Finance (No. 2) Bill
Debate between Mark Field and Michael Meacher(11 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Mr Meacher
Yes, I appreciate that. It seems that Graham Aaronson, whom I have criticised pretty strongly in the House in the past, has for reasons best known to himself—although I am very appreciative that he has done this—changed his mind in the important respect that the hon. Gentleman described and which I tried to set out at the beginning. There is more joy in heaven over one sinner who repents than over 100 just men.
Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)
The right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that I have grave concerns about going down the route of even a general anti-avoidance rule, but surely he must recognise that if his new clauses were agreed and we took a principled, rather than a rules-based approach, that would lead to ever more uncertainty and, dare I say it, even larger fees for the lawyers and accountants whom he wishes to clamp down on in this regard.
Mr Meacher
I will come to that point. I know that the hon. Gentleman, who has spent enough time in this Chamber, as I have, might think that I am kicking it into the long grass, but I will come to it at the end. I think I have an effective answer to it, but I prefer to give it at that point.
There are other problems with the GAAR. For the reasons given, it is far too narrowly drawn, tackling only the most aggressive forms of tax avoidance. It would not, for example, tackle Google or Amazon—which have had enormous publicity over the last weeks and months—because the channelling of profits from genuine sales through tax havens would still be permitted. That is just one example. The implication—dare I say it one that was probably intended by the Government; I hope that is not unreasonable—is no doubt that a veneer of respectability is thereby cast over everything else, which might well include artificial contrivances designed to avoid tax. They will somehow be seen to be okay.
There is also no clear penalty regime in the GAAR, which is certainly needed if others are to be deterred from exploiting every opportunity to go down the tax avoidance route. Contrary to all other tax logic, where the burden of proof has always fallen on the taxpayer, uniquely in the case of the GAAR, the burden of proof that an arrangement is abusive has unaccountably been placed on HMRC. Despite the one improvement, which I am glad to mention—
Mr Meacher
I would rather get on, if I may, as many others wish to speak and it is a very short debate.
Despite the improvement I mentioned at the beginning, the net accumulated effect of all these flaws makes it reasonable to argue that the GAAR is a step backward for two particular reasons. One is that while the most heinous cases will certainly be caught—we are all agreed about that—the impression given is that virtually everything else is somehow okay and everything else goes. The other is the outrageous fact that HMRC cannot commence GAAR action on its own initiative. That is rather like forbidding the courts to take action against a thief until the honorary city guild for thieves has given permission.
The alternative is the general anti-tax avoidance principle—the GAntiP—as set out in new clauses 7 to 16. It was drafted by Richard Murphy, one of our foremost tax accountants, as the Minister knows only too well as a sparring partner, and a founding member of the Tax Justice Network. What are the advantages of GAntiP? I will set them out briefly.
First, tax avoidance is currently estimated to cost this country and its other taxpayers £25 billion or up to £25 billion—I know the figure is much disputed, but it is certainly a very substantial sum. It would be significantly reduced, so that many services now under threat because of Government cuts could be saved and more money would be available to help promote jobs, which the Government want, and economic recovery.
Secondly, to deal with the point raised by the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field), the UK tax system would be made considerably more certain if HMRC were for a small sum to provide prior indication, which I would strongly support, about whether or not an arrangement would fall within the scope of tax avoidance. No one is trying to trick companies; we want certainty, and this would be a very good way to achieve it.
Mark Field
On this matter, I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman. I have said on a number of occasions that if we are to go down this route, whether it be a general anti-avoidance rule or on the basis of the principles that the right hon. Gentleman prefers, it must be done hand in glove with a proper pre-clearance process. It needs to be a swift process and it may be that a fee is to be paid as well, but it must be done on the basis that before any new scheme is marketed it must get the thumbs up from HMRC that it is a legitimate one. That would provide a sensible way forward taking into account the certainty reasons that I pointed out earlier.
Mr Meacher
I am glad to have the hon. Gentleman’s agreement on that. I hope that he will also agree with me that what the Government are proposing—that the criterion should be whether a certain arrangement amounts to a “reasonable view” or a reasonable course of action—is an extremely vague, subjective and uncertain way of deciding this matter.
Mark Field
The right hon. Gentleman referred earlier to egregious schemes, and I think we all recognise that there are some, as highlighted by The Times and other newspapers in recent months. Which particular schemes does the right hon. Gentleman, who is obviously in close contact with Richard Murphy among others, think would not fall foul of the reasonableness test? Which schemes would be regarded as highly egregious yet would fail to be caught?
Mr Meacher
I have already mentioned two that have had a great deal of publicity—Google and Amazon—but there are many, many others. Only a very narrow and small proportion of the most “aggressive”—the Chancellor’s phrase—or abusive tax-avoidance schemes would be caught. What worries me is the impression given that everything else is somehow okay with the Government. I think that is a very unwise position to adopt.
Briefly, the third advantage of GAntiP is that the incentive for accountants, lawyers and bankers to sell tax-avoidance schemes would be curtailed. That would be a thoroughly good thing, because they and their clients would know that most of those schemes would fail in future.
Lastly, my fourth advantage might be the single most important one. GAntiP really could help to change the rancid culture in British society today whereby the top 1%—whether it be super-rich individuals or the big corporations—are widely perceived to be ripping off the honest remainder of the population.