Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Debate between Margaret Hodge and Seema Malhotra

Consideration of Lords amendments
Monday 4th September 2023 Commons Chamber

[Seema Malhotra]

I think that that will be covered in the points I am going to make, including around the steps that the Government need to take further.

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

On that point, there is discussion in the Bill about reasonable arrangements, which will be decided through secondary legislation. It will be necessary to ensure that the processes through which small and medium-sized enterprises show that they are preventing fraud and money laundering can be done in a way that is not burdensome on those businesses or a detriment to them. The same arguments took place over the bribery legislation, when there was concern about an attempt to have an SME exemption. That failed at that point, and all the research since that legislation was enacted shows there has been no detriment to SMEs or to their ability to export.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank my right hon. Friend for her intervention. Indeed, she pre-empts some of the content of my speech, which is absolutely fine—we can reference it twice. She makes an important point about the Bribery Act 2010, which has also been referred to by the right hon. and learned Member for South Swindon.

The important point here is that it is for the Government to get this right, and I think we can all agree that there should not be disproportionate costs for small businesses. Lord Vaux, an experienced professional in these areas, also expressed concern over the credibility of the Government’s figures on the estimated costs for smaller businesses. Another important argument is that these policies can also protect SMEs, which are also the victims of fraud. We can sometimes lose sight of that. In 2022, 64% of UK businesses experienced fraud, corruption or other economic crime. That is much higher than the global average of 46%, and second only to South Africa. This is a matter of a cost to businesses as much as a cost for businesses, and what the extent of that would be in reality.

We have also looked at the safeguards—particularly since my conversation with the Minister last week—that are in place to avoid disproportionate costs for SMEs, which the Government can use to get the balance right. Spotlight on Corruption has noted:

“It is open to the government to make clear in guidance issued for the offence what reasonable procedures would be proportionate for SMEs, and in what circumstances it would be reasonable not to have them at all.”

The offence also contains a defence for companies to be able to argue, in the event of legal action, that its procedures were reasonable in all the circumstances or that it was not reasonable to expect the body to have any prevention procedures in place. That is important for informing the debate today and it is the reason that, after deliberations and listening to the Minister last week, we have decided that we should support the debate in the Lords and that we do not want to see the exemption for SMEs taken out of the Bill.

Amendment 159, on failure to prevent money laundering, was tabled by the noble Lord Garnier. It would expand the scope of the Government’s new offence of failure to prevent fraud so that the offence would also cover money laundering. The Government argue that this amendment is not needed as we already have an anti-money laundering supervisory regime, but I remind the Minister that a Treasury review into our anti-money laundering regulations published in June stated that

“significant weaknesses remain in the UK’s supervision regime.”

Hugely frustratingly, the Government have responded to that with yet another consultation.

In addition, since the most recent money laundering regulations were brought in, the UK has had only one corporate criminal conviction for money laundering, so it is pretty clear that the existing safeguards against money laundering are not enough. Here is a chance to take stronger action and to include in the new offence a failure to prevent money laundering, and the Government should take it. We will be supporting this amendment to stay part of the Bill.

Privilege: Conduct of Right Hon. Boris Johnson

Debate between Margaret Hodge and Seema Malhotra

Monday 19th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

That is an extremely interesting point, for which, as a non-lawyer, I thank the hon. Lady.

If it is true that attempts were made to bully and, yes, blackmail Privileges Committee members so that they came to conclusions that were not based on the evidence but prioritised Boris Johnson’s personal interests, that is shocking. The integrity of Parliament must come above all else. It takes courage to stand up against such political pressures, but showing integrity and leaving party tribalism at the door is absolutely vital if we are to uphold democracy and protect this place from a further erosion of trust.

[Seema Malhotra]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point about integrity and the protection of this House. Young people have contacted me about this debate, which they are following. Does she agree that for a former Prime Minister to lie to the House and to the Privileges Committee, to seek to undermine the Committee and then to threaten parliamentarians who support the Committee’s findings is behaviour on which we must take a stand, in the interests of our constituents and the next generations? In voting for this motion today, it is important that we take this decisive stand on integrity, which will have an impact on confidence in this House for generations to come.

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

I agree, and I am pleased that the Privileges Committee will look at the conduct of some Members of both Houses in attempting to intimidate Committee members.

Today’s debate has to be considered as part of a bigger problem facing us. Over the past six years, we have seen consistent attacks on the fragile pillars that act as vital checks on Executive power. We have seen judges and judicial review denigrated; senior civil servants sacked for speaking truth to power; cronies appointed to key public positions; pals rewarded with honours and contracts; attempts to undermine the independence of the BBC; and our Parliament systematically bypassed. Boris Johnson allowed that creeping culture of corruption and unchecked executive power to infect our democracy.

Let us not beat about the bush: Boris Johnson did recklessly and deliberately mislead this House. His behaviour helped to support a culture that threatens our democracy. Today, I hope we are beginning to undo the damage that has been done. We are reaffirming the importance of Ministers and Prime Ministers being properly, honestly and truthfully accountable to Parliament and, through us, to the public.

Mr Johnson was not just called an “honourable” Member of this House; he led a major political party. He was our Prime Minister, yet he misled us time and time and time again, and he did so with impunity. Conservative Members knew this man before he became their leader. They knew he had been sacked as a journalist for lying. They knew he had been sacked from the Opposition Front Bench for lying. They knew he routinely bent the rules and misspent public money at City Hall. They knew he was a liar, yet they still made the terrible mistake of electing him as their leader.

So today, I hope that all Members of this House, and particularly Members on the Government Benches, do not make another terrible mistake by choosing either not to turn up or not to vote. This should not be about Conservatives versus Labour. Every parliamentarian needs to look at the evidence and ask themselves if they can honestly ignore the heaps of information that shows that Boris Johnson lied to us all, and through us, to the people in the country. I strongly urge every single Member of Parliament to walk through the Lobby and register their vote—a vote for the resolution, a vote that demonstrates our support for truth, justice and democracy.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Debate between Margaret Hodge and Seema Malhotra

Report stage
Tuesday 24th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Seema Malhotra]

My right hon. Friend is right about keeping our legislation up to date. He says that with great authority. We must recognise that those who seek to perpetuate economic crime are always innovating, and unless we are aware and informed, we will not move our legislation and processes on with that. There is also a vital point about the information that comes to the House. Today, we are debating reporting and information. There will be further debate tomorrow about the appropriateness of the structures through which that information is assessed.

New clause 16 seeks to specify further some of the information that should be brought forward and, crucially, calls for a detailing of instances—or maybe even numbers, depending on the reasons—in which exemption powers under the Bill are used by the Secretary of State. The Minister will be aware of the concerns that we raised in Committee about the need for Parliament to have transparency even on the number of uses of exemption powers under the Bill.

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent contribution to the debate. The point is that the Government’s new clause 15 simply reflects reporting on the process of implementation—[Interruption.] That is how I read it, and that is how the Minister spoke to it. If I am wrong, I am happy to be corrected. Through new clause 16, we are trying to hold the whole of Companies House’s works to account and ensure that it delivers what we have in mind in being at the front end of fighting economic crime through the data that it collects.

[Seema Malhotra]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. We should be ambitious for the registrar and for Companies House in tackling economic crime and being a beacon around the world for how a nation should do that. She makes an important point about where the new clause goes further than the Government’s proposal. Along with the report and the data in it, importantly, there would be recommendations about whether further legislation should be brought forward in response to that report and the information in it. That is extremely important, because that is where Parliament will have to make choices about whether it chooses to take further action.

Issues of concern that the report may draw attention to, and which we could encourage the registrar to look at, could include investigations of unusual patterns of directorships and companies registered at one address. All of that would also enable Parliament to hold Companies House to account for its performance. We are willing to work with the Minister to strengthen the Government’s new clause so that it becomes more purposeful and effective—and, in doing so, collectively achieve the outcomes that we intend for the Bill.

I turn to further amendments tabled by Labour Front-Bench Members. New clause 22 seeks to disqualify any individual convicted of a serious breach of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, such as a deliberate refusal to pay the national minimum wage, from serving as a company director in future. In Committee, the Minister stated that it was

“right to identify the scale and nature of the problem before we legislate”.––[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 3 November 2022; c. 240.]

He said that he was “keen to do so.” He also said:

“There have been 16 people convicted under the National Minimum Wage Act 1998. I want to do some further research on that to see what has happened to those people and their director qualification or disqualification. That might inform debate more clearly.”–[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 3 November 2022; c. 233.]

Since then, we have not heard a satisfactory answer to the central question: should an individual convicted of an offence for a serious breach of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, such as a deliberate refusal to pay the national minimum wage, be prevented from serving as a company director?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

Does my hon. Friend agree there can be absolutely no objection to that approach? In the Minister’s opening remarks, he said that the reforms will give Companies House much more proactive capability. If the Minister sees that, and if we want that, what on earth is the objection to putting it in legislation so that Companies House knows darn well that that is what we expect of it?

[Seema Malhotra]

The Minister has heard what my right hon. Friend says. If that is what Parliament wishes and intends, we should have the courage to put it in the Bill. The amendments tabled by my right hon. Friend and by the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness and others—including new clauses 17 and 19 and amendments 102 and 103—are important, and we support what they are calling for. Separately, we strongly encourage the Minister to look at amendment 101.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his confirmation. The legislation is not as tight as we would like it to be, but if he puts his intentions on record, that does take us a step further.

Amendment 107 would require a limited partnership dissolution notice to be published on the registrar’s website and to remain published for a minimum of 20 years. The Minister has previously said that he would like to explore with Companies House the feasibility and costs associated with introducing that requirement. I should be grateful if he confirmed that he has concluded those discussions, and tell us what decision he has reached.

New clause 20, which we support, concerns resourcing. It would raise Companies House fees to £100 to help to properly fund the fight against crime. The current fee of just £12 makes this country the sixth cheapest place in the world in which to set up a company. The Treasury Select Committee recommended a fee of £100. Will the Minister tell us what his plans are? Having a plan to resource Companies House is fundamental to achieving the goals of the Bill.

I thank Scottish National party Members for their amendments, whose arguments are similar to ours. In particular, we support new clause 36 and amendment 109, which deal with reporting and unique IDs—although we think that some minor changes might be made to new clause 36—and would also support any attempt to push them to a vote.

New clause 26, which is being debated today but will be subject to a decision tomorrow, would amend provisions in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 to require the introduction of open registers of beneficial ownership in each of the UK’s overseas territories. There should be no double standards in the legal requirements for transparency of beneficial ownership across different parts of the UK, including the overseas territories. We have witnessed too many scandals involving money being laundered through territories for whose administration the UK is ultimately responsible to accept the idea that we must simply leave them to their own devices. According to the spin that the Government chose to put on the wording of the 2018 Act, its obligation had been met simply by the publication of a draft Order in Council, regardless of when, or even whether, such an order might actually come into force. The result is that we are here yet again, nearly five years later, still discussing how to ensure the implementation of registers to the same standards across all the UK’s territories. Surely it should not have been beyond the wit of Ministers, even in this Government, to have sorted this out by now. [Interruption.] With the exception of the Minister who is present today.

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

My hon. Friend is raising a really important point, which has been put into some question by a judgment of the European Court of Justice by an action relating to a shell company in Luxembourg. I know that this is not entirely in the Minister’s control but it is particularly important because, although the Crown dependencies agreed in 2018 or 2019 to publish registers of beneficial ownership, we never passed the legislation because we got their agreement verbally. I am really concerned that they will now go back on that in the light of that judgment. It will be interesting to hear the Minister’s views on that.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank my right hon. Friend for her intervention and for the discussions that we had on this matter prior to the Report stage.

In summary, this legislation is essential, but as we have heard from across the House today, there are still areas in which it must go further if we are to catch up after years of being on the back foot on economic crime due to years of inaction. These are thoughtful and purposeful amendments that will improve the Bill, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Nineteenth sitting)

Debate between Margaret Hodge and Seema Malhotra

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th November 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Margaret Hodge (Barking) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I will be on my feet for a bit, so I will try to be succinct—I know that Members have other things to do this afternoon. [Laughter.] It may be impossible for me. I want to say quite a lot about this new clause.

New clause 71 is about reforming of the suspicious activity reports regime. Ministers will accept that the SARs regime is a central tool in our defence against money laundering, but I hope they also accept that the current system is broken—it is not working. The new clause would introduce a new risk rating system, which would transform the efficacy and efficiency of the current regime.

SARs are very valuable and a vital source of intelligence. They are made mainly by financial institutions, but also by solicitors, accountants or estate agents, and they report suspicious activity. They have been absolutely instrumental in a range of successful actions against criminal activities, locating sex offenders, tracing murder suspects and identifying those involved in online child abuse, and they have shown how young women are trafficked into the UK. They have also been instrumental in closing down fraud and money laundering.

To give one example of a successful case involving fraud, a vulnerable elderly man in his 80s was the victim of a fraudster who had gained his personal details through a cloned website, when the elderly man believed that he was making a genuine investment. The reporter who saw the transaction going through was suspicious when the fraudster tried to impersonate the victim and access his main funds. He reported the transaction, and the UK Financial Intelligence Unit, which operates the SARs regime, received that report. The unit immediately passed it on to the enforcement agency—I wish this happened every time—which visited the victim in his house. The agency was then able to quickly contact the institution where the transaction was supposed to take place. It reported that the suspicious activity was wrong and confirmed the real identity and bank details of the elderly man, which all prevented him from losing in excess of £80,000.

This scheme is therefore important, and it is successful when it works well. However, at present, the sheer volume of SARs and the limited resources available mean that the information is not analysed and often simply not used. In evidence to the Treasury Committee, Mark Steward, the director of enforcement at the Financial Conduct Authority, said:

“More needs to be done in order to get more out of the valuable data that is in there. Otherwise, it just sits there.”

Graeme Biggar, also giving evidence to the Treasury Committee, as director general of the National Economic Crime Centre, said:

“Twenty years ago, we got 20,000 suspicious activity reports in, largely from banks. This year, we would not be surprised if we got three quarters of a million, and the number of defence against money laundering SARs, where we are told in advance and given the option to refuse permission to proceed, is going to double, we think, this year. The sheer volume coming through is really significant and very hard to deal with.”

According to research from Spotlight on Corruption, only 118 people handle the SARs. That is one employee to 4,250 SARs. The Australians, who have a similar enforcement regime, and who have also experienced an explosion in SARs, have a staff complement of one to 1,400—three times better than our own. The Committee has often talked about the relative budgets for enforcement of the UK and the USA. The USA has increased funding of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network by 30%, and its staffing by 50%. The Minister should recognise that the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s budget is now 15 times larger than the National Crime Agency, although our population is only five times smaller than America’s.

The Financial Action Task Force review in 2018 said SARs should be reformed, and SARs were criticised by the FATF. The Treasury Committee report in 2019 talked about SARs reform. In 2017, the Government had announced a reform programme for SARs, led by the Home Office together with the NCA. That reform programme constituted action 30 in the economic crime plan. The intent was to have an IT transformation, better analytical resources and capabilities, and an improvement in SARs processes. That SARs programme was reviewed by the Government’s Infrastructure and Projects Authority, and was given an amber rating in 2021. So reform started in 2017, the programme was given an amber rating in 2021, and today, in 2022, it is not complete and there is no timetable from the Home Office—maybe the Minister can help with that—or a target date for completion, which was a criticism the Treasury Committee made of the programme. Delivery was originally promised by December 2020, but we are two years on from that and we are a long way from seeing SARs completed.

In that context, new clause 71 introduces a risk-rating regime. I do not think anybody thinks that is a crazy idea, and I hope the Minister will—just for once—adopt one of the suggestions that the Opposition have made in Committee. I hope he will not say that we do not need the legislation. We are nearly six years on from when the reform programme was announced, and reform has not happened. The Government cannot, despite the best efforts of right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson), ignore legislation, although they seem to be ignoring the desire to reform the SARs programme.

If Ministers want action, which they have consistently said they seek with the Bill, they should accept new clause 71. If they simply see this measure as party political, they should not. We do not deal with the funding issue in the new clause, but we will ensure that the focus is on the most significant SARs. That will lead to more enforcement. I urge the Minister to adopt our new clause.

[Seema Malhotra]

It is a pleasure to speak briefly in support of the new clause tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking. It would amend the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 such that any disclosure made as part of the suspicious activity reporting regime must include a risk rating. My right hon. Friend outlined very effectively the reasons why the new clause is important. Much of the evidence in our meetings at the outset of the Bill, which set out the context and stakeholder views, it was clear that the SARs regime was failing. The databases of referrals were going unreviewed and unlooked at, because the resources were not there. There was no effective means that we could see of prioritising SARs fed into the NCA.

SARs is an essential tool in our defence against money laundering, but if the system is not working, something needs to happen. Having an extra step in the process to help with prioritisation, look at risks and deal with those identified as higher risk would help, as my right hon. Friend outlined, to bring in quality, at a time when we know that quantity is the new battle. She said that the current estimate is three quarters of a million referrals, which is extraordinary. Given the scale and types of economic crime, the number of referrals is likely to get worse, not better. That is a good thing if we are starting to highlight and refer more cases as we start to clean up our systems. However, we then need to deliver on that; otherwise, the downside is that we will reduce confidence among those doing the referrals that anything will actually happen.

Nigel Kirby of Lloyds Bank said in his evidence to the Committee:

“I think the SARs regime and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 itself actually need—well, not necessarily to be turned upside down, but to be looked at as a whole.”––[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 25 October 2022; c. 19, Q26.]

I think we have some agreement that the system itself is important, essential and necessary but that it needs wholesale reform to make it more efficient and effective and to ensure that it does what we ask of it.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Seventeenth sitting)

Debate between Margaret Hodge and Seema Malhotra

Committee stage
Thursday 24th November 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Kevin Hollinrake]

I thank the hon. Members for Feltham and Heston and for Aberavon for tabling their new clause. I also thank the right hon. Member for Barking and the hon. Member for Glasgow Central for their contributions. I agree with much of what they said. As they know, I fully agree that Parliament should be regularly updated on the implementation and impact of this legislation. What gets measured gets done, and it is vital that we know what is being done with this legislation.

I will speak to new clauses 26 and 28 first, because I think there may be a duplication of things that exist already. Much of the information suggested by new clause 26, such as Companies House expenditure and the numbers of companies incorporated and struck off, is already published in the Companies House annual report. Companies House already reports publicly on its activities and its regular statistical releases on gov.uk. On new clause 28, through dissolution a company is brought to a point at which it ceases to exist and ceases to appear on the register. A company can seek its own voluntary strike-off, or it can be struck of compulsorily by the registrar. In principle, that process takes place when there is reason to believe that the company is no longer in operation or carrying on business. In both cases, statutory processes ensue whereby the public generally are informed that the dissolution is in train by publications in the Gazette. There are opportunities for third parties to intervene and object to a company being dissolved.

Concerns have been expressed that unscrupulous companies choose to give the impression that they are defunct in order to precipitate their dissolution and evade creditors. That concern is ultimately misplaced, as any assets left in a company following its dissolution will not be held by the company any more, and will be passed to the Crown, bona vacantia—as ownerless property. It is also important to note the effects of the Rating (Coronavirus) and Directors Disqualification (Dissolved Companies) Act 2021, which amended the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 by introducing a mechanism for disqualifying directors of dissolved companies.

It is also worth noting that the 1986 Act includes provision not only for disqualifying directors but for ordering disqualified directors to pay compensation. That provision is in section 15A of the Act and, as amended by the 2021 Act, covers directors of both insolvent companies and dissolved companies. If a director is disqualified and the conduct for which they were disqualified caused loss to the creditors of an insolvent or dissolved company, the director can be ordered to pay compensation either for the benefit of specified creditors or by way of a contribution to the assets of the company.

The Bill introduces a new circumstance under which the registrar might seek to strike off a company that persistently fails to provide an appropriate registered office address. I assure Members that the registrar will initiate dissolution in those particular circumstances only after having assessed the risks of doing so. The normal notification procedures, by way of the Gazette and Companies House webpages, will apply.

As noted, Companies House already makes data on company dissolutions regularly available. I question what benefit the reporting proposed by the new clause would add, as it is not clear to me that the information it covers would necessarily be available to the Secretary of State. However, I acknowledge the concern about the manner in which compulsory strike-off operates. I have asked my officials to advise me on the extent to which the Bill’s new information-sharing provisions might improve safeguards and transparency in this area. I am of course happy to engage further with Members on this topic in due course.

Most of the comments related to new clause 63. I absolutely agree that there needs to be a mechanism by which progress made on the implementation of the provisions in the Bill is reported to Parliament. There should be regular reporting on the registrar’s use of the new powers. I also accept that it is important to give Parliament an early opportunity to scrutinise how quickly Companies House implements the reforms.

I believe, however, that the new clause requires further consideration. As drafted, it has the potential to place unintended obligations on the registrar. For example, it will require the registrar to report on the imposition of financial penalties before the commencement date of the regulations. It also requires the registrar to indefinitely report on the implementation of the legislation, even if it is completed in the near future.

With the agreement of the Committee, I would like to ask my officials to consider the new clause further. I hope Members are reassured that we will give it consideration. If the new clause is withdrawn, we will have further discussions about what we might put in its place.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his comments about the new clauses. I appreciate his response on new clause 63 and very much look forward to hearing from his officials about the proposed reports, but will he tell us when we will hear from them? None of us wants the measure to be lost in the course of proceedings, and we do not want it to be left to the Lords, so I would be grateful if he can tell us when he expects us to hear a response. Assuming that it will be positive, I am happy not to press new clause 63 to a vote.

On new clause 26, the Minister did not respond with the detail that I was expecting. I understand that some data is already published. We can have an argument about whether it is there, but it is easy for there to be a summary. If Parliament is looking at one document, it will want that data. It will want to review the later data in the context of the more procedural data that Companies House already publishes. I cannot see that it is onerous to publish a summary of data that already exists.

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

In the Minister’s response to my hon. Friend, he said that there was duplication of subsections (1) and (3). All the other things that were listed in subsections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) are issues on which we want an annual report to Parliament because that shows us whether the legislation is working. If there is duplication, it is not the end of the world. There is a lot of duplication in our legislation—I am sure, Sir Christopher, that you are an expert on that—but that is not a sufficient argument to put the whole new clause out of the Committee’s consideration.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister. To clarify, he referred to coming back on new clause 63; my question is in relation to new clause 26 and whether and how the later subsections are all going to be covered by the Companies House annual report. It would be helpful if he responded to that, because currently I am not clear that they are all covered.

In new clause 26, we are asking for an assessment of whether

“the powers available to the Secretary of State and the registrar are sufficient to enable the registrar to achieve its objectives”

and about

“making recommendations as to whether further legislation should be brought forward in response to the report.”

Yes, there may be details elsewhere, but they could be summarised for the ease of use of the report. The new clause requires

“a breakdown of the registrar’s annual expenditure”

and

“data on the number of companies struck off”.

That information may well also be elsewhere. Will the Minister confirm whether

“the number of cases referred by the registrar to law enforcement bodies and anti-money laundering supervisors”

and so on is all going to published elsewhere?

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

May I also draw the Minister’s attention to new clause 26(6), which is important? It asks for an annual report of the total number of companies incorporated to the registrar and

“the number of company incorporations by Authorised Company Service Providers”.

The purpose of that particular bit of information relates to our concern about the integrity and honesty of company service providers. I do not believe that is covered in the Companies House report. I accept that there may be some duplication—we got that wrong—but there are issues of huge importance in terms of accountability and the integrity of the data that we would lose if new clause 26 were simply ignored.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank my right hon. Friend for explicitly emphasising the importance of subsection (6). She is absolutely right. The Minister will be mindful of the importance of transparency in respect of the issues relating to incorporations by authorised company service providers. Will he confirm that all the subsections in new clause 26 will be explicitly covered elsewhere? If not, we will want to pursue the matter of how that information is going to be published by Companies House and the Secretary of State.

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[Dame Margaret Hodge]

I do not know whether I have the quote here from the previous HMRC permanent secretary—I will dig it up and send it to the Minister—but he actually said, in evidence to the Treasury Committee I think, that he did not quite understand why it was part of his job to do the supervision. I am not quoting him accurately, but the purport of what he said was that they see it as marginal and a sort of add-on—I think he used the word “add-on”—to their main function, which is to get the money in.

The position and reputation that professionals enjoy through membership of professional bodies is really important. Therefore, the professional bodies themselves should be taking steps to minimise and attack suspicious activity where it takes place, and they should be calling it out. It is in everybody’s interest to get the bad apples.

Let me give some evidence of the current failings as we see them. The 2021 review of OPBAS—the body responsible for all the professional bodies—found that 81%, or eight out of 10, were not supervising their members effectively. This review was done only on the legal and accountancy professions. Half the supervisors did not ensure that their members were taking timely action to improve their money laundering procedures where they were found wanting. A third of the supervisors did not have effective separation between the advocacy role and the supervision role, which I think is an important aspect. For a proper review, one would separate bodies undertaking supervision and bodies undertaking advocacy to ensure there is no conflict of interest.

Some 60% of the firms visited by the Solicitors Regulation Authority in 2021 were failing to comply fully with their duties to have adequate AML controls in place. OPBAS found that nine supervisory bodies of MLR are engaging in what it calls “low levels of enforcement”. The way in which those bodies respond when they find something going on is to have a quiet chat rather than issue fines and publicly censure lawyers for breaching the MLR rules. The highest ever AML fine for a law firm by the SRA was £232,500, and it was for Mishcon. If that fine had been levied by the FCA under similar powers, it would have been £5.4 million.

The Council for Licensed Conveyancers, another group of professionals who are active in this area, imposed zero fines, despite finding that two out of three of the firms it is responsible for supervising were non-compliant with AML regulations in 2019-20. To use another example, the Law Society of Northern Ireland imposed just one fine—of £1,750—in the year 2019-2020, despite it finding 228 cases of non-compliance. That is a considerable body of evidence, if I may say so, that shows that the current system is broken and not fit for purpose.

The Chartered Institute of Taxation, a group I work with a lot, found that a third of the firms visited were non-compliant, but only four firms were disciplined for failure to provide renewal forms by the required deadline and fined for failure to submit appropriate criminality check certificates or to deal with the action points that had been raised with them in the review by CIOT of their AML procedures. In three of the four disciplinary cases by CIOT, a financial penalty was imposed, and only in the fourth was the member suspended.

I know that the Government are looking at the supervisory framework but, as is the way with Governments, that could take forever. We want to implement these reforms swiftly, so we must have some assurance and confidence, particularly because of the outsourcing of the checks on individual companies, that the professionals will seek out the miscreants in their profession. We cannot wait for the review, to put it bluntly. With these measures, we have taken the least of all the options the Government have put forward and proposed it for legislation. If the Government, on reflection, want to come back with a tougher regime, that is fine, but at least we would have the minimum in place as we enact the legislation and the reform of Companies House. Our new clause says, “Action now. Toughen up the powers and duties of OPBAS—introduce greater transparency into the system, and comeback if that is needed.” We are suggesting new powers and duties for OPBAS. The power is

“to impose…financial penalties on Professional Body Supervisors that fail to…adopt an effective risk-based approach to anti-money laundering supervision…impose proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance…and…separate their advocacy and regulatory functions.”

This is minimal, sensible and desperately needed now if we are to go ahead, with the speed that we all want, with the implementation of the legislation.

[Seema Malhotra]

I do not propose to spend much time speaking in support of the new clauses. The arguments made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking have broadly said it all. She highlighted the high levels of non-compliance, the very low levels of fines and disciplinary measures, and the frustration of the sectors in terms of tools to really root out the rogue players who need action taken against them. The new clauses would be very effective and are much needed, for the reasons outlined—in trying to get action now, toughening up powers and providing greater transparency. For the reasons that I have outlined, I totally agree that the Bill is the right place for these measures. We should not have to wait and wait and wait for what is likely to come and will almost certainly draw the same conclusions.

New clause 44 would have the effect of amending the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 such that the commissioners would be responsible for anti-money laundering supervision, and it states:

“The Commissioners shall treat the function in subsection (1) as a priority”.

New clause 72 would introduce provisions requiring the Secretary of State, by regulations, to set out a further power and duty for the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision. This is defined as

“the power to impose unlimited financial penalties on Professional Body Supervisors that fail”—

that fail—

“to…adopt an effective risk-based approach to anti-money laundering supervision…impose proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance with anti-money laundering requirements …and …separate their advocacy and regulatory functions.”

We want stronger action taken against economic crime, not least because we know the scale at which it comes through the cracks, with the damage that it does to our economy. It seems to me that tightening up the roles and the performance of professional body supervisors and HMRC in some way is an opportunity that we should not miss.

The proposed clause would also insert a duty

“to publish the details of any sanctions imposed on Professional Body Supervisors, and…reviews of Professional Body Supervisors with data disaggregated by body rather than by sector.”

The sum of the two new clauses is to ensure the urgent improvement of the UK’s anti-money laundering sector. Throughout our witness sessions and Committee debates, we have heard about the lack of effectiveness of our AML system. I think that is a view also supported by the Minister. The changes are a much-needed strengthening and safeguarding against potentially rogue corporate service providers, the third parties who act on behalf of companies and can carry out the identity verification of directors.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Fifteenth sitting)

Debate between Margaret Hodge and Seema Malhotra

Committee stage
Tuesday 22nd November 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Seema Malhotra]

I think that there was a slight misunderstanding, but we will move on.

Clause 158 confers on the Secretary of State a regulation-making power to make consequential amendments that arise from the Bill. I want to raise a general point: the Minister did speak to this, but perhaps he could say a little more about examples of where the Secretary of State might need to use the power. Perhaps it is written somewhere, but I am not fully clear whether any changes that come through secondary legislation to the Act itself—I think that is a Henry VIII power in this clause—would be taken through the affirmative procedure.

It has been a general theme of debate though our proceedings that we need to make sure that there is sufficient provision for the transparency, scrutiny and accountability of changes, as well as for accountability of the Secretary of State’s use of powers for the reporting that there should be on how well the provisions are working. The power to make consequential amendments comes at the end of the Bill in clause 158, but it is a Henry VIII power that means that amendments to primary legislation can be made. That is different from the power to make regulations under secondary legislation, which we have been debating.

The Government have said that the power is needed to ensure that other provisions on the statute book properly reflect and refer to provisions in the Bill once it is enacted. I want to be clear about what the scope of the use of this power would be, how it is intended and how it would be reported on. Would an affirmative or negative procedure be used to make any changes under this clause?

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

We have raised a number of amendments to the Bill during the course of consideration in Committee, many of which I consider to be technical and things that would improve the processes. All those amendments so far have been rejected. I wonder whether, rather than bringing us back at a later stage as the clause proposes, the Minister would undertake, together with his ministerial colleague, to look again at some of those amendments, which are really just practical, pragmatic amendments, with a view to bringing them back. Would he bring them back on Report?

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Debate between Margaret Hodge and Seema Malhotra

Committee stage
Tuesday 15th November 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

That was a very useful contribution, and I thank the Minister. Through these new clauses we are simply trying to strengthen transparency so we know who is behind the corporates structures. Before the Minister was in his post, the Government themselves cited in their White Paper on corporate transparency three massive scandals: the Azeri scandal, Danske Bank and the Moldova bank fraud. All of those involved limited partnerships or limited liability partnerships, which have the features of a corporate entity acting as a partner and were located offshore in one of the secrecy jurisdictions. We are trying to get at that with these new clauses. If we have not got them quite right, I look forward to the Minister coming forward with other propositions.

It is the opaque corporate structures that hide the true identity of the individual who owns or controls a company. That is a classic way that bad people hide their dirty money. This is not an exception—I know that the Minister likes to sometimes say that, but the recent Transparency International analysis of limited liability partnerships found that one in 10 had the identical characteristics to entities that are involved in serious financial crime. That is quite high, and just another red flag. These companies were a newly formed identity, entered immediately into deals and laundered the money or were suspected of laundering the money. Very shortly after the wrongdoing, they closed the company. An awful lot of times I have come across companies with no financial history. They never submit any accounts to HMRC and claim that they have no assets in the accounts. A company might be using nominees and secret offshore jurisdictions, which we have talked about.

The other interesting thing in the Transparency International evidence, which the Minister might want to reflect on, is that out of the 1,532 companies that they looked at, 94% had at least one corporate partner with a registered address in one of 21 high-risk jurisdictions—the BVI, Belize and so on. I like to have these little stories to tell: there is the bottle laundromat that the Minister will know well, which ended up with £750 million being laundered out of Russia, stolen from the Russian people between 2014 and 2016. Some 130 companies were used. They falsified sales to Russia of bottle-making machines. They never really produced the machines, but in paying for them, they got the money out of Russia. There were three UK LLPs, all of which had two or more offshore corporate partners from one or more high-risk jurisdictions behind them.

This is not an insubstantial problem: it is a big problem. These are not just exceptional occurrences; they occur with too much frequency. What we are trying to do here is not a silver bullet, but we think it is part of the jigsaw that needs to be put together to improve transparency and therefore make things more difficult for people who engage in money laundering and other crime and for people to hide who they are. We are just saying that one natural person should be listed on the board. I am a bit unclear as to whether our proposal would actually achieve that or whether there are other ways of getting to the same objective, one that I think we probably share. I do not know why—I find it a bit odd—we in the UK are offering UK legal protection and privileges, things like limited liability or the rule of law, and sort of by accident we are offering anonymity to people offshore who are not in the least bit troubled by UK law, because they are completely beyond its reach. It seems to me that the current structure enables that to happen.

The new clauses would ensure that partners or members could no longer hide behind offshore corporate partners and members without a named individual being on the line for—held to account for—any wrongdoing. We will still, I know, get nominee directors. Trust and company service providers will still put themselves forward as the named people, or people working in TCSPs will still do it. But I think that this proposal would help with raising red flags and enabling Companies House to focus its activity on those areas where there is the greatest danger.

[Seema Malhotra]

It is a pleasure to speak to these measures. We have had quite an extensive debate, so I will make just some limited remarks on clause 107 and new clauses 57 and 58. Clause 107 is a very important clause, inserting a requirement on registration for confirmation that a limited partnership’s proposed general partners are not disqualified under the director’s disqualification regime. It also inserts, under proposed new section 8J, a new duty to take steps to remove a general partner who is disqualified. If general partners fail to do that, they will be liable to an offence.

Those requirements are extremely important. I think that some of the debate is just on where some measures perhaps do not go far enough. In summary, we support the arguments made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking on new clauses 57 and 58.

I want to read out another contribution from Professor Berry. I think it is important to keep these contributions on the record in our discussions—recognising as well some of what the Minister has said. As Professor Berry set out in her written evidence to the Committee about the issue of corporate directors, ascertaining an individual acting as a director through a body corporate is certainly more opaque than if the director is just a natural person. The situation is very confusing, but I will read out what the professor said. She stated that

“the concept is demonstrably open to abuse, a ban”

on corporate directors

“was originally proposed in the interests of accountability and transparency, and a legal entity is incapable itself of carrying out the functions or duties of a director…Not only are corporate partners/LLP members a significant feature of wrongdoing…the attempts in the Bill to trace an individual somewhere behind them are so complex as to be unworkable in practice…impossible in practice for CH to check, and an obvious route for obfuscation by wrongdoers. E.g the concept of a named officer or of a managing officer of a corporate partner (and presumably of an LLP member), compounded by the fact that a named officer’s residential address can be redacted and they need not supply a service address.”

As the Minister reflects on our discussions and how we move forward, he should bear in mind the concerns raised by Professor Berry. Whatever is brought forward by the Government—however they have reconsidered it, and tested what it will do and mean in practice—does it pass the Professor Berry test, and meet the challenges that have been put to us regarding the legislation and what could otherwise slip through the net?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

That sounds like a good idea, but HMRC is absolutely hopeless at using such powers. Time and again with these limited partnerships where scandals have emerged, it appears companies have told HMRC that they are dormant. They have not submitted accounts, and HMRC never checks up on them. What steps will the Minister take to make sure that those useful powers are used?

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank my right hon. Friend for her remarks. The clause is extremely important for HMRC, providing clarity around accounts and accounting information and what tax should be due. It gives HMRC powers to request information and inserts a new section into the Limited Partnerships Act 1907 to create a new power for the Secretary of State to make regulations that require general partners to prepare accounts and, on request, make accounting information available to HMRC.

We very much support the measure. We want enhanced powers for HMRC to help with the detection and prevention of economic crime, and indeed the paying of rightful tax through better accounting information and submission of tax returns. I support the question that my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking asked about how we can ensure that HMRC uses the powers in a useful way.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Tenth sitting)

Debate between Margaret Hodge and Seema Malhotra

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th November 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his remarks, and wish to speak to this group on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon as well. I must say that these provisions are not easy to follow, so forgive me for feeling like I will need to reread Hansard in a darkened room in order to completely follow what the Minister has said.

[Dame Margaret Hodge (Barking) (Lab)]

I do not think any of us understood a word of that. It would be really nice if the Minister could explain it in black and white, because I just could not get what that was getting at at all.

[Seema Malhotra]

I give way to the Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

Perhaps the Minister could also explain how that is different from what we agreed last week.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank my right hon. Friend for her question, which the Minister may wish to answer before I continue my remarks.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Margaret Hodge and Seema Malhotra

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th November 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his intervention. The issue is not what we assume and hope might happen, but having some checks and balances on the use of powers. It is part of our responsibility on the Committee to think that through.

[Dame Margaret Hodge (Barking) (Lab)]

That is always the case. Perhaps the Minister will reflect that Usmanov was a case in point. He exploited an exemption to hide some of the information around his ownership. It is worth all of us reflecting on that. Obviously the provision has to be there for good people, but it may become yet another opportunity for bad people. The Usmanov case was a classic one. I think Fedotov was another, if my memory serves me right. Apologies if I have this wrong, but Fedotov was another one who managed to get an exemption in some way. If these things are not done properly, and are not then properly monitored, they can go wrong.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank my right hon. Friend for highlighting an important case in point.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his intervention.

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

I think the Minister is right about Usmanov, but on Fedotov I think it was something different. I cannot quite remember the details, but he managed to use an exemption to hide his identity. We raised it last week, and I think that officials were going to come back with a response. They may not have had time to read the letter yet, but that is more the case that one would think of.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

That would be welcome. New clause 18 grants the Secretary of State the power to make regulations as they see fit, in order to protect material on the register. Further scrutiny will be required on what could happen in future, and the circumstances in which that power might be needed.

The perception may have been that we had opposing positions on some aspects of the Secretary of State’s powers, but we now find ourselves coming a little closer together. We are debating the Bill, which largely has cross-party support, in good faith, but there are many little ways in which things could get changed, without those changes being subject to full debate in the House. It is important that we debate that further during proceedings on the Bill. I repeat that I want to ensure that there is no devil in the detail. I appreciate the Minister committing to return to the issue in part 3, when we will have a chance to look at the matter in slightly more detail.

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

There was a report in The Guardian yesterday on an organisation called Wealth Chain Project. Its analysis showed that 138,000 residential and commercial properties in England and Wales are owned by offshore companies. We have managed to get 3,000 so far, so there is a heck of a lot—

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Margaret Hodge and Seema Malhotra

Committee stage
Tuesday 1st November 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Seema Malhotra]

My right hon. Friend will want to speak to her own amendment, but I will lay out a few comments. She is right that we need Companies House to become a more active agent in our efforts to combat economic crime as a result of the Bill—I am sure the Minister will agree that we do not want an economic crime Bill No. 3 in the House, and nor do we have the time for delay in sharpening our response and defences against economic crime.

In evidence given to the Committee, Thom Townsend from Open Ownership stated that the clause—or the important objectives laid out in it—

“seems like a ridiculously low bar.”––[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 25 October 2022; c. 63, Q136.]

He is absolutely right. I am sure that all Members listening to that evidence agreed. My right hon. Friend will speak to her own amendment, but we very much support it, because this House needs to send a clear message about our expectation of a proactive role for the registrar—not just a reactive role.

Why is it so important to do so now? As Companies House now begins its transformation to reform its systems, processes and capabilities, part of that will be about its culture, and in line with what this House will expect, the proceedings of this House and this Committee will be important in sending that message. It is our job to ensure that the objectives and powers are very clearly laid out in legislation, so that there is no confusion over our expectations.

The fifth objective in the amendment would raise the “ridiculously low bar” of the first four objectives, as stated by Thom Townsend, from minimising risk to proactively identifying suspected uses of the register for criminal purposes and acting accordingly. As the Secretary of State herself stated on Second Reading:

“We want to ensure that there are more restrictions on who can register with Companies House so that we prevent the abuse of the regime.”—[Official Report, 13 October 2022; Vol. 720, c. 285.]

But I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking will want to speak to her own notes on this. Thank you, Mr Robertson, for giving me the opportunity to do so.

[Dame Margaret Hodge (Barking) (Lab)]

Sincere apologies for being late, Mr Robertson. I want to start by welcoming the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton, to his role. I have worked very closely with him over the past few years, and it is great to see somebody who understands the issues sitting in his seat. I hope that we can have very positive engagement with him while considering the Bill.

Like the hon. Gentleman, I welcome the reforms. The amendments that we have tabled, including this amendment, are all designed to improve the quality of the legislation that we pass. I hope that they will be taken in that spirit. Having been a Minister in my time, I am very aware of the fact that when amendments are tabled by hon. Members, whether they are on the Opposition or the Government Benches, there tends to be a mood of “reject” from the officials advising the Minister. I simply say to him that many of the amendments that we are putting forward, like this one, are really there to improve the Bill. They are not about trying to raise contentious issues. Perhaps as we proceed, we will come across more contentious issues, but this amendment is not contentious; it is simply to secure an improvement. It is not party political, and I think it reflects common sense. I hope that the Minister will feel able to accept this particular amendment.

Why have we tabled the amendment? I draw the Minister’s attention to the Government’s own factsheet on the Bill, which states that broadening the powers of the registrar of Companies House is designed—that is my word—so that the registrar can become a “more active” gatekeeper over company creation and a custodian of more reliable data. Companies House itself has six strategic goals, one of which is to combat economic crime through active use of analysis and intelligence. We have there a commitment from Government and from the organisation itself that it should take a proactive role in using the information that it has.

Our amendment would embed in legislation the Government’s intent and the organisation’s goals. It would ensure that that intent and the goals were on the statute book and therefore implemented in the future. Too often, as the Minister knows, we have organisations and bodies that have powers but simply do not use them. We can think of His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and its oversight of company service providers as just one example of where there is a power but, without emphasis on that duty in legislation, it tends to get ignored. The aim of our amendment is just to ensure that what is a power becomes a strong duty.

Why does that matter? Companies House holds a massive amount of data: information about 4.5 million companies, with more than 800,000 new companies incorporated each year and more than 10 million documents filed annually. That data is full of red flags that should be proactively investigated to ensure that we really bear down on economic crime. We want to pursue the wrongdoers, and if we get that stronger investigation and it is known that Companies House does use its proactive powers, that is a good preventive measure because it is much less likely that the ne’er-do-goods will indulge in bad practice.

Let us look at the sort of stuff that has come out so far. There are endless examples: five beneficial owners control over 6,000 companies—a massive red flag. They are clearly not the real beneficial owners. Four thousand beneficial owners are under two years’ old, including one who is not born yet. The company Atlas Integrate Services LLP was registered in September this year. The person of significant control in that company is just two months’ old. In her two months of life, she has not just found time to start a business but apparently has got married, as she is listed as “Mrs” in the register.

We know from all the leaks how Companies House and our UK corporate structures are used and abused by bad people. I take just one example from the FinCEN files: 3,267 of the LLPs and the LPs were holders of bank accounts that involved suspicious transactions—British corporate structures. Of those 3,267 British corporations, 1,656—over half—were created by just four agencies. Nine agencies created more than 100 UK entities. One agency created 646 limited liability partnerships and limited partnerships. Those are examples of strong red flags that suggest malpractice.

It is not just the perpetrators who benefit but the victims who suffer, as the Minister knows. The only successful prosecution in this space is that of Kevin Brewer—the Minister will probably remember the case. This was a man in his 60s who deliberately set about showing the flaws in the system in Companies House. He set up a company called John Vincent Cable Services Ltd, when Vince Cable ran the Department that the Minister is now in. He did that in 2013. He then wrote to Vince Cable to tell him what he had done.

In 2016, he used the names of James Cleverly and Baroness Neville-Rolfe to set up another company. Again, he wrote to them. All he was doing with drawing attention to what was wrong with the system, but he was prosecuted. The Government proclaimed that prosecution as a great victory of how Companies House is vigilant over the quality of the data. Nothing could be more wrong. I think the Minister will agree that, in effect, he was a whistleblower. He was treated abominably by the authorities. That throws into stark relief the lack of action taken against others responsible for setting up bogus companies.

I urge the Minister to accept the amendment. It is common sense. It simply ensures that there is a strong duty on Companies House to use that wealth of data to investigate, proactively raise red flags and talk to the enforcement agencies. I hope that he sees the amendment as something that adds to the value of the Bill.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Margaret Hodge and Seema Malhotra

Committee stage
Thursday 27th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

Q Would you go down to zero—all shareholding data?

Chris Taggart: Yes. With shareholders, we ultimately need to get to a statement of fact—an authoritative record—so that what Companies House says is actually what the courts agree are the shareholders, and people cannot say, “We will move the shares, and then we will tell Companies House,” or, “We forgot to tell Companies House.” That will take work and time. We can extend the verification provisions for directors and PSCs to shareholders, at least over a de minimis amount, but ultimately we need to make Companies House the authoritative record of shareholding, so you are only a shareholder if you are on Companies House.

Elspeth Berry: On your question about dissolution, for limited partnerships it is a different issue because they are not an entity and you can still go after the partners, but of course that is why corporate partners are such a problem. Entities were a problem in Scotland some years ago. I am sure your Scottish colleagues can tell you more than I can about how that was dealt with after a fairly horrific criminal incident involving a lot of deaths. It was not possible to prosecute the partnership after it had dissolved. That is a problem with legal entity status, which is a whole big issue.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q I have a couple of specific questions. First, do you think there should be any sort of limit on the number of companies or partnerships registered at one address? Secondly, should there be any sort of limit—perhaps one beyond which there needs to be an application to increase, under specific criteria— on the number of directorships that any one director can hold?

Chris Taggart: On the latter question first, I have been a director for some 20 years. The first time, someone sat me down and said, “This is what’s involved in being a director.” You think, “Wow, that’s kind of scary.” You have a fiduciary duty and you have to understand the company. If you are a director of 200 companies, I fail to see how you can perform that fiduciary duty, or those companies are, in some ways, just legal entities for some conduits for something. They are not actually in business; they are just conduits. I struggle when someone is a director of 200 companies: either those are just legal entities for some purpose other than as a normal company or they are not doing their job. It seems to me obvious that there is a challenge there. Whether that is a limit or whether that is actually holding directors much more personally liable for the wrongdoing of the companies, I do not know, but I think that there is something. There seems to be a contradiction there, fundamentally.

Elspeth Berry: I agree. I would have supported a cap on the number of directorships for exactly those reasons, in that I do not think a director can fulfil their duties if they have a lot of companies. However, if you are not going to have that, that certainly has to be a red flag for Companies House. It has to be a thing they will investigate and that they have the resources to investigate, which comes back to the problems that we identified earlier.

On the addresses, if you have a company service provider giving their address, it is quite possible you will have multiples and that might be okay if that is their business, they are doing it properly, they are AML regulated and all the rest of it. The problem is that we have seen in recent years that they are not. Again, that ought to be a red flag. In the limited partnership proposals, where you are trying to establish some real connection, economic or otherwise, with a particular jurisdiction within the UK or, at least, with the UK, that is one of the problems. One of the options on the list—they are all problematic—I personally thought that the principal place of business might be quite a good one, showing an actual connection, but I have been corrected in my beliefs by my journalist colleagues who say that almost all the wrongdoers were able to tick that box. I think it is a problem if you are saying that as long as somebody will pick up the mail here, that is okay. Again, that needs to be a red flag.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Margaret Hodge and Seema Malhotra

Tuesday 25th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

Q The other brake on pursuing the bad people is the fear of failure, and therefore the burden of costs on the public purse. Would you like to see the cost capping that has been introduced on unexplained wealth orders extended here, or do you have other ideas about how we can try to make that brake less solid?

Michelle Crotty: The SFO would like to see those. We understand the concerns that other parts of the system have in terms of how you ringfence a cost regime just for economic crime. In terms of what the SFO can recover in any one year, we can retain £900,000 of legal costs if we win. Clearly, it is the other way if we lose, and there are ongoing discussions with the Treasury. I gave evidence to another Committee last week that, where we do not have a fund available to us for that that sits within our budget, we have to go and negotiate one with the Treasury if we lose. We would certainly welcome some protections, but we understand the challenges around fitting them into the broader scheme.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q I want to come back to some comments made by DCI Welch, which were very instructive on the challenges—we have heard it in some of the data as well. I think you referred to criminals not putting assets in their own names, thereby making them harder to find and seize. Do you think that the Bill gives sufficient powers for tackling fraud, especially through the use of fraudulent names and addresses? If not, what else needs to be done to help you all do your work more effectively, but is missing from the Bill?

Simon Welch: Obviously, we are putting more resource into this area. If we are to go after them proactively, we are building up our intelligence around this. Historically, fraud has not been given the same emphasis as other types of criminality, so I think we lack in some areas. If we start to build that up, to get more intelligence that is actionable for us to work on, and to go after some of these people proactively as opposed to reactively, we will be getting ahead of the game, and then we will be able to arrest these people and prevent other people from becoming victims. It is important to invest in this area. It is a difficult time for us, because recruitment and retention of staff are challenging. We are looking to build, and are getting investment streams coming into us. We are looking to develop that all across the piece. We are looking at the intelligence and at the proactive capability and the investigative capability to take this on.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Thank you both for taking the time to give evidence today. I have a broad question for you, because the contributions that you have already made and that I think we will hear from you will really enrich our discussions. Obviously the Bill makes progress on improving law enforcement bodies’ ability to identify fraudulent and criminal activity in our economy, but in the light of what you have just said, Mr Browder—on the lack of action that we have actually taken on the Magnitsky issue—where do we need to go further in identifying criminal activity and economic crime, and in seizing those assets? What can we learn from other countries about things that you say the UK does not do well, and where can the Bill be improved?

Bill Browder: Thank you. This is the crux of the whole issue. By the way, it was not just Magnitsky money that was not investigated. We have this problem; since Vladimir Putin has come to power, he and 1,000 people around him have stolen $1 trillion from the Russian people. This has been the largest destination of Russian money laundering. In 22 years since he has come to power, not a single money laundering prosecution has come out of Russia—not one—and we are talking about $1 trillion.

What is going on here? What I have learned is that the law enforcement agencies effectively refuse to open criminal cases unless they are 100% sure that they can win without any tough fight on the other side. Why are they so risk averse in opening cases? It comes down to simple risk-reward for them. Their budgets are very thin, as law enforcement does not have a lot of money, and when they go to court here on any type of civil case—it is not true in a murder case, but it is true in a civil case—if they lose at any point, not just at the end of the case, but at any point procedurally during the case, the loser has to pay the winner’s court fees, and there is no budget for that. Therefore, the UK law enforcement agencies will not take that risk.

I have seen it done differently. We presented the United States Department of Justice with the same information. They do not have that problem; they can open a case, conduct an investigation and build their case as they are doing their investigation, and if they lose, nobody loses their job, nobody is bankrupted, and no departments have to go back and beg for more money from the Government. Whatever money they have spent on their lawyers is the money they have spent.

What has to happen here—this is plain as day—is that you have to get rid of this adverse costs issue in a civil case brought by the Government. You could easily write an amendment to the law as it is written, because it is not here right now, to say that if the Crown Prosecution Service brings a money laundering case or an economic crime case, there are no adverse costs. If you make that point, it will change the whole dynamic—the whole risk-reward—for these people.

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

Q You talked about civil cases, Bill, and I think we should publicly recognise the contribution that Bill Browder and Oliver have made in this space—it is brilliant. You talked about civil cases but say, fingers crossed, we get a criminal offence for failure to prevent, what would you do in those cases to ensure that costs do not act as a brake on the enforcement agencies taking action?

Bill Browder: The same thing.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Margaret Hodge and Seema Malhotra

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

Q And that is really hard.

Andy Gould: Yes.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q I want to follow up on what you were saying about how you can follow the flows, but you do not always know who is sending and who is receiving. I want to understand a bit more about crypto accounts. I understand that you do not need an account in order to make a transaction, but if you do have an account you can see who is making transactions. Is there more that can—or needs to—be done to say that everybody must have an account? Is that practical and how could it happen? Secondly, what is the current level of identification and verification checks when setting up a crypto account, and what level should there be?

Andy Gould: The average member of the public using cryptocurrency will probably be using an account through one of the legitimate exchanges. They will go through the whole “know your customer” process that they would go through for a bank. Regulation pretty much covers that; I think we are in a good place with it. It is the criminal exchanges and criminal service providers that regulation would not affect. You would not be able to build an infrastructure that stops them being able to create their own wallets, as you could for those accounts with what are effectively crypto banks.

Arianna Trozze: There has been research that some of the KYC processes, especially in some of the higher-risk exchanges, are quite easy to fool with fake documents and other such things. There are companies serving UK customers that are still not registered with the FCA and do not meet its KYC or AML requirements, despite its best efforts. For example, none of the Bitcoin ATMs operating in the UK is registered with the FCA, even though they are supposed to be, and they tend to have quite lax KYC requirements. They may require you to put in a phone number. Some of them have more requirements, but whether it is a rigorous process remains in question.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Q I will be brief in asking this question, and then I have to leave. Do you think the NCA has sufficient resources to make use of the new recovery powers in the Bill, and do those powers go far enough?

Jonathan Hall: I do not know about the resources of the NCA, but in terms of whether the powers go far enough, I think there are some areas where they perhaps go too far, or at least where I think, from a fundamental rights and individual rights perspective, some attention may need to be drawn. There is the simple question whether you should be able to seize cryptoassets on the basis of the fact that they might be used by terrorists. Of course you should. Then you have the complicated question of how you bring about a seizure regime where assets are not physical. It is one thing if you seize a jewel or some cash, but it is another thing if you are effectively seizing information. What you have here is a very lengthy set of provisions to allow you to do that.

Generally speaking, I think it works, but there are one or two areas I want to draw to your attention. The first, which I think is acceptable but worth thinking about, is that the power is a power to seize not just cryptoassets but crypto-related items. In practice, you are not seizing a thing; you are seizing a code and that can be written down on a bit of paper or on a computer. What these provisions do, unlike all the other seizure powers that say you can seize the jewel, the cash or the contents of a bank account, is that they allow the police to seize any item, which could be a computer, or a piece of paper. So, it is quite a wide seizure power. I think it is kept effectively within bounds, but it is something that is worth drawing attention to, which is different from other aspects of seizure in this field.

The next point is that you have to be able to convert crypto and there are several reasons for that; one is because the prices may go massively up or down. Individuals whose assets are the subject of seizures may never be prosecuted—and this is a civil remedy—and, in fact, no final application for forfeiture may ever be brought. That is particularly true in the context of terrorism, because often what counter-terrorism police will want to do is disrupt the transfer, but they will not necessarily want to go on and apply to forfeit. The figures from last year show that there is a disparity between the number of accounts that are frozen and the amount of money that is finally the subject of forfeiture.

The Government did listen to my views on this issue. It is important that the Bill has provisions such that both the police can apply to convert the cryptocurrency into, say, pounds sterling, and that it is also open to the individual from whom it is seized, who might say, “Look, I bought this crypto. It’s gone massively up in value. You’re never going to apply to forfeit this. I don’t want to lose out on the rise of value.” There is provision in the Bill for the individual to go to court and say, “I’m a person from whom the crypto has been seized. Please can you convert it?” That will be decided by the court, but it is good that that provision is in the Bill; I think it works.

Is this too boring and long? I mean, there is a third bit, which I think is the most difficult bit. It is the power of a magistrates court to require a UK-connected wallet provider to freeze the cryptoassets and, even more significantly, to require that the UK-connected crypto wallet provider should actually pay the money over to the court. It is slightly in the weeds, but what the Government have done—and I understand it—is to try to be quite novel. They are really trying to push the law here, because they realise that many of crypto wallet providers will not be based in the UK, but this comes with a consequence regarding how the Bill is currently worded. I will just give you the bit that I think may need a bit of attention; it is clause 10Z7B—

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

Q Can you give that again?

Jonathan Hall: Yes, I will. It is clause 10Z7B(7).

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Margaret Hodge and Seema Malhotra

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

Q The other brake on pursuing the bad people is the fear of failure, and therefore the burden of costs on the public purse. Would you like to see the cost capping that has been introduced on unexplained wealth orders extended here, or do you have other ideas about how we can try to make that brake less solid?

Michelle Crotty: The SFO would like to see those. We understand the concerns that other parts of the system have in terms of how you ringfence a cost regime just for economic crime. In terms of what the SFO can recover in any one year, we can retain £900,000 of legal costs if we win. Clearly, it is the other way if we lose, and there are ongoing discussions with the Treasury. I gave evidence to another Committee last week that, where we do not have a fund available to us for that that sits within our budget, we have to go and negotiate one with the Treasury if we lose. We would certainly welcome some protections, but we understand the challenges around fitting them into the broader scheme.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q I want to come back to some comments made by DCI Welch, which were very instructive on the challenges—we have heard it in some of the data as well. I think you referred to criminals not putting assets in their own names, thereby making them harder to find and seize. Do you think that the Bill gives sufficient powers for tackling fraud, especially through the use of fraudulent names and addresses? If not, what else needs to be done to help you all do your work more effectively, but is missing from the Bill?

Simon Welch: Obviously, we are putting more resource into this area. If we are to go after them proactively, we are building up our intelligence around this. Historically, fraud has not been given the same emphasis as other types of criminality, so I think we lack in some areas. If we start to build that up, to get more intelligence that is actionable for us to work on, and to go after some of these people proactively as opposed to reactively, we will be getting ahead of the game, and then we will be able to arrest these people and prevent other people from becoming victims. It is important to invest in this area. It is a difficult time for us, because recruitment and retention of staff are challenging. We are looking to build, and are getting investment streams coming into us. We are looking to develop that all across the piece. We are looking at the intelligence and at the proactive capability and the investigative capability to take this on.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Thank you both for taking the time to give evidence today. I have a broad question for you, because the contributions that you have already made and that I think we will hear from you will really enrich our discussions. Obviously the Bill makes progress on improving law enforcement bodies’ ability to identify fraudulent and criminal activity in our economy, but in the light of what you have just said, Mr Browder—on the lack of action that we have actually taken on the Magnitsky issue—where do we need to go further in identifying criminal activity and economic crime, and in seizing those assets? What can we learn from other countries about things that you say the UK does not do well, and where can the Bill be improved?

Bill Browder: Thank you. This is the crux of the whole issue. By the way, it was not just Magnitsky money that was not investigated. We have this problem; since Vladimir Putin has come to power, he and 1,000 people around him have stolen $1 trillion from the Russian people. This has been the largest destination of Russian money laundering. In 22 years since he has come to power, not a single money laundering prosecution has come out of Russia—not one—and we are talking about $1 trillion.

What is going on here? What I have learned is that the law enforcement agencies effectively refuse to open criminal cases unless they are 100% sure that they can win without any tough fight on the other side. Why are they so risk averse in opening cases? It comes down to simple risk-reward for them. Their budgets are very thin, as law enforcement does not have a lot of money, and when they go to court here on any type of civil case—it is not true in a murder case, but it is true in a civil case—if they lose at any point, not just at the end of the case, but at any point procedurally during the case, the loser has to pay the winner’s court fees, and there is no budget for that. Therefore, the UK law enforcement agencies will not take that risk.

I have seen it done differently. We presented the United States Department of Justice with the same information. They do not have that problem; they can open a case, conduct an investigation and build their case as they are doing their investigation, and if they lose, nobody loses their job, nobody is bankrupted, and no departments have to go back and beg for more money from the Government. Whatever money they have spent on their lawyers is the money they have spent.

What has to happen here—this is plain as day—is that you have to get rid of this adverse costs issue in a civil case brought by the Government. You could easily write an amendment to the law as it is written, because it is not here right now, to say that if the Crown Prosecution Service brings a money laundering case or an economic crime case, there are no adverse costs. If you make that point, it will change the whole dynamic—the whole risk-reward—for these people.

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

Q You talked about civil cases, Bill, and I think we should publicly recognise the contribution that Bill Browder and Oliver have made in this space—it is brilliant. You talked about civil cases but say, fingers crossed, we get a criminal offence for failure to prevent, what would you do in those cases to ensure that costs do not act as a brake on the enforcement agencies taking action?

Bill Browder: The same thing.