Britain in the World

Debate between Madeleine Moon and Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston

Monday 1st June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

It is an honour to follow the hon. Member for Fareham (Suella Fernandes). I was struck by the fact that her father arrived in 1968, and I arrived some six years later under my own steam but also carrying only a suitcase. I was an immigrant by choice rather than necessity, but what brings us together is a supranational concept of being British, so whether born in these isles or having decided to live in these isles, we can call ourselves British. That is something we should never forget, and it takes me to the subject of my speech.

The Queen’s Speech talks about Britain in the world. I wonder whether the time has come for us to pause occasionally and see how the world sees us. The divergence in the way we see ourselves and the rest of the world and how the world looks upon us is becoming greater. Elections are quite often viewed in Germany—the country of my birth—through journalists following me around on the campaign trail. Invariably, when I do radio interviews, one of the first questions I am asked is, “Well, Mrs Stuart, just how long have you been on these isles?” I suddenly realised that for the rest of mainland Europe, these are islands, whereas we have largely forgotten that we are an island. The most telling evidence of that forgetting was the mention of our maritime surveillance aircraft and the fact that the strategic defence review did not start by saying, “We are an island, therefore we need a navy.” That is part of our forgetting who we are.

We assume that we have natural advantages, one of which is the English language. I want to warn Members. There was a wonderful programme not long ago in which a young American woman attributed the breakdown of her marriage to an Englishman to the simple fact that she did not speak English English. For example, she would say, “I would like children” and he would say, “Yes, let’s think about that.” She would suggest that they move to another part of the country and he would say, “Yes, we can discuss that.” She said it took her about 20 years to realise that this was just a very polite English way of saying, “No. No chance. I just don’t want to have an argument.”

When we talk about hard power and soft power, we assume that part of our soft power is the export of our culture, our values and the English language, but just listen to many an interview. The English language as spoken on these islands is no longer necessarily the English that is spoken in the rest of Europe and at many of the negotiating tables. We think of ourselves as being, as of right, permanent members of the UN Security Council. Yes, in terms of the institutional structures, we are there as of right, but if we do such things as lecture NATO members in Wales about not meeting the 2% standard on spending and tell them that they are no-good crummy allies by failing to do so, when we ourselves fall below the 2% standard, the gap widens between our posturing and the reality, and our credibility is diminished.

We are a force for good. It is not just the supranational concept of Britishness, but it can be traced back to Queen Elizabeth I who, when dealing with the Catholics, said, “I will not make windows into men’s hearts.” That was her way of saying, “If you live in these islands, I expect from you certain behaviour in your public life, which includes compliance with the rule of law, but there is a part of you—your inner beliefs—which are yours.” I therefore make a plea that we do not often get a chance to make in this House: let us start looking at ourselves a little more carefully.

The rest of the world sees these islands as fragmenting, and sees a startling rise of nationalism. Whether that is the Scottish referendum, the call for English votes for English MPs or other causes, the world sees us not as pulling together but as fragmenting. Unless we start to be conscious of that and deal with the consequences, our negotiating positions will become much harder.

Above all, as a member of the Defence Committee in the previous Parliament, and after two Sessions on the Foreign Affairs Committee before that, I believe that unless we start to define what British national interests are and formulate a foreign policy accordingly, all the discussions about defence will be meaningless. There is a natural hierarchy—we do not know what forces we need unless we know what role we wish to play in the world. If we wish to play a positive role in the world, that will occasionally mean that we need significant military capabilities, because when war breaks out we have to fight that war before we can do the peace.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

I apologise for interrupting a fantastic speech, but I remind my hon. Friend that during our last inquiry one of the most frightening pieces of evidence given to us was when we asked about strategy and were told that, unfortunately, the speaker thought that the Prime Minister’s concept of strategy was “What’s next?” Is not the great problem of this House that perhaps we become more focused on what’s next than on what is the grand strategy for the UK, where we aim to be and where we aim to take these islands?

[Ms Stuart]

I do not disagree with a word my hon. Friend has said. I ask new Members of the House to take note. Too often, we spend time on all the important things in life such as rubbish not collected, the potholes in our constituencies and the hedges not being cut, but we do not spend enough time on what the role of this House should be: taking a strategic view of what this nation is about, what the requirements of this nation are and whether the Government are fulfilling them.

Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa and Security

Debate between Madeleine Moon and Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston

Wednesday 10th September 2014 Commons Chamber

[Ms Gisela Stuart]

rose—

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

rose—

Defence and Cyber-security

Debate between Madeleine Moon and Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston

Tuesday 4th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

I apologise, Madam Deputy Speaker, for not standing up. I thought the hon. Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti) had sat down to take an intervention, but slowly it came to my mind that he had finished his speech.

It is an honour to follow the hon. and gallant Gentleman. I share his concern about an attack on our national infrastructure, but we sometimes focus on things such as banking and transport when we should perhaps look at our food supplies or our hospitals. The impact of such an attack on the civilian population and the country’s morale would be huge. We must address resilience to a cyber-attack and we must engage the civilian population in understanding and preparing for that.

T he Chairman of the Defence Committee and I were given a book for holiday reading: “One Second After”. That delightful read, which probably wrecked my summer, was a description of the United States after an electro-magnetic impulse attack had taken out all its computer-based systems. Everything went. No cars could go on the road and nothing would work. It was a scary prospect and I now understand why the Defence Committee’s Chairman runs a car that does not have a computer in it. I am sure the book was a great influence in the decision to purchase that car.

The book also made me aware of the very narrow issue of who is the enemy. In traditional warfare, we tend to know who we are fighting, but in future we may be fighting criminals who are holding the country to ransom. We could be fighting terrorists, because a state is not needed to manufacture a cyber-attack, or activists or anarchists. It has been suggested that some of the attacks in Estonia were by third-party actors. At the bottom of the list is the potential for a state to attack, because states like rules and the rest do not follow rules. That is why they must be our focus, our worry and our concern.

A statement made in 2012 informed us:

“Our cyber defences blocked around 400,000 advanced, malicious cyber threats against the government’s secure intranet alone”.

On the whole, we do not know where those threats are coming from. We do know that the Government have given a commitment to having full-spectrum capability in dealing with cyber-attacks. In fact, in response to the growing number of cyber-attacks, the Secretary of State said that

“we are developing a full-spectrum military cyber capability, including a strike capability, to enhance the UK’s range of military capability. Increasingly, our defence budget is being invested in high-end capabilities such as cyber and intelligence and surveillance assets to ensure we can keep the country safe.”

I was very interested in that statement, so it sent me off on a little tangent, as such things often do.

As the Minister, who has received many of my quirky little requests for information, will know, I sent off a parliamentary question to every Department asking them how many specialist IT staff they employed who had a PhD in computer science, who had a master’s degree in computer science, and perhaps who even had just a basic bachelor’s degree in computer science. It did not bode well, I have to say. The Ministry of Defence can rest on its laurels; it came second to the Department for Work and Pensions, with 1,625 such members of staff. None of the Departments could break the information down by qualification across Departments, which could explain why Government are not very good at commissioning cyber-capability and improved computer networking capability. Only 5,088 people, in total, held a degree-level capability in computing. It was depressing to note that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport had only three people with such a qualification, so we should watch out for its contracting.

[Ms Gisela Stuart]

Given the logic of Government, did my hon. Friend also ask whether the people with a computing degree actually worked in such areas beforehand or did something completely different?

[Mrs Moon]

I did, and most Departments responded that they worked in specialist teams, as we would expect.

Interestingly, the response from Her Majesty’s Treasury told us that a total of 48 people are employed within its centralised IT department, or teams. Those staff provide IT services to the Cabinet Office and to the Treasury. That compares with 57 people in 2008 who worked exclusively within the Treasury, so the numbers are going down, and that has to be a matter of concern. As people with these skills are increasingly highly valued in the marketplace, can Government stay ahead of the market in being able to recruit them?

I was worried about the budget and looked into that aspect. We have heard about the figure of £650 million over five years, which is a mere fraction of the figure for the annual economy, which is set to lose £27 billion every year to criminal activity in the cyber-realm. In contrast, the US Department of Defence has outlined a $23 billion spend on cyber operations in the financial year of 2018 alone.

I thought that I would then have a look at how well we were doing in this area. I discovered, rather alarmingly, that the Government had withdrawn from a new cyber-warfare project called Project Cipher, which was intended fully to scrutinise complex programmes to ensure that they had the potential to meet our needs. After thorough assessment, it was decided that Cipher would not meet the full defence capability required to offer long-term value for the taxpayer, and so the programme was not taken forward. The costs of the stalled project, in the assessment phase alone, had been £66 million, so we have lost a large percentage of the money set aside for cyber, and they were £47 million above the original budget. Overall, this was a major disaster. IHS Janes has said that the project was

“intended to renew the MoD’s cryptographic inventory and automate its crypto-key management systems by replacing obsolete current systems to prevent encoded communication links being compromised.”

I understood half that sentence. The important bit is that it was intended to replace obsolete current systems, because Departments are not good at replacing obsolescent systems. They tend to work things for the length of a Parliament, which is now five years, when we all know that these computers are dying on their feet after about the first two years.

IHS Janes continued:

“The delays in bringing Cipher online are creating capability risks, says the NAO, because the ministry’s existing crypto capability lacks the flexibility to deliver the flagship Network Enabled Capability project, which aims to link up a wide range of military communication networks. This means efficiency savings relating to the automation of crypto capability has been delayed, leading to increased demands on military manpower.”

It explained that the problems with Cipher’s design first emerged during an assessment phase and that they were the result of the lack of suitably qualified experienced civil servants—you will be surprised to hear that, Madam Deputy Speaker. One of the essential things that we must do if we are to be responsible in looking to the defence of this country is to find the way to employ and retain the capability that we need within government to provide the skills and oversee the systems that we operate to keep this country secure.

There has been considerable discussion about having a cyber reserve. I have had conversations with a number of companies that have told me that they are very worried about their employees joining the reserves because they fear for them when they have to travel abroad. Many international companies work around the globe, and they worry about someone who has been in our cyber reserve and transfers to work in another country, or merely travels through a country perhaps on business or on holiday, being prone to personal attack because of the information they would hold not only on their company but on the UK’s cyber-defence capability. I hope the Minister is aware of that concern and will address it.

This is perhaps one of the most urgent and pressing issues affecting this country. We have to take it seriously across every Government Department, but we also have to alert our citizens to the fact that they are now on the front line, because the attack may come from their personal computer, which could be hacked and used for an attack not only on this Government, but on other Governments.