The Government's Plan for Brexit Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateMark Durkan
Main Page: Mark Durkan (Social Democratic & Labour Party - Foyle)Department Debates - View all Mark Durkan's debates with the Department for Exiting the European Union
(8 years ago)
Commons ChamberThose who have spoken most strongly in favour of the Prime Minister’s amendment have generally taken some time to ridicule and carp at the Opposition’s motion. They have questioned the wording, asking what “plan” means, for example, and they have even criticised the language for its split infinitives and the like. They are denigrating the very motion that they now claim to want to pass, as amended by the Government amendment.
Sometimes consensus can be a great and powerful thing; at other times it can be a risky thing. Many Members have often counselled against consensus. When the consensus is entirely artificial, however, and is made up of a purely ephemeral coincidence of tactics without any substantive or strategic work, we should not fall for it. I am here to represent my constituents, who voted by more than 78% to remain, and I know that they would not fall for this amended motion.
Is it not a good idea to try to get a consensus to back the British people in their decision?
I am not one of the British people; I am here as an Irish person, proudly carrying an Irish passport. However, I fully respect the terms on which other hon. Members come to this House. I come to the debate in circumstances in which the people of Northern Ireland voted by 56% to remain, while the people of my constituency voted by 78% to remain, as I said. The people of Northern Ireland, moreover, previously voted for the Good Friday agreement in a unique dual referendum process involving the north and south of Ireland—that was the high watermark of Irish constitutional democracy. I am pledged to adhere to that and I make no apology to anybody for it. I do not seek to indict the terms on which anyone else comes to this House to speak in this or any other debate.
The principle of consent is meant to be the core of the Good Friday agreement. It is not only housed in that agreement, but it was the principle of consent that was used to endorse the agreement. A week after the 23 June referendum, the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Mrs Villiers), tabled a written statement on the security situation in Northern Ireland. The words she used about republican dissidents on 30 June were interesting.
Order. A point of order has been raised by Mr Kwarteng.
Thank you. The clock was stuck, and it is now working again.
The then Secretary of State said:
“Their activities are against the democratically expressed wishes of the people in Northern Ireland. They continue to seek relevance and inflict harm on a society that overwhelmingly rejects them”—
she could have been talking about the Northern Ireland Conservatives. She continued:
“Their support is very limited. Northern Ireland’s future will only be determined by democracy and consent.”—[Official Report, 30 June 2016; Vol. 612, c. 13WS.]
Where is the democracy and consent for the people of Northern Ireland when it comes to Brexit? Many of us are free to come here and vote against article 50 as and when the relevant provisions are tabled. When we do so, that will be consistent with our principled support for the Good Friday agreement and consistent with our pledges to our constituents honourably to represent them.
As a result of the Good Friday agreement and the consent principle, the people of Northern Ireland voted to remain in the United Kingdom and to give foreign policy and treaty-making powers to the UK Government. There is no inconsistency between a UK Government choosing to trigger article 50 and the hon. Gentleman’s constituents having objections to that. There is no breach of a consensus.
I am afraid the right hon. Gentleman does not know the difference—people in Northern Ireland are very clear about this—between the principle of consent and actually giving consent. He has made a mistake that is consistently made, and it is a mistake that will strain some people’s belief in the Good Friday agreement.
People such as the right hon. Gentleman do not recognise the damage that they are doing. Carefully compacted layers of understanding created the bedrock of the Good Friday agreement, and fissures are being driven into those key foundations. Remember that, as a result of that agreement, the principle of consent is housed in the Irish constitution as well, because the referendum—north and south—changed the constitution. It removed the territorial claim, and two additional clauses were inserted.
If the key constitutional precept of the Good Friday agreement is not housed in any new UK-EU treaty that might result from these negotiations, we shall be in a very serious situation. The promise and the understanding that the people of Ireland, north and south, were given when they endorsed the Good Friday agreement in overwhelming numbers will have been betrayed and damaged. I do not accept, and no Irish nationalist, north or south, who supported the Good Friday agreement has ever said, that the principle of consent that is housed in the Irish constitution can be removed, replaced or surpassed by a vote in England on Brexit or on anything else.
The Good Friday agreement states very clearly that the question of Irish unity will be a matter for the people of Ireland, north and south, without external impediment. That key principle must be reflected in any new UK-EU treaty, making clear that if in the future Northern Ireland votes to become part of a united Ireland, it will do so as an automatic part of the EU, without any change in Ireland’s terms of membership and without the need for any new negotiations on the part of Northern Ireland. We cannot afford, in the Northern Ireland context, the sort of trickery that was used in the Scottish context to raise question marks over whether EU membership would apply. This is a key principle and tenet for those of us in the House who support the Good Friday agreement.
There are other risks to the agreement as well. There are risks to the weight of the rights in strand 1. There is also significant damage afoot in relation to strand 2, which involved a delicate balance of institutional and constitutional arrangements. That strand will be left in complete deficit after Brexit unless someone takes care of it.