Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Eighteenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Hodge of Barking
Main Page: Baroness Hodge of Barking (Labour - Life peer)(1 year, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesMy right hon. Friend may well wish to do so.
I think that any member of this Committee will understand what I mean when I refer to certain “usual suspects” in cases involving financial dealings that, even with the most charitable interpretation, can only be described as being questionable at best.
The language that was ultimately added to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 reflected a recognition from Members of all parties and in both Houses that the same standards requiring open, publicly accessible registers of beneficial ownership should apply to both the UK and its overseas territories. It also reflected the widespread consensus that if we wanted to ensure that the overseas territories played by the same standards, we should be prepared to use sticks as well as carrots.
The result of that consensus was the provision in section 51 of the 2018 Act that any overseas territory that had not established a beneficial ownership registry in line with the standards of our own by the end of 2020 should be subject to direct legislation by an Order in Council. As I have already mentioned, the Government practically had to be dragged kicking and screaming to the point where they accepted that provision in the first place. However, as subsequent events have demonstrated, the real problem is that Ministers have interpreted section 51 of the Act so creatively that in effect they have completely undermined if not the letter then certainly the spirit of the law.
It seemed clear to those who pushed for section 51 of the 2018 Act that what it required was for beneficial ownership registries to be in place by the end of 2020, whether as a result of the overseas territories’ own legislation or an Order in Council. According to the spin the Government chose to put on it, its obligation had been met simply by the publication of a draft Order in Council, regardless of when, or even whether, such an order might actually come into force. The result is that we are here yet again—almost five years later—still discussing how to ensure the implementation of registers to the same standards across all of the UK’s territories. Surely it should not be beyond the wit of Ministers—even in this Government—to have sorted this out by now—[Interruption.] I am just checking that hon. Members are still awake on the Back Benches.
I am certainly not arguing against the spirit of the new clause. I add my thanks to the right hon. Member for Barking and, indeed, my right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell), who took great action on this matter way before I became interested in the whole subject—although it is true to say that I took an active interest from the Back Benches on ensuring that we address this issue.
I do not accept the hon. Gentleman’s characterisation of our approach as being hands off. I do not consider 250 pages of legislation as being hands off at all. There is much we want to do and agree on, and I have to agree with what I said previously. The hon. Member for Aberavon may regard me as poacher turned gamekeeper, but I do not see that at all. I still want to ensure these measures are in place. In fact, we should go further than his new clause, and I will explain that in a second.
When amendments were tabled to the Bill that became the 2018 Act several years ago, we were clearly in a very different place. All inhabited overseas territories have now committed to introducing publicly accessible registers of company beneficial ownership, and the UK Government expect them to be in place by the end of 2023, so there is a deadline on which the order could be placed. As well as overseas territories, we have committed to asking the Crown dependencies to also do that, and that does not feature in the hon. Gentleman’s new clause, so it is important that this goes further than he set out.
The Minister is correct in what he says, but could he deny the rumour I have heard, which is that they are trying to get around ensuring public accountability by charging anybody who wishes to look at the register by entry? If a charge is levied for entry to everything that appears on the register, that would diminish the intended public accountability.
I am not aware of that. Clearly, it is important that the overseas territories and Crown dependencies respect the will of Parliament and the spirit of the will of Parliament, so we would be very concerned if that is the case.
I have raised this issue with the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield, who now sits in the Foreign Office, but I do not think it is entirely within his portfolio. Will the Minister agree to pursue the issue? If that is the way they have tried to avoid or play down the intent of Parliament, it is a very serious matter.
I do not think we should operate on the basis of rumours, but I hope that the overseas territories and Crown dependencies will be following this debate with interest. We want them to follow both the spirit and the letter of the legislation that is implemented. The information should be publicly available—that is the clear intention.
This is a major commitment that will put the overseas territories and Crown dependencies ahead of most jurisdictions, and it will be a vital element of promoting greater transparency around the control and ownership of companies. I have sought assurances that it is not a hollow commitment. The FCDO is providing support to the overseas territories through Open Ownership, a respected and expert NGO, to ensure that each territory can progress its publicly accessible registers, and significant progress has been made. For example, Gibraltar’s register is already live, so it will be interesting to hear about the right hon. Lady’s experiences of that.
The Minister has jogged my memory. It was actually from the implementation of the Gibraltar register that I heard that, although it is live, there is a charge for accessing information.
That may be something that the right hon. Lady will investigate. I am happy to make the commitment that we will do so as well.
The Cayman Islands has completed a consultation on the approach to its register, and the technical work to hit the target date is under way. The BVI recently passed primary legislation to enable the framework for regulations to be made for its register in preparation for the end of 2023. Smaller overseas territories are also working with the FCDO to update their systems to allow public access to this important information. Notably, in Anguilla the FCDO financed a completely new register, which is designed to allow public access.
The effect of new clause 53 would be to move the timeline forward by only six months for the overseas territories. All the territories are now willingly implementing publicly accessible registers and putting significant effort into the policy, despite the fact that most jurisdictions around the world are not doing so. To move forward an agreed timeline would not show good faith in our partnership with the territories. I can commit to keep the House regularly up to date on progress with the territories, and the UK Government will continue to work collaboratively, and as equal partners, with the overseas territories on their commitment.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
We touched on this issue last week. The new clause is what I consider to be another perfectly sensible, rational, pragmatic amendment that enhances transparency and accountability. It would ensure that the legislation worked effectively rather than ineffectively, as we think will be the case at the moment.
The word “trust” in this context sends shivers down all our spines. I understand the rationale behind the new clause, but the right hon. Member for Barking is right in that I will state my position.
There is a key matter here. The right hon. Lady cited a couple of examples, one a trust and one a company, where she implied a disguised ownership of certain assets. The current requirements of legislation are that information about a registrable beneficial owner of a trust is displayed publicly. If someone is a beneficial owner, their name is revealed publicly. She might argue that that person could be lying, but they can lie about ownership of anything—“I don’t own any of this and do not exert control”—as we have discussed before.
The amendment makes all trust information available, even if that sits below the 25% or whatever ownership there might be of the trust or its benefit.
Usmanov is the better example, although I could have talked about Gutseriev or Fedotov, or about Azerbaijan—I had a debate in the House on the leading family of Azerbaijan. The reason all those things hang together is that the beneficial ownership is passed to a daughter or sister, or the shareholding is below 5%, and we are creating all these legal loopholes that enable the Usmanovs, Gutserievs, Fedotovs and all those people to hide their real control of an asset. That is really the point. That is what we are trying to get at—having it out in the open. What we have said constantly with our amendments is that if there are minor flaws with the way we have put them together, we are happy to listen, but I am absolutely certain that the principle behind them is correct.
I just do not think that is right. The right hon. Lady might not have meant this exactly, but even if ownership is reduced—this goes for a company more than a trust—to below 5%, the amendment would not even solve that issue, would it? The legislation requires the beneficial ownership to be registrable and for there to be openly available information. Of course the person who is entering that information could lie. A lawyer or accountant could lie. But now they are subject to a criminal sanction for doing that if it is proven. As has been mentioned, information around trusts is a concern. It should raise red flags with Companies House. That information can of course be shared.
The other thing I would say is that trusts are used for legitimate purposes, including to protect the privacy and safety of children, for example, and other vulnerable individuals. The ECTE Act allows the registrar to disclose protected trust information to HMRC, and regulations will soon be made to allow the registrar to disclose the information to other persons with functions of a public nature, such as tackling crime.
The Minister often says this, but there are two issues here. If the trust or any of these entities are for legitimate purposes, the people involved should have absolutely no fear of transparency. That is the fallacy in the argument. If nobody is doing anything wrong, they should not worry about the information being public. If there are really good reasons, as there occasionally may be, for keeping confidential the name of a particular individual in a particular trust, we can and we are putting in legislation that covers those exceptional circumstances, but using the exceptional circumstance to justify the general rule is simply not good enough.
We may have to agree to disagree. The requirement to register somebody of beneficial ownership is quite clear. If there is a beneficial owner, that person will have to be publicly named. That is what we seek to achieve through this legislation, and that is what we think it does. There are some points in the amendment that we think are relevant, including potentially widening access to information in certain circumstances with certain authorities. We will consider that, but we cannot accept the totality of the amendment at this time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
He knows very well that I am not going to accept it. The way in which the new clause is set out cuts across many other aspects of law, and it would quite severely affect jurisprudence in this country. However, he is absolutely right to point out the issue, and it is worth taking a bit of time to explain how we intend to address it.
The right hon. Gentleman is correct that the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton, and I are extremely clear that this is an important aspect of legal reform that we need to see in the United Kingdom. It is important because it affects freedom of speech in this country, as the right hon. Gentleman rightly says, and because it has a certain negative influence on the legal environment in which, sadly, people have to operate. He rightly spoke about Catherine Belton, whose work in exposing many of the crimes of the Putin regime has been frankly exemplary and heroic.
It is important that we address this. The way to do that is not to treat it simply as an economic crime, which it is not. It is not just a crime that affects the economy of our country or the movement of dirty money. It is a crime that is about freedom of speech and the access to justice that many people in our county need. We should look at it more as an offence against a fundamental democratic value than as an economic crime. That is why the work is being done with the Ministry of Justice, for rather obvious reasons. We are ensuring that we have a piece of anti-SLAPPs legislation, as the right hon. Gentleman correctly calls it, that addresses the whole problem.
The UK is still leading the way on the issue at national level. We are not yet where we wish to be, but we are doing better than many others. It is worth remembering that many different groups are working on this. The Solicitors Regulation Authority is already doing a lot of work to review the 20 firms suspected of involvement in SLAPP activity. The SRA is shortly to issue its regulated professionals with another warning notice, which will provide guidance on conduct in such disputes. It has already outlined guidance on certain oppressive behaviours, and has expressly linked those to the growing focus on the use of SLAPPs in England and Wales.
As the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill knows, there are many different tactics—aggressive letters, labelling correspondence and seeking to run up bills, as he rightly identified—that challenge people’s access to justice. They are exactly what the SRA is looking at and will be communicating with the MOJ about.
First, will the Minister describe the action that, according to him, the Government are taking? I do not understand what action they are taking.
Secondly, the new clauses that my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill tabled were written by a group of lawyers who support the UK Anti-SLAPP Coalition. They are not like the new clauses that we put together—they have been given considerable consideration—so I do not quite see how they could be bad law. They have thought this through.
Thirdly, there is a real tendency—I say this with the greatest respect and affection for the Minister’s work—for Ministers to shift a bit a paper to the left or right and do nothing with it. It is the easiest thing to do. We have described this as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to change the world; I plead with the Minister to grasp it and accept the new clauses. Let us move forward, rather than shifting the paper aside.
I am surprised to hear the right hon. Lady speak so negatively about her other amendments and new clauses. New clause 64 is not the only one that is well drafted; others have been as well. New clause 64 focuses, quite rightly, on getting anti-SLAPP provisions into the Bill, but it would extend the reach a bit further than we could take. I am happy to look further at the issue. I am happy to listen carefully to the opinions not only of the right hon. Lady, but of the people who advised the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill, on different approaches to the question. I am extremely happy to listen, but I am afraid we will not accept the new clause.
The hon. Member is not just a practising solicitor, but clearly also a recovering solicitor. The SRA has been on the front foot in wanting to crack down on some of the bad behaviour. We had this debate in January on the Floor of the House; it was one of the best debates I have seen in 18 years in this place. What became clear was that, although there are some in the legal profession who do have to operate on that cab-rank rule—they have to step forward and plea in favour of people who are at the front of the queue—there are others who have choices about who they represent. The truth is that here in London there are groups of lawyers, such as Schillings—there are many others—who are making millions out of some very bad people. In fact, those people are so bad that they have subsequently been sanctioned, in this country and around the world.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that if the SRA were to fine those solicitors who engaged in that sort of false litigation—it is phony litigation—it would be a little cost on business given the millions they are making? Abramovich, for example, is worth, as far as we know, £12 billion. If he spends £50 million on a legal case, it is peanuts to him, and it is certainly peanuts to the solicitors who are subject to fines by the SRA.
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right that the whole strategy behind a strategic legal action against the public participant is not to win: they just want to damage their opponent to such an extent that they cannot afford to tell the truth.
It has been a disappointing debate, and it will disappoint many of the people who are watching and following it. It is unfortunate timing, because the anti-SLAPP coalition is coming together for its second annual conference on Monday, when it will publish a draft and more comprehensive law. We have not had a date from the Minister as to when the Government may have listened and brought forward a more comprehensive argument. If the argument is that the measures I am moving today are too fragmented or nugatory, that is fine, but let us hear the date for when a more comprehensive solution will be proposed. The Secretary of State for Justice has said it will be forthcoming but has not provided the date. That was the point of the new clauses: we want to know the date.
I am grateful for the intent behind new clause tabled by the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill. He has an absolutely valid point—we need to equalise the firepower between some of the organisations. We have a fundamental challenge, because we cannot assume that arising from the actions of a UWO, which is not a human rights action but to do with civil litigation, costs should fall on the losing party. We must look at how to balance the different elements.
My own inclination would be look more at how we fund our agencies to do this work. Some members may have heard that I once was in the Army. The way the armed forces does such things is by having two different forms of budget—the ongoing budget and the war reserve. I am much more inclined, and much more persuadable, towards the argument that we should be making sure that the agencies that take on such claims have a war reserve to ensure that they can meet the costs without that affecting their ongoing work, rather than changing the law in a way that would affect civil liabilities in many different areas.
To be honest, I do not think that would prevent the impact that the fear of incurring costs would have on how any of the agencies operate. Everyone in the House has great respect for Bill Browder, and I am sure that the Minister will have talked to him about the issue, and I know that the Under-Secretary has, too. Bill Browder is completely shocked and astounded by the fact that we allow any costs at all to be claimed by successful litigants when they challenge Government action.
I do not know whether either Minister had the chance to meet Judge Mark Wolf, who is over here campaigning for an international anti-corruption court. I do not know whether they have come across him. He was here last week and, when we talked about such litigation, he expressed absolute astonishment that defendants in any of these cases, have the right to any of their costs being met. In America, looking at those figures, great success comes from that hugely important lack of ability to claim costs.
It is worth pointing out that the Americans do not use unexplained wealth orders, which, after all, are civil litigation, because they do not have them. Therefore, the question of costs does not apply in the same way.
I would not use the example of unexplained wealth orders. They have not worked in the way that we had all hoped and intended. On the failure to prevent bribery, if we think of the acts that the Serious Fraud Office has been engaged in—I think it is with Serco, where they face a couple of million pounds in claims and costs. It goes right across the panoply of tools that we have to fight economic crime.