Detainee Inquiry

Debate between Malcolm Rifkind and Lord Clarke of Nottingham

Thursday 19th December 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clarke]

First, I certainly share the right hon. Gentleman’s frustration with the delay, which was not contemplated by the Prime Minister or anyone in government when we embarked on this process. Indeed, we are extremely anxious to inquire as necessary as quickly as possible so that we can draw a line under this matter, learn lessons and ensure that the House can be totally confident that there would be no similar problems in future. The delay has been caused by the length of time taken for the police to investigate these matters. No politician has control over the police and it is right for them to inquire into issues where they believe it is justifiable to do so, but the result has been a timeless delay. Nobody has been able to proceed, in Sir Peter Gibson’s case, to the calling of witnesses and the taking of evidence, because that could compromise any criminal procedures and investigations that needed to take place in due course.

I join the right hon. Gentleman in praising the work of Sir Peter and his panel in producing this report, which, in the circumstances, is extremely valuable, but as the panel makes clear, it can come to no conclusions and make no findings of fact or conclusive allegations against anybody, and nor can it clear anybody conclusively, because it relied on documents that were frustrated when it came to calling witnesses.

Only one passage in the report is redacted. We did our best to reach agreement with the panel on the redactions and we were anxious to publish as much as possible, as was the panel. The redactions relate to a matter that is already subject to a public interest immunity certificate in the courts. In my and the Government’s opinion, there was no going back on that. Sir Peter and the panel acknowledge in the text that the redaction is of no significance to the general narrative and the issues set out in the report.

The Prime Minister was quite clear about preferring a judge-led inquiry. When he said that almost two years ago, I said we would set up the judicial inquiry once the police investigations were over and we could get the inquiry under way. That has not proved possible, however. Nobody contemplated at that time that in December 2013 we would still be trying to work out when we would be capable of proceeding.

A judge-led inquiry normally involves the publication of evidence as the inquiry proceeds, although in cases such as this the evidence is sometimes redacted. The whole process of a judicial inquiry could conceivably compromise a criminal investigation. It is true that some recent inquiries, such as that conducted by Lord Justice Leveson into a totally different matter, proceeded although criminal investigations were taking place, but Lord Justice Leveson avoided, very scrupulously, any areas that might compromise the criminal investigation. The trouble with Sir Peter Gibson’s scope is that the only matters that he is considering are the subject of criminal investigations, so the same situation could not arise. The Prime Minister has therefore come up with the solution of referring the issue to the Intelligence and Security Committee in the House of Commons.

I hope that the right hon. Gentleman can be persuaded that that is a very good way of proceeding. The ISC’s inquiry can start now, whereas a judge-led inquiry could not. Moreover, the House of Commons has greatly strengthened the ISC. When we debated these matters last year, Members in all parts of the House agreed that we should make the ISC independent, more powerful, and capable of calling for, rather than merely requesting, the information that it wanted. I think that we now have an opportunity to demonstrate that its work is a valuable addition to all the other requirements in our constitution to ensure that the activities of our intelligence services are properly accountable, and that, as far as is feasible, there is some democratic oversight of what can be done.

Finally, the right hon. Gentleman reminded me that, two or three years ago, non-governmental organisations and perfectly reasonable lobbies had criticised Sir Peter Gibson and refused to co-operate with him because, in their view, his inquiry did not comply with article 3 of the European convention on human rights. I remember that exchange, which disappointed me at the time. The organisations concerned appeared to be arguing for a full-blooded public inquiry in which everyone would be represented—detainees present, press sitting in the gallery at the back—and in which a great deal of evidence would be produced that would be of enormous value to this country’s enemies. No country in the world would sensibly deal with matters in that way. I think that the process we are adopting, with the use of the ISC, is the best way of ensuring that our intelligence services remain as strong and effective as we all want them to be, that their bravery is respected, and that they are protected when they carry out work on behalf of all of us, while also ensuring that there is proper scrutiny and a proper inquiry so that we can be reassured that the highest ethical guidelines are being followed.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

May I, through the Minister, give the House an assurance about the work that the Intelligence and Security Committee has agreed to undertake?

As Members will know, in 2005 and 2007 the Committee published reports on the treatment of detainees and on rendition. Those reports turned out to be unsatisfactory and incomplete, because the intelligence agencies had not provided the Committee with all the relevant information, which, at the time, they were under no statutory obligation to do. As the Minister has said, that has now changed: the agencies are required to provide all the information, and the Committee’s own staff can go directly to them and inspect their files. It is on that basis, and on the basis of the extra resources that we will be given to prevent our other work from being interfered with or delayed, that the Committee believes that it can fulfil this duty, and is very willing to do so.

[Mr Clarke]

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for explaining why we gave the ISC more powers, and why that very powerful Committee, with its very strong membership, is capable of exercising its responsibilities and—we hope—producing the information that we require. The Gibson report did indeed indicate that when it had previously tried to conduct inquiries into detention and rendition, the Committee had not been given access to much fuller information involving all the incidents of detainee mistreatment that had been complained about, and the full internal investigations of rendition that had taken place. I have no doubt that my right hon. and learned Friend’s Committee will rectify that when it returns to the subject.

Justice and Security Bill [Lords]

Debate between Malcolm Rifkind and Lord Clarke of Nottingham

Monday 4th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clarke]

Amendments have been tabled to Bills of this kind to try to define the concept, but that leads to more trouble than it is worth. I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman that reasonable doubt is a very good comparison.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Clarke]

I will in just a second. I am sorry not to give way to the Chairman of the Committee at the moment, but I will before I finish.

I think I have made my point that people are grasping at the straws that keen human rights lawyers have presented to the critics of CMP, and trying to bring in a process to prevent them from happening. That would be the effect of most of the amendments. We have accepted the spirit of the JCHR’s amendments, and we have addressed the questions on unintended consequences.

Let us consider amendment 30 and the Wiley balance. I have just mentioned the unfettered discretion that we are giving to judges. Should we add to that discretion a confinement so that a judge would have to apply what is known as the Wiley balance, which is used in PII? I will not repeat the arguments used by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee and, I think, the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles. PII is not the same.

The amendment that the Opposition have been persuaded to table is not actually about the Wiley balance. Whoever drafted it has realised that that would not be quite good enough for their purposes, so they have altered it by adding the words “fair” and “open”. I do not understand how, having decided that national security would be at risk and that that would be relevant to the issues, and that such a measure would be necessary for the fair administration of justice, someone might then decide that they preferred open justice and that the evidence should be given in public anyway. That is a complete non sequitur, in a way. It would be slightly absurd to do that. It would be like saying to the judge, “If you agreed with the Green party and were against the policies in the Bill in the first place, you can now throw everything out anyway because you need to consider whether you would prefer open justice, after those three conditions have been satisfied.” That would be a slight non sequitur, and it is also a bit deceptive—not deliberately; I am not accusing anyone of acting improperly—to describe this proposal as the Wiley balance. It is the Wiley balance with bits added, which some ingenious lawyer has come up with to try to put a spoke in the wheels.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

My right hon. Friend rightly says that in PII, because people do not like excluding all the evidence, there is a perfectly legitimate argument about how much we can gist and how much can be redacted, and then it can be put into the open court. But everything that does not get there is entirely left out; it is not available to claimant, judge, lawyers or anybody else. In a CMP, exactly the same thing can be done, because the judge will be required to consider how much we can gist, how much we can redact, and what can be shared with the defendant. The only difference is that in a CMP, the evidence, including, as my right hon. Friend said, some things that might be absolutely key to the case that cannot unfortunately be disclosed, can be considered by the judge. PII shuts out all that which is not possible to gist. With a CMP, there can be all the gisting and redaction that one wants, but all the evidence is considered.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

rose—

Justice and Security Bill [Lords]

Debate between Malcolm Rifkind and Lord Clarke of Nottingham

Tuesday 18th December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clarke]

The practical effect of the Bill is exactly as my hon. Friend recommends, although it may have been drafted with a few too many provisos and provisions because of the deep suspicion with which these things are regarded. Essentially, however, we do not think that Norwich Pharmacal should apply to intelligence material provided in confidence to the British security services.

I will not take too long on this because the argument is perfectly straightforward, but I want to tell the House that these are not false fears. Over the past year, we have picked up concerns from human agents. They have always been concerned about the degree to which their relationships can be protected, of course, but they are now becoming really concerned about disclosure to the British courts. Sir Daniel Bethlehem, a former legal adviser to the Foreign Office, told the Joint Committee on Human Rights that the flow of intelligence from the United States was being limited. He said that he did not want to exaggerate, but the point was that the trust of the United States had been weakened and that trust needed to be restored.[Official Report, 8 January 2013, Vol. 556, c. 3MC.]

Arguments tend to break out as to whether agents have any reason to be fearful, but that is not totally the point. As long as, as a result of hearing about the extraordinary process called Norwich Pharmacal, other intelligence agencies and our agents think that there is always a risk of disclosure by the British courts, the damage is done. To follow the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field), what on earth are we running that risk for?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

In support of what my right hon. and learned Friend has just said, I should say that the Intelligence and Security Committee has taken extensive evidence on the matter in both the United Kingdom and Washington in respect of the likelihood or actuality of damage to very important information that prevents or might prevent terrorist incidents in the United Kingdom. We are satisfied that my right hon. and learned Friend’s point is entirely valid and that the House should take it into account.

[Mr Clarke]

I close my case, as they say; there is no need for me to carry on addressing the House about Norwich Pharmacal. We wait to hear what points might be raised about it.

I move on to part 1 of the Bill, to which I think the House should have much more regard. It deals with the important issue of parliamentary oversight of our security and intelligence agencies. I suggest to both sides of the House that if we wish to be reassured about the accountability of our security services and really try to guarantee to ourselves that they are not misbehaving, we should look to stronger parliamentary oversight as well as to more accountability to the courts.

It is time to put the Intelligence and Security Committee, chaired by my right hon. and learned Friend, on a much stronger footing and to enhance its independence to strengthen the valuable work it has done so far. We have to give Parliament more effective oversight of the intelligence and security agencies.

The ISC operates within arrangements established by Parliament in 1994, but the nature of the Committee’s work has changed dramatically. In the past 18 years, particularly since 9/11, the public profile, budgets and operational demands on the agencies have all significantly increased, but there has been no change in the statutory arrangements for oversight. In the past, the ISC has overseen operational matters but has done so relatively infrequently and generally at the direct invitation of the Prime Minister. The ISC has no statutory powers to oversee such matters. Its statutory remit is also limited to oversight of the security and intelligence agencies, although it has long heard evidence from the wider intelligence community.

At the moment, the Prime Minister receives its report and appoints its members. Currently, the heads of the security and intelligence agencies are permitted, in certain circumstances, to withhold information from it. We can certainly improve on that. We need to give the ISC greater teeth to ensure that we can continue to have confidence in those who oversee the agencies on our behalf.

The Bill provides that the ISC will in future be able to oversee the agencies’ operations, within appropriate constraints. The Committee will also in future report to Parliament, as well as the Prime Minister. Its members will be appointed by Parliament, after nomination by the Prime Minister. The power to withhold information from the ISC will move from the agency heads to the Secretary of State responsible for that agency—a Minister accountable to the House. It will be a parliamentary Committee. We are greatly strengthening our powers to hold accountable those who do such vital work for our country.

[Mr Clarke]

I have the greatest respect for the Wright Committee and we will consider the matter further, although I am not instantly attracted by that proposal. We are moving to a situation in which the Chairman of the ISC will be elected by the Committee and the Committee itself will be elected by the whole House from a list approved first by the Prime Minister. On reflection, I think that the problem with a system whereby the House could elect whoever it liked, subject to a prime ministerial veto, is that it would be an Exocet that was hugely embarrassing to use. It is not impossible—I hope that it is not too fanciful—to envisage a case where the security services have satisfied the Prime Minister that there is some problem with a particular Member of this House of which the wider world is completely unaware. [Interruption.] That is not unknown; I am sure that it has happened in the experience of the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw). The idea that the Prime Minister must suddenly issue a veto on the result of an election carried out in this House is probably a step too far, and I think that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), the Chairman of the ISC, agreed with me when we discussed this very matter not too long ago.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

indicated assent.

[Mr Clarke]

My right hon. and learned Friend nods his head in approval.

The arrangements that we are proposing for a stronger Committee will in some cases be underpinned by a memorandum of understanding between the Government and the Committee. The MOU will set out the arrangements at a level of detail far beyond that which need be put in this Bill. We have reached the stage of discussing the terms of that MOU with the Committee. I have had some extremely constructive discussions with my right hon. and learned Friend and other members of the Committee about the Bill. We will bring forward other amendments if necessary to make clear the ISC’s increased connection to Parliament and provide it with some statutory immunities to assist in this work.

I apologise for the length of time that I have taken in introducing the Bill, but I have given way generously. It is the kind of Bill where there should not be serious argument about the principle, but the details are extremely important in a country which has high regard to the rule of law and does not to want to risk abuse of process in any proper case. That is why I commend its Second Reading to the House. To reject it and stay with the status quo would be to continue a quite intolerable situation that is not only unacceptable to the agencies, which cannot defend their reputations, but should be unacceptable to the taxpayer, who has to pay for some of these settlements, and to any citizen who wants a judge to have the chance to make a judgment on the issues.

In my opinion, for all the reasons I have given, the Bill strengthens the accountability of our intelligence agencies and GCHQ to the courts and to this House. It supports our belief in justice, the rule of law and the liberal, democratic principles that underpin this country. I trust that the House will therefore be content to give it a Second Reading.

Justice and Security Green Paper

Debate between Malcolm Rifkind and Lord Clarke of Nottingham

Wednesday 19th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clarke]

Special advocates are a key part of what we are proposing. Controlled material proceedings will involve the use of special advocates, but the Green paper touches on how to improve that use. There are serious problems relating to how much special advocates have to know about the evidence they will hear before they can take proper instructions from their clients and how far they can report back to their clients the gist of what has been said. At the moment that works quite well in immigration tribunals, on which this is based, but the Green Paper asks for suggestions on how the role of special advocates can be improved. They are an essential part of the process, but anything that helps us handle the difficulties in using them would be welcome.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

I warmly welcome the priority given to the protection of information provided by friendly foreign Governments, because, quite frankly, without that protection the provision of that intelligence would simply dry up, to the great detriment of this country. As Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee, may I say how much the Committee welcomes the decision to follow its recommendation that it should become, for the first time, a Committee of Parliament and be given effective powers relating to the operation of the intelligence agencies and not simply relating to policy, procedure and administration, as laid down in the current legislation? That is very much to be welcomed because it will enable Parliament and the public to have confidence that there is genuine, independent and effective oversight of our intelligence agencies.

[Mr Clarke]

I am grateful for that authoritative response to the Green Paper. I think that it matters on both sides of the House that the ISC becomes a Committee of Parliament and, in a fuller sense, is accountable to Parliament as well as to the Prime Minister. We can build on the excellent work it has done since it was first established.