(3 weeks, 4 days ago)
Commons ChamberSadly, European Union defence has always promised far more than it delivers. It was meant to galvanise all the European states into spending more money; it failed and just did not do that. When any serious military operation was required, it was NATO. To the EU’s credit, some EU military operations are taking place, but they are on a very limited scale. The British and the Americans need to reinforce the Balkans now, because the Europeans are not committing enough on their own and are incapable of doing so.
Even if, this time, there were rapid growth in EU military capability to address the crisis that we face, it would take decades to replicate what the Americans currently provide, such as tactical nuclear weapons and air cover. Why does the EU need to have its own air defence policy when that is exactly what NATO does? It does European air defence. We need to bolster NATO. It is encouraging that force planning for a possible peacekeeping force in Ukraine is all being done at NATO and not in the EU crisis management centre or at EU military headquarters. Only NATO has the capability to plan large-scale military activity.
The hon. Gentleman shakes his head. What does he know about it? I would be interested in him challenging me.
Does the hon. Gentleman not see the fragility of a European defence that is dependent on key items of American hardware, which he correctly identifies that we do not have, and which it will take decades for us to replicate, operate, integrate with our systems and train people on? Does he not see the fragility of our defence if President Trump or another incoming US leader says, “Actually, you’re on your own. We don’t care about the defence of Ukraine”?
(6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI will be as quick as I can, Madam Deputy Speaker, but I am extremely grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s question, because that was a failure of regulation. The crucial point is this. In other safety-critical industries, such as the civil aviation, rail and marine sectors, there is no ban on the private sector being selected to perform inspections. Employees of airlines, of aircraft manufacturers and of aircraft engine manufacturers perform the inspections, but they are independently regulated, overseen and certified by the Civil Aviation Authority. The fact that they are employed by the airlines or by commercial interests does not make them incapable of objective judgment. The whole aviation sector flies incredibly safely on the basis of aircraft being inspected not by Government inspectors or public employees, but by the private sector.
My experience in the aviation industry includes overseeing and being part of the record-keeping process for inspections. Does the hon. Member agree that the requirement to record and store all successful and unsuccessful testing results would resolve some of the issues that we saw in the Grenfell disaster, where unsuccessful test results were hidden and not made accessible to the public?
I completely agree. The record keeping of airlines, air engine manufacturers and aircraft maintenance companies has to be absolutely meticulous. It is inspected by the CAA, but the information originally comes from inspections conducted by people who are employed by the private sector. I think the hon. Gentleman agrees that we need to tackle the regulation, not indulge in shorthand for saying that anybody making a profit must be guilty. I abhor the idea of people making a profit at the expense of safety, but that is not what happens in other industries.
The success of independent accident investigation and safety investigation branches in other sectors speaks for itself. Aviation and rail safety has much fuller public confidence and a lower accident rate under such models, delivering safety improvements faster, more effectively and at lower cost than traditional public inquiries. Reforming building control would ensure that all inspectorates operate under consistent and rigorous oversight, regardless of whether they are in the public or private sectors.
Our proposals are not just about learning from the Grenfell tragedy, but about preventing the next disaster. The inquiry shows the systemic failures in building safety and regulation that led to an avoidable tragedy. I regret to have to warn the House that if we do not get this right, and do not finish working on what the inquiry has presented to us and fill in the gaps, there will one day be another Grenfell, just as Grenfell was a repeat of earlier safety failures. We have an obligation to get this right finally for the Grenfell community, for the memory of those who died and for future communities. The Government now have the opportunity to follow up the inquiry, to build on its findings and to put in place institutional arrangements that will embed learning and safety improvement in residential building management in a comprehensive safety system that matches those of other safety-critical industries.