Modern Slavery Bill

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Tuesday 4th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Frank Field]

I, too, want to pursue the theme just followed by the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) in congratulating the Government, but drawing attention to just how important new clause 11 is. The Home Secretary made it very plain in her first article in The Sunday Times that she wanted a clause on supply chains in the Bill. I therefore congratulate her, her very able Minister and the person in No. 10 who changed his mind at this very late stage in the Bill’s passage. Heaven rejoices at the sinner who repents even at the eleventh hour, and some credit should go to the Prime Minister for changing his mind on this matter.

My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) has played a valiant role in spearheading our approach to the Bill and has borne all the heat of the day on it. However, I think we all accept, whatever efforts we have put in, that the legislation is the easy part of the process. The next part will be very hard—to get a genuinely mass consumer movement of people who do not buy goods if they are not kitemarked as being free of slavery.

As we draw stumps on this House’s proceedings on the Bill, it is important to commend it, as the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate has just done—it will not just be a good Bill, but a world leader when it leaves the other place—but the real work will be on enforcement and on convincing consumers that they have the vital job of not buying goods that are tainted by slavery.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

In following the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr Field), I want to acknowledge the Minister’s efforts in making good the serious deficit in the Bill, but also those of the right hon. Gentleman and many other colleagues during the pre-legislative scrutiny, on Second Reading and ever since. Those efforts by him and the many others who spoke on Second Reading and in Committee have reflected the very strong concern of some of the groups that have worked so hard to support and promote the Bill and that understand the issue so well.

I am one of those who can take yes for an answer, now that the Government have made good on this matter. However, I would say, “Yes, up to a point, but maybe it could be improved.” I believe that the Bill could go further. The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson), who tabled new clause 5, has shown that there are important issues. The headings given in subsection (3) are clear and useful, and it is right for them to be in primary legislation, rather than left to remote chance by way of secondary legislation.

New clause 5 is also important in what it would do with respect to the Companies Act. I understand what the Minister said about not only using that Act as the way to deal with the problem, but how it brings in very clear corporate responsibilities. In that context, it also highlights relevant professional obligations, which would give real meaning to what the Government and others are trying to encourage in relation to ethical investment, and in relation to the understandings we should all have about any investments—all the new pension provision and everything else—for which we are the source of the money.

The hon. Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Stephen Barclay) has referred to financial services legislation. We have said that more and more needs to be done to ensure full and due transparency in that context. We should complement such provisions in the Bill. I therefore hope that the Minister—I support her new clause 11—can see her way to accepting new clause 5 as well.

I tabled two of the new clauses in this group of amendments. The Minister has addressed new clause 15, but let me point out that throughout the gestation of the Bill, we have been told that it is meant to be world leading. New clause 15 is an attempt to bring in the clear standards in EU directive 2011/36/EU on preventing trafficking in human beings. If the Government are at pains to consolidate and codify much existing law in the Bill and to present it as world-leading legislation, the question arises whether we should not also use it to show that we are at least matching and adhering to international standards and obligations, including EU ones. My clause on the legal liability for the beneficiaries of slavery would be consistent with the EU directive, and I see no reason why we should not explicitly ensure that our legislation is up to that standard.

New clause 14 seeks to go further on questions of the supply chain and sourcing, and the possible use of slavery or exploited labour. We are meant to be discussing world-leading legislation, but the new clause reflects legislation that was introduced 84 years ago in the United States of America. We hear a lot about Californian legislation on supply chains, but the Tariff Act 1930 in America gave power to prohibit the importation of

“goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country…by forced labour.”

The new clause is therefore hardly a radical view or innovation, and the Californian legislation—referred to often in debates on the Bill—exists in wider US legislation.

New clause 14 does not just rely on language in the 1930 legislation, which puts responsibility on the Secretary of State at the Treasury to prescribe the necessary regulations, but it also reflects the essence of the code of federal regulations in the United States, which establishes the process whereby anyone can petition the Department of Homeland Security. That explicitly provides for:

“Any person outside the Customs Service who has reason to believe that merchandise produced in the circumstances mentioned is being, or is likely to be, imported into the United States.”

The United States legislation does not guarantee that the state will fully police all those issues, but it indicates that it will respond to legitimate petitions or legitimately presented evidence that gives rise to concern, and that it will act. Legislators in the US have ensured that the state reserves that power to act to prohibit the import of a good.

In the Government’s new clause 11, the onus is—understandably—on companies, which have to be able to show what they are doing regarding their supply chains. We wanted supply chains included in the Bill not as a badge for companies, but as a shield for workers in developing countries and other places—including the UK—who could be exploited. The difference is between this measure being a corporate badge or a shield for human beings. If companies have only to present what they say they are doing, and consumers then make their judgment and choice, why—if we are legislating for company responsibility but also for consumer responsibility and activism—is there still no rule for the state or Government?

New clause 14 clearly states:

“The Secretary of State shall have the power to prohibit the import at any point of entry to the United Kingdom of any good, ware, article, or product mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country that can be demonstrably shown to have been produced by slavery, forced labour, child labour or with the involvement of human trafficking.”

By rejecting that new clause we are saying that even if exploitation can be demonstrably shown, we do not want the state or any Secretary of State to be able to act against that. Whether in relation to the T-shirts that were in the newspapers recently, or anything else, we are saying that when such issues are raised, we do not want anybody or any part of the state to have responsibility for saying, “The nature of those products in terms of the quality of the supply chain is clear, but it is nobody’s job to move to do anything other that what companies are inspired to do, or what consumers are mobilised to do.”

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[Mark Durkan]

On consumer action, what are the Government’s intentions with regard to public procurement, because the public purse will be a significant consumer? On sourcing and supplying, will there be a Government public procurement standard for companies?

[Karen Bradley]

I addressed that point briefly in my opening comments, but I will come on to it again in a moment. I will just finish the point about enforcement.

The courts can force companies to disclose, but that is different from the issue that some companies may make disclosures that consumers, shareholders and campaigners feel show that inadequate steps are being taken to eliminate slavery from supply chains. The courts can act if no disclosure is made, but there is action that civil society can take if it feels that companies are not making appropriate disclosures. The Government believe it is for civil society to put pressure on businesses that are not doing enough to eliminate modern slavery from their supply chains. The Government’s new clause makes this as easy as possible by ensuring that disclosures are easily accessible. The link to disclosure must be in a prominent place on a business’s website home page.

Before coming on to public sector procurement, I would like to address the concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) on the extent of the new clause. I can confirm that the new clause on supply chains will apply to England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. This is made plain by later amendments to be taken later. I want to put it on the record that I am grateful to the Northern Ireland Executive and all the devolved Administrations for the excellent work we have done together to ensure that this provision can extend to the entire UK. He will know, from our discussions in Committee, that there were points on which we needed agreement—not just on this matter, but on many others as well. I am pleased that we have made so much progress. It was important throughout that this was not Westminster imposing on the devolved Administrations. Action has been taken because the devolved Administrations wanted to take that action.

On public sector procurement, all public sector suppliers are required to comply with applicable law, including relevant human rights and employment rights law. UK public procurement policy is that social, environmental or ethical issues can be taken into account in the procurement process where that is relevant, proportionate and non-discriminatory. We expect public sector procurement to be as transparent as other procurement, which is covered elsewhere. We will consult on this matter, and I encourage people who are concerned to respond to the consultation. It should be noted that whatever action is taken will be taken only following the affirmative procedure to ensure that Parliament has its say. We will ensure that points are put forward.

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[Mark Durkan]

The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) referred to my amendment 138, which is mainly what I wish to address. However, I fully endorse what the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) said about the amendments standing in his name and the wider issue of consent, which is also touched upon in amendment 143.

Amendment 138 aims to make good a clear deficit in the Government’s provision in the Bill for a statutory defence. That defence is inadequate and certainly is not fit to deal with the position of children. The amendment seeks to change that so that child victims of trafficking would be fully protected. Clearly, children have already suffered if they are detained in the process, and if they find themselves subject to a prosecution or even the speculation about a prosecution. That becomes traumatic for children who have come through trafficking, slavery or exploitation, as it would for any victim. So it would be wrong to have a requirement that children have to show that there was compulsion—that should not exist in law. The presence of any other means including compulsion should be irrelevant when defining a child as a victim of trafficking or exploitation. Children in such a situation will be frightened, confused and traumatised. They should not face further isolation and distress and all the other psychological pressures as they go through what will be to them a fairly unknown process.

Despite the Crown Prosecution Service guidelines, children are still prosecuted. It should be an imperative for us in this legislation to stop that occurring in the future, and this Bill provides us with an opportunity to do that.

I point out to the Minister that in July the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child urged the Government, in relation to trafficked children and to all children covered by the optional protocol on the sale of children, to establish

“a clear obligation of non-prosecution in the criminal justice system and ensuring that [children] are treated as victims rather than criminals by law enforcement and judicial authorities.”

Basically, that is what amendment 138 tries to do; it tries to bring the Bill up to that standard. However, I recognise that there is the wrinkle in relation to schedule 3, and for that reason amendment 138 addresses a very important issue that needs to be considered further. I will not be pressing the matter to a Division, because, as the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North has said, there is an outstanding issue in connection with it.

[Karen Bradley]

I am grateful to all Members for tabling and speaking to a number of amendments that relate to the offences set out in clauses 1 and 2, the ability to seize the assets of those convicted of offences and the defence for victims who are compelled to commit an offence, as outlined in clause 41.

We had a thorough, detailed and lively debate on the offences and their practical application in Committee. I am extremely grateful to all Members of this House and others who have contributed to the debates on the offences and have made their thoughts known to the Government to enable us to continue our thinking.

I made it clear in Committee that the Government’s approach is to consolidate and simplify existing offences into a single Act, which will make it easier for law enforcers to understand. We want to see clear offences that can be used effectively by prosecutors and others to convict serious criminals who will now face a potential life sentence.

The offences in the Bill deliberately tackle serious criminal conduct that can be said to amount to modern slavery. Given the time available and the amount of discussion that we have had, I want to put it on the record at this stage that the Government continue to listen to all points that are made on this matter. We want to ensure that we reflect the concerns that have been raised and that we have clear and simple offences that achieve the convictions that we all want. Members should remember that we are looking here at international conventions and protocols that are written in civil law, which is a different type of law. Putting them straight into UK common law sometimes creates unintended consequences, and I am keen to ensure that we do not do that.

Clause 1 targets those who hold a person in slavery or servitude or who require another person to perform forced or compulsory labour in this country, without any requirements for movement. The clause 2 offence targets a different type of wrongdoing, which is the movement of human beings with a view to exploiting them. That different type of wrongdoing has been the subject of international legal instruments such as the Palermo protocol and the EU directive. That is fully justified because we know that there is an international and national trade in human beings. It is right that we have a separate offence targeting those involved in the movement of people to be exploited, and that is what this offence achieves.

These measures are part of a wider strategy to improve the law enforcement response to modern slavery, and to increase the number of successful prosecutions. Let me highlight that there is no magic bullet by which we can transform the situation simply by amending the technical definition of the offences. The Committee heard from the Director of Public Prosecutions that the offences set out in this Bill are clear and welcome. However, the issue is often not the definition of the offence, but getting the evidence required for a conviction, which is a point that was made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Sir John Randall).

I want to touch on the Kinsella case, which the shadow Minister raised. We discussed a number of cases in Committee. It is important to put it on the record that the offenders in that case were convicted of false imprisonment, and that offence carries a maximum of a life sentence, whereas under the current law, slavery carries a maximum of only 14 years. It is completely understandable that those offenders faced the criminal charge conveying the highest possible penalty, but this Bill will ensure that slavery and trafficking offences carry a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, and I want to see those offences used in prosecutions in the future. So the solution to obtaining more prosecutions is better work by law enforcement, better support for victims and witnesses, and clear offences with the more severe penalties set out by this Bill.

New clauses 3 and 4 and the amendments seek in different ways to widen the scope of the offences to create a new criminal offence of exploitation, which will carry a life sentence. I fully understand why right hon. and hon. Members have tabled such amendments. I share the concern to ensure that this Bill criminalises modern slavery effectively. The wider criminal law needs to tackle exploitation that should properly be criminal but might fall short of the conduct required for the serious offences in this Bill.

I know that we debated this issue at length in Committee and I continue to look seriously at where there may be any gaps in the legislation. I have been absolutely clear throughout that our approach to offences is to take seriously how they will work in practice. For example, we have taken advice from the Director of Public Prosecutions. The director gave evidence in Committee that

“We much prefer the clarity of the offences in the Bill as drafted by the Government.”––Official Report, Modern Slavery Public Bill Committee, 21 July 2014; c. 4, Q2.]

rather than the more complicated and confusing alternative presented by the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee, which included exploitation and child exploitation offences.

Introducing exploitation offences would risk causing confusion. “Exploitation” is potentially a very broad term, and there is a real risk that we would capture much wider behaviour than was ever intended in this Bill, which focuses rightly on the very serious crimes of slavery and human trafficking. The risk is that, by making the offences too broad, the public will no longer be clear on the conduct that we are targeting through very serious criminal offences that carry a life sentence as a maximum. And the effect of the Bill on law enforcement will be diluted, as the conduct we are targeting will be less clear and so will law enforcement’s focus on the victims of serious crime. It is only right and proper that, where we are dealing with less serious conduct, we prosecute those responsible using less serious offences.

A second issue raised by new clauses 3 and 4 is whether separate child offences are needed in this Bill. In some circumstances, child offences are helpful to enable a tougher sentence to be given to criminals who target and abuse children. This Bill introduces a maximum of a life sentence for the main offences in relation to slavery and human trafficking and current sentencing guidelines already highlight offences against children as an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes. There is no practical benefit in establishing a separate child-specific offence when offenders already face the maximum penalty possible—life. That is why there is no need for a separate child murder offence.

The Director of Public Prosecutions gave clear evidence to the Committee that

“If you separated out offences into adults and children, it would make it more complicated because we know from the number of cases we prosecute that defining and identifying someone’s age is often extremely difficult…There is absolutely no need for it to be separated out; that would make it more complicated and more difficult to prosecute some of these offences.”––[Official Report, Modern Slavery Public Bill Committee, 21 July 2014; c. 6, Q11.]

So I do not believe that a separate child offence would help to deliver the objectives of the House.

Amendments 135, 136, and 143 seek to remove any requirement for consent to be considered by the court when looking at clause 1. While I do not favour the wording of the amendments tabled today, which could make prosecution harder, I want to be clear that the Government are open to clarifying this aspect of the offences. We have already altered the Bill following pre-legislative scrutiny to make it clear that the court could look at all the circumstances when determining whether an offence had taken place, including any vulnerability of the victim. I am now seriously considering the issue of consent in clause 1 and whether the law could be clarified to make it clearer that consent does not preclude a determination that a child is being held in slavery or servitude or required to perform forced or compulsory labour.

Turning to the trafficking offence, the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee also raised a concern that the offence in the draft Bill might not be as broad as the international definition, for example on receipt or harbouring of the victim. We responded and made it clear in the Bill that arranging or facilitating the travel of another person includes all of the ways through which human trafficking may be committed, as set out in the Palermo protocol and EU directive. So a person may arrange or facilitate travel by recruiting, transporting, transferring, harbouring or receiving, or transferring or exchanging control over a person—words reflecting those used in the international instruments.

In Committee, we debated whether there should be a requirement for travel in the offence. Those instruments are explicitly concerned with “human trafficking”. The evil that we are trying to tackle is trafficking, and clearly trafficking involves movement or travel of the victim.

On asset recovery, I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Stephen Barclay) and the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr Field) for raising the important issue of asset recovery in relation to modern slavery offences. We have amended the definitions of modern slavery offences to make them lifestyle offences for the purposes of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and introduced a reparation order, but we are seeking through the Serious Crime Bill to look at a number of other measures that would tighten up asset recovery overall. I hope that my hon. Friend and the right hon. Gentleman will allow us to have that debate when the Serious Crime Bill reaches this place.

The provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act are already tougher—