Northern Ireland (Welfare Reform) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateMark Field
Main Page: Mark Field (Conservative - Cities of London and Westminster)Department Debates - View all Mark Field's debates with the Northern Ireland Office
(8 years, 12 months ago)
Commons ChamberClearly, the use of petitions of concern is a matter for the Northern Ireland parties and for the Northern Ireland Assembly. All I ask is that parties in Northern Ireland recognise that the petition of concern is related to community concerns, and should not be used for things such as caravan legislation, or other such matters.
Taking this power enables the Government to implement Northern Ireland-specific flexibilities in the welfare system. When the 2012 welfare reform measures were first introduced, Northern Ireland’s Department for Social Development negotiated certain administrative flexibilities with the Department for Work and Pensions. They included, for example, a slightly different sanctions regime and the ability for welfare payments to be made to claimants on a fortnightly rather than a monthly basis.
In addition, as part of commitments made under last year’s Stormont House agreement, the Northern Ireland parties agreed a range of so-called top-up measures, which were designed to compensate claimants who were losing out as a result of the welfare reforms. The Assembly’s Welfare Reform Bill—the one that fell in May—was amended to reflect the various administrative flexibilities and top-up measures.
In providing a broad power, the Bill allows the Government to implement these Northern Ireland-specific flexibilities and top-ups. That reinforces the fact that the Government’s intent is not to impose Great Britain’s welfare system on to Northern Ireland. Instead, we are proposing to use the power provided by this Bill to legislate for the Northern Ireland-tailored welfare system agreed by the Northern Ireland parties.
The Order in Council that will follow this Bill, if passed, will make that clear. The order is based largely on the Assembly’s Welfare Reform Bill that fell at its final stage in May. It therefore includes the reforms made in Great Britain by the Welfare Reform Act 2012; the various flexibilities agreed between the Northern Ireland Department for Social Development and the Department for Work and Pensions; the amendments agreed during the passage of the Assembly Welfare Reform Bill; and provisions that allow for Northern Ireland Executive-funded top-ups.
The second reason for opting for a broad power in this Bill is that it enables the Government to implement other potential welfare reforms, such as those contained in the Welfare Reform and Work Bill currently being considered by the Lords.
The Northern Ireland Executive have just endured almost four years of political instability owing to their inability to implement the last major set of welfare reforms. It is important that the fresh start envisaged by the Northern Ireland parties is given time and space to grow and strengthen. If the Assembly considers the 2015 welfare reforms too soon, it could jeopardise this new-found consensus in Northern Ireland. It is therefore necessary for the Government to legislate for implementation of these measures.
The Minister is being very pragmatic in explaining the history behind this and why the Government are behaving as they are. Does he believe that it is desirable in the medium term that the welfare arrangements for Northern Ireland should mirror those of the rest of the United Kingdom, or does he think that this Bill will hold sway in the long term?
It is of course desirable that the welfare package and policy that this Government have come up with over the past four or five years is implemented across the United Kingdom. It is a good and well-needed reform. We also accept that, within the parameters of the devolved settlement, some devolved institutions have the ability to top up or be flexible in order to be able to deliver. In the long term, it will be interesting to see which delivers the best results for the people of those countries and whether our welfare reforms without flexibilities produce a better outcome than those that are adopted elsewhere.