflict could very well be all over. It is obvious from those timings that we would need our NATO allies, especially US air power, to seek to hold the ring until heavier reinforcements could arrive.

What is to be done? First, NATO would have to be prepared to fight and win an intense information campaign, in which television cameras would arguably be more powerful than missiles. The Skripal case showed that in fact the west was prepared to stand together quite impressively in response to Russian misinformation, expelling more than 100 Russian diplomats. I believe that really hurt the Russians.

[James Cleverly (Braintree) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that in the era of hybrid warfare and conflict in front of cameras, it is more important than ever that our service personnel feel that if they make difficult decisions in the moment they will be protected through their lives? I raise this because of the intrusion of cameras in conflict.

[Mr Speaker]

May I gently say that the time limit will have to be reduced for subsequent speakers at this rate? I say that not by way of complaint, but as a piece of information to the House.