National Security and Russia

Madeleine Moon Excerpts

Monday 26th March 2018 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. As I said earlier, those expulsions have taken place not just as a sign of support for the United Kingdom, but because it is important for the national security of those countries. The action will have an impact. The expulsion of 23 undeclared intelligence officers, which we have already undertaken here in the United Kingdom, will have a major impact on Russia’s intelligence network here in the UK, which I will make reference to later in my speech.

I said a little earlier that Russia has meddled in elections. It has hacked the Danish Ministry of Defence and the Bundestag, among many others. It is seeking to weaponise information, deploying its state-run media organisations to plant fake stories and photoshopped images in an attempt to sow discord in the west and undermine our institutions.

During his recent State of the Union address, President Putin showed video graphics of missile launches, flight trajectories and explosions, including the modelling of attacks on the United States, with a series of warheads impacting on Florida. Of course, Russia used radiological substances in its despicable assault here in London on Mr Litvinenko. Russia is also failing to honour its responsibilities in the international community as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

At the NATO Parliamentary Assembly this weekend, the right hon. Member for Newbury (Richard Benyon) issued a statement to members. We had 100% support from all the NATO alliance parliamentarians for what happened and for our stance in relation to the blaming of Russia. One matter was raised: some of the members were concerned that Britain has very good chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capability to investigate, but that many of them would not if such a thing were to happen on their soil. Does the Prime Minister agree that, if another NATO ally were attacked in this way, we should provide them with the capability that we have and that we have demonstrated so well?

[The Prime Minister]

The hon. Lady raises an important point. It is clear from the European Council that, within the EU, we will be looking at the whole question of enhancing our ability to deal with potential CBRN attacks. Regarding the wider group of countries to which she refers, I understand that the NATO summit this summer will be looking at the question of sharing capabilities. We recognise that certain countries hold certain capabilities and expertise, and it is important that they can be put to the use of others when necessary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

I spent last weekend at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly gathering for the spring session in Vilnius. There was a statement from the right hon. Member for Newbury (Richard Benyon). We then discussed the attack that had taken place in the UK. I take great pleasure in telling Members that, from across political parties and across the nations of the Parliamentary Assembly, there was complete unanimity in condemning the attack and in recognising the source of the attack as coming from Putin’s Russia. The solidarity of the NATO alliance was wonderful to see.

This is not the first chemical weapons attack in the UK. We know of at least one other, and, yet, here we are again, deliberating on how we will look at our defence and security in the light of such attacks from Russia. We must understand that these attacks are part of ongoing hybrid warfare—not peace, but not war. They are a challenge to NATO states, and a threatening message to those within the Russian dissident community that their lives are at risk if they oppose the Putin Government.

This is Russian hybrid warfare in action. The aim is to sow insecurity, distrust and disinformation, to influence, to confuse, and to demoralise. According to Russian defence doctrine, this practice is called IPb—information confrontation. Its aim is to provide both information and psychological effects, neutralising political opposition and diffusing recognition of Russia’s interference in business, banking and politics. Typically, the information contains a mixture of true and false information. The majority of the information is true. That builds a trust in all of the message, which means a vulnerability to the lies and the influence messages being sent out. The messages often fit with the pre-existing world view of the intended audience, so they are easier to accept. We know that this is happening, and I cannot say how much I disagree with the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) in his belief that we are immune to such attacks; clearly, we are not.

Across the alliance, we have seen a growth of cyber-enabled psychological operations, compromising networks gathering intelligence information that can be used to embarrass, discredit or falsify information that is leaked to the media. German troops serving in Lithuania have had phone calls, telling them that their wives are having affairs. Those calls are an attempt to destabilise those troops defending Lithuania.

NATO parliamentarians have received phone calls from apparent friends asking them for their views and opinions on political matters. The voice sounds just like their colleague, but, in fact, it is someone impersonating their colleague. The conversation is then relayed on Russian media.

Since 2010, Russia has been building what it terms “information confrontation”—a holistic concept ensuring information superiority both during peace and war. It consists of hacktivists and CyberBerkut—false persona carrying out denial-of-service attacks against NATO, Ukrainian, German, US and Estonian sites, among others. These people leak documents to demoralise and embarrass. Trolls are online commentators who seek to change the narrative of a story to turn it in Russia’s favour. The Russian Internet Research Agency blogs and tweets on behalf of the Kremlin. Bots are automated pushers of content on social media. They drown out unwanted content or push a specific message, sometimes overwhelming the information space, drowning out real information and facts.

Interestingly, Russia does not believe in a free internet for its own subjects. It has laws curbing domestic media and increasing control of technology and content; it bans websites; monitors online activity and limits news media ownership. During a Defence Committee visit to Russia, we took evidence about the intimidation and murder of journalists and the constant harassment and intimidation of political figures.

We must wake up. The west is being attacked. Systematic information warfare is being waged against us. We should not see the attack in Salisbury as simply a chemical attack; it is part of a concerted attack. I urge the Government to establish an independent Russia commission to examine the role that Russia is playing in our social media and in our financial, business, political and legal spheres. We need to educate our public, as the Lithuanians have done, in how to recognise these cyber-enabled psychological operations.

The public needs to know that there is a campaign to destroy and disrupt NATO command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities. This is all very real to the 800 British soldiers heading up the forces in the enhanced forward presence in Estonia. They are there to protect Estonia and to enhance Euro-Atlantic security. The men and women of the Royal Welsh are providing the alliance’s combat-capable infantry force. Estonia is now Britain’s eastern border, so an attack on the Baltic states is an attack on Britain. We must recognise that and understand that our forces are now our frontline.

Distrust, disinformation and disregard sum up the Russian approach towards the latest, and arguably most serious, situation we are witnessing towards our country and our allies. Our allies and our people require us to stay strong and to acknowledge the threats that are being sent in our direction.