(9 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend makes a very important point. We should recognise that the Government are spending that money and are committed to looking at the specific law enforcement challenges of cybercrime, but we must also consider the economic consequences of that crime.
Particularly through organised crime, but also by foreign state activity, there can be a breakdown of networks, such as those for electricity, telecoms, power, banking, and food and fuel distribution. Everything relies on those logistical systems. Only today, companies have announced that their online retailing is now stronger than their direct retailing, and only today, there have been comments about the amount of money lost in banking fraud. Online retail and on-time logistics are clearly areas of potential attack, and the paralysis of such networks as a result of cyber-attacks is not just a security risk, but probably the most significant and serious threat to our economy except for world economic factors.
If those networks come under criminal control, even for a relatively short period, there would be not only grand-scale theft, fraud and illegal drug dealing, but a cost that would dwarf the figure of £24 billion, which the Home Secretary rightly remarked last year was the cost of organised crime to this country. I say “dwarf”, because daily banking transactions in the UK alone probably total five or perhaps 10 times that amount.
The potential for crime is huge, so it is absolutely right for the national cyber-security programme to break down cybercrime into its two parts: cyber-dependent crimes, which can be committed only by using computers and computer networks; and the even more significant cyber-enabled crimes, which can be committed offline and online.
My hon. Friend is making a powerful case. I am sure that he agrees that many provisions in the Bill will strengthen the law on cybercrime, but does he share my concern that, as some of the statistics perhaps show, business also needs to take cybercrime more seriously than it has in the past?
My right hon. Friend is absolutely correct. Any number of reports in the past six months have found that major companies have not helped Governments either to assess the risks to their own networks, which creates a national risk, or to assess the threat from organised crime, which leads to serious risks not just to such companies, but to individuals. A number of companies should accept their responsibilities in that area.
The Bill is very important because of the sheer expansion in the potential for cybercrime. Sections 1 to 3 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 clearly set out ways to deal with unauthorised access, but the provisions of that Act are now simply too limited. What was relevant in 1990 is no longer relevant, and the pace of change in equipment and software capability requires a significant updating of the response. Economically, part 2 is a singularly important part of the Bill. It accepts that the current law is hopelessly inadequate, and puts in place a new offence in relation to unauthorised acts
“causing, or creating risk of, serious damage”.
The Home Secretary set out that that applies not only to the area of economics, but in other areas, such as security and the environment.
Simply in the area of economics, such crimes are so serious that they could wreck—that is not too strong a word—the whole economy. It is therefore hugely important that the Bill covers unauthorised acts in relation to computers that result in serious damage. The definition of “serious damage” has rightly been left somewhat opaque, because some of the information inside banking systems would be difficult to assess, but the Bill rightly recognises how far the world has moved since the 1990 Act.
It is clearly right for the Home Secretary to include protections in the Bill. The need to establish a significant link to the UK is now clear—for example, one of the accused, the target computer system or the damage must be in the UK or, if the attack is from abroad, the accused must have been a UK national at the time of the attack and there must be a similar offence in the relevant country. That provides relative protection while putting in place the right measures to enable law enforcement agencies to tackle this crime. There has been some detailing of the need to upgrade sentencing, and the Bill also recognises that the 1990 Act fails to deal with the seriousness of such crimes. It therefore rightly imposes life imprisonment for serious injury or death, while a sentence of 14 years applies for serious economic damage.
The potential to commit cybercrime, and the manner in which is it committed, is constantly evolving, and it is right for the new offence to recognise that and the seriousness of its effects. It is also true that whatever we do in the UK—our attempts to extend protection extra-territoriality in the Bill are important—it simply will not be enough. Much of cybercrime is international, and although like many in the House I am hugely concerned about the onward march of certain areas of the EU into our lives, no sensible person would set their face against international co-operation.
(12 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberAs the hon. Gentleman will know, there were problems with the system that we inherited. It was a harsh system, which we have been working hard to make work better, and I hope he will join us in supporting Professor Harrington’s work in this area, which is leaving us with a work capability assessment that better serves the people of this country.
6. What recent assessment he has made of the benefits for jobseekers of undertaking work experience.
(12 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberObviously, we will want to look into all such issues. The hon. Gentleman and I have already had a number of conversations about his factory, and I applaud the work he does in supporting disabled people in his community, but I should also draw his attention to the facts I gave him before: there are many thousands of other disabled people in his community whom I want to make sure are getting support, and our reform of Remploy will help to achieve precisely that.
For the sake of accuracy, can the Minister confirm that there is a period of transitional benefits for anyone leaving a Remploy factory? Can she also confirm that last year Remploy employment services found work for 15,000 disabled people whose disabilities are similar to those of employees at Remploy factories?
My hon. Friend makes some important points, and we will ensure that support is in place for people affected by the announcements we are making. But what we are about is supporting thousands more disabled people into mainstream employment, and we have clear support for our approach from disabled people and from disabled people’s organisations.
Given that they had to be reminded, the Opposition seem to have forgotten that they closed 29 of these factories. The difference is that when they did that, little attempt was made to find any alternative buyers. Worse, the then Chief Secretary to the Treasury did nothing to put in place a comprehensive support package for those made redundant. Perhaps that is why so many Labour Members know that in their own constituencies many of the people affected by the previous redundancies did not get back into work, and perhaps Labour Members should hold their previous Chief Secretary to account for that. We should contrast that with the £8 million package of support that this Government are putting in place. That shows the importance that we attach to the measure.